For the united states, one of the great national security challenges of the past few decades has been dealing with nations and political movements whose Islamic underpinnings make them difficult for Americans to understand. As a nation with relatively few immigrants from Islamic countries and a small percentage of Muslims, the United States has had neither the opportunity nor need to learn much about a religion practiced by over one billion people. Yet, as the world's only superpower, America in recent years has taken the lead in a variety of international concerns and crises with strong Islamic overtones. These have included brokering the Arab-Israeli peace process, forcefully expelling Iraq from Kuwait, and trying to bring peace to warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. If the United States is to continue to operate on such an international scale, it can ill-afford to ignore the challenge of understanding Islam.

Lieutenant Colonel Randal K. James, U.S. Air Force, wrote this paper while a student at the Air War College. It received Distiguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition.

The resurgent, often revolutionary or radical, Islamic movement now affecting the Middle East could have grave implications for American interests in that region, including world access to oil, the security of Israel, and the on-going peace process. Additionally, the impact of any widespread Islamic movement could be farther reaching than most realize. Though Americans generally equate Islam with Arabs, this ethnic group comprises only 25 percent of the world's Muslim populationCover 700 million Muslims live outside the Arab world, in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, all of which present their own challenges to U.S. policies.

Following the end of World War II, the free world quickly saw Communist ideology and activities as threats to peace and took actions to contain it. With the specter of Communism receding, however, many are now making that same application to Islam. Unfortunately, we often fail to understand Islamic movements that combine religious concerns with secular, political issues in terms of a threat-primarily in the form of terrorism, radicalism or fundamentalism-and then negatively conditioned our response to them.(Note 1) This paper, although it cannot deal in depth with the political Islamic movement, will look in general terms at this powerful phenomenon to gain a greater understanding of some of the major issues and concerns.

To begin this study, let's sort through the various labels and terms used. For example, one of the most popular and commonly used terms, especially by those critical of the movement, is "fundamentalism." According to Jurgensmeyer, however, this is not the best choice of words for several reasons.(Note 2) First, fundamentalism is a term clearly considered a pejorative, a term "less descriptive than accusatory: it reflects our attitude toward other people more than it describes them." Second, it is a term to describe a Christian reform movement of the early 1900s that emphasized adhering to certain fundamentals of the Christian faith which were being called into question by liberal theologians. However, this term does not exist in Islam, and most Muslims would certainly resent the implication they did not hold to the fundamentals of Islamic faith. A final reason for avoiding this term is that it does not carry any political meaning, as it implies a person "is motivated solely by religious beliefs rather than by broad concerns about the nature of society and the world." Consequently, a more inclusive term should be found for individuals who have fused their religious zeal with concern for societal and political matters.

Others see the current Islamic resurgence as the latest of a number of Islamic revivals over the centuries,(Note 3) hence the occasional use of the term "revivalist." One author takes this a step further and sees in the revivalists-that is, anyone who has contributed significantly to Islam's current revival-four types of individuals: traditionalists, modernists, fundamentalists, and pragmatists.(Note 4) Consequently, rather than finding a more inclusive term, we have a proliferation of terms for various categories within the movements.

There are other terms that could be explored, but the point has been made: there are a number of terms being used to describe the current wave of political Islam. For the purpose of simplicity this paper will use "Islamist" as a general term for someone "seeking to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state."(Note 5) This definition covers a wide range, but as French scholar Dr. Francois Burgat observes, "Islamists are nothing more than people who connect Islam to political dialogue; so they include the entire range from neo-fascists to ultra-liberals."(Note 6) Some argue against the term Islamist for those in the various Islamic movements, asserting it unfairly allows them to claim "the Islamic adjective for themselves," as if those they oppose were not Islamic.(Note 7) However, most scholars and authorities accept this designation, as do the individuals concerned; hence, that is what is used here.

To better understand the religious underpinnings of the Islamist movement, it would be instructive to take a brief look at the origins of Islam(Note 8) and the doctrine and precepts which guide its adherents. Islam, the world's third major monotheistic religion (along with Judaism and Christianity), as well as the second largest (after Christianity) and fastest growing religion, has been a major factor shaping the social, economic, and political life of the Middle East and North Africa for almost 1,400 years. Islam is based on the revelation of God given to Muhammad, an illiterate but honest caravan trader from Mecca. These revelations, first received around 610 A.D., continued for a period of 20 years, and as recorded by Muhammad's wife and friends, constitute the basis of the Koran. Muhammad's denunciation of the pagan, polytheistic culture in Mecca and his growing popularity among much of the population caused unrest in the city and threatened its enviable and lucrative position as a center of idolatry in the region. Consequently, in 622 Muhammad was forced to flee for Medina, the event referred to by Muslims as the hegira. In Medina, the "Prophet" found ready followers for his message, and after securing this city as a base he succeeded in militarily subjugating Mecca in 630, overthrowing the jahiliyya (the "time of ignorance" of Arabs before Islam).

Islam spread rapidly in the following years, as its adherents fulfilled the call of jihad, a term often associated with "holy war" but which refers more generally to the struggle or striving of Muslims individually or collectively to do what is right and defend the umma ("brotherhood of believers" or Islamic community). The spread of Islam was unaffected by Muhammad's death in 632, though that event did lead to questions of succession, which eventually produced a split resulting in the formation of the two major sects in Islam, Sunni and Shia. Within 100 years Islam had spread west through North Africa (even crossing the Straits of Gibraltar for a 700-year stay in Europe); north into Turkey and Central Asia; and east as far as India. During its first few centuries, while Europe was in its so-called "Dark Ages," Islam produced a rich, brilliant culture centered initially in Damascus, then in Baghdad. Even after the fall of these first dynasties and in spite of wars and empires that continually reshaped the region, Islam has remained a constant and unifying factor.

Islam as it is now practiced is a result of several doctrinal sources. The most important of these is the Koran, considered by Muslims to be the divine word of God. However, as the Koran does not cover all aspects of Islamic life, Muslims look to Hadith ("tradition") and Sunna ("the way of the Prophet") as further guides. These are the compilation of sayings and decisions attributed to Muhammad and to the code of acceptable behavior for Muslims as modeled by him. Another source of Islamic doctrine is ijma ("consensus"), decisions by leading Islamic scholars about issues not specifically covered by the Koran or Hadith-Sunna. A final source of doctrine for Muslims is qiyas ("reasoning by analogy"), the process by which ulama (Islamic judges and scholars) devise a solution to a problem not previously covered based on principles inferred from the Koran, Hadith-Sunna, and ijma. Using these four sources of doctrine as a basis, Islamic jurists and theologians compiled the Shari'a ("the Way"), the body of sacred laws to govern the life of the umma and individual believers. These doctrinal sources and the Shari'a are very important to the Islamists, as they form much of the religious basis for what they consider the "re-Islamization" of society.(Note 9)

Two other aspects of Islam have played an important part in motivating individual involvement and participation in the Islamist movement. The first of these is the five pillars of Islam (faraidhCliterally, "compulsory duties" or "obligations") enjoined on all Muslims, under promise of reward by Allah. These are the shahadah (proclamation of one's faith in Islam);(Note 10) salat (prayers, done five times each day); sawn (fasting during Ramadan); zakat (alms to the poor); and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). However, many Islamists have added a "sixth pillar" to the faith they proclaim, that of the Muslims obligation to jihad, in this case the struggle to overthrow secular governments and establish a truly Islamic society.(Note 11) Unfortunately, while this struggle can be a spiritual one, it clearly encourages a literal, violent battle.

A second specific aspect of Islam that has strengthened Islamist movements is ijtihad.(Note 12) This term refers to the practice of independent reasoning and interpretation on matters of Islamic law, traditionally considered authoritative only when exercised by an Islamic jurist. However, many young Islamist leaders, few of whom are Islamic clerics or scholars, are claiming the right to ijtihad for themselves. Consequently, the Islamist leader is in a position to interpret matters involving Islamic society and government and authoritatively pass it to his followers. The combination of personal interpretations of Islamic doctrine, combined with followers' zealous religiosity and willingness to aggressively confront secular authorities presents volatile possibilities.

There are various Islamist movements, including a number of national movements, each with its own historical and ideological perspective. One scholar estimates there are over 300 Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, few of which are identical in terms of origins, goals, activities, or methods.(Note 13) Nonetheless, certain factors seem to be generally linked to the genesis of Islamist movements.

First, scholars who have studied the rise of Islamism in the Middle East consistently point to Arabic identity crisis as a major factor.(Note 14) Following an age in which Islam and Arab culture combined to form a brilliant and advanced civilization, the Arab world fell into decline, suffering defeats at the hands of the Crusaders, centuries of rule by the Ottoman Turks, and finally, colonial rule by Western powers. Hence, even in the post-colonial period, there was a sense of loss and inferiority, especially in comparison to the rich and technically advanced West. Though a Pan-Arabist movement of the mid-1900s presented some opportunity to correct this situation, it ultimately fell short because of a lack of Arab unity, failure of secularized governments, and Arab military losses to the tiny, but Westernized nation of Israel. The sense of military impotence created by the 1967 Six-Day War increased the burden of inferiority vis-a-vis the West.(Note 15) Added to this was the loss of the West Bank and the failure to resolve the Palestinian refugee issue favorably, which was further perceived to be an Arab failure.(Note 16) Hence, a look into the past and seeing a "golden age" of Arab life under Islamic rule, whether true or not, gives Islamism a strong appeal in a world of failed governments, low national pride, and weakened Arabic identity.

A second factor contributing to the rise of Islamism is the perceived failure of secular ideologies, especially those linked to the West.(Note 17) In the flush of post-colonial independence, many Middle Eastern and North African nations attempted superficially to imitate the evidently superior West or Soviet Union in their forms of government or economy, with generally dismal results, industrially, agriculturally, and economically. These highly secular and nationalistic regimes, some using a thin veneer of Islam to help legitimize their rule, often degenerated into authoritarian socialist regimes which also failed to provide for the people.(Note 18) After decades of seeing the failure of irreligious Western ideologies, many Muslims believe there is little of value outside of science and technology to learn from the West. They see in Islam the foundation of a just and prosperous society, no doubt leading to the frequent Islamist campaign slogan, "Islam is the answer."

A third factor in the rise of Islamism has been the encroachment of the West in Islamic values and culture, what Dekmejian refers to as "modernization and culture clash."(Note 19) In many areas of life, Muslim society indulged in mimicry of the West. For many, Islamism is very much a backlash against what is seen as Western-inspired decadence and immorality and is an attempt to reverse the pollution of Islamic culture. This is not to say, however, that Islamists are against all Western imports. Most Islamists are very much in favor of Western technology and learning, as they are essentially value neutral. Islamists have no problem with modern technology and conveniences, as long as they are not used in a way contrary to Islam. Indeed, one author noted most Islamists would like to increase the number of television sets in society, but only after they had gained control of the broadcasts.(Note 20)

Another factor in Islamist movement success has been the loss of legitimacy by governing elites and institutions.(Note 21) Many, if not most of the countries experiencing an Islamist movement are states with a history of single party or individual rule. Acting from weak legitimacy bases, these governments have refused to open the political process to others, resulting in the need for more and more repressive measures when opposition arose. This has been especially true in those cases where the government has failed to successfully implement economic and social policies which address the needs of the people. Additionally, many of these governments are marked by official corruption and incompetence, which further undercuts their legitimacy with the people. Ironically, preventing or eliminating secular opposition movements has strengthened the Islamist appeal, as the only avenue left open for opposition is the mosque.(Note 22) In some cases, governments have tried to co-opt Islam to reinforce their legitimacy, but with limited success. Though generally seeing Islam as a bar to progress, these regimes have attempted to control the Islamic discourse by claiming to govern by Islamic principles and Shari'a, providing for maintenance of mosques, and appointing and paying the ulama.(Note 23) Unfortunately, rather than confer legitimacy on the governments, such actions have simply tended to bring into question the legitimacy of the clerics and the "establishment" Islam.(Note 24)

A final major factor behind the Islamist movement has been the social breakdown in a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries.(Note 25) The failure of state socialism, precipitous drops in oil prices since the early 1980s, and failed agricultural and industrial policies have left many nations economic basket cases. Simultaneous with these economic problems, high birth rates and migration from rural areas to cities have swollen urban populations. Consequently, unemployment is rampant throughout the region, particularly in the ranks of the young, even the well-educated, who form the majority of the population in most countries.(Note 26) Additionally, with the governments failing to meet the rising expectations of the 1960s and 1970s, the gap between the "haves" and "have nots" has grown precipitously, leaving the masses in most countries to face a bleak and uncertain future.(Note 27)

When looking objectively at the social, psychological, and economic conditions facing the Middle East and North Africa, it is easier to understand the appeal of new ideologies. In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the beneficiary of popular discontent was usually Arabist or Marxist movements.(Note 28) However, with the virtual collapse of the pan-Arabist movement following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the growing recognition of the failure of Marxism, the torch was passed to the ideology of Islamism. Thus, while many have assumed the appeal of Islamism is essentially a religious one, this does not appear to be the case. The appeal of Islamism can be linked to its availability as a protest ideology, the fulfillment of psycho-social needs in giving followers a sense of belonging and self worth, and the provision of social services as much as to its religious aspects.(Note 29)

Considering the number of causes underlying the rise of Islamism, it is not surprising to find this ideology is embraced by a wide spectrum of people. Though television images of a black-clad ayatollah leading anti-Western mobs may give the impression the Islamist movement is primarily led by the religious establishment, the contrary is generally true. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Islam has been co-opted by the ruling regimes, either through their assumption of the Islamic mantle, as in Saudi Arabia; through state control of the mosques and appointment of religious leaders, as in Algeria; or by proclaiming the state to officially be "Islamic" and guided by Islamic principles and Shari'a, such as in Egypt. Since "establishment" Islam is closely identified with the state, "[t]he Islamist movement is not led by clerics (except in Iran), but by young secular intellectuals, who openly claim to be >religious thinkers,' rivals or successors to a class of ulamas who have compromised themselves with respect to those in power."(Note 30) The average Islamist leader is more likely to be a young college professor, lawyer, or engineer exercising his "right" to ijtihad, than a cleric. Indeed, though a few clerics are involved in the Islamist movement, most would be considered irrelevant at best to the Islamist. Roy notes, The Islamists reproach the ulamas two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the shari'athe other is their compromise with western modernity: the ulamas have accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization).(Note 31)

In many cases, establishment clerics perceived to have compromised with secular regimes are considered traitors to Islam,(Note 32) with several having been assassinated by radical Islamists.

Though Islamist leadership tends to be young professionals interested in combining political and religious goals, they represent only a small, albeit important, part of these movements. The majority of those involved in Islamist causes comes from other groups particularly susceptible to the appeal of Islamism. Though some variations exist throughout the region, it is possible to identify those who are likely to heed the Islamic revivalist call.(Note 33) For example, one of the most fertile recruiting grounds is among the youth of the region. As previously noted, high birth rates and poor economic performance have left many nations with large populations of unemployed youth with few prospects for the future, even among the college-educated. Social inequities, identity crises, and the other problems facing Middle Eastern and North African nations seem to hit the youth especially hard. As a result, many Islamist organizations have a high percentage of youth as members.

A second source of Islamist strength is among the newly urbanized elements. Recent decades have seen a great migration from rural areas as a consequence of flawed government policies favoring industrialization and urbanization over agriculture and because of the appeal of a supposedly better life in the cities. Governmental inability to provide services, housing, and jobs to people already experiencing culture shock has left the field open to the Islamists promising a better life and social-spiritual security.

Islamism has also successfully appealed to a variety of political malcontents and those to whom Dekmejian refers as "nativist-traditional elements." Among the political malcontents one finds a variety of individuals and ideologies, such as leftists, Arabists, nationalists, etc., who have found Islamist movements to be the most effective means of voicing their protests. The nativist-traditionalist elements are composed primarily of the religious, middle classes of Islamic society who have seen their status and numbers shrinking as a result of governmental social and economic policies and who perceive their religion under attack from both Western culture and their own secularized governments.

A final major group susceptible to Islamist ideology may be referred to as the "disinherited."(Note 34) This mass includes urban poor (which overlaps with newly urbanized elements and youth), tribesmen, and peasants. As the most traditionalist sectors of society with respect to their Islamic heritage, and because of their low socio-economic status, this amorphous group is particularly receptive to the vision offered by Islamist ideology. According to Dekmejian, this group, along with the youth and the middle-class nativist elements, are most likely to provide the "cannon fodder" for an Islamist seizure of power.

Despite the attempt by some to portray the Islamist movement primarily as a monolithic, fundamentalist religious movement, examination of the goals of the various Islamist groups gives lie to this claim. Though a few individuals speak of a supranational umma,(Note 35) virtually all Islamist groups focus on national problems and have a national agenda.(Note 36) These groups, though occasionally aided with training or money by Islamists in other countries,(Note 37) have arisen in response to national or even local conditions and are aimed at dealing with issues at these levels. In general, Islamists are attempting to reverse what they see as a trend of dividing life into secular and spiritual, especially at the national level. Though the West has a well-established tradition of separating state and religion, this is not the case in much of the Muslim world. Islam is viewed as a comprehensive way of life for its adherents, affecting not only spiritual matters, but social, economic, and political life as well. The idea of separating faith and the nation is inconceivable to a pious Muslim.(Note 38) The attempts by many Middle Eastern and North African governments to emulate the Western concept of "separation of church and state," especially in view of the economic and social failures of these regimes, have helped create a backlash of support for making Islam the foundation of society. The Islamist view is the various problems affecting their nations would be corrected under the implementation of a true Islamic regime.(Note 39) Even such conservative Islamic states as Saudi Arabia have come under attack for being too close to the West and not being sufficiently Islamic.

Yet, even with the general goal of "re-Islamizing" society, there is no consistent view on how that is to be achieved. In some cases, the goal may be simply to increase the influence of traditional Islam on the governments. For instance, some believe the mullahs who led the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 would have actually been content simply to regain the influence their predecessors possessed-essentially a consultative and veto role-at the turn of the century.(Note 40) In some countries the goal is to do away with secular, Westernized laws and establish the Shari'a as the sole law of the land.(Note 41) Others see an Islamist society that rejects the corruption of the current system and in which justice-economic, political, legal, and social-is founded on the Koran and is extended to all members of society. For others, the goal is to destroy modernism, the secularizing force they see attacking society's traditional Islamic roots and culture. Even democracy is frequently proclaimed as an Islamist goal.(Note 42) Of course, it is not clear Islamists are as committed to democracy when they are in power as they apparently are when out of power,(Note 43) nor is it clear what form democracy might take in an Islamist regime; there is simply no track record from which we can judge.(Note 44)

One author probably reflects the view of many when he simply states the goal of Islamists is power, control of the state, and maintenance of power.(Note 45) But, again, we have little upon which to base such a cynical view, and even if true, this is the same goal of virtually every Muslim regime in the region. Ultimately, it may be the Islamists themselves do not always know what they want. Esposito notes,

Islamist movements . . . often tend to be more specific on what they are against than what they are for. While all may speak of an Islamic order or an Islamic state, implementation of the Shari'a, . . . a society grounded more firmly on Islamic values and mores, the details are often vague. After the electoral victory of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), when Abbasi Madani was pressed for his program he described it as broad. When pressed for its practical steps, he replied, "Our practical program is also broad."(Note 46)

Yet, if the goals of Islamists are highly varied, the means they have available to achieve those goals are constrained. Despite the view that Islamists groups are violent by their very character, the facts indicate most would prefer to work within the system to create change and gain power and influence.(Note 47) Many Islamist groups, such as Algeria=s FIS and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have attempted to work from the bottom up, that is develop their support among the population as a whole then work within the political system as normal opposition groups. Unfortunately, this avenue generally has been closed off to the Islamists, as their popularity and success in political organization have made them viable alternatives to ruling regimes. Consequently, Islamist groups are often banned once a government perceives the "threat" they represent. Indeed, it is unlikely these groups would have ever been legal except for the fact that many governments, notably in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, used Islamists to successfully counter the appeal of Marxism, Communism, and other ideologies in recent decades. Once these threats had receded, however, it was usually only a short time until the Islamists were again outlawed.

Once the possibility of successfully operating as an opposition party within the political system is closed to moderate Islamists, they essentially have two options. One is to retreat to the mosque and continue to surreptitiously recruit followers and agitate peacefully for change. The other option is to join the ranks of the more radical Islamist groups and resort to violence and terrorism. As noted previously, the idea of violence is not foreign to the Islamist, as the very concept of jihad implies the struggle of a good Muslim to protect the Islamic community.(Note 48) Indeed, some of the more radical Islamist groups see in modern, secularized society the same state of jahiliyya which existed prior to the coming of Islam and are thus enjoined to fight against it(Note 49) and against the Muslim "apostates" who support this system.(Note 50) Unfortunately, when governments outlaw or attempt to destroy Islamist organizations, the usual result is to radicalize their ranks, leading to the escalation of violence. Few governments have been completely successful in eliminating Islamist violence,(Note 51) and many have made their situations worse by causing further radicalization. The fact is that violence-whether by the Irish Republican Army, Tamil rebels, or Islamists-gives power to a relatively small group of people and grants them influence well out of proportion to their numbers.(Note 52) Islamist violence serves a variety of purposes (intimidation, economic warfare, destabilization, etc.) and will undoubtedly continue to be a problem as long as other means of expression are closed off.

Islamism is one of the key factors in the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. It is a diverse movement, composed of hundreds of groups which have arisen in response to local conditions and problems and which seek to solve them at the national level. They have a variety of goals, always with the idea of a state more in line with Islamic doctrine, laws, and values. Though not numerous, Islamists are drawn from all segments of society and are strongly committed, even to the point of violence, to their ideals. Though Islamism does not currently pose a serious threat in most countries-Algeria and Egypt being two notable exceptions-it is still a growing movement and not likely to go away.

An interesting paragraph in a recent DOD publication reads:

The United States does not presume to instruct Middle Easterners or anyone else on their religious beliefs. Rather, we try to work with our friends in the region to address the causes of extremism and channel potentially destructive impulses toward more peaceful, productive ends. At the same time, we must be prepared to counter, by force if necessary, violent manifestations of radicalism that endanger our interests.(Note 53)

Though this paragraph is speaking in general terms and is necessarily vague, it raises some interesting points. It wisely points out that the United States should not get involved in others' religious problems. But, then it states the United States will work with its "friends" in the region, which is, of course, another way of saying "friendly governments." Further, the statement commits the United States to using military force to counter "violent manifestations of radicalism" if they should threaten our "interests" (a vague term, whether intentional or not). The implication is clear: the United States intends to maintain secular, nondemocratic governments in place, as long as they support American interests in the region, and protect them from the obvious (to Americans) threat of a violent Islamist takeover. However, judging by the hornets nest stirred up with the American public when troops were committed to Bosnia to support U.S. "vital national interests," it is reasonable to assume commitment of U.S. assets or military forces to battle Islamists or prop up Middle Eastern regimes will cause similar concerns. Consequently, it would be wise to ask about America's responsibilities and capabilities in the region, if any, and best course of action in light of the Islamist challenge.

This question can be answered only by adding, "and to whom?" or "and to what?" Islamism, as defined here, is a political movement which seeks to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state. As noted previously in this paper, this definition covers a wide range of movements and ideologies, from relatively moderate to extremely radical. For the sake of argument, we will assume a worst caseCthat is, a radical, violence-prone, anti-Western Islamist movement fighting for control of its nation.

First, does such an Islamist movement threaten the United States? The answer has to be no. Currently, there is no country or combination of countries in the Middle East or North Africa that represent a physical threat to the United States even under the most radical Islamist control. This is quite different from Russia, for example, where a rise to power of a radical nationalist or neo-Fascist government and the continuing presence of nuclear weapons could represent a valid threat. Obviously, continuing regional programs for development of weapons of mass destruction represent a potential threat in the years to come; even so, it will be a long time before an Islamist regime is truly able to threaten America. This is not to underplay the dangers of terrorism presented by an anti-West or anti-American Islamist state. But terrorism, no matter how unsettling or deadly, will not represent a major threat to the United States.

If Islamism does not represent a threat to the United States, does it represent a threat to American interests? The answer to this question is, at strongest, maybe. Vital U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa can probably be limited to just a few. The two most important are access to Middle Eastern oil, for the United States and the rest of the world, and the security of Israel.(Note 54) If oil is the concern, however, the United States should not be too worried, as no matter who is running a country, they will continue to sell their oil. As noted by one author, even a totalitarian government with a powerful army is constrained by international economics. "Fundamentalists the Iranians may be, but they want to sell oil to the West as desperately as any Saudi prince."(Note 55) Considering the amount of oil on the world market and the difficulties OPEC has in enforcing quotas, it seems unlikely an Islamist regime would present a threat to the availability of Middle Eastern oil.

An Islamist threat to Israel's security is more likely, though still doubtful. Though some Islamist groups do use anti-Israeli rhetoric, it is not clear how much is posturing or if words would translate into action if such Islamists came to power. Additionally, during a recent audience with a high-ranking Israeli official, an Air War College class was told Israel felt confident it possessed the ability to defeat any regional nation or combination of nations. It is possible an Islamist regime in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria could derail the tenuous peace process, but that in itself does not represent a threat to Israel; the primary threat to Israel continues to be potential weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an unfriendly regime, with Iraq or Iran being the most probable candidates.

Two other important interests in the region might be stability and the promotion of democracy. National stability, however, can be achieved under Islamist regimes as easily as under authoritarian governments, many of which have experienced quite a bit of instability over the years. Admittedly, regional stability might be threatened if Islamist regimes exported trouble to neighboring states, as Iran and Sudan are currently accused of doing. Yet, secular governments in the region have histories of stirring up trouble for their neighbors, and it is not obvious an Islamist government would represent a particularly odious threat.

Neither is it clear Islamists represent a threat to democracy in the region, considering one can count the current number of democracies on no hands (excluding non-Islamic Israel). Indeed, several abortive attempts at democracy in Sudan contributed greatly to the instability that finally resulted in its current Islamist regime, thus making democracy appear less than desirable.(Note 56) While Islamists may or may not be committed to democracy, it is not clear anyone else in the region is either. The fact that many who professed democratic ideals actually supported the military intervention that kept the FIS from assuming power in Algeria might cause the Islamist to question who is really committed to democracy.(Note 57) Consequently, this should be a major concern for the United States only if we take the position that current regimes are authoritarian and may move over time toward democracy, while a radical Islamist regime would be totalitarian and would not become more democratic. Of course, this may not be an untenable position; even now, opposition groups are being elected to the Jordanian parliament, and Saudi Arabia has established a majlis al-shura ("consultative council") to "advise" the King.

If Islamism represents a true threat, however, it does so more to the people under its rule than anyone else.(Note 58) Unquestionably, the more radical elements of Islamism advocate ideas with which the West and many Muslims would disagree. Most of these relate to the status of women in society, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and the implementation of Shari'a as the sole source of law. The abuses that have been witnessed in Iran and Sudan should give anyone pause. However, this may simply argue for the importance of opening dialogue with the more moderate Islamic groups, as the more radicalized the movement becomes, the more of a threat any subsequent regime would be.

The easiest thing, and for many the most tempting, would be to simply assume that one authoritarian government in the Middle East is as good as another and that we have no business involving ourselves in their internal problems. The United States has observed tragedies unfold in other parts of the world-Cambodia in the 1970s and Rwanda in 1994, for example-without taking action. Why should the various Islamist movements throughout the Middle East necessitate U.S. interest and activity? There are at least three general reasons for America to stay involved.

First, the United States has some moral responsibility in the region because American foreign aid, economic and military, has contributed at least in part to the internal struggle between governments and Islamists. Indeed, in some cases (such as Egypt), U.S. aid abetted governments in avoiding making adjustments in their economic systems that might have helped alleviate conditions contributing to Islamist movements.(Note 59) Also, military aid strengthens a regime in the face of an Islamist challenge, whether intended to do so or not. Finally, a large number of the Islamist fighters in the Middle East were actually trained by the United States or its proxies to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.(Note 60) So, while the American contribution to the conflict has been limited, it exists and provides moral grounds for at least trying to help resolve the situation.

The second reason for U.S. involvement is a practical one: a radical Islamist takeover in one nation is likely to have negative effects for its neighbors, which could ultimately draw the United States into the problem. Iran is a major sponsor of unrest in the Middle East and terrorism throughout the world. Sudan's military Islamist government is similarly accused of exporting Islamist ideology and terrorism, especially toward Egypt. A radical Islamist takeover in Algeria would likely send hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing into Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and France, causing major problems for those countries. If American involvement can help ameliorate the conditions furthering Islamist radicalism or could help regimes and Islamists resolve their differences peaceably, that would clearly be a case where an ounce of prevention would beat a pound of cure.

The final and most basic reason for American involvement in the region is to protect, to the extent necessary, U.S. national interests. The United States has made it clear for a number of years that the security of Israel and world access to Middle Eastern oil are vital national interests. Though it is not clear Islamist gains would threaten those interests, being involved early and peacefully might help assure they were protected. Other interests in the region might include stability, promotion of democracy, preventing an unfriendly nation from establishing hegemony, or simply maintaining the status quo. As discussed above, while Islamist regimes, even the most radical, would not automatically threaten U.S. interests, it only makes sense to remain engaged with the nations and organizations of the region.

The short answer, unfortunately, is, not much. Virtually all writers on the subject of the Islamist movement in the Middle East have to acknowledge the United States has very little influence with the regional governments and virtually none with the Islamists. While the United States has done little to affect the Islamists directly, America is seen as the leader of the West which has offended Islamists by its modern culture, its colonial past, and failed ideologies. Additionally, Islamists believe that if Americans are not actually hostile to Islam, they are distrustful of it. Consequently, Islamists have little interest or confidence in what the United States thinks. As for governments, the United States generally does not have the historical ties or interests in the countries to have gained much sway. Additionally, America seems unwilling to put pressure on threatened regimes for fear of encouraging their Islamist opponents, or because of the very real likelihood of being ignored.(Note 61) Nonetheless, there are a few things the United States can do.

• Recognize the diversity of the Islamist movement.(Note 62) There are literally hundreds of Islamist movements in the Middle East alone, different in size, goals, and methods. The United States cannot simply lump them all together as "fundamentalists" or "radicals" and treat them as if they were a monolithic threat. Many of these groups serve useful societal functions, give voice to the unrepresented masses, and should be considered relatively moderate. The conditions that have provoked the Islamist revival are not going to disappear any time soon, and it is important to realize some of the Islamist organizations can be dealt with in a reasonable way.
• Recognize Islamism is produced by factors other than theocratic zeal, then work to alleviate those conditions. As noted earlier, there are a variety of factors which work together to help produce Islamist movements. Once the United States has acknowledged those factors, it can help to ameliorate them. For example, while the United States could never provide enough aid to correct economic difficulties in so many countries, it could encourage positive trade and industrial policies, help in agricultural development, and provide expertise in appropriate areas. Just as there are a variety of contributing causes, there are undoubtedly a variety of possible solutions.

• Encourage governments to open political systems to both moderate Islamists and secular political opposition.(Note 63) This is a tough one simply because most governments probably prefer the status quo; they have power and they are not interested in sharing it. Obviously, if a regime chooses to be repressive enough, it can greatly lessen an Islamist threat; Syria and Libya are good examples. Yet, it is unlikely opposition to authoritarian, single-party states will go away in the near future, and the Islamists will continue to be the beneficiaries of this opposition. It would be better to convince governments to co-opt and integrate these elements before they become radicalized and more violent. Many regimes may fear opening the political process too quickly, seeing what transpired in Algeria when the single-party government suddenly opened the political system to opposition groups following riots in 1988. The Islamists were the only ones capable of producing a viable opposition and by 1991 were on the verge of taking over the government democratically. The military stepped in, however, cancelling elections and banning Islamist parties, provoking a civil war that has resulted in an estimated 50,000 deaths. Governments could learn from that experience, however, and open the political process more slowly than did the Algerian Government (allowing multiple parties to develop) and make pre-election agreements limiting the initial victories by new parties.(Note 64) Governments could also learn from the example of Jordan, where Islamists are active in politics and have been elected to that country's parliament. Giving opponents a stake in the system is infinitely preferable to repressing and possibly radicalizing them.
• Expect some volatility and instability when authoritarian governments open their political systems. As Entelis noted regarding the process of Algerian democratization in the late 1980s, Whatever else was happening in the weeks and months prior to the apparent FIS electoral victory, Algerian politics was bursting with vital energy, political discourse and competition, exchanges of ideas, and points of view, and, not surprisingly, strikes, demonstrations, and street rallies. In virtually all democracies, especially emerging ones with little history of legitimate contestation, the first experience with freedom and liberty is always volatile if not violent.(Note 65)

• Offer to mediate or establish a forum for mediation. While many Islamists may not entirely trust the United States, most would undoubtedly deal with us if it worked in favor of them having at least the chance of sharing power. Consequently, if a government was willing to work with the Islamist (and/or other) opposition, the United States could offer to help, much as it has done with Israel and Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians. If participants preferred not to have direct U.S. participation, America could work with other nations to establish a forum for talks to take place.
• Continue to work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of America's greatest international priorities is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It is not obvious an Islamist government with such a weapon would be any more dangerous than any other. Nonetheless, if a Middle Eastern or North African nation had weapons of mass destruction and seemed to be threatened by an Islamist insurgency, it would clearly worry neighboring states, Israel, and the United States, possibly provoking some sort of intervention. Preventing the development of weapons of mass destruction might keep a troublesome situation from becoming a disaster.
• Distinguish between Islamist rhetoric and reality.(Note 66) Despite what Islamists often say to garner support and encourage their followers, they tend to be fairly pragmatic once in power. Islamist movements are, above all, political movements, so the United States should be as careful taking what Islamists say at face value as it would any secular politician. Entelis wants Islamist leaders and groups judged "by the same criteria as any other potential leaders or opposition party. . . . [Most Islamist governments] will generally operate on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally interdependent world."(Note 67)

• Avoid compromising moderate Islamists. At least one author cogently argues that if moderate Islamists exist, the worst thing the United States could do would be to talk with them and, consequently, compromise them in the eyes of their constituents or more radical colleagues.68 While this view seems extreme, it does point out the United States, as the leader of the West, is not completely trusted in much of the region. Very likely, one of the worst things we could do to a government or opposition group would be to dote on them too much. If we engage moderate Islamists, we should carefully demonstrate they have kept their independence from the U.S. in fact and appearance.
• Do not get involved in someone else's insurgency. Any time the United States helps a regime fight against its internal opposition, we are going to anger someone, and that someone might just wind up in power. We would be far better off to try to mediate disputes than get involved in them. If a truly friendly or valuable government was about to fall to Islamist insurgents, perhaps we could justify getting directly involved. Even that, however, could backfire, as putting U.S. forces on Middle Eastern soil, could cause a further backlash against the inviting government. Even after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were a number of Muslims who resented the Saudi Arabian decision to allow U.S. and other Western forces in their country. The politics and religion of the region would dictate the United States get involved only in the most critical of circumstances.
• Do not fall for simplistic arguments. During a recent trip to the Middle East, the author heard top officials in Syria, Jordan, and Israel state the Islamist threat was directed by forces external to their countries, and it seems likely most governments in the region would make similar claims Though undoubtedly containing a grain of truth in some cases, such a statement also sounds much better than admitting your internal policies and problems have generated an Islamist opposition. Claiming an external threat, such as Iran, is also a better way of garnering American support in most cases, just as a country claiming an insurgency was Communist received more American attention during the Cold War. Even non-Islamic governments are not immune to broad, simplistic arguments. For example, until recently France said of Algeria that no moderate Islamists existed, no middle ground existed between the government and the Islamists, and no compromise was possible, all points that are patently untrue.69 The United States must be careful about accepting such statements at face value.
• Do not give friendly governments a free ride. A number of the governments the United States supports in the region are guilty of human rights abuses and violations as serious as those committed by Islamist groups, yet the American government says little, at least publicly. While the United States is properly concerned about human rights and freedoms under an Islamist regime, we do not seem to hold authoritarian governments to the same standard. Such attitudes simply reinforce Islamist beliefs that they have little hope of competing legitimately for power.

The challenge to the United States will be to use what little influence we have in the Middle East and North Africa-with both the governments and the opposition-to help build prosperous nations that respect political pluralism and human rights. The alternative, in many cases, will be to sit back, watch the disintegration, then help pick up the pieces.