"New Thinking About Jerusalem:

Life After Camp David"

 

Co-sponsors:

The Center for Middle East Peace & Economic Cooperation & Americans for Peace Now

 

Moderator:

Dr. Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair For Peace And Development, University Of Maryland

 

Speakers:

Dr. Yossi Beilin – Israeli Minister Of Justice

Dr. Saeb Erekat – Palestinian Peace Negotiator

Professor Ruth Lapidoth – Hebrew University

Dr. Khalil Shikaki, Director – Palestinian Center For Policy & Survey Research

Professor Menachem Klein – Senior Political Science Lecturer, Bar-Ilan Unviersity

Dr. Riad Malki – Director General, Panorama

Daniel Seidemann, Expert – Jerusalem Municipal Operations

 

Location:

Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2255

Washington, D.C.

 

The event was opened by the Honorable Wayne Owens, president of the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation.  He welcomed the audience and recognized Debra DeLee, president of Americans for Peace Now (APN), the event’s co-sponsor. He also recognized Sara Ehrman, senior adviser at the Center, and Stan Urman, the Center’s Executive Director.  Mr. Owens told the audience that the end of Camp David II gave birth to a new phase of two frenetic activities in the peace process.  First, “American, Israeli and Palestinian officials worked in separate venues to intensify the seeking of solutions to the unresolved issues dealing with Jerusalem.”  Second, there was an “effort among private individuals and groups like ours…to help find better, more apt solutions.”  It is this second effort that led to this important symposium, “where our purpose is to expose and exchange and perhaps help develop new ideas and approaches.” 

 

Mr. Owens emphasized that the premise of the day’s symposium was that compromise is both possible and necessary, and that it must be made at this time and by these leaders, Arafat and Barak.  “Failure is unthinkable,” he said, “because the consequences of that failure are themselves unthinkable.  Only those two men, encouraged, counseled, prodded and supported by an American President not willing to accept defeat on this historic imperative, can make it happen.”  He said that there will never again “be three such leaders in position to make this peace – [leaders] who so devoutly desire peace, who have the highest intellectual and judgmental skills to develop the formula for peace, and who have the political opportunity now to bring it about.  These leaders need only the political will to make it happen.” 

 

Mr. Owens then introduced the first keynote speaker, Israeli Minister of Justice Yossi Beilin (participating from Jerusalem via live satellite link).  He noted that Minister Beilin is a longtime contributor to the peace efforts and a longtime friend of both the Center and APN, and that Mr. Beilin’s efforts were instrumental in reaching the 1993 Oslo accords and led to what has come to be known as the Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement.

 

MINISTER BEILIN told the audience that “the issue of Jerusalem has been one of the most difficult issues to solve.”  This is the main reason why Jerusalem was left as one of the final status issues under the Oslo agreement – “both sides understood that Jerusalem is going to be perhaps the most difficult issue, not because it is connected to security or to strategic needs, but because of the emotions, the history of the two peoples which are connected so much to Jerusalem.”  Unfortunately, both sides have failed to sufficiently “prepare the solution in advance,” preferring to defer it to a more distant point in the future.  Instead, they have chosen to stick to “their own slogans…their own generalized ideas, and to get the applause or standing ovations…”  The truth, however, “is that both…the Palestinians and the Israelis understood very well that we are so much dependent on each other in order to solve the issue of Jerusalem.” He posited that it is a fact that Israelis need the Palestinians to recognize West Jerusalem and the 11 Israeli neighborhoods built since 1967 in East Jerusalem; otherwise, “Jerusalem will not be recognized by the world as our capital.”  For Palestinians, it is a fact that “…talking about East Jerusalem without referring to the Israeli neighborhoods would be, in reality, impossible.”

 

Despite these facts, he contended, “both of us prepared our people for the 100%.  Both of us actually said, or even hinted, that without getting 100% of what we really want, there won't be an agreement.  And finally in Camp David, only some weeks ago, there was a chance, and the ice was broken.  And for the first time, we talked seriously about a solution in Jerusalem which includes a compromise for both sides.” 

 

Referring to press accounts of what happened at Camp David II, Mr. Beilin said that Israel had been prepared to relinquish sovereignty over the eastern and northeastern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, and to accept limited sovereignty of the Palestinians on the neighborhoods adjacent to the holy sites.  For their part, the Palestinians were prepared to recognize the 11 Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, all of West Jerusalem, and the two West Bank settlements of Maale Adumim and Givat Zeev as the Israeli capital.  What this means, he said, is that the two positions on Jerusalem “have never been so close.  …It means that we have two cities, Jerusalem and el-Quds, and there is the holy basin in between, which is becoming now politically the sticking point, and which if solved right now will actually create a solution for the whole problem of Jerusalem.”

 

Regarding the holy basin (i.e., the Old City and immediately adjacent areas), Mr. Beilin said that the solution is essentially the status quo.  “…Generally speaking, both sides agree that the status quo of the holy basin, and especially of the Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall, will prevail.  There are no new ideas about the situation which will exist in the holy basin once we solve the problem of sovereignty.”  The key question, then, is what will the sides agree to call this status quo, and Mr. Beilin said, “…I don't believe that if the question is almost a question of a name for the status quo – and mainly for the Temple Mount – that we cannot solve this problem.”

 

Mr. Beilin said he was surprised that at Camp David II the Israeli delegation discovered that the Palestinians were “not too knowledgeable about the connection between the Jewish people and the Temple Mount.” They took the position that the Wailing Wall is the most important site for Jews, while the Temple Mount and its mosques form the third holiest site in Islam, and proposed that “…we will be the sovereign on the Temple Mount; you will be the sovereign on the Wailing Wall, and, of course, that will solve the problem.”  The Israelis, he said, tried to explain that this is not an accurate understanding of the Jewish attachment to the site, since for Jews, the Temple Mount is in fact holier than the Wailing Wall.  “The Wailing Wall is the wall.  The Temple Mount is the temple.  That is the holiest of all.”  He explained that Jews do not go to the Temple Mount to pray not because it is not a holy site, but because it is too holy.  “And that is why the solution on the Temple Mount is a little bit more complicated than one can see.”

 

Looking ahead, Mr. Beilin described a solution in Jerusalem based on Palestinian recognition of Israeli Jerusalem and Israeli recognition of a Palestinian el-Quds. “…We are left with the question of the holy basin, which is less than a square kilometer, with all the symbols and the emotions and the love in the world.”  He suggested that a solution for this area could be based on some kind of shared or joint sovereignty, according to the locations of particular holy sites.  Mr. Beilin said that with regards to the Temple Mount, the bottom line of the discussions in which he had participated was that it was more important to each side “that the other will not be the sovereign” than that they are themselves sovereign there.   He concluded that if this is actually the case, then the debate over joint or divine sovereignty “cannot become the reason for failure of negotiations…I think this solution is around the corner.  We just have to be creative enough and find it.”

 

Mr. Beilin recognized there might be a situation in which, for the time being, no solution is found.  This might lead to “a temptation on both sides to say, okay, this is the fault of the other side.”  He rejected this view, saying “…I would like to use this opportunity to say –  to ourselves, to the Israelis, to the Palestinians, to whoever care about the peace process and to every believer – that we can make a peace.  It is in our hands.  That whatever happens we should tell ourselves in advance that in no case we can tell ourselves that we are not going to have peace.  We cannot afford it.  We are committed to it.  And even if there are difficulties, we will find a solution in a month, in two months, in three months, in half a year.” 

 

“True, this is a window of opportunity…We know the political situation in the United States.  We know that it might take time for a new President in the United States to get into the same situation whereby the Middle East peace process is so important on the agenda.  But nevertheless, it doesn't mean that we are losing the opportunity.  We don't have better partners. We don't have better situations. We know that eventually we are dependent on each other, although both of us try to deny it.  And if this is the case, let us commit ourselves in advance and say let us do whatever we can in order to have peace now.  And if, God forbid, we don't have it now, we will have it later.”

 

Responding to a question from the audience regarding historical plans to place Jerusalem under UN control, Mr. Beilin said the original idea in 1947 was to internationalize the whole area of Jerusalem – a plan accepted by the Jewish state and rejected by the Arabs.  “I don't believe that something like that is feasible today,” he said.  “I don't think that both sides would like to have something like that today.”  Speaking about only the holy sites, or the Temple Mount, Mr. Beilin suggested that something like a “deferred sovereignty” or some kind of sovereignty that is neither Israeli nor Palestinian might be possible, and he noted that Palestinian negotiator Abu Ala, speaking the previous day in Europe, had spoken positively about divine sovereignty.  “That is interesting, and it might be the solution.  I'm not sure whether international sovereignty is something which is better than a religious one.” Returning to his earlier point, he noted that if the reality is that for both sides the sovereignty of the other is the worst option, then “we should be creative and think about third parties' sovereignties.”  This may turn out to be something like “divine sovereignty,” which is not a very clear concept.  “But what might be very clear is the behavior and the norms under this sovereignty.  I mean we will have to write the book of what are the rights and what are the commitments of each side, and then find a name for it...” 

 

Responding to questions regarding security arrangements in the Old City if there is an agreement, and another regarding Israeli public opinion vis à vis the Jerusalem question, Mr. Beilin said that the security question “should be agreed upon in advance.  I mean, in this book which I'm speaking about, a kind of a book of all the norms and regulations, the issue of security should be dealt with.  I'm sure that the Israelis would like to be in charge of security.  But I'm also sure that something like that should be debated.” 

 

Regarding Israeli and Palestinian attitudes about solutions on Jerusalem, Mr. Beilin said that “it depends very much on the leaderships.  I mean if the leadership is saying ‘it is ours 100%’, the people will vote for it and applaud.  If the leadership says ‘for our security and for our future and for peace, we have to share’, then you see changes in the public opinion.”  Mr. Beilin said that in the last month Israeli public opinion has changed a lot, with many Israelis coming to understand that some of the neighborhoods of Jerusalem “are not really Israeli, that they never became part of the Israeli Jerusalem, they were never integrated into it.  They are much more connected to the Palestinian side and will become a natural part of the Palestinian state.”  He concluded that “once they can understand it, then they can support the new ideas.  So I'm optimistic about it, and I'm optimistic that strong leaderships might suggest ideas which will be accepted by the public opinions because they attribute wisdom and strength to their leaders.”

 

MR. OWENS thanked Minister Beilin.  He then introduced the event’s moderator, Dr. Shibley Telhami, who holds the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland and has taught at Cornell, Princeton, Columbia, Berkeley and Ohio State.  Dr. Telhami also worked on Capitol Hill under the Foreign Relations Committee under Lee Hamilton, and at the UN under Tom Pickering.  He is the author of more than 100 articles and two books, including a definitive book on the Camp David Accords.

 

DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI explained that the purpose of the panel would be to “try to answer not only the questions that were raised in the debates of the past few weeks, but also to clarify to the extent possible the many aspects of the question of Jerusalem.”  He said that the issue of Jerusalem has generated debates not only among Israelis and Palestinians, but within the wider Palestinian and Israeli communities and among Arabs, Muslims, and Jews worldwide.  “And I think there're a lot of people who are really confused as to where they stand.  They thought they knew how far they're willing to go.  And clearly, in some ways, the negotiations have gone farther than they have imagined.”  The issue has turned out to be much more complex than a lot of people had understood, he said, and the purpose of the panel is “to shed some light on these aspects of Jerusalem that remain outstanding.” 

 

Dr. Telhami then introduced the panelists, beginning with Professor Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah and professor of political science at al-Najah University.  Professor Shikaki “is clearly one of the most respected Palestinian scholars and certainly among the most respected Palestinian political scientists.  He is also the expert on Palestinian public opinion.  He has conducted over 75 public opinion surveys since 1993 and clearly is more informed about this question than anyone I could imagine.”

 

He next introduced Professor Ruth Lapidoth, professor of international law at the Hebrew University and a researcher with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.  Holder of the Bessie and Michael Greenblatt Chair for International Law, Dr. Lapidoth also served as a member of the arbitration panel that resolved the Taba dispute between Israel and Egypt.  A member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague since 1989, she has written extensively on various issues.

 

Next introduced was Professor Menachem Klein, professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University and a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. A distinguished professor who has been very much involved in second track diplomacy, Professor Klein “follows the issue of Jerusalem very closely and, in fact, has had recently a book in Hebrew published on this issue, which is coming out in English as Jerusalem:  A Contested City, which will be published soon by NYU Press.”

 

Dr. Telhami next introduced Mr. Daniel Seidemann, a lawyer and widely recognized expert on Jerusalem who has followed the question of planning, residency rights, property management and has been very much involved in second track diplomacy between Israel and the Palestinians.  “And he was also the person who filed the petition with the Israeli Supreme Court that prevented the Netanyahu administration from closing the offices at Orient House just before the last Israeli elections.” 

 

Finally, Dr. Telhami introduced Professor Riad Malki, a political analyst and an expert at the Panorama Center – a Palestinian NGO that deals with democracy and community development – who has been very active in second-track diplomacy.  He has also taught at Birzeit University.

 

PROFESSOR KHALIL SHIKAKI took the floor first to talk about public opinion.  He said that Jerusalem is a highly emotional issue and that there is “no doubt” that both sides look at public opinion for guidance. He noted that public opinion has changed in recent years since talk about possible compromise first began to surface.  “In both societies there have been some dramatic changes, I would say, in the way the public has begun to perceive the notion of compromise.  Some five years ago…you would not have found much support among both Israelis and Palestinians for any of the compromises that we are talking about today.”  A possible compromise along the lines of what was discussed at Camp David II, he said, would have received no more than 15-20% of Israeli or Palestinian public support.  This situation began to change slightly in tandem with progress in the peace process. 

 

“The Abu Mazen-Beilin deal, for example, received about 25% of the support of the Palestinians” when it was initially brought to light.  Immediately after the end of the Camp David talks, Dr. Shikaki reported, a survey conducted jointly among Israelis and Palestinians showed that on the Palestinian side, approximately 38% of the public now said they supported a compromise along the lines of Beilin-Abu Mazen.  He explained that under such a compromise, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and the holy places would come under Palestinian sovereignty.  The Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would come under Israeli sovereignty, along with the settlements of Maale Adumin and Givat Zeev, the Wailing Wall and Jewish Quarter in the Old City.  Together with West Jerusalem, this would be Israel’s sovereign capital. On the Israeli side, “approximately 44% of the Israelis, a little bit more than the Palestinian side, accepted a similar compromise, except that on the Israeli side the compromise gave Israel sovereignty over the area of El-Haram or the Temple Mount.” 

 

Dr. Shikaki explained that on the Israeli side “the issue of religiosity and religious background…was a very important factor” in determining Israelis’ attitudes toward a compromise. On the Palestinian side, however, political attitude was more important than religion.  He said that supporters of compromise were the same people who supported Arafat and the Fatah faction, who supported the peace process in general, who opposed violence, who supported compromises on other issues of the peace process, who supported more open reconciliation and a more peaceful future, and who supported more cooperation in economic and political matters.  Dr. Shikaki concluded that, on the Palestinian side, support for a compromise on Jerusalem is “a matter of political attitude. That is the bottom line, and this is where the societies, both societies seem to be very much divided.”

 

Dr. Shikaki agreed with Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin’s earlier comments regarding the role of leadership in shaping public attitudes, and said that the fact that at Camp David II these issues were discussed openly for the first time “had a very important impact on the way public attitudes have changed, and I think as long as we see more of that we will probably see a lot of change in how the public perceives this issue.”  That said, Dr. Shikaki emphasized that shifts in public opinion do not necessarily mean that the leaders will be able to come together on an agreement that the public will support.  He explained that the Palestinian public is very traditional, and that the Palestinian political system is a very traditional political system based on traditional notions of legitimacy and sovereignty. “…Any attempt to dilute it [sovereignty] or to avoid the issue of sovereignty is not going to be taken easily by such a traditional public.”  Sovereignty, he said is “a great source of legitimacy for the political system and the leadership.  It would be a mistake to try and deprive that leadership and that political system of that source of legitimacy.  Therefore, one should also think of the sustainability of the peace process and not just of the immediate needs of reaching a compromise.”

 

PROFESSOR MENACHEM KLEIN spoke second, addressing the role of religious actors regarding the Temple Mount.  He said that in dealing with Jerusalem there are two main social groups, both part of the ultra-orthodox community.  First, there are those “for whom the issue of sovereignty over Temple Mount…has become a theological problem,” and who oppose normalization of relations between Jews and non-Jews.  Second, there are those for whom the Temple Mount has become a national symbol “even without entering to the place, even without exercising the right to pray there.”

 

From an ideological standpoint, Professor Klein said that there are three different religious ideologies that impact the Jerusalem debate.  The first he called the “hyper-Zionist religious approach,” which “calls for implementing the Zionist revolution” on even the most holy areas, including the Temple Mount.  It also calls on Jews to actively pursue the Zionist ideology – meaning to act upon the religious imperative towards settlement and “to act in order to rebuild the Temple...”  The second ideology, he said, encompasses those for whom the rebuilding the Temple is in God’s hands – people who believe that “the third temple will come down from heaven completely, as one unit, when God decides that the right time already is there.”  The third ideology encompasses those for whom “the national symbols are much more important than realizing the issue of praying on the Temple Mount.”

 

Professor Klein explained that it is only since Camp David, where the issue of Temple Mount became so problematic, that the question of the future of the Temple Mount became so important to the Israeli public and a subject of so much public discussion.  And it is only now, as a result of this focus, that these approaches are being taken so seriously among Israeli decision-makers and even the Israeli delegation to the talks with the Palestinians.

 

DR. RIAD MALKI next addressed the issue of the daily life of Palestinians in Jerusalem. He stated that “anything less than Palestinian sovereignty over the eastern part of the city won’t ease the concern of the Palestinian residents of the city and…of the rest of Palestine.”  He explained that at stake is not only the symbolism of Jerusalem as capital of a Palestinian state, or Jerusalem’s religious significance to Moslems and Christians, or the city’s history and culture.  “It is also life.  It’s also services. It’s also respect, human respect. It’s also human dignity.  It’s also equality, right for development, right for residence, right for worship, right for work and right to study, and right for political and social expressions.”  He said that for the past 30 years Palestinians have not had these rights, and it is to realize these rights that Palestinians want sovereignty in Jerusalem.  “Any promise from the Israeli side to change this situation won’t fly because we have heard and received many promises in the last 30 years to improve living conditions of the Palestinians. It didn’t really work. Israel cannot be fair, sincerely fair in dealing with the Palestinian needs, always having in mind the Israeli needs in Jerusalem and Zionist needs in Jerusalem.”  This, he argued, is why the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem need the Palestinian Authority to be in charge in Jerusalem – to respond to Palestinian needs.  “Israeli cannot do it.  It failed to do it in the last 30 years.  Right now it’s time for the Palestinians to do it for themselves.”

 

Dr. Malki described the Palestinian experience in Jerusalem over the past 30 years as the “collection of measures and policies against [the] Palestinian presence in Jerusalem.”  He discussed the difficulties that Palestinians encounter when trying to build their homes, including waits of 7-8 years to obtain required permits. He contended that Palestinians in Jerusalem contribute about 20% of the total taxes collected taxes from the Jerusalem municipality, but get less than 5% of services.  He asserted that, while there are four times more illegal houses in West Jerusalem than in East Jerusalem, the municipality demolishes four times as many homes in East Jerusalem than in West Jerusalem. Dr. Malki concluded that all Israeli actions in Jerusalem aim to support a “stated policy” of the Israeli government that seeks to maintain the demographic balance in Jerusalem at 72% Jewish, 28% Palestinian.  This extends to land use, he said, where the Palestinians of East Jerusalem have the right to develop on only less than 20% of East Jerusalem, while the rest is dedicated for exclusive Jewish use, current and future.  As for Palestinians outside Jerusalem, he explained, all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza need a permit in order to enter Jerusalem or work in the city. They do not have the right to spend the night in the city.  This impacts, for example, a family who may have to wait for years for a husband to be united with his family.  

 

“…when you look into this on a daily basis for the last 30 years and then you say ‘What kind of solution will be acceptable for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem?  What kind of resolution will be accepted for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza?’  And the only one, the only one… [is] to have a Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem and that all Palestinians living there will be dealt with in total dignity and respect.”

 

DR. RUTH LAPIDOTH spoke fourth, addressing the question of sovereignty, and asking rhetorically, “assuming, as we heard from Yossi Beilin, that in East Jerusalem there will be Palestinian sovereignty, in West Jerusalem there will be Israeli sovereignty, what happens in the area in between?”  She noted that “we have heard that for the Palestinians the notion of sovereignty is very important.  …It’s similar with regard to the Israelis, and therefore we have to deal with this subject very, very carefully, taking into consideration this very delicate attitude, because the question of sovereignty is a question of symbols. It’s a question of emotions. Because after all, sovereignty is an abstract notion.  What counts are powers and responsibilities.”

 

Dr. Lapidoth described the concept of sovereignty and its possible permutations.  Sovereignty, she said, has an internal and an external aspect.  “The internal aspect means that the government has exclusive and full authority.  Externally, it means freedom from interference from other states.”  This is the classical notion of full territorial sovereignty, which in many cases is subject to the principles of international law as well as international commitments adopted by a state.  She said that if the parties stick to this classical notion of sovereignty, it will be almost impossible to reach any compromise.

 

As for alternatives to this classical notion of sovereignty, Dr. Lapidoth first discussed “shared” or “joint sovereignty.” In this formulation “you have the symbolic satisfaction that you have sovereignty, but still, you have also an associate, and therefore you will have to divide the powers and responsibilities with the other one who is sharing that sovereignty.”  She also spoke of “relative sovereignty,” meaning “sovereignty, but not full sovereignty.  There is a distinction between de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty.  De jure sovereignty is the notion that you have all the residual powers.  And de facto sovereignty is the fact that you actually have lots of powers in that area.”   Looking for examples, she pointed out the case of Quebec and Canada, where there is an arrangement which involves “sovereignty, but in association with the other one.”

 

Another possibility she suggested, taken from the law of the sea, was “functional sovereignty.”  In the law of the sea, a state has full sovereignty within its territorial waters.  Beyond these waters, it has another 200 miles of function sovereignty solely for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources.  “So here you have a function for which you have all the necessary powers, and not for other functions.” She noted that functional sovereignty can overlap with another type of sovereignty; for example, one state could have territorial sovereignty and another other state could have functional sovereignty over the same area for a specific purpose or function.

 

Another possibility is “to suspend the claims for sovereignty for a certain time, for 20 years, until people are a little bit less intense in their feelings about Jerusalem. You suspend the claims to sovereignty and you deal with the practical questions which have to be dealt with.”  A precedent for this arrangement exists in the South Pole, where sovereignty claims have been suspended for 30 years “and the relevant states liked it so much that they continued the system.  I always say the South Pole is very cold whereas the Palestinians and the Israelis are hot-blooded people. So it is a different case, I must admit.”

 

Another possibility is “divine” sovereignty.  “…If we agree that it [sovereignty] belongs to God, it either belongs to none of us or to both of us, and we can again agree on functional sovereignty for the purpose of certain functions.  For instance, for the Muslims, it could be functional sovereignty for the purpose of managing the holy places, and the Israelis could have functional sovereignty for the purpose of security against foreign invasions.”

 

The last possibility raised by Dr. Lapidoth was “to agree not to agree.”  In this scenario, both sides can state their claims to sovereignty over the Temple Mount, and both sides can refuse to accept the other’s claim.  Then, they can sit down and agree on practical arrangements.  A precedent for such an arrangement exists in the Falklands Islands, where England and Argentina “have agreed that they do not agree on the question of sovereignty, and nevertheless they have managed to arrange all practical matters concerning consular relations, fishing, et cetera.  Now, you will say again that most of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands are sheep and not people, which is true. But I have not found a better example.”

 

MR. DANNY SEIDEMANN concluded the panel’s opening remarks with a discussion of the background of the geographic and demographic facts on the ground “as they exist today, and how these impact on the contours of the emerging agreements that came out of Camp David II.”  He explained that on the eve of the 1967 War Jerusalem was really two small towns.  The Israeli side was about 38 km², and the Palestinian (Jordanian) side was about 6 km², consisting of the Old City and the immediately adjacent neighborhoods.  “This is of significance – because whereas Jerusalem, indeed, might be sacred, there’s nothing sacred in the arbitrarily drawn lines of what Jerusalem is and there’s an element of flexibility in defining precisely what Jerusalem is.”  After the 1967 War, Mr. Seidemann explained, Israel extended “or purported to extend” its rule of law to some 70 km², adding to the city limits more than 64 km² of area, including 27 towns and villages located outside of Jordanian Jerusalem. The population of the newly-defined city, he said, was approximately 26% Palestinian and about 74% Israeli.

 

Mr. Seidemann explained that “…for the last 30-33 years, virtually everything that has transpired in Jerusalem has been dictated by the zero sum calculus of national struggle. And Israel, being the stronger party in this engagement, basically did everything within its power to consolidate sole Israeli sovereignty over the unified 105 km² Jerusalem.”  This included, he said, the expropriation of approximately one-third of the territory of East Jerusalem, on which Israel built 42,000 residential units for Israelis. There are also barriers to Palestinian development – “according to our data, less than 7% of the lands of East Jerusalem are available for any private-sector Palestinian development in East Jerusalem, and these have mostly been exhausted.”   Mr. Seidemann explained that the Palestinians responded “with their version of zero sum game politics, and that is ‘we will avail ourselves of political rights only to the extent…that this does not signify an acquiescence to the legitimacy of Israeli rule.’  And these terms of engagement held until the emergence of the Oslo process when it became clear that if there was going to be a painful rapprochement between the two peoples, these rules of engagement were counter-productive to both sides.”

 

Examining the results of this zero-sum calculus, Mr. Seidemann asked rhetorically whether the Israeli policies were a success.  His answer was that from one perspective, Israeli policies was clearly successful.  “There are about 200,000-210,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but there are almost 190,000 Israelis. There’s almost a numerical parity between the two peoples. …it has really created a new reality…”  He likened Jerusalem to a strand of DNA, pointing out on a map how in the northern part of East Jerusalem, all of the Palestinian neighborhoods are to the west of Israeli neighborhoods, while from the center of East Jerusalem to the south, all of the Palestinian neighborhoods are to the east of the Israeli neighborhoods.  “Basically, Israel has created a situation where Jerusalem is physically indivisible. It is, indeed, politically divisible, but it is physically indivisible.”  In Mr. Seidemann’s view, this reality has been internalized “far more than we’re aware of by both parties. Very few people invoke the physical re-division of the city and I think that’s one of the successes of Israeli policies in this…”

 

That said, Mr. Seidemann argued that from another perspective Israeli policies in Jerusalem were clearly a failure. “Today you have not 26% Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but some 33%. And by the year 2020, it will be 50%.”  Taking the greater Jerusalem area – looking at a 20 km radius from the Temple Mount, “you will find that today there is numerical parity between Israelis and Palestinians – about 550,000 Palestinians, about 540,000 Israelis.  Today in Jerusalem’s capital, you have less than 45% of the population of Israeli-defined Jerusalem who celebrate on [Israeli] Independence Day… You have 33% of the population which is Palestinian, 22-23% of the population which is ultra-orthodox who view Zionism as something of an anathema. So you have a minority of Israelis who are Zionists in the capital of Israel.” 

 

Mr. Seidemann argued that it was these “facts on the ground” which, when dealt with at Camp David, led to the transformation of Israeli policy on Jerusalem. This, he said, was the major achievement of Camp David: it was the first time the national leaders on both sides began to deal with “the primordial base issues that divide the two peoples. In that situation, it was not enough to speak mythically. You had to treat facts on the ground and the minute that Prime Minister Barak began to treat the physical demographic reality seriously, it engaged a qualitative change in the nature of the conflict and the nature in which the conflict is perceived in the body politic on both the Israeli side and the Palestinian side.”

 

This transformation in approach, Mr. Seidemann said, “almost dictates the nature of what is emerging as a political resolution for Jerusalem.”  From an Israeli perspective, he said, this can be described by three questions.  First,  “what the hell are we doing here?”  Mr. Seidemann observed that Israel “is not conceding very much” by admitting that some areas of Jerusalem are not Israeli, “other than…recognizing the existence of an already in-place reality.”  Evidence of this reality is the fact that Israel had “not been wise enough to extend equal opportunity and equal rights to the residents of north Jerusalem.”  For example, he described a case of his which is now before the Israeli Supreme Court – he is suing the Israeli government to provide public schooling for children who live in the village of Kafr Aqab in the northern part of East Jerusalem.  Although under Israeli law there is compulsory education for school-age children in all of Jerusalem, in this neighborhood the municipality provides only 400 places for 4000 children.  As another example, he pointed out that the security border of Jerusalem (i.e., the Israeli checkpoint) is located 4.5 km inside the city limits, at the Ar-Ram Junction.  “Already today the political boundaries of Jerusalem – as defined by Israel – and the security boundaries, are not one and the same.”

 

The second question in Mr. Seidemann’s paradigm dealt with “the Jordanian municipal boundaries or the center of Jerusalem, where physical separation is a virtual impossibility.”  In these areas he said that the Israelis and Palestinians are like Siamese twins who share certain vital organs and vested interests. The question on the Israeli side is “what are our national interests?”  Mr. Seidemann posited that Israeli national interests are few and revolve around “a certain element of security, of shared infrastructure – sewage, water, water table, things of that nature – an element perhaps of planning and things of that nature.”  In these cases, he said, “functional arrangements” are most appropriate since physical separation does not seem here to be possible. “And, indeed, this seems to be what has emerged from Camp David – Camp David II.”

 

The third question in Mr. Seidemann’s paradigm “has less to do with the physical properties of Jerusalem and more to do with its symbolic value.”  On the one hand, he noted, Jerusalem is “also a city” with sewage needs that have nothing to do with politics.   On the other hand, Jerusalem is “unique and things in Jerusalem operate unlike anywhere else in the world.”  Regarding the question of the Old City and the holy basin, and particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, “here it is not a question necessarily of the national interest, but the question that is ‘are our sacred values being violated?  Are they being protected?’”  He emphasized that it is the “language of sanctity, both by religious and secular, which is evoked and invoked here.”  He disagreed with Minister Beilin’s earlier comments that all that is really at stake is the name to be given to existing arrangements, contending that “we’re talking about something entirely new. The fact that it is only in the cognitive dimension does not make this more or less difficult.” The question “are our sacred values being violated?” on the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif involves “the primordial materials of which national consciousness is made up. These are the basic building blocks. Nations are not nations without myths. And we have two competing narratives, mutually exclusive, competing for the same sacred space...”  The challenge, he said, is to come up with arrangements that will demonstrate the recognition by each side of “the legitimacy of the other side’s narrative in a way that is not perceived as a violation of one’s own values.”

 

He summed up his remarks, saying that the discussions on Jerusalem involve “…three concentric circles... Restoring areas in the northern and southern parts of the city to full Palestinian sovereignty, functional sovereignty in historic Jordanian Jerusalem, in the city center. And special arrangements which will allow for the compatibility of the two national narratives in the Old City, the Basin around the Old City, and most particularly, the Temple Mount.”

 

Next to speak was the second keynote speaker, Dr. Saeb Erekat, who arrived late to the even.  He was introduced by Mr. Owens as “the well-known face of the Palestinian negotiations, known to be very much an insider in his role as chief Palestinian negotiator.  …a member of the Palestinian National Authority Cabinet as Minister of Local Governments.”

 

DR. EREKAT began by talking about Camp David II. He told the audience that the summit “was not a failure, and it wasn't a success.”  He explained that President Clinton defined success as the reaching of an agreement; the failure of the parties to reach an agreement was the cause of President Clinton’s anger at President Arafat, since he placed all of the blame for the failure on the Palestinians.  Dr. Erekat argued that this placing of blame was wrong.  “We were, for the first time, negotiating and discussing issues like Jerusalem, like refugees, like settlements, like borders, like security, and many taboos were broken at Camp David.  And the question wasn't after Camp David how to measure who did what.  …we [Palestinians] understand that our mile, in the eyes of the Congress, in the eyes of the American administration, is shorter than the Israeli inch.  We know that.  …But we're out there to try to achieve an agreement on issues that relate to there being Jewish, being Moslem, being Christian.  These are the issues that we're discussing and trying to find solutions for.  So, it's not easy.”

 

Dr. Erekat noted that since Camp David II, Palestinian officials have been and continue to be engaged in intensive meetings with their Israeli counterparts – 25 meetings averaging five hours each so far. “…We've both engaged seriously in trying to see a system of belief.”  Referring to reported conflict between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators over alleged Palestinian ignorance or insensitivity regarding Jewish beliefs and the Temple Mount, Dr. Erekat stated that as a Palestinian he does not ask Jews “to stop believing what they believe in.  But, they should not tell me that to be good to them I must believe what they believe in.”  He asserted that it is “not a question of either side trying to undermine the other side's belief.”

 

Referring to speculation that the next few days (during which both Arafat and Barak were scheduled to meet separately with Clinton in New York on the margins of the UN summit) could make or break peace efforts, Dr. Erekat stated that “if this peace process goes down, don't worry.  Don't worry.  I'm willing… to hold a press conference and say to the people, ‘blame me.’ Because that's not the point.  That is not the point between Palestinians and Israelis at this stage.  The point is much larger than this.  …Sometimes we have to negotiate history.  Sometimes we have to negotiate security.  Sometimes we have to negotiate religion.  Sometimes we have to negotiate needs, real needs, facts on the ground.  [and sometimes] we have to negotiate constituencies and politics.” 

 

Dr. Erekat said that in recent days and weeks Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have discussed a key issue: how not to make Palestinians and Israelis feel that things have changed once an agreement has been signed.  “Life will go on,” he said.  He and said that, for example, Palestinians do not want Orthodox Jews who go to pray in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City on the Sabbath – a time when they are supposed to avoid walking long distances – to be forced to change their traditional (shorter) route through Palestinian neighborhoods and the Moslem quarter in favor of a much longer route through Israeli neighborhoods.  At the same time, in order to have this kind of “open city” there will have to be intense coordination between the sides.  “We need to know who is who on the streets.  We need to know what kind of limitations each side will have on planning and zoning.  What kind of economic regime we're going to have.  …How do we make it work in day-to-day life in terms of economic regime, the security regime, the transportation regime?  We will imagine certain police joint cars on certain streets.  How about the planning and zoning?  And 102 issues of each one of these single things must be discussed because these are all part.”

 

Referring to the demographics of the city, Dr. Erekat noted that there are some 260,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, and that this number upsets the Israeli demographic balance. “The Israelis don't want them.  They don't.” He argued that “East Jerusalem is East Jerusalem, West Jerusalem is West Jerusalem.  Anyone can tell the differences from the first look at the city.  It [the issue of Jerusalem] has to do with the taboos.”  He emphasized that it is not a question of what kind of compromise Prime Minister Barak or President Arafat “can live with.”  The real question is “what it takes to make an agreement…that can survive with Israelis and Palestinians?”

 

On the question of security, Dr. Erekat stated that Palestinians want to have a nation “that is limited in arms” and that “will not threaten anyone.”  At the same time, they do not want their soil used “by anyone against anyone.”  Since the state will be largely demilitarized, there is then the question of national defense for the Palestinians.  Dr. Erekat said that in this regard, the Palestinians welcome an international presence – be it the UN, the U.S., the Europeans, or some kind of multinational force.  He acknowledged the Israeli position that Israel will not permit anyone else to defend its security.  He countered, however, that while Palestinians recognize Israel’s right to defend itself “from Israel, the borders of Israel, the skies of Israel, you can do it the way you want,” once there is an agreement “…we're talking about Palestine.  We're talking about my Palestinian borders…my Palestinian skies.  And these skies and soil must be void from an act of aggression or threats from anybody.”

 

Developing the security question further, Dr. Erekat noted that he often hears about the “threat from the East” and that due to this threat “Israel must have zones and areas for the emergency deployment of its forces in the year 2100 if there may be a threat.  That they will be deployed without even asking our permission.”  This formula, he said, is unacceptable to the Palestinians.  Referring to the “threat from the East,” Dr. Erekat noted that Israel’s eastern border is 630 km long, and of this 500 km is the border with Jordan.  The 130 km-long Palestinian eastern border is part of this border with Jordan.   He pointed out that “not one single Jordanian or Israeli soldier [is] at that site, each side of the border” and concluded that Israel must therefore believe that the “threat from the East” which “will justify for Israel to have its troops present in the Jordan Valley, and the tops of these mountains, and the mountain station, and to control the Palestinian sky – will come only from the 130 kilometers that makes the borders between Jordan and Palestine.”

 

Referring to the territorial question, he said that the negotiations are “like a bazaar,” with the Israeli negotiators stating one day that 13% of the West Bank must be annexed to Israel, on another day 10.5%, another day 9%, and a fourth day 3%.  He argued that this was not the right way to negotiate. “‘This is serious business to bring your maps,’ we say, ‘and let's identify our needs, provided we will have swaps so that you don't undermine my water aquifers, that you don't undermine my Palestinian population, and that you don't undermine the continuity of the Palestinian State.’  The answer will be, ‘I'm not supposed to discuss what they say there needs to be.’  How and why?  It's my land.” Dr. Erekat continued, saying that he was “looking at the larger picture.  We, as Palestinians, come with the best model of day-to-day life in Jerusalem, identifying the streets…who's who and what's what.”

 

Dr. Erekat emphasized that there is an important difference between the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and negotiations Israel held with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  “When Israel signed an agreement with Egypt, it was happy to sign it with a government.  When they signed with Jordan – with a government.  When they signed with Syria, they were signing with a government.”  However, with the Palestinians, Israel cannot sign a treaty just with a government.  “…They want to [should] make sure that they're signing a peace treaty with every single Palestinian.  Strategically speaking, I'm not Jordan. I'm not Egypt. I'm not Syria.  Me to them—them to me is the daily life strategic threat.  It's the same street, the same corner.”  He noted that with other Arab countries, Israel could “find solutions in terms of the neutralizations…” 

 

It is different with the Palestinians, he contended.  Israel cannot make peace if it means that Arafat has to come back to the Palestinian people with a deal that gives the Palestinians 20-22% of historic Palestine (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 borders), but with “skies under Israeli control and open to the use of the Israeli Air Force” plus “11% [of the land] will be annexed to Israeli sovereignty immediately, no swaps,” and on the Eastern border there will be “8% under Israel’s continued security control with an Israeli presence, along with control over the mountains…[and] zones/areas/locations to be specified by Israel for what they call ‘emergency deployment’ of Israeli forces.”  In addition, “roads free to use for Israel, no justification even to the Palestinians.  And I'm talking about 50 years later.  I'm talking about the Palestinian State.  Water aquifers continue under Israel's control.  Palestinian needs will be met through the desalination…  And then I'll be called neutralized.” 

 

Dr. Erekat contended that these positions represent “a major retraction of what took place in Camp David.”  He asked rhetorically why there had been this retraction, and asked if perhaps Barak had retreated from positions agreed on at Camp David he discovered “that the political realities in Israel will not allow him to carry out what he set out to get.”  If this is the case, he suggested that Barak does not need to “exit” in this manner. “It's difficult, we know.  If you cannot do it, you cannot do it.”  However, he argued that if the maximizing of positions was a ploy to have a third part come in and bridge between the Israelis and the Palestinians, then this ploy would fail. “…I've been in these negotiations for nine years…It's no good.  A third party can't help.  We welcome the help of the United States, the help of Egypt, the help of Jordan, the help of Europe, but at the end of the day it's Palestinians and Israelis that have to deliver the agreement.”  He asked if the retreat from Camp David was to punish the Palestinians for not being “good” at Camp David. He said he had heard the analysis that the Palestinians only came to Camp David to “find out Israeli positions…and take and take and take…”  He responded that this was “absolutely unfair.” 

 

Regarding the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif, Dr. Erekat said he was now hearing people say that “the only issue is Haram, Haram al-Sharif, the sanctuary.”  He contended that this approach was neither accurate nor helpful.  “It's not the only issue.  And I don't advise people to start fragmenting issues.  It's not good.  It will not lead anywhere.  To begin with the Haram, what will be the second fragmented piece – the Armenian quarter?  What will be the third – refugees?  What will be the fourth, and the fifth, and the sixth, and the seventh?  This is a comprehensive package on all issues.  Israel will not sign a peace agreement if it doesn't address its issue to end conflict and end claim.  I will not sign an agreement without seeing East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, and without finding a just solution to the refugee problem.”

 

Regarding the timeline for negotiations, Dr. Erekat stated emphatically that negotiations must continue and expressed his displeasure with the artificial deadlines constantly imposed on the peace process.  “…After Camp David I was told that we have three weeks…then stretch [this] for six weeks.  Now I'm being told it's the end of September.  Why?  What's wrong with October?  There are Jewish holidays in October and many of these days they can work.  It's not like Yom Kippur.  Why is time now becoming a sword over our necks?  Do they want to declare that on the sixth of September the peace process will be over?”  He complained that at each meeting and each step in the peace process, there are threats.  “…Somebody will leave, somebody will stay, and somebody can do it, somebody cannot do it.  And what you have at the table are genuine issues that need genuine solutions. …We don't have to really use the time element and the threats…it's a very obvious game from either party.  But, in the end both Palestinians and Israelis need genuine help on such issues.  It's not the deployments, certain percentages of land.  It's not how many joint patrols, or joint mobile units…  The distance between us now is big.  …It can be shortened.  It can.  I don't think anybody should give in yet…I think we have some time left with us.”

 

Dr, Erekat said that after Camp David, President Arafat instructed him and Mohamed Dahlan to “go and see to it that we do whatever we can to bring an agreement.  That mandate is still with me.  It's not terminated yet.”   He said he did not know when it might be terminated, and argued that in the meantime “all these games must stop.  …Whatever time that's left must be spent with the ultimate seriousness, trying to find genuine solutions.”  He urged everyone to “give it the chance, until the last minute.  As long as there will be Palestinians and Israelis there will always be people who will try to make peace.  I don't think that Palestinians and Israelis today stand where they stood three months ago, or four months ago.  They stand on new ground.  The possibilities are great.  The difficulties are enormous.  The gaps are wide, but the need to make peace between Palestinians and Israelis has never been greater to both people like it is now.”

 

MR. OWENS asked Dr. Erekat about his comments immediately after the end of Camp David II on July 25^th, when he said that the sides were only 10-15% apart on the issues, and if he was as optimistic now as he had been then.

 

DR. EREKAT responded that he did not want to weigh matters in terms of optimism or pessimism, or in percentages.  “As I said, when the need is genuine to achieve a deal, the possibilities are out there, I think people must look at the larger picture.  And irrespective of how difficult it is now, I think we should continue trying until the last possible minute of this peace process.”

 

An audience member asked Dr. Erekat if he saw any time constraints on reaching constructive solutions.

 

DR. EREKAT responded by asking if the question was about Prime Minister Barak’s situation, President Clinton’s situation, or the Palestinian situation.   He protested that “nobody is looking at the enormous difficulties President Arafat is facing, or will be facing if this process goes down.  Nobody is even willing to look at the complexities of transformations within the Palestinian society.  That's none of anybody's business.  I'm bitter, a little bitter about this, because at the end of the day it's this constituency, it's this people, it's this man's daughters and children that are involved in this, because it's so difficult after seven years of being engaged in this peace process that Arafat would come out and say, no deal.  What are the options after you say that?”  He maintained that today Palestinians face enormous difficulties in every aspect of their daily lives, and suggested that “the main energy for Palestinians for the past seven years has been hope – hope for a genuine solution.  Take this hope out, people like me will become irrelevant in my society.”

 

An audience member asked Dr. Erekat to comment on reports that the Palestinian delegation to Camp David was oblivious to the historical and religious significance of the Temple Mount/Al Haram al Sharif to the Jews.

 

DR. EREKAT reiterated his earlier comments regarding his respect for the beliefs of others. “I respect the beliefs of Christians, Jews, Moslems.  …We must learn how to respect what each one believes in.  But, no one has the right to come and say to the others, ‘if you [don’t] accept what I believe in, then you're not good.’  No one is trying to tell the Jews to change what they believe in.  On the contrary, what we're telling them, ‘please, if you force me to believe in what you believe in, then I'm denying my basic belief.’”  He argued that this issue must be dealt with very carefully.  “If I defend what I believe in, it doesn't mean I'm denying, or telling the others you should stop believing what you believe in.  But, at the same time they should stop telling me what should I believe in, or not to believe in.  And these issues, they were introduced in these negotiations.”  He said that during the past nine years of peace negotiations he had never “heard any of my Israeli colleagues telling me abut the complexities of this holy site.”

 

He noted that the issue is very difficult.  For 33 years the chief rabbis of Israel had, wisely, forbidden Jews to pray at the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount.  Now, Israeli negotiators are asking the PA to change this.  He told the audience that he had asked Israeli Minister of Interior and Security Shlomo Ben Ami, if he wanted Jews to be able to pray on the Haram, why didn’t he take it upon himself to change the status quo, since it is Israel that is in charge in the area.  The Minister, he said, answered “Why? Do you want me to have a revolution on my hands?”  Mr. Erekat asked rhetorically “why,” when the status quo has operated for 33 years, “all of a sudden this was thrown in our faces?”  He recognized that there are many “good people” working on all sides of this issue, but he said that he feared that if people get caught up in this one issue they are never going to resolve it and will, unfortunately, stop trying to resolve any of the other issues.

 

A member of the audience asked Dr. Erekat to comment on a recent Washington Post front-page story in which it was reported that recently distributed Palestinian textbooks contained no reference to Israel or maps of Israel.

 

DR. EREKAT responded that the only textbooks issued so far are for use in the first grade – for six year-olds.  He said the Palestinians are going to publish new textbooks gradually, over 12 years.  “So if we are at this stage where Palestinians who are six years of age must start studying geography, I thought they would study in the first grade, A, B, C, D, E, F, whatever, grassroots.  But, if you want them, Mister, to study the maps of Israel, that's another story.  And stop scoring points.  My job is to save Israeli and Palestinian lives.”

 

MR. OWENS asked Dr. Erekat if the concept of divine sovereignty over Jerusalem is one that Palestinians could accept.  He also asked how Dr. Erekat would feel about a partial agreement.

 

DR. EREKAT responded that he did not think a partial agreement would be acceptable to either the Israelis or the Palestinians, both of whom want a comprehensive agreement on all issues.  Regarding the sovereignty question, Dr. Erekat pointed out that “the maps are clear.   …it's very well-defined Palestinian areas.  It's not that complex.  …I don't think the problem is over sovereignty over most of the city.  It's not.”  Nonetheless, he admitted that question of sovereignty in the Old City is very difficult.  “…I believe that so far we have introduced 23 forms of sovereignty.  Anything you want today you can create and call sovereignty.  You can say population sovereignty, people sovereignty, you can say residual, you can say remaining, if you don't want residual.  Name it, you can say it.  But, at the end of the day, and irrespective of how wide the situation is for tactical reasons, today, I believe that an agreement is do-able, and I believe that…there are those in a majority in Israel, and the Israeli people, and the majority of the Palestinians, and the Palestinian people, who will not let this peace process go down.

 

[Note: Dr. Erekat did not remain for the panel discussion that follows].

 

DR. TELHAMI re-opened the panel discussion by asking the panel to comment on Mr. Beilin’s remarks concerning the future sovereignty arrangements for the Haram Al Sharif/Temple Mount.   “Mr. Beilin said that a solution will be more or less the existing status quo on that issue and the main divide between the parties is really on the symbolic issue of sovereignty.  …later on, when asked a question about who will handle security if God is sovereign over that area, he clearly left it open for negotiation.  So the status quo was not, after all, a sufficient answer.  So…what is the status quo in that area?  And is the statement that Mr. Beilin made about the status quo one that is acceptable, in your judgments as panelists, to either or both sides?”

 

DR. MALKI explained that under the status quo, management and administration of the site itself is the responsibility of the Islamic Waqf.   The Waqf has its own employees and guards who are responsible for solving problems that arise within the Haram.  However, they do not conrol access to the Haram – this function is held by the Israeli police, who have the right to enter the Haram plaza but not the religious sites sites on the plaza.  Foreign visitors come to the site, as do small groups of Israelis.  The Israeli visitors are watched by Israeli police, and they do not have the right to pray on the Haram.  As for rehabilitation of the site and excavations on the site, this is also the responsibility of the Waqf. Since 1967 there has been an Israeli representative of the Antiquities authority who is in charge of monitoring the situation, but effectively the Waqf is in control.

 

Mr. Malki noted that if there is going to be a negotiated agreement regarding permanent arrangements ont the site, then “obviously…we should go beyond what Mr. Beilin referred to because this existing status quo gives overall security to Israel, over the site, which, in our point of view, is totally unacceptable.”  He went on to explain that from the Palestinian perspective, Israel should “not have any right whatsoever in terms of administration our security over the site.”  He explained that what the Palestinians are calling for is exclusive Palestinian sovereignty over the site. If another option is agreed on, like divine sovereignty, “then obviously that means…functional sovereignty should be transferred totally and exclusively to the Palestinian side.”

 

PROFESSOR KLEIN spoke next.  Addressing the Israeli perspective of the question, Professor Klein stated that the status quo dynamic.  “It is not a status quo freezing the situation as it was in '67. Especially regarding the Jewish prayer on Temple Mount, on the Haram…”  He noted that currently Jews are forbidden [by the judgement of their rabbis] from praying on the Temple Mount.  He also pointed out that lately the security coordination between Israelis and the Palestinian security services has been “better than ever.”  He suggested that the millenium events in Jerusalem as well as the Pope’s visit to the Haram and the Wailing Wall, had led to this improved security coordination.

 

Professor Klein suggested that the dynamic nature of this status quo is felt on the Palestinian side when Palestinians are frightened by attempts by Israeli extremists to go and pray on the Temple Mount.  They are likewise frightened by the various “pressure groups within the Israeli public opinion, especially ultra-orthodox, ultra-nationalist orthodox Jews, who push to change the status quo in favor of Israel or for them or how they understand the Israeli interest.”  At the same time, the special arrangements on the site may make many Palestinians believe that in this area the Israelis will not “exercise Israeli law and the Israeli sovereignty…”– a position that frightens many Israelis.  Professor Klein concluded that the status quo on the Temple Mount is dynamic and it “changes from two directions, one in favor of the Palestinians and also in favor of the Israelis.”

 

In response to a question from the moderator, Professor Klein addressed an issue raised recently in the context of discussions over the future of the Temple Mount – the proposal to establish a synagogue near or alongside the Temple Mount.  He explained that the idea is to “establish a small synagogue…just behind the entrance to the ground.  Another idea is to let Jews to pray on the roof on the top of the Gate of Mercy, outside the Haram but looking into it directly.” He noted that this proposal, which would change the status quo in the area, was presented by the Israelis at Camp David.  He explained that the Israelis did so for two main reasons.  First, “to help the Israeli government to market the agreement to the Israeli public and show a change in the status quo in favor of Israel.”  Second, “to satisfy the radicals…and get them to support even partly the agreement.”

 

Professor Klein stated that he opposes such a change in the status quo, as do many Israelis, including members of the delegation to Camp David.  He gave several reasons for this opposition.  First, on the issue of marketing an agreement, he noted that “…we have to bear in our mind that it's not enough to market the agreement to the Israeli public. There is a need, first of all, to achieve an agreement, then to market it to the Palestinians as well – the Palestinian public as well. And…to maintain the agreement, to achieve an agreement that both sides could maintain and keep it.  It will be almost impossible to achieve an agreement with such a demand.  …It will be almost impossible to market such a change, dramatic change, to the Palestinian public.”  In addition, he said that such a proposal, even if implemented, “won't satisfy the radicals in Israel.  The frustration of the radicals will be greater and they will do their best in order to bomb the whole agreement and if they can to bomb also the Islamic shrines there.”

 

Moreover, he noted that this proposal addresses the interests of only a very few Israelis.  “…How many people will practice the right to pray in this synagogue?  This tiny, small synagogue. Very few.  Not myself, not the ultra-Orthodox, most of the ultra-Orthodox.  Neither Mr. Barak or his daughter's son's bar mitzvah won't be there.  Very few people.  So who will be satisfied with this?  Who will enjoy this right?  Very, very few.”

 

Professor Klein said the negotiators would do better to find an alternative that “is relevant to more Jews, to more Israelis, that…will answer their concerns regarding Temple Mount.  Then we can market the agreement much better than by establishing a synagogue.”  As an alternative, and in keeping with Dr. Erekat’s earlier remarks, he suggested that “…Palestinian recognition of the Jewish religious and historical attachment linkage to the place could help much better than founding a synagogue, because it will touch the Israelis, all the Israelis. And it's much more important for the Israelis than exercising the right to pray on the Haram al Sharif.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked Professor Lapidoth to follow up on the question of the status quo, and discuss any differences in legal status between the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount and any other area of East Jerusalem.

 

PROFESSOR LAPIDOTH first addressed the status of holy sites under international law, stating that “usually the attitude is that international law recognizes any arrangement made by the relevant parties, which means those that belong to the relevant religions.”  Relating to the previously-discussed question of recognition of the religious beliefs of others with respect to the Temple Mount, she stated that “it’s different whether you say, ‘you believe what you want and I believe what I want’ or whether you come and say, ‘whatever you believe is wrong.’  …this is what is happening on the Temple Mount, because some of the Muslims claim loudly and often that this is not the place of the Jewish temple. …this is something which the Jews don't like to hear. The Muslims don't have to believe it was the Temple Mount but they should not come and tell us, ‘it was not your mountain, it was not your Temple Mount.’”

 

Returning to the moderator’s question, Dr. Lapidoth added that “legally speaking, there is not difference between the Temple Mount and any other part of Jerusalem.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked Dr. Shikaki to address the kind of “functional changes” in the status quo that will need to occur for an agreement to satisfy the Palestinians on that part of Jerusalem, as separate from the question of sovereignty.

 

DR. SHIKAKI first recognized that it “is very difficult for the public to separate the issue of Jerusalem and the way you see Jerusalem from the whole treaty or agreement you reach.  For the Palestinian public, I think the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem and sovereignty, in particular, over al-Haram, the Temple Mount, is an extremely important component of any agreement.  It is the, perhaps, major sticking point in the agreement.”  He explained that if Arafat agrees to a settlement that fails to give the Palestinians sovereignty over the Haram, then “all the deficiencies, the defects in all the other parts of the agreement will be exposed and it will be very difficult for him to sell that agreement.”  In addition, Arafat’s own legitimacy is likely to be questioned.  “And, most importantly for the Israelis, the sustainability of the peace process will be questioned.”

 

On the question of functional changes and sovereignty, Dr. Shikaki noted that “sovereignty is about authority. At the end of the  day it is the powers and responsibilities, it is the security.  Who's in charge of security. It is who's in charge of making the law, the legal framework. And it is who's in charge of administration.”  He argued that the Palestinians will not accept any agreement that legalizes or institutionalizes the status quo, where all of this authority resides with the Israelis.  Regarding the discussion over the various permutations of sovereignty that might be applicable in this situation, Dr. Shikaki noteࡤ that if these are all ways to “avoid discussion of the substance of sovereignty…then I think the problem is a lot easier to deal with…than Saeb [Erekat] would like us to think.”  If, however, these are all ways for Israel to try to “share in the authority, in the powers of responsibilities, and to negotiate specific powers and responsibilities to itself in the agreement…then the matter becomes an extremely difficult issue.”

 

Developing this idea further, Dr. Shikaki argued that if, for example, the Israelis ask for “security control, then for the Palestinians this is not just a bad agreement, this is a terrible agreement.  Because the Palestinians have learned from Oslo that the Israelis can concede a lot of things but they keep residual powers, they keep overriding security responsibilities, and they use it whenever they like to. And for most Palestinians this is a sign that occupation continues.  If you present an agreement to the Palestinians that claims to be final, permanent status and you still give the Israelis overriding security responsibilities, the whole state of Palestine becomes a joke, in my view, in the minds of Palestinians.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked Dr. Seidemann to elaborate on the question of functional changes as well as security control on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount.

 

MR. SEIDEMANN responded that “…nowhere in Jerusalem is the gap between the formal realities of Israeli sovereignty and the facts on the ground greater than on the Temple Mount. To all intents and purposes the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif has extra-territorial status with certain exceptions in extremis…”  He noted that many times building violations committed on the site by the Waqf have been taken to the Israeli Supreme Court, which each time has refused to intervene. “The rule of our law is in large part fictitious…”

 

Another example of the de facto extra-territorial status of the site is “the whole question of archaeology. Formally the Israeli Antiquities Authority has the right to intervene – the obligation to intervene – whenever anybody digs anywhere and certainly in an archaeological and holy site. For more than 20 years…the Antiquities Authority went to the Waqf people and said, ‘okay, when you do something, come to us. We don't want the formalities, you don't have to get a permit. Let's just make sure that things are okay.’”  This arrangement fell apart, Dr. Seidemann explained, during the September 1996 tunnel affair and has still not been resumed “…because the tribal drums are working overtime. The extremists – the Islamic movement, mostly the Israeli Islamic movement in the Waqf and the settler organizations on the Israeli right are raising the battle cry. And it's been almost impossible to resume this dialogue.”

 

Mr. Seidemann stated that about six months ago the Waqf engaged in some excavation activities on the site, in coordination with the Israeli police.  However, their excavations went beyond what had been approved and “some of the antiquities were thrown out.”  Mr. Seidemann said that this hit a “raw nerve” among Israelis, because this occurred in parallel to statements from the Waqf and in the negotiations that said “look for your temple elsewhere.”  Mr. Seidemann said that this denial of the Temple is, at least in some ways, equivalent to denial of the Holocaust. 

 

He said that the Temple Mount, for him, “ is the moral equivalent of the right of return for the Palestinians.”  He said that asking Israelis to “recognize the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative” by recognizing the right of return is tantamount to asking Israelis to “recognize something that's associated with Israel's quote unquote original sin, real or purported.  Our taking part in the Palestinian national tragedy. That's painful, that's difficult, and I think it's something that we have to do. It's an indication of Israel's coming of age.”  At the same time, he said, Moslems and Palestinians are not being called upon to accept Judaism's claim to the Temple Mount.”  Rather, they are being called on to “recognize this is a claim that is being pursued by Israelis and Jews legitimately and in good faith, and to recognize the legitimacy of our narrative. And that, too, is very painful and arouses fear and suspicion among Palestinians given the marvelous track record we've had in these sites.”

 

Returning to the question of functional changes on the Temple Mount, Mr. Seidemann said that in order for there to be an agreement, “three elements that are required.”  First, he said, neither side can waive their claims to the Mount.  “It's one thing to implement them, to express them, but I don't think that anybody is going to sign, either a Palestinian or an Israeli, to say we have no claims.”  Second, there must be an expression from each side that they recognize the legitimacy of the other’s claims. Third, both sides must work “to bolster of confluence of interests that already exist… we have a small atomic device on our hands in these 35 acres. It's destructive potential to both sides is enormous and the extremes on both sides seek to undermine the existing arrangements. We have to bolster those arrangements.”  He clarified that this bolstering means security arrangements, and arrangements pertaining to artifacts and archeology; this does not mean saying that Israel will have security control – “we don't have it now and we shouldn't in the future.” 

 

That said, Mr. Seidemann added that Israel, like the British during the Mandate period, must be prepared for the possibility that a crisis will erupt and Israel will need to be prepared to intervene.  “We have to look at the eventuality. Will any potential agreement be able to survive an assault by Jewish extremists or by an attempt by Islamic or fundamentalist Islamic bus bombers who seek refuge on the Mount? And that means we have to discreetly create security arrangements.”  However, ongoing security “already exists in the hands of the Palestinians. That is something to be fleshed out and formalized.”

 

DR. MALKI followed up on Mr. Seidemann’s comments, stating that the issues at stake are very sensitive and important – claims, recognition, and security.  Regarding recognition of religious claims, he stated that “it's very difficult…the concept of recognition. It's going to be very difficult.  Because the moment that Muslims recognize…the claims of Jews over the place, then that means it's a total violation of their beliefs as Muslims that the place is only Muslim above and beneath.  …it contradicts exactly with  their own beliefs.”  He suggested that instead of recognition, the sides should be asked to acknowledge and respect the other’s beliefs, “…because recognition, it's very difficult but…accepting that there are others who believe something different, this might – might – might – might – might work.”

 

With respect to security arrangements, Dr. Malki reiterated Dr. Shikaki’s  concerns regarding institutionalization of the status quo, which “gives Israel overriding security powers” and permits Israeli security forces to intervene whenever they choose and to control access to the site.  This situation “won't be acceptable.”  Dr. Malki suggested that the only solution for the security question is to “limit sovereignty to certain functional matters” and leave security in the hands of neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians, but rather with the Waqf.   He suggested that the Waqf, while not equipped with arms, could control access to the site and maintain order on the site.  In this case there would need to be “certain provisions or arrangements” to deal with the various security situations that might arise, situations that could involve Palestinians, Israelis, or both, and arrangements whereby the Waqf security personnel will transfer the problem to an authority located outside the site.  “…In this case things really might work, I believe.”

 

DR. TELHAMI commented that Dr. Malki’s idea was interesting, “especially if whoever is in charge – whether it's the Waqf or anybody else on the ground – might hand Israeli criminals to Israeli police and Palestinian criminals to Palestinian police to handle under their own courts.”

 

Dr. Telhami then responded briefly to comments made earlier by Mr. Seidemann.  Dr. Telhami noted that, regarding Dr. Seidemann’s comments about “nobody has been prevented from intervening…on the holy ground in extreme situations where…where there was a perception of a major threat,” this type of intervention “happens whether you have sovereignty or not.”  He noted that sovereignty is really a fig leaf, “because, in fact, the truth of the matter is, we intervene all over the place, in sovereign places. And, in fact, actually when you look at the Israeli behavior over the past…couple of decades, Israel was more likely to intervene in Lebanon than it was in Gaza even though Gaza…had only autonomy but didn't have sovereignty.”  He added that there was no doubt that international lawyers could explain why intervention is legitimate even when it encroaches on the sovereignty of another state.  However, the point is “nobody's going to deprive the right of states to do that…but you still need the fig leaf. And the fig leaf is not to be underestimated.”

 

DR. TELHAMI opened the floor to questions from the audience.  The first question came from Trudy Rubin, of the Philadelphia Inquirer, who asked if the Palestinians would accept any agreement that addressed their concerns about security and other matters, but wasn’t “couched in the terminology of sovereignty…” 

 

DR. SHIKAKI responded that “If full authority, as normally understood by the term sovereignty, is granted to the Palestinian state and people can indeed see it that way, then I think that gives Arafat a much larger room for maneuver. I think the notion of divine sovereignty would look much more beautiful than any time before. But Israel must first tell him that all these aspects of authority, aspects of sovereignty, are his. That Israel is not going to challenge him about these aspects. If he is assured of this than I think he is – his willingness to discuss divine or otherwise of any other form of sovereignty would very much be increased.”

 

MR. SEIDEMANN responded that the question is “very well taken. And I think it's one of the things that the negotiators on all sides were not sufficiently aware of.”  He suggested that the questions of sovereignty “resonate differently with Israelis and Palestinians, because Barak is representing the sated part of a sated society… Arafat represents the hungry part of a hungry – a symbol-starved society. And I think that creative ideas resonate much better in north Tel Aviv than they do in a refugee camp in Gaza.”

 

An audience member asked for clarification about archeological excavations on or near the Temple Mount.

 

MR. SEIDEMANN responded that excavations had been carried out before 1967 “on the southern wall, outside of the temple” but not formally on the Mount itself. 

 

An audience member suggested that, since the idea of exclusive sovereignty has led to “repeated bloodbaths in Jerusalem” it might be wise to “consider a modified set of definitions of sovereignty.”

 

DR. LAPIDOTH responded, saying “I love your question. I am against sovereignty. …I always quote from a Columbia University professor who says that sovereignty is a bad word.  It has led to – how did he call it? – aggrandizement and crazy behavior of states.”  She suggested that sovereignty is bad “both in internal and in international relations. But, unfortunately, two kinds of states still stick very much to that notion.  First of all, states that are weak, that are threatened. And, secondly, new states. So we cannot get rid of this notion in the present situation but it would be great if we could do without it.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked the panelists to comment on the negotiations at Camp David II – what was actually agreed on (or not), and how the negotiations have progressed up through the present.

 

DR. SHIKAKI responded that “…there were three or four issues of significance that were agreed on.  One, that the city would remain united, or actually the term "open" was used.”  He said that the concept of an open city is a new concept – there aren't many open cities in the world divided into two sovereignties.  He said that at Camp David there was some discussion of the details of how this open city would work.  “…they've gone into discussion over a possible regime that would apply to an open city.  That possible regime would entail a great deal of details, from economic-commercial activities to infrastructure to police work, tourism, et cetera.  There was an agreement on this.  There was discussion, it seems, of some of the details, but there was no wrapping of this issue.”

 

According to Dr. Shikaki, another issue that was discussed was “the question of boundaries of sovereignty.”  He said it was known that Israel “basically suggested that the area of East Jerusalem, as we know it, the whole municipal area, is divided into three rings.”  The first ring is, the outer ring “is what Yossi Beilin this morning called the east and northeast neighborhoods. … It is not very clear to the Palestinian negotiators what were the boundaries of the outer ring.  And it is possibly here that one can see retraction.  In the outer ring, the Israelis offered normal sovereignty.  The Palestinians would have normal sovereignty.”  Inside this first ring, he said, Israel wanted to establish an inner ring comprised of the inner Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem (Salaheddin Street, Wadi Joz, Sheik Jarrah, Mt. Scopus, the Mount of Olives).  In these areas Israel first offered autonomy, and then later offered “constrained sovereignty,” the meaning of which was not fully explained, but it turns out that it means the Palestinians will not have full authority in areas of planning and zoning, security, overriding security, et cetera.”  The third ring, he said, encircles the Old City, for which there were two proposals – “that…the Muslim and Christian neighborhoods would come under Palestinian sovereignty, and in another offer, that they would come under Palestinian autonomy that would be part of the Palestinian state, in any case.”  Under the Israeli proposals, he said, the Armenian and Jewish quarters, as well as Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif, were to come under Israeli sovereignty.  In a later American modification to the Israeli proposals, the future of the Armenian quarter was put on the table, and a proposal was made for the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif that would give the Palestinians sovereignty above ground and the Israelis sovereignty underground.  “This, as far as I know, was what the Israelis offered.”

 

With respect to the Palestinian offer, Dr. Shikaki said that he believed that the Palestinians offered “territorial exchange in which all the major Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would come, as part of that territorial exchange, under Israeli sovereignty.”  In addition, they agreed that areas around East Jerusalem would also become part of a territorial exchange, allowing the Israeli settlements of Maale Adumim and Givat Zeev to come under Israeli sovereignty as part of a larger Jewish Jerusalem.  In addition, the Palestinians offered to have the Wailing Wall and the Jewish quarter come under Israeli sovereignty.

 

Dr. Shikaki stated that in recent days, Dennis Ross started preparing for the upcoming meetings between President Clinton and Yasser Arafat, and President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak.  As part of this process “he began to talk with each side about the concessions made.  And it is during these concessions that it was revealed that the two sides are now retracting.”  Dr. Shikaki suggested that the reason for this retraction was political.  “…both sides were waiting for the other side to make the concession first, to make the change in position first after the collapse of Camp David.  Nobody was willing at this point to show flexibility.  And if there is going to be any, we will see it tomorrow.  If we don't see it tomorrow, I have doubts that we will see it in the very near future.”

 

MR. SEIDEMANN, following up on this theme, said he agreed very much with Dr. Shikaki, although he said he did not think that there had necessarily been a retraction, but instead “a failure to proceed.”  He noted that there is a sense “that Mr. Barak has gone much farther, much quicker, and has, for the first time, in the most volatile issue in Israeli society, taken the lead well out ahead of public opinion.  It's never happened before.  And there's a sense that the Palestinian negotiating position was: this would be the base line for new concessions.”  Mr. Seidemann said that. personally, “it's not only that I believe that Mr. Barak has gone almost as far as he can go; he's gone almost as far as I am willing to go…”  He said he thought that the perception on the Israeli side was that “until such time as there is give – the abandoning of the mantra on the other side – we are going to dig in our heels.”

 

He noted that while the panel was calmly discussing the various options for resolving differences in the negotiating positions, the reality is that “we're sitting here on the brink of a volcano, if things fall apart tomorrow.”  He said that this is an opportunity. “Camp David not only indicated the possibility of agreement – it almost indicated the inevitability of agreement.  We already know what the agreement looks like, more or less…”  He argued that it is “not a question of cognition; it's a question of volition.  Is the will there?  And the only real variable there is, will it require another round or two rounds of blood-letting before we arrive at the inevitable?  The only real question are the number of casualties.  And therefore, I think there has not been a withdrawal from the positions.  There has been a tactical digging in of heels in order to try to advance the negotiations.  And we'll know very, very shortly.  And from what we heard this morning, I think there's room for very little optimism.”

 

PROFESSOR. KLEIN continued the same theme, saying that he generally agreed with Dr. Shikaki’s description of what was discussed at Camp David.  Developing further the ideas about Jerusalem, he said that Jerusalem is really three different cities.  First, the holy city, about which nothing was agreed.  Second, the national city and the urban city, about which nothing was agreed “but many items were on the air and understood,” including the fact that they could be negotiated on a win-win basis.  For example, the idea that there can be no return to the 1967 borders.  This is a win-win proposal, since it involves “enlarging Jewish Jerusalem in order…to please the Israelis [and] enlarging the Palestinian city in order to please the Palestinian demands.”  This win-win perspective was recognized by both sides, he said.  In addition, both sides understood the benefits of having Jerusalem be an “undivided and open metropolitan area.  …This is an economic imperative, the social imperative, tourist interest, et cetera…”  In addition, both sides understood the win-win benefits of having special arrangements regarding the economic regime, the security regime, and for urban issues like planning and zoning.  Moreover, there was the win-win idea regarding the need to reorganize the city management and to establish a metropolitan coordinating committee to coordinate between two separate city halls.  Also, it was understood that the establishment of two capital cities within the metropolitan area, one Israeli, the other Palestinian, is a win-win principle.  Finally, “both sides agreed on the fate of the new Israeli neighborhoods built on the former Jordanian territory, that these neighborhoods on the former Jordanian territory will be part of West Jerusalem, Israeli Jerusalem, and that several Palestinian neighborhoods now under Israeli jurisdiction and in annexed Jerusalem will become full components of the Palestinian Quds municipality…”

 

Professor Klein pointed out that, “… the talks in Camp David were over East Jerusalem only.  There was no negotiation on West Jerusalem.  …The only subject relating to West Jerusalem…[was] the option of having Palestinian recognition of West Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Israel.  It means dramatic change in the discourse that the compromise is not between east and west, but on East Jerusalem.”

 

Professor Klein said that Arafat’s last offer at Camp David called for the Jewish quarter of the Old City to fall under full Israeli sovereignty, and for the other three quarters to fall under full Palestinian sovereignty. President Clinton, Professor Klein said, supported a 50-50 split, whereby the Armenian Quarter would also be under Israeli sovereignty. Overall, the negotiation was about trying to find a compromise for East Jerusalem.  Arafat wanted a compromise that traded Israeli interests in Jewish areas of East Jerusalem for Arab interests.  The Israelis and the Americans wanted a compromise that “provides some Israeli authority, some type of sovereignty on Arab areas of East Jerusalem, especially Haram Sharif and the Old City.  Yossi Beilin hinted this morning that Israel is ready to concede full Palestinian sovereignty on the inner ring if the Palestinians will express flexibility on Old City and Haram Sharif.”

 

DR. MALKI said that “regardless what was said, the most important aspect of it [is] that after the end of Camp David…negotiations went forward on two levels.”  He explained that meetings had continued on the official level – as alluded to in Dr. Erekat’s earlier comments.  In addition, both leaders have asked experts to look into “creative ideas,” suggestions to break the deadlock on Jerusalem.

 

Returning to a point mentioned by Professor Klein, Dr. Malki pointed out that “while we talk about Jerusalem, then it happens that we are talking about East Jerusalem and not Jerusalem.”  He emphasized that it is important to really define what is being discussed.  “It's not Jerusalem, so it's East Jerusalem.  And then…while we talk about East Jerusalem, then we are talking about metropolitan Jerusalem, so what [does] that really mean and where?  I don't see a map that shows for me exactly what that means in terms of metropolitan Jerusalem.  Then Menachem [Professor Klein] mentioned another concept, a ‘greater metropolitan area’.  My goodness.  What [does] that mean?  It becomes the whole West Bank.  It's up to Tel Aviv and somewhere north and maybe south to Beersheba. 

 

Dr. Malki explained that the concept of a “metropolitan area” or “greater metropolitan area” is confusing in this discussion.  The Palestinians, he said, do not need an enlarged Jerusalem.  An expanded city will be harder for the Palestinian Authority to run: “why start a new experience with 500,000…citizens…living in big city that I cannot really control and manage its borders.  And not only it's a city; it's not any normal city.  It's a special city with special arrangements.  So imagine the complexity of the situation…”  He noted that from a Palestinian perspective, the idea of a “greater metropolitan area” won’t work.  “It is an Israeli need.”  However, for Palestinians, “the moment that we talk about a ‘metropolitan Jerusalem’ or a ‘greater metropolitan Jerusalem’ [the question is] from where we are going to add area into that, to make it metropolitan Jerusalem or a greater metropolitan Jerusalem? The northern part is West Bank.  The eastern part is West Bank.  The southern part is West Bank.  …this is my territory.  …I decide when I want to enlarge my city or to make it smaller.  But if there's a decision to enlarge it on my expense, then there is a problem.”

 

Dr. Malki noted that even the current map of Jerusalem is problematic for Palestinians.  “This is the Jerusalem that was created by Israel.  Is this really the Jerusalem that we fight for?  Is this really the Jerusalem that we wanted?  Nobody can answer me until now why Jerusalem looks like that.  Why this finger (of land extending to the north)?
Dr. Malki said that he had heard different explanations of the genesis of the current borders of Jerusalem. In one of these, it is argued that after the 1967 War, Israel expanded Jerusalem’s borders to encompass all military installations in the area and all sites that had any significance to Judaism.  “And as a result, they came up with this kind of figure, configuration.  But it doesn't have any planning dimension, political dimension, social dimension, nothing.  So it is a false kind of map that…we find ourselves really dealing with.”  Dr. Malki suggested that it would be better for the parties to “release” themselves from this map, “because even right now the Israelis don't really consider that this is really the best map.”

 

MR. TELHAMI asked Dr. Lapidoth to address the question of the differentiation between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem under international law.

 

MS. LAPIDOTH began by responding to points made by Dr. Shikaki about Jerusalem as an “open city.”  She noted that she did not think that this concept actually exists under international law.  The closest parallel is the free port or free area with a port.  Lacking a precedent, Dr. Lapidoth asked the question, “What would be the open city of Jerusalem?”  She suggested that it could mean that there are different borders “ for the purpose of movement of people, movement of goods, and strategic purposes – because otherwise how can you have an open city where people can move freely?  But nevertheless, there are two different economic units and different strategic units.  So all this has really to be worked out very carefully.”  Dr. Lapidoth also referred to an article she had read by an economist that dealt with the economic implications of an open city.  The article, she said, suggested that “if Jerusalem is really completely open – which means people can move freely from one side to the other – this must also lead to a unified economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian state, because otherwise how can you have such a big city without borders where you can smuggle as much as you like?”

 

Dr. Lapidoth also commented on the concept of a divided city.  She noted that “Jerusalem will not be the only divided city.  There are several other divided cities in the world, and maybe we can learn a little from them.  There is Brussels which is divided.  There's Belfast.  There's Montreal.  And last month I was on the border between Finland and Sweden, where they have two cities on the two sides of the river, and it was very interesting to see how they cooperated.” 

 

Regarding the legal status of East and West Jerusalem, Dr. Lapidoth said that “in the eyes of the Israelis, both West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem are under Israeli sovereignty…”  However, the international community “has not recognized any sovereignty, neither over West Jerusalem or over East Jerusalem, neither of Israel nor of the Jordanians nor of the Palestinians.”  At the same time, the UN Security Council and General Assembly have adopted a range of resolutions that refer to East Jerusalem as “occupied territory,” while they have adopted no resolutions that refer to West Jerusalem at all.”  Therefore, she concluded, there has been de facto recognition of Israeli sovereignty in West Jerusalem, but not de jure recognition. 

 

Dr. Telhami opened the floor for questions.  The first question was posed by Gil Kulick, from Search for Common Ground, who asked the panelists to discuss the specific arrangements that would be in place to permit Jerusalem to be both an open city, and at the same time not a gaping hole in the border separating Israel and Palestine. 

 

MR. SEIDEMANN responded that this was an excellent point, and that thus far nobody knows the answer.  “Until now the negotiators, and I think correctly, have been looking at the architecture, the overall architecture of agreement.  What can be agreed upon.  And there is a very major weakness which need be addressed in the second round of negotiations, and that is the sustainability of any agreement that's reached.”  Mr. Seidemann explained that, unlike any other agreement between Israel and the Palestinians or Israel and another Arab state, this sides are “not talking about drawing a line on a map and separating.  We're talking about functional arrangements that have to be rooted in an economic reality, a social reality, a political reality.”  For example, Mr. Seidemann argued that it is clear that the economy of East Jerusalem “is like the lock in the canal between the Palestinian economy and the Israeli economy, and that has a very important stabilizing effect.”  The question, he said, is once there is a border with Jerusalem, “why will it be different than, let's say, opening the border between Tijuana, Mexico and San Diego?  How are you going to deal with that?  It's clear that what is envisaged is not a hard border, not around Jerusalem on the perimeter and not within Jerusalem, because neither party aspires to that.  But how do you then develop sustainable arrangements which will make use of this description in order to stabilize that?  That is precisely the negotiations that are before us.”

 

Mr. Seidemann said that he did not believe “that anybody has taken a serious look at it, and that concerns me.  I think that we can find ourselves arriving at agreements that could collapse in the same way, so that the final image of the agreement will be the visual equivalent to people holding on to the skids of helicopters on the roof of the Saigon embassy.  And that scares me.  I'm almost as scared of success as I am of failure.”

 

DR. SHIKAKI responded that he knows that there are three ideas that have been discussed to address this border question.  The first is the idea of keeping the borders open between Palestine and Israel, making them one economic unit.  Dr. Shikaki said that this idea was supported by 75-80% of the Palestinians and the Israelis, but was not placed on the negotiating table at Camp David.   Instead, two ideas were discussed by negotiators,  The first is to have two separate economies.  “The borders will be closed except in Jerusalem, where the border checkpoints will be outside the boundaries of the open city.  For both sides, there will be checkpoints and there will be customs stations, et cetera.  And that assumes that, therefore, within the city itself, there will be indeed some sort of economic union, a regime will be established that will address all the issues, starting from what to do with the sewage, other infrastructure, roads, schools, security.”  The second idea that involves separation everywhere, including in Jerusalem.  “They will define a road which will be the dividing line between East and West.  On that road, there will be joint patrols.  These joint patrols will have the responsibility to impose whatever they agree on in terms of inspection, in terms of making sure that, in fact, there's still two separate economies.  These are two separate cities.  The people are allowed to move freely, but they are allowed to do so in a very constrained manner, so that they cannot indeed bring in whatever they want to bring in.  Trucks full of merchandise cannot go in freely.”

 

Dr. Shikaki said he was not sure which of these proposals would win out in the end, but noted that the proposal that is supported by the majority of both Palestinians and Israelis – open borders and an economic union – is not being discussed.

 

PROFESSOR KLEIN argued that there are clearly going to be costs associated with having an undivided Jerusalem.  “…Both sides have to decide what it’s most likely to accept – having a wall of physical checkpoints dividing between East and West Jerusalem, or checkpoints outside.  That's the problem.  That's the issue.”  He said he believes both sides agree that the most important issue is to maintain Jerusalem physically undivided.  Therefore, it is likely that the checkpoints will be outside the city that will control Palestinian access west of the city, and Israeli access beyond its eastern borders.  Many other issues remain to be resolved.  The most problematic, he said, is immigration.  “If Jerusalem will enjoy a special regime and economic boom and continue to serve as the main source of income for the Palestinian economy, then it's logical to assume that it will attract Palestinian immigration in order to find higher income.  Then how you control this immigration…the emerging of slums?  And how you keep the interest of the local Palestinians, local Jerusalemites that were deprived, during the Israeli years of rule and annexation?  And this issue was not touched at all, as far as I know.”

 

DR. MALKI  Following up on Professor Klein’s comments, Dr. Malki agreed that it was possible that “different arrangements, economical arrangements” could be discussed.  “And it's obvious that these economical arrangements are not the only arrangements that will be made.”  He said that, personally, he would prefer “virtual borders that exist maybe in the minds, but they don't exist on the ground…there will be certain patrols that will stop people if they suspect for any reasons.  Otherwise…people could really cross without a problem.”

 

Dr. Malki commented that throughout this discussion “…if we talk about sewage – certain arrangements.  Education – certain arrangement.  Residency – certain arrangements.  Everything – certain arrangements.  I started to believe that whoever wants to live in Jerusalem has to carry with him a manual…how to deal with each and every issue…because living in Jerusalem is different from living anywhere in the world.”  Dr. Malki concluded that “there is a price that people have to pay for living in Jerusalem.” However, he pointed out that all of these arrangements – “there's a special arrangement, special regime, special effort, special plan, special law, special policy, special police, everything special” will effectively “constrain the normal living conditions of people in Jerusalem.”  He argued that as a result, “there will be people leaving Jerusalem…rather than people coming in.”  People, he said, are not looking for complications.  “So there will be price to be paid.  There will be certain suffering for people who live there [in Jerusalem].  He concluded that it is important, as we consider the future arrangements for Jerusalem to consider “the human dimension.  Otherwise… we'll make these people really suffer the most.  And this is not our intention.”

 

There was a question from the Mr. Bob Brand, regarding the potential negative impact of checkpoints on traffic on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway.  There was also a question regarding Jerusalem’s physical infrastructure, asking whether, if there is an agreement, it would perhaps be better to have a symbolic capital in the city and have the infrastructure for embassies and international personnel somewhere outside  There was also a question regarding arrangements for an open city, and concern over the possibility of a wall dividing the city again..

 

DR. SHIKAKI  responded first, saying that “the idea of having an open city is an Israeli idea.  The Palestinians went along.  …If, in the Israeli eyes, the idea of an open city is problematic, I don't think that there will be any Palestinian objection to that.  If, also, there is any possibility of limiting the size of the open city, or the parts – neighborhoods that will be open – that, too, I think, is a subject that the Palestinians would be willing to discuss.  Building a wall is not something that either side, I think, would like to do.  However, I must also add that you have to remember, yes, there aren't any open cities in the world, but Jerusalem today is an open city.”

 

MR. SEIDEMANN:  spoke next, saying that he did not think dividing the city with a wall was a feasible option.  “I don't think it's rooted in the urban culture of Jerusalem as we've known it for the last – I think it's nine centuries.”  He noted that it is very “sexy” to talk about the volatility of Jerusalem – and “to a certain extent, it's true.  Look at the volatility of the Haram Sharif and the Temple Mount.”  However, “it's not nearly as sexy…to talk about the stability of Jerusalem.  …The dirty little secret is it's a very, very stable city.  We have a pattern of life of the mosaic since the 11^th century, which allows neighborhoods to live cheek-and-jowl next to each other without getting into each other's kishkas.”  He said that he had asked, at the end of Camp David, "What difference is this going to make, if all of this is agreed upon, to the average Israeli on the West side of Jerusalem?"  His answer, he said was that it would make absolutely no difference.  “Nothing will change; very little, very little.”

 

However, he recognized that on the Palestinian side the changes will be greater.  “There'll be real empowerment.  There'll be real dealing with the problems of the Palestinian sector.  The changes there will be more stark.”  He also noted that there were sure to be “abrasions.”  He noted that this is a process of “channeling and rebuilding, restructuring the conflict.  But…it's not desired by either side to have a wall.”  He argued that “with the restructuring of this conflict, we're going to find ourselves with a more stable [situation].  …I don't anticipate checkpoints within the city.  And in terms of the traffic, the traffic already is one of the indicators, the great indicators, of the yin and yang of the city.  You have Israeli roads.  You have Palestinian roads.  You have binational roads.  And it's one of the ways that indicates this city that's full of contradictions but happens to work.”

 

Finally, he noted that one year ago Israelis and Palestinians were together in Belfast.  Mr. Seidemann said that “the visceral hatred that existed there was something that was unfathomable to Israelis and Palestinians alike.  It was a dire warning about what could happen.  So I would not get too carried away with how problematic things are.  I think that the infrastructure for an eminently viable city is in place, and we're talking about significant political adjustments that will make it more so.”

 

PROFESSOR. KLEIN stated that there are taboos that cannot be destroyed, and the undivided city of Jerusalem is one of these taboos.  He added that the restrictions and special arrangements under discussion would be “neutral” and would apply only to a limit area – the holy basin and the Old City.   In these areas “there are problems of planning and zoning limitations that are needed…”  In contrast, he said, “I do not expect any limitation regarding, let's say, for Shu’afat or Beit Hanina, any Israeli disagreement to have a building boom like in Ramallah, for example…”  Economically, he noted that there will be problems, like trying to prevent workers from the Palestinian areas outside Jerusalem from coming to work in West Jerusalem.  Likewise, security, planning, zoning, and immigration will all have to have their own arrangements.  “But basically the most problematic area is the Old City and its surroundings.”

 

Regarding checkpoints, Professor Klein noted that there are technical solutions – like toll roads or limited access roads.  “However, you cannot have a 100 percent security regime that prevents anybody to enter from Palestine to Israel.  You can cross over the fields, and vice-versa.”  He noted that, personally, he disliked the idea of having to get a visa to go to Ramallah – and effectively he could cross a field and go there without one if he wanted.  However, he emphasized that what is at issue is the exercise of sovereignty.  “A state wants to exercise sovereignty by demanding visa.”  He said this is not about security, and noted that Jerusalem is not a power base for Hamas, and that, in the past, Hamas attackers have come from outside the Jerusalem area, and have carried out attacks even when Israel has had in place a closure of Jerusalem.  “So it's not a problem of security.  It's a problem of exercising sovereignty.  And it costs.  Keeping Jerusalem undivided physically costs.  You have to have special arrangements that make life easier.”

 

DR. MALKI  responded to Professor Klein’s comments.  He said that he could “cannot really envision any situation where Jerusalem, East and West, won't have a coordination party at the level of planning and zoning, because I don't believe that one side can really set up a dumping site next to a residential area.  …That requires an overall planning and zoning coordination at that level, while leaving…the details in terms of the city itself…for each planning and zoning authority to determine.”  The need for coordination, he said, “is obvious.  And we have been discussing this for the last three or four years, and we came to certain conclusions.  And ideas are ready for the moment that our leaders really ask us to present these ideas.”

 

Speaking about Jerusalem’s planning and infrastructure, Dr.Malki said he would like to have an agreement under which “the core area will be an area free of government offices and any representation…  We could say, for example, the Old City and the radius outside for about – I don't know how many kilometers.”  He said that this would then be a zone free of government offices and foreign representation.  “By doing so…we could preserve the Old City and the surrounding…inner circle.  We could really protect it from traffic, from jamming, from pollution, from what have you.”  In addition, speaking again about the special arrangements for Jerusalem, Dr. Malki said that any arrangements will have to be implemented gradually.  “If we are talking about right now a problem of security, a problem of trust, a problem of coordination between the two sides, and suddenly we reach an agreement and we forget about these problems while these problems do exist in the first place, we cannot just now forget about it and say, ‘No walls’ or ‘Yes, walls.’”  Dr. Malki said that “the idea is a gradual approach where…it will be phasing out at the end…if the situation really goes along our plans.”  He said he believed that the security people will stress the importance of checkpoints and other constraints, in order to limit the security risk.  “And obviously they will win… but…with the condition that along the way, over a certain period of time, we'll be phasing out of this situation and at the end we might see, you know, an area that's open, free, accessible for everybody.”

 

MS. LAPIDOTH  interjected that she did not think a wall should be used to divide the city.  “We had the wall from 1949 to 1967, which was very unpleasant and the city was divided and the city could not develop, neither the eastern part nor the western part.  Nowadays, there's a lot of economic exchange between the east and the west, and therefore I think that it would be a big mistake to re-establish a wall.”

 

DR. TELHAMI next asked Dr. Shikaki to give his assessment of Palestinian public opinion on the question of sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.  He also asked him to address how that public opinion is impacted by Arab and Islamic public opinion outside the territories.  Finally, he asked him the analyze the extent to which Arafat is constrained by what he hears in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or elsewhere.

 

DR. SHIKAKI responded that “the point of departure is that public opinion is changeable, that the peace process has a dynamic of its own and that [in] both societies – and I can speak more authoritatively on the Palestinian side – in the past seven years since the beginning of the Oslo process there has been some radical changes in public attitude as a result of the peace process.”  He explained that an important factor in bringing about these changes is leadership.  “Any time the leaders take a position on any issue, they automatically affect public attitudes of their supporters.”  He asserted that on the Palestinian side, around 25% of the population firmly opposes any agreement, and another 40% could go either way.  “That 25% could be enlarged to become 70 or 80 if the red line that Yossi Beilin mentioned today was not met.  …It is true…for the Palestinians, and I imagine also for the Israelis.” He asserted that a Palestinian decision to cede sovereignty on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount to Israel “would be tantamount to suicide.  Public opinion would reject any agreement, I would say by 95 to 100%.” 

 

For this reason, he continued, he believes Palestinians doubted Barak’s intentions when he raised this issue at Camp David.  “…Saeb mentioned this…and I have been involved with back channel discussions with Israelis and Palestinians and other since ’92.  I have never been in a situation in which I heard any Israeli official or non-official who demanded that Israel should have sovereignty over al-Haram area.  Never.”  He said that in the Abu Mazen-Beilin discussions in ‘94-‘95, “the Israeli negotiators never raised the issue of sovereignty over al-Haram.  In fact, the only thing that was agreed upon in terms of sovereignty in East Jerusalem during these Abu Mazen-Beilin talks…was over al-Haram.  The Israelis conceded Palestinian sovereignty over al-Haram in the Abu Mazen-Beilin discussion.”  Dr. Shikaki emphasized that this is a “red line” for Palestinian public opinion. 

 

Finally, Dr. Shikaki noted that it will be very difficult for people to accept specific compromises, “but if you give them a package deal that involves many compromises, you'll find a situation which is very unique.  You will find that the majority will reject each aspect of the package, but they will accept the overall package.  That indicates that the public is thirsty for normalization, for peace, even though the terms are very painful.”

 

Turning to another question, Dr. Shikaki said that “to a large extent Palestinian public opinion is not influenced by what happens in the Arab world.  In fact, it’s amazing the extent to which the Palestinians pay very little regard to what happens in the Arab world, and they do not think that the Arab world pays much attention to what happens among Palestinians.”  He said he believed the “red lines” are the same both for Palestinian public opinion and Arab public opinion in general, “and that the Arabs in general will tend to support any agreement that is supported by the Palestinians, as long as the Palestinians respect certain red lines, one of which, of course, is this idea of sovereignty over al-Haram [and] not conceding it to the Israeli side.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked Mr. Seidemann to address the question of Israeli public opinion.  He also asked him to explain the idea of “tier-ing” the neighborhoods with different “shades of sovereignty.

 

MR. SEIDEMANN  responded that, in his view, “the change over the last two months is literally a quantum change.  It is reminiscent of what happened when Rabin and Arafat met on the White House lawn.  There have been, then and now, subterranean shifts” in public opinion, the preparations for which have been going on for a decade. “Rational discourse on Jerusalem, and we’re talking more the vocabulary and the grammar than the literature itself, is now clearly legitimized in a way that it was not legitimate months ago.”  Mr. Seidemann said he believed this change to be irreversible, and that the question facing us now is “where do you go with this?”  He said that as far as Israeli public opinion is concerned, Israelis will be asking themselves two basic questions “and are primed to hear positive answers from their national leadership.”  The first question is, “are our national interests being protected?”  The second question is “are our sacred values being assured?”  He added that “both these questions require elements of risk and elements of painful compromise.”

 

Mr. Seidemann said that, personally, he believes that “any agreement that Barak is capable within his own heart and mind of arriving at with the Palestinians, he is also capable of selling to the Israeli public.”  At the same time, he emphasized that there is “one major test which we have not gone through.  In the past, any conciliatory gesture anywhere between Israelis and Palestinians has been backed up by both sides, by being particularly abusive in Jerusalem.  So when you redeploy in Hebron, you avenge yourself by building Har Homa or Ras al Amud, or you tell the other side to go drink the sea in Gaza.  This will be the first time in which we will have to arrive at a compromise on Jerusalem, to sell it simultaneously in the same arena with each side listening in to what the other side is saying, and that doesn’t augur well.”

 

Finally, Mr. Seidemann noted that the settler organizations in East Jerusalem “who were very often seen, I think correctly so, as the potential detonators of this volatile city” are still there and they are “keeping their ammunition dry.”  He stressed that, assuming there is an agreement, then following that there will be a ratification process, and “not under solid-state conditions.”  This ratification process will go on “under circumstances in which there is going to be an assault by the extremes on both sides, the nature of which we have never encountered before.  And much of my questions about the sustainability of an agreement is the resolve of the centers of both sides, both the Palestinians and the Israelis, to ward off an unprecedented assault by the extremes on a subject that radiates well beyond the immediate hinterland of those extremes.”

 

DR. TELHAMI asked Professor Klein to address the same issues, with a particular focus on the impact of the extremists, and in particular the religious fringe.

 

PROFESSOR KLEIN began by first discussing the question: who shapes public opinion in Israel?  He said that he had spoken with several experts who said that in Israel it is not the leaders but the “professionals. People tend to believe…the professionals more than politicians.”  He concluded, therefore, that the professionals are leading the changes in public opinion, and that the impact of the leaders come after them

 

Regarding the radicals in Israel, he said that any final status agreement with the Palestinians “will immediately raise a crisis of identity in Israel.”  He said the debate will be about the Jewish majority – he suggested that a fair agreement will win by no more than 10-12% of the vote, and this point “will be used by the Israelis who voted for the agreement” who will say “okay, we achieved Jewish majority” but only with the help of Arab vote, “and then it will immediately raise the problem of…the profile of Israel as a democratic society – whether Israel is an ethno-democratic or liberal democracy, and so on.  And the extremists will use it to de-legitimize the agreement.”

 

Professor Klein said he feared that Israel is headed into a real crisis “not vis-à-vis the geographical borders of Israel, but self-determination and self-identity…Israel as a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people.”  He said that this would not be easy, and that it is probable that Israel “will pass through the French experience after the withdrawal from Algeria…facing the option of several extremists taking arms and trying to resist with arms any decision taken in referendum or agreement.”  This is several groups in Israel will reject any agreement with the Arabs, because they reject anything that normalizes the relationship between Jews and gentiles.  As an example of another problem, Professor Klein referred to one “very important, very popular rabbi” who has stated his opposition to any agreement, and said that Israel should not withdraw “even from one centimeter from the West Bank or Gaza…”   Professor Klein concluded that “we see in Israel a very interesting coalition between the ultra-orthodox Haredi, conservative Jews and ultra-nationalist groups coming all together in order to de-legitimize any peace agreement.  And there is only a small group of religious people supporting the peace process, and their task will be very, very difficult.”

 

DR. MALKI  Continuing with the question of public opinion, Dr. Malki said that he is concerned that “neither leadership, Palestinian or Israeli, have put an effort to prepare their public opinion about eventual peace agreement and what that really entails in terms of sacrifices, compromise and concessions…”  He said he believed this was a serious mistake, “because…the moment that this agreement will be put for a vote by the referendum in Israel elections or in Palestine…the people will dictate the outcome.”  He argued that it is important to begin preparing the people immediately to accept the compromises that are coming.

 

Dr. Malki noted that it is not clear what will happen on the Palestinian side if the sides manage to come to an agreement.  “Are we going to copy the model in Israel, go for elections or a referendum?  Or simply…convene the National Council and a vote in the National Council will determine the decision?”  He said he believed it would be very difficult to put an agreement to a referendum, since “there are Palestinians who live outside the Palestinian territories in the diaspora and their participation in any form of referendum will be very difficult these days.  So that really brings into the preparation the idea of the National Council convening, and in the National Council obviously Arafat will have, you know, the upper hand.”

 

Regarding Palestinian opposition to agreement, he said there is religious opposition, like Hamas, and secular opposition, like the PFLP and others.  He said that he expected the two would react differently, with the secular opposition groups objecting to and rejecting the agreement, “but their area of operation will be very much limited and these people, I believe at the end of the day, will be fully integrated in the political system and they will participate in the local government elections, and if there would be national elections, they will participate in order to have an influence within their national politics.”  As for the religious opposition, Hamas, Dr. Malki said that he believes it will take time before Hamas, and in particular the military wing of Hamas, will accept an agreement.  “Hamas will participate, obviously, as everybody expects, in the local government elections that might take place either the 15^th of December or the 15^th of March next year.  But in terms of their opposition to the agreement, they will maintain a total opposition, and it’s possible that they will stay outside, loyal to that position, and make a total separation between their position and the position of the secular parties.

 

DR. TELHAMI asked the panelists to address the question of what they expected to happen during the upcoming Clinton-Barak, Clinton-Arafat meetings in New York.  He asked what they expected to come out of the meetings and if they expect a comprehensive agreement by the end of the year.

 

DR. SHIKAKI responded first.  He said that “we must see Camp David achievements as they were: a great deal of progress, but a conference or summit that ended on a bad note.  And the bad note was the issue of sovereignty in Jerusalem.”  He said that this last issue had generated a great deal of suspicion on the part of the Palestinians and Arafat “who had by then already conceded on all the other issues.  He had already conceded on territorial exchange.  He had already conceded on security arrangements.  He had already conceded on refugees. …He was then hit with the demand for sovereignty over al-Haram, and I think his feeling was ‘What a sucker I was.  They wanted all of this, and then they knew I could not in any way accept Israeli sovereignty over al-Haram.  They really just wanted to explode the whole negotiating after they had exposed my bottom line.’”

 

Dr. Shikaki said that nothing that has happened since Camp David has restored Arafat’s confidence in Barak.  As a result, Dr. Shikaki said he feared that their will be no progress in the upcoming meeting.  “…I must say that I’m a lot more optimistic today than I was before the Camp David summit.  I tell you the truth.  I did not expect Arafat to concede, for example, a settlement like Ariel, 15 kilometers inside the West Bank.  Arafat conceded that Ariel will become part of Israel.”  He said that for Arafat to have personally conceded on major issues shows that Arafat “went to Camp David to make business.”  Dr. Shikaki rejected arguments that Arafat does not want a deal now, or that he is waiting for American elections, or that he can live with the right wing as easily as he can live with Barak.  “…Arafat can live with the right wing [but] he definitely prefers to reach an agreement with Barak now, if possible, and I think he went to Camp David to do that.  At this point I think there is a crisis in confidence, and I think unless the issue of sovereignty over al-Haram is resolved and in such a way that would allow him to regain confidence, then I doubt very much that it can be done…” 

 

Regarding the various creative formulas for non-traditional sovereignty being discussed, Dr. Shikaki said that while Arafat may be willing to go along with such ideas, he will not be very enthusiastic about them and “there could be other problems along the way in trying to resolve the other issues.”  However, if sovereignty over al-Haram is granted to Arafat and the Palestinians, this “will embolden him to be able to take risks elsewhere…I see no serious impediments to reaching a full agreement.”  However, he added, if the issue of sovereignty over al-Haram is resolved in any other way, “I still have doubts about the ability to reach a quick agreement on the other issues.  If the issue is unresolved, I don’t think that we will see any agreement soon, and the Palestinians will declare statehood before the end of the year.”

 

MR. SEIDEMANN followed up on this theme.  He said that the issue is not longer one of trying to come up with creative ideas.  “There’s a tendency to look for the gimmick. We’ve exhausted the gimmicks.”  He said that while the experts can still help with the details, “the last mile of this is going to depend on the raw political courage of two individuals, that’s Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat. I think that Barak has exhibited a good deal of that political courage. He will require some more. I think that Arafat has yet to display the full amount and it really depends on that courage and I don’t hazard a guess on what will happen.”

 

Mr. Seidemann noted that if there is an agreement, then it will be a framework agreement, meaning that “before us we have yet another grueling round of detailed negotiations in which genuine conflicts of interest need be resolved. It’s going to be ugly, protracted, long, nerve-racking and we should be prepared for that.”

 

On the other hand, if there is no agreement, “I think that this is going to be over for a long time. I think we should anticipate low-intensity conflict with periodic eruptions for a protracted period of time.  It’s not going to be terribly pretty.”  He concluded that in the end, “we’re going to end up coming back to this room, or rooms like this…because the basics are immutable.  And those basics are that there are two national collectives in this area of Jerusalem, both of which possess the critical mass to make a credible claim on the area…once you have said that, we will come back to the same ideas and the only question is the cost in human lives, human suffering, time, et cetera.”

 

PROFESSOR KLEIN said that the Israeli Cabinet ministers with whom he had spoken before leaving “almost despaired regarding the chances to have a breakthrough” during the New York meetings.  In his view, this means that there is a need to immediately begin negotiating a “bottom-up” approach in parallel to the “top-down” approach.  What this means is that, in terms of a “top-down” approach, the leaders must work to find a solution to the problem based on one of the many options under discussion, many of which were mentioned during panel’s discussion.  Once they have agreed, then they should “delegate people to negotiate ‘bottom-up’ extensively in order to form up a core agreement through the end of this month.”

 

At the same time, it is possible that there won’t be an agreement.  In this case, Professor Klein said, the main problem for the Palestinians will be how to implement statehood, because they will declare statehood not for the sake of words, but in order to function as a state.  “So how they can operate this state? First and foremost in Area A, under the area of which they enjoy full authority.”  This, Professor Klein warned, might lead to small clashes; for example, a problem could develop if a Palestinian policeman asks an Israeli citizen to show a visa, or if Palestinian police try to stop the cars of settlers.  These small clashes, he said, “might bring a build-up, a critical mass for an explosion.  It won’t bring, as I see it at the moment, immediately to a new intifada, and so on.  But gradually it might deteriorate because…both sides don’t have any agreement now how to arrange life, to allocate, share authorities on the territory. The Oslo Agreements are ended.  That’s it.  We face chaos.  But the chaos won’t occur immediately. We'll face it gradually.”

 

DR. MALKI said he, too, doubted that any agreement would come from the New York meetings.  Instead, he said he expected  “some partial statements.  And at least there will be a statement that will announce that the two sides, on the official level, not the leaders, but the negotiating sides, will continue negotiations and they will have rounds either in the region or some rounds, they will be held also in Washington.”  Such a statement will “serious American involvement…to accelerate the process.” He suggested that, at the same time, those involved in track two diplomacy “will be heavily involved in supporting the official negotiating teams by providing them with creative ideas to all issues -- on Jerusalem, the old city, the holy places, settlements, refugees, everything; borders…  This is how I see it, and I believe that by the end of September, maybe early October, we might start seeing some light at the end of the tunnel.”

 

In the case where there is no agreement, Dr. Malki said he did not know what would happen, but said he did not expect violence to erupt.  “I don’t know why people are talking about violence because I don’t see it at all.  What I will see is that both sides will sit down and start to see how they will try to…accommodate themselves with the new realities.  It’s true that the Palestinians will declare a state before the end of the year if there is no agreement.  And even they will declare a state on all territories of ’67 borders, everything, the ’67 borders.  And they will say that territories that Israel did not really withdraw from are territories occupied of an independent state.  And this is exactly going to be the situation.  But I believe that the first possibility has higher chances.”

 

MS. LAPIDOTH addressed the question of the Oslo Accords and their status after the end of the year or in the event of a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence.  She noted that “the Oslo agreements of 1993-1995 do not say that they’re ended after five years.  What they say is that they will be ended once the permanent status negotiations have been completed.  So there is discussion on the question of whether that Oslo agreement continues to be in force or not.”  More important, she said, is the fact that before Oslo was signed, “three letters were exchanged between Chairman Arafat and Rabin and the Foreign Minister of Norway.  And these letters preceded Oslo and they will continue to be valid even after Oslo is not valid any more.  And these are the agreements where the parties have recognized each other and have promised to solve all their differences by peaceful means and not to use force in the future.  And we have to remember that Oslo or not Oslo, these three letters are still in force and they are not limited by the timetable of the Oslo agreements.”

 

DR. TELHAMI thanked the panel and the keynote speakers.  He also thanked the event’s sponsors – the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation and Americans for Peace Now.

 

MS. DEBRA DELEE,  President and CEO of Americans for Peace Now, thanked Dr. Telhami and all of the panelists for a “remarkable discussion, certainly thought-provoking and challenging…” She noted that the discussion had revealed that “there are very real and significant and deep differences between the sides.  But when people of good will and good intent who care about peace in the Middle East come together, they can talk about those differences, make very strong statements about those differences in an atmosphere of cooperation and problem-solving.  I think we’ve also learned that we can shatter a number of the final taboos. Certainly, looking at the borders and the boundaries of Jerusalem, that those are not sacrosanct and that those can be discussed.  We can look at them and we can learn and we should remember that the mapping process is not a technical process.  It’s one that involves people because it affects people.”

 

Finally, she noted that it is important not to “underestimate the difficulty of selling what we hope is a forthcoming agreement to both peoples.”  She commended the Center for Middle East Peace for coordinating the day’s event, and noted that Peace Now in Israel is undertaking a number activities to support the process of marketing an agreement to the people.