28 Dec. 2000 - 3 Jan. 2001
Issue No.514
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Al-Ahram Weekly
On-line 28 Dec. 2000 - 3 Jan. 2001 Issue No.514 | ||
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Fifty years of politics
For the Arab world, 2000 -- the last year in the century, in my opinion -- was a year of many important and serious developments. Two of these were particularly significant. The first is the convocation of the Arab summit -- with Iraq's participation for the first time since 1990 -- at which Arab leaders passed their groundbreaking resolution stipulating the annual convocation of this high-level political gathering. The second is the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada, the result of a major imbalance, and even deficiency, in the peace process. It sounded the alarm that this entire process was nearly on the verge of collapse.
These two serious events are related. They happened around the same time, and one seems to have been a direct consequence of the other: the peace process stumbles, the Intifada starts, the Arab summit convenes.
However, the causal relation between these events is not only about today's politics. It is about the history of this region over the past 50 years and about the psychological make-up of the peoples who live in this part of the world.
Both the Intifada and the Arab summit occurred at a crucial political juncture in the history of the Middle East and its people. They both occurred at a moment when many serious questions were being asked inside and outside the Middle East about the credibility of the peace process and the possibilities for its continuation (let alone success). Peace, shortly before, had seemed within reach, and the potential for regional coexistence and cooperation great. In fact, serious questions were being asked about the identity of this region and the future of the Arabs and their collective decision-making mechanisms given the fact that Arab politics and regional relations were managed on the premise that peace was untenable. Peace only became a factor to be taken into account as a strategic choice throughout the 1990s, a decade that witnessed the process of Arab-Israeli settlement along with an unprecedented change in the regional order.
In other words, the Intifada and the Arab summit epitomise 50 years of Middle East history. They also represent a serious concern that this region was in the process of moving back to the political mood that prevailed some five decades ago: an Arab order attempting to find its way in a postmodern world; in the land of Palestine, a resurgent conflict that raises questions about Palestinian-Israeli interim peace agreements and recalls the angst of four wars that shook the region, the pain of a decade of hard negotiations that involved the Palestinians and Syrians, and years of conflict, resistance and finally liberation in Lebanon.
Throughout 2000 Egyptian diplomacy had an active role to play in these serious political developments. During this year, Egypt continued its efforts to bring about a rapprochement in Arab relations, just as it did in 1944 when former Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa El-Nahhas led the Preparatory Committee that established the Arab League in Alexandria. In Cairo last October, President Mubarak called for and chaired the first all-out Arab summit in a decade. Also during 2000, Egypt maintained a key role in relation to the developments of the Palestinian cause, as it always has -- in times of war and peace -- since the 1948 War and the Camp David Accords that opened the door to regional peace-making. And as always, these efforts, which have proven relentless, have one clear objective: a balanced, fair and comprehensive peace. This, we believe, is the best and most rational choice for the region if stability and prosperity are to be achieved.
photo: Mohamed Abdel-Fatah
photo: Mohamed Hegazi
photo: Mohamed Abdel-FatahTIGHT MOVES: Cairo has played host to many a summit in recent years, but none so crucial as the long-overdue October Arab summit (top) that brought together representatives from all Arab nations, most importantly Iraq (conspicuously absent from the last Arab gathering in 1996); a historic visit by President Mubarak (with Lebanese President Emil Lahoud, second from top) to Beirut was the first by an Egyptian leader in over 41 years; a cross-section of Egyptian intellectuals and prominent figures calling for an end to United Nations sanctions against Iraq made up the delegation of Egyptians who flouted a ban on flights to Iraq in force since the Gulf War (third from top); a hastily-convened summit of world leaders involved in the Middle East peace process held in the Red Sea resort of Sharm Al-Sheikh shortly before the Arab summit did little to stem the tide of violence erupting after the fated visit by Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa compound that began the recent uprising in the occupied territories (bottom)
The Intifada and the Arab summit, then, embody a long history of regional political developments. For Egypt -- given its regional role and responsibility -- they were also the focus of much diplomatic attention and activity. This said, one must remember that the context in which today's Intifada and Arab summit are being played out is far more crowded and complex than that of the first days of the Arab-Israeli struggle, or of Arab unity. Today's Middle East has seen the early signs of an intricate new regional order, and the unmistakable signs of continuity in a struggle that still cannot be settled despite all the political efforts exerted and all the blood shed to end it, through war or peace.
So, while the convocation of the Arab summit brings with it much hope, it also, in all honesty, brings to mind certain deficiencies, not to mention the many political and economic challenges, in the Arab order that could have a bearing on its future. There is only one way to deal with these deficiencies and challenges: encourage Arab cooperation in a way that takes into consideration the complexity of today's Arab world.
The Palestinian Intifada is a cry of protest against the imbalance in the peace process and the misery prevailing on the ground as a result of intransigent, short-sighted Israeli policies that continue to violate both international law and even the text and spirit of the peace agreements signed by Israel's successive governments. I still believe, however, that it is not too late to restructure the settlement process in a way that allows for the realisation of a fair and comprehensive peace acceptable to all parties. In the past few days, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators have resumed their contacts in Washington, with an American presence. In this I see a window of opportunity that should not be missed.
But to keep this window of opportunity open there has to be a serious commitment and adamant devotion to the cause of peace from all the directly concerned parties. Otherwise, the efforts of countries that have been supporting the realisation of a final peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis will have been expended in vain.
At exactly this time last year, the peace process was entering a phase of confusion and disorder. It was obvious to us that the moment of tension was around the corner. As we had foreseen, the defects that marred the negotiations at the time led inevitably to tension.
That tension was to culminate in violence with Ariel Sharon's incursion into the Al-Aqsa compound last September. In part at least, the violence was the result of accumulated frustration with the peace process, which started late last year and continued through the first eight months of this year. The extent of the frustration was made obvious twice prior to the outbreak of the Intifada: once at the Geneva summit between late Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton, where Israeli proposals for peace with Syria proved insufficient; and a second time, again as a result of severe shortcomings in the Israeli proposals, with the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli talks that convened in Camp David under US supervision.
The Palestinians were left standing empty-handed and exasperated at the meagre dividends all these years of negotiations had yielded. Then came the Intifada and the paralysis that befell the peace process -- originally begun in the wake of a previous uprising.
This outbreak of violence served as a clear indicator of the very serious state of affairs in the Middle East. Intense and close Arab consultation became imperative. Hence, the Arab summit.
For the past few years, the Arabs have made a strategic choice. But the peace they have chosen is not unconditional. As far as the Arabs are concerned, peace must be fair and comprehensive. In other words, it must stipulate the return of all the occupied Arab territories (Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese) and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state -- which entails settling all the final status issues including Jerusalem, refugees and water -- in return for peaceful Arab-Israeli relations, which can only be created when the file of the Arab-Israeli struggle has been closed decisively.
It is with this vision in mind that the Arab summit used every means available -- political, economic, or otherwise -- to support the Palestinian people and the PA within the framework of a fair, active and substantive peace process. It is also with this in mind that the Arab summit insisted on the return of East Jerusalem and the uncontested right to Arab sovereignty over Al-Aqsa Mosque. This stipulation provides a crucial safety net for the Palestinian negotiators during the current contacts and potential negotiations.
Moreover, the Arab summit was successful in working out a new and modern vision for close and intense future Arab cooperation aimed at realising the hopes of the Arab peoples, and particularly a just, comprehensive and lasting peace through the Middle East. This was made very clear in the Cairo communiqué issued by the Arab summit which emphasised that a formula of a fundamentally skewed peace or a return to the climate of violence and tension was an impossible one.
During the past few days, there have been a number of contacts that aim to resume Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The question now is whether these contacts will be successful in restructuring the peace process in an operational mechanism. In answering this question we must keep in mind the very disappointing rounds of negotiations that were conducted during the earlier part of this year.
The road towards rebuilding and activating the peace process is straight and short: it entails providing a reasonable proposal for a settlement -- that is different by definition from the skewed, faulty and insufficient offers that were made at several points of the year 2000.
There are only a few weeks left before Bill Clinton -- a man who has shown a commendable interest in the peace process -- leaves the White House. Also imminent are the Israeli elections. Meanwhile, the region remains in a state of tension and peace negotiations have been halted for weeks. All these are elements that could help encourage a serious and concerted effort to rebuild and reactivate the peace process.
This said, the on-going contacts will not be successful if they aim only at ending the current state of regional tension.
The Sharm Al-Sheikh summit held last October attempted to end the Palestinians' suffering and the explosive violence reigning in the occupied territories. The terms agreed upon during that summit have yet to be implemented -- yet they must be, if calm is to replace tension. Parallel to the implementation of the terms of Sharm Al-Sheikh, a decent offer must be put forward.
In speaking of a "decent offer" it is important to reply to some of the allegations made against Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the wake of the Camp David talks last summer. At the time, Arafat was accused of turning down an offer by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak that no previous Israeli official had ever made to the Palestinians. This is only half the story, however. While what Barak offered Arafat in Camp David may have been better than Yitzak Shamir's proposal, for instance, it was still woefully inadequate when seen in the context of justice and international law.
The Arabs are not seeking any deal, so we may simply discard any talk of an agreement to be cobbled together hastily under the pressure resulting from the upcoming change in the White House, or the Israeli elections. The time concern will not be a gun pointed at the Arabs' heads -- at least, we will not be the only ones waiting for the trigger to be pulled.
In fact, I do not believe that any Arab party would accept an unjust deal under any circumstances. Neither the Syrians, the Lebanese nor the Palestinians would agree to an unjust deal. This was made very clear in the Camp David talks last summer. And for its part, Egypt will not support an unjust deal.
As the Arabs continue to pursue the cause of peace, we hope they will also continue to pursue closer cooperation among themselves. We hope that the warmth in Arab relations witnessed during 2000 will even advance further in the coming year. The first of the regular Arab summits is scheduled to convene in Amman in March 2001. We sincerely hope that the Arab summit as an institution will receive the necessary support from all Arab countries, allowing it to serve as an effective mechanism for the realisation of Arab hopes, particularly in the field of economic development and the establishment of the Arab Common Market. It is through the establishment of this market that the Arabs will become a viable economic block, enhance their negotiating position and empower themselves to participate in the on-going restructuring of the world economic order.
To ensure the future role of the Arab summit, a follow-up committee is meeting regularly, on a monthly basis, to review the implementation of the political and economic resolutions of the Cairo Arab summit.
The summit in Amman will be the second Iraq attends since 1990. Its return to such high-level Arab meetings reflects the development that has occurred in the Arab stance with regard to the question of Iraq.
The prevalent sentiment in the Arab world now seems to be that, while due attention should be given to the honest implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions with regards to Iraq, the crippling sanctions cannot go on forever. The political scene of 1990 is certainly not that of 2001. We need to move towards a sense of certainty that the coming years will be years of stability.
Stability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region is what Egyptian diplomacy worked hard for during 2000. This will continue to be its mandate in the future. The tasks ahead of us are clear: a fair and durable peace, Arab cooperation and, hopefully, modernisation.
Egypt, under the wise leadership of President Mubarak, has adopted modernisation as a course of action. For the fruits of this modernisation to be reaped, Egypt must continue to play its fundamental regional role in the fields of culture, economy, politics and security.
This article, exclusive to Al-Ahram Weekly, is based on an extensive year-end briefing.
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