MID-TECH REVOLUTION
By Jon B. Alterman

Jon B. Alterman is program officer at the United States Institute of Peace. Previously he served as legislative aide to Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and taught at Harvard University. He is author of New Media, New Politics? From Satellite Television to the Internet in the Arab World (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

Omani television station. Whereas most regional viewers in the past were limited to watching their state television service, tapes and satellite television have caused choices to grow exponentially in the last decade. Photo Credit: Hussein Shehadeh

A third change is the vast increase in video programming, both on recorded videocassettes and via satellite television. Whereas most regional viewers in the past were limited to watching their state television service, tapes and satellite television have caused choices to grow exponentially in the last decade. States no longer enjoy monopoly control over their populations, and there is a fierce battle underway for eyeballs.

The great losers of the last decade or so are the vast information bureaucracies that Middle Eastern states established in the middle of the last century to inculcate values and restrict information flows. While censorship is not dead, it is withering as increasing numbers of outlets exist beyond the censors' reach. Whereas a nation's evening news broadcast used to enjoy wide attention, the audience is now fragmenting as growing numbers of viewers watch music, entertainment, or debate shows that originate abroad, either in the Arab world or the West.

Stepping into the breach are a vast array of information innovators who spread ideas about politics, religion, music, social relations, fashion, food, or a combination of all of them, to anyone who cares to pay attention. Such information can, and does, cross borders with ease, all on the wings of 1970s technology.

What this all comes down to is the vastly increasing ability of individuals and groups in the Middle East to access different kinds of information, and the vastly decreasing ability of individual governments to control their citizens' ability to access that information. At the same time, we are seeing an efflorescence of information of all types, from commercial to religious to cultural to news to entertainment. We are still in an experimental stage, and it is impossible to predict conclusively what media outlets will look like when the current period of intense experimentation ends.

One can be bolder in predicting the political effects of technological change, namely, that it is unlikely to force a deep restructuring of Middle Eastern governance patterns. Authoritarianism has predominated in the region for decades and seems poised to continue to do so for years to come.

The usual argument about information technology and authoritarianism is that the former undermines the latter by freeing the public from the rulers' grip. Such a notion, however, misunderstands the nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East. It is not merely a top-down system, and it has never been so. Every authoritarian government in the region has had to maintain a watchful eye on public sentiment, and it has had to balance coercion with cooptation - albeit in different measures at different times in different places.

Technological developments have made that balancing act more difficult because states have lost some of the tools that have helped them lead public opinion - and thus, co-opt their populations - in the past. While most states still maintain an overwhelming advantage over any possible opponent in the public sphere, their ability to control what happens in that sphere is waning.

In meeting these new challenges, the countries of the Gulf are in a somewhat better position than the countries of the Levant or North Africa. They have generally accentuated co-optation over coercion, and they have the deep pockets to help make co-optation work. Also, with their smaller populations, they have found it easier to educate their citizens, and their ability to import labor for menial jobs helped prevent the development of a large underclass in most Gulf societies.

Gulf states have an ability to grow their way out of many of these issues, using the distributive power of the state to keep people vested in the system and constantly improve the human capital within their borders. In addition, high levels of income mean that the states can stem a "digital divide" from opening in their countries. The UAE is perhaps the most extreme example of this phenomenon, using petrodollars to begin teaching English in the early primary grades and putting a huge emphasis on technical education in the universities.

The Gulf has witnessed an increasing number of elections in recent years, but the elections do not appear to have technology as their driver. These elections mostly represent reform from above, as a new generation of leaders emerges that is less fearful of the ballot box. Electoral politics in the Gulf remain highly influenced by traditions of consensus and family alliances and, in any event, only include a small percentage of the population of states whose citizens are far outnumbered by foreign workers who hold no citizenship rights.

At the other end of the spectrum are poorer and more populous countries. They lack the ability to co-opt their citizens through money, and as they lose control of the media environment, their ability slips still further. Improved economic circumstances could facilitate co-opting the broader public, but such an improvement is easier said than done and may itself hold the prospect of instability.

In order to respond, some regimes may cede public space to loud voices that ultimately do not threaten the regime. Such a move could kick off a noisy debate between secularists and Islamists, for example, while still keeping democratic change at arm's length. In addition, regimes that have relied on moderate repression in the past may feel forced to use more repression and repression that is targeted more precisely than in the past, in order to compensate for their declining ability to co-opt the broader population through the media.

While it is impossible to predict the shape of Middle Eastern politics after technological change has been more fully integrated, it is far easier to understand the challenges that the present regimes will face. In the coming years, they will have far fewer tools and face far more competitors, in the battle for the hearts and minds of their citizens. Whether such change will cause more democracy, more repression, or the rise of a new breed of demagogue - or some combination of all three - is unclear. Nevertheless, that change is afoot is certain.

Return to Homepage