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Al-Siyassa
Al-Dawliya held a special roundtable discussion
on 27 July 2007 to discuss Egyptian-African
relations, reviewing past Egyptian foreign
policy strategies in Africa and the need for a
new approach. The group of Africa experts
gathered included: Dr Abdel-Malek Auda, veteran
academic and professor of political science at
Cairo University; Mr Mohammed Fayeq, holder of
various official posts during the Nasser era and
current secretary-general of the Arab
Organisation for Human Rights; Ambassador Ahmed
Haggag, secretary-general of the African
Society; Dr Iglal Raafat, professor of political
science at Cairo University; and Dr Ahmed
Youssef Al-Karie of Al-Ahram.
Dr Osama
Al-Ghazali Harb, editor-in-chief of Al-Siyassa
Al-Dawliya, introduced the topic of discussion:
On behalf of Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya I would like
to welcome our esteemed panel today. We are
especially keen to introduce our younger
generation of scholars to figures that played a
leading role in establishing the modern
foundations of Egyptian-African relations. We
hope that our discussion will raise the interest
of the younger generations in this important
topic and promote further consideration of
various important related themes.
Our
discussion is part of an examination of Africa
within the international context, covered by
this issue’s file. The object of this roundtable
discussion is to present an overview of the
history of Egypt’s role in Africa, its
determinants, features, stages of development,
the reasons behind its recent deterioration, and
the steps needed to reactivate it.
Mr
Mohammed Fayeq: I would like to make an
important point: when we talk about Arab-African
relations, we must not forget that the Arabs
living in Africa are Africans as
well.
Egypt’s July 1952 Revolution, which
occurred during the period of African liberation
and the search for African identity, revealed
Egypt’s African face. It added Egypt’s history
and its Pharaonic civilisation to the history
and civilisation of Africa, transcending, for
the first time, the desert barrier between North
Africa and black or sub-Saharan Africa. The
proponents of the pan-Africa project and the
search for African identity at first spoke of
Africa’s history and founding fathers within the
context of black Africa. The new Egyptian
approach towards the continent attracted their
attention, making of Egypt a bridge to improved
Arab-African relations.
When the first
African conference was held, only two
sub-Saharan countries had gained independence:
Liberia and Ethiopia. Ghana joined later, while
five Arab countries from North Africa
participated in this conference.
Sudan
has played an important role in Egypt’s strategy
of linking North Africa to the countries south
of the Sahara. Sudan’s geographic location
allows it to link the two regions and to play an
important role in establishing balance on the
continent.
Dr Abdel-Malek Auda: The July
1952 Revolution introduced a new approach to
Egypt’s African policy by linking Egyptian
interests to the changing regional and
international environment at the time. Egypt’s
new policy towards Africa was linked to issues
such as fighting colonialism, establishing new
independent states, and promoting African
ambitions for progress and development – all of
which allowed it to reach into
Africa.
This new approach, however, did
not completely replace two strong underlying
currents that historically influenced Egypt’s
attitude towards Africa: the security-oriented
approach of Egypt’s relation to the Nile basin
area, and the spread of Arab culture and Islam
in the continent. Egypt’s relation to the Nile
basin area has been governed by a militaristic
conceptualisation of how to secure Egypt’s share
of the Nile waters. Therefore, it is
historically linked to the establishment of
Egyptian hegemony and dominance through military
presence.
Although the regime of the
revolution tried to change this by recognising
Sudan’s right to self-determination, this
security-oriented attitude remained dormant
under the surface, only to re-emerge when
Egypt’s revolutionary strategy in Africa
weakened. This weakening occurred not only
because of Egypt’s military defeat at the hands
of Israel, but also because most African states
gained their independence and began to pursue
different national interests and make new
international alliances. This security-oriented
approach became reflected in an Egyptian
attitude that focused only on securing access to
the waters of the Nile. As long as Egypt’s
interests in this respect were protected, there
was little interest in pursuing other aspects of
relations with Africa.
Following the end
of the Cold War, Egypt’s African policy fell
into crisis. On one hand, a military-based,
hegemonic approach was untenable, while on the
other, there was no longer an appropriate
regional or international context for a strategy
based on pursuing revolutionary goals. Egypt was
not prepared with a strategy to deal with the
new and fast-changing balance of power on the
continent, as well as Africa’s changing goals
and priorities.
There is still no clear
Egyptian strategy, even in terms of Egypt’s
relations with the Nile basin countries. For
instance, when the countries of the Great Lakes
region signed a military cooperation treaty,
there was a lot of hesitation on the Egyptian
side: Should we join or not? There are many new
issues to be addressed, such as the new
rationale of the World Bank in terms of pricing
water resources, yet Egypt has not clearly
defined its position in this respect. The
information available within Egypt on important
ventures, such as the details of the Nile water
initiative, is insufficient. This does not help
us to define a clear position. Moreover, there
has been little open discussion in Egypt on
important issues such as the storing of water in
Lake Tana, controlled by Ethiopia, and the need
to introduce international guarantees that
Ethiopia will not threaten Egyptian
rights.
Even in our dealing with Sudan,
we signed the Four Points agreement, and then we
didn’t implement it. There are projects, for
example, to connect Egypt and Sudan by road that
have never materialised, while more roads
between Sudan and Ethiopia are actively under
construction to facilitate cross-border trade
between the two states.
Egypt has yet to
reconsider its relations with Nigeria and South
Africa, two of the continent’s emerging powers
that now play a role in the negotiations
regarding southern Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, while Egypt is absent. South
Africa has sent troops to Darfur and southern
Sudan, and its president is playing an active
role throughout Africa, trying in particular to
solve problems in Congo and northern
Uganda.
Is our inability to develop a
strategy in Africa related to the fact that we
lack a strong infrastructure in the areas of
trade and investment on the continent? The US
and Europe can offer Africa loans and
investment, while we cannot. Or is it because
Egypt continues to adopt a militaristic
perspective on its national interests in Africa?
These are times that require the use of
negotiations, and the spirit of give and take,
to safeguard our national interests. Egypt’s
Africa policy is in trouble. If we wish to play
an active role in Africa we must reconsider our
historical preconceptions regarding our role
there. We should not be content to say Egypt
used to have a role in Africa, or that Gamal
Abdel-Nasser and the revolutionary regime used
to play a role. This is now history.
Mr
Mohammed Fayeq: I would like to point out that
the regime of the revolution did, in fact,
abandon the militaristic approach to securing
Egypt’s interests in the Nile waters. It
accepted Sudan’s right to self-determination.
Nasser insisted on securing a British withdrawal
from Sudan even before British troops withdrew
from Egypt. He argued that their withdrawal from
Egypt would be pointless if they were only to
redeploy in Sudan. Options regarding Sudan’s
status at the time included a form of
Egyptian-Sudanese union or that Sudan become
fully independent. The first option would have
involved extending Egypt’s physical presence
into the heart of Africa, bordering countries
such as Chad, Central Africa, Kenya and Uganda,
in which there was still a strong colonial
presence. The US also had a very strong presence
in Ethiopia and was strongly antagonistic to us
at the time. Our approach to securing our
interests in the Nile waters at the time was
based on helping these countries to gain their
independence and consequently becoming allies.
This was the major strategic goal as it was
clear that securing these interests could not be
achieved through military means or by
maintaining a full presence throughout the
region.
Egypt’s consent to Sudan’s
independence and right to self-determination
earned us great credibility within the African
context. Egypt was the first country to
recognise the independent Sudan, and we also
made them a gift of some heavy weapons, which
opened wide doors for us in Africa.
As
for gaining various countries’ approval for the
Aswan High Dam project, Sudan’s president at the
time, Ibrahim Abboud was glad to sign the High
Dam accord with Egypt as a means of asserting
his own authority in Sudan. This is an example
showing that for any regime to become well
established in Sudan, good relations with Egypt
are essential. The major obstacle at the time
was Ethiopia, with which we had been in a tough
struggle. Egypt sent scientists to study Lake
Tana and determine Ethiopia’s ability to affect
the High Dam project. They concluded that
Ethiopia would only be able to control
one-fourteenth of the water flowing from the
Ethiopian Plateau. Therefore, we proceeded with
the High Dam project without reaching an accord
with Ethiopia, leaving it for a later stage.
Unfortunately, this agreement still hasn’t been
achieved.
I personally believe that the
influence of Lake Tana on the water supply to
the dam is limited. The plateau is extremely
steep, and for water to be held up there its
shape would have to be changed completely – this
was our assessment when we proceeded to build
the High Dam. Yet, although Ethiopia has limited
influence, I think that an agreement with it has
to be reached.
Egypt’s policy towards
Africa at that time was based on cooperation on
issues of common interest, such as the struggle
against apartheid in South Africa, the issue of
independence and the building of African unity.
These relations were supported by economic
cooperation. The Egyptian regime at the time
perceived that Egypt’s future was linked to
developing its industrial capabilities. This
required sources of raw materials and large
markets, both of which were available in Africa.
We made the needed adjustment to the Egyptian
industrial structure to support trade activities
in the long term. For instance, we realised that
Nigeria represented a huge market for textiles,
but that Egyptian products were not competitive
as they were made of long-staple cotton. The
importation of short-staple cotton was at the
time prohibited by law. This law was therefore
changed in order to allow us to produce textiles
at a price suitable for the African market. We
also acquired pigments and looms that enabled us
to produce textiles suited to African
tastes.
It should also be noted that the
Egyptian role in Africa was not brought to an
end by the 1967 defeat, despite the difficult
position Egypt was in at the time. For example,
on 25 August of that year, as Nasser was
preparing to leave for the Arab summit in
Khartoum, the Nigerian president called
requesting help against repeated rebel air
attacks on Lagos. The only country that came to
their assistance was the Soviet Union, which
provided a number of fighter jets. The Nigerian
president appealed to Nasser to send pilots.
Realising the difficulty of the situation, I
passed the letter to the president without
comment. He asked to see me and said: ‘I don’t
want Africa to experience a setback due to our
problems.’ He then gave me authority to provide
them with the necessary pilots. This positively
affected our relations with Nigeria, which
became our ally at international
forums.
At that time, the concept of
African unity brought African countries
together, but today, there is no joint cause to
unify us and strengthen our links to Africa. I
would like to see a redefinition and broadening
of our understanding of the concept of African
unity. We should expand it to include issues
related to development, as this is an important
priority for Africa.
Africa, in my opinion,
possesses huge riches and capabilities that have
yet to be fully tapped. For example, there is
great need in Africa today for heavy investment
in mining. I think this is an opportunity both
for Arab investors, who are seeking new fields
of investment, and Africa to profit. I agree
with Dr Auda that trade relations are important,
but political relations with Africa remain the
cornerstone.
Dr Iglal Raafat: The only
period in which Egypt has had a clear and
applied African strategy was between 1952 and
1967. During this time, Egypt supported
liberation movements and, through trade and
other means, was influential. I cannot forget
when on a visit to Zaire I found a street named
after Gamal Abdel-Nasser. To many in Africa,
Egypt was personified by President Nasser and
the Egyptian revolution.
After African
liberation movements achieved independence,
development became their first priority. After
Nasser, Egyptian governments have been unable to
devise a non-militaristic African policy that
combines both economic and political dimensions.
I think that although Egypt cannot provide huge
funding for African projects, there are,
nevertheless, some fields in which it could
provide invaluable assistance, such as in the
area of agriculture and the development of
simple industries based on agricultural
produce.
In the absence of a coherent
strategy for dealing with Africa, Egypt’s
behaviour towards African states became heavily
influenced by the imperatives of its own
relations with international superpowers, even
at the expense of its true interests. In my
opinion, Egypt entered into alliances and
conflicts in Africa that have not served its
interests. On the other hand, Libya – for
example – has intensified its activities in
Africa, making use of its geographic location to
gain influence across its borders in Darfur and
Chad, and further afield in Mali.
There
is a need to review our established and
persisting attitudes towards Africa to see if
they remain compatible with facts on the ground.
Our attitude towards Sudan has remained
unchanged for 100 years. We hold on to the
notion that Sudan must remain united, and have
no plan to deal with the possibility of the
secession of the south, which has intensified
since the death of John Garang. He was the
pre-eminent statesman in Sudan; he developed and
followed a clear strategy for 20 years. Although
the chances of maintaining Sudan’s unity were
far greater while Garang lived, Egyptian media
consistently portrayed him as being of dubious
loyalty to his country, and as an ‘Israeli
agent.’ Neither the government nor the
information ministry made any effort to correct
this misinformation repeated by the media on a
daily basis.
Egypt has also faithfully
adhered to its close ties with the Sudanese
National Democratic Alliance, despite the fact
that both the party and its leader have lost
their popular base and have minimal influence.
Egypt bases its African policy on a
state-to-state approach, and does not give much
attention to changes occurring under the
surface. This has been true of our approach to
problems in Sudan, Somalia and Chad, and it has
led to repeated failure.
This was true
even with Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the helm
of the foreign ministry, a time when Egypt was
clearly active in Africa. For example, Egypt
declared its support for Ethiopia against
Eritrean independence, and maintained this
stance till only days before Eritrea achieved
independence – revealing that our embassy and
officials there were not following developments
on the ground. A similar situation influenced
our position towards the regime of Omar
Al-Bashir in Sudan, when Egyptian authorities
ignored warnings regarding its close connections
to Hassan Al-Turabi.
Since Egypt has no
dealings with African civil society and has
restricted itself to interaction at the state
level, the emergence of failed or semi-failed
states in Sudan and Somalia has made Egyptian
policy ineffective. It seems to me that there
has been no serious study of the actual
situation in Somalia, for example, with an
analysis of the roles played by the government
and the Union of Islamic Courts and the relative
weight of each.
Mr Mohammed Fayeq: In my
view, the problem isn’t simply whether or not
Sudan is to be divided; it is preventing such a
division from taking place against a background
of hostility between Arabs and Africans. Garang
was the only politician who would have been able
to carry through a formula that would preserve
Sudan’s unity but also allow scope for the
African influence within it. Since his death,
the situation has become markedly more
complex.
I believe that the Darfur issue
is used nowadays to revive once more the barrier
between North and sub-Saharan Africa. Lots of
crimes have been committed in Darfur, and the
Sudanese government has not acted in accordance
with international law or international
agreements on human rights. Yet these crimes
cannot be identified as genocide, because that
would imply Arabs were killing Africans on
purely racial grounds, which is not true. The
division between Arabs and Africans emerged as a
result of the crisis, but was not its underlying
cause.
Unfortunately, the Arabs have
played a part in reinforcing this sense of
division, through supporting the Sudanese
government regardless of developments on the
ground, and by failing to develop a policy that
would protect the people of
Darfur.
Sudan, which used to be – and
which should remain – a bridge between the Arab
north and the African south, has failed in this
role and is now being used to deepen the sense
of division between Arabs and
Africans.
Dr Iglal Raafat: The literal
definition of genocide may not apply to what is
going on in Darfur, yet I believe that there is
a deep-rooted problem between Arabs and
Africans, especially in Sudan and along the line
separating North and sub-Saharan Africa. There
is an attitude of superiority that dominates the
Arab stance towards Africans which is a
historical legacy of slavery. In Sudan, for
example, Arabs in the north sometimes still
refer to southerners as ‘slaves.’
Amb
Ahmed Haggag: I am sorry to say that Egyptians
too have something of a racial attitude towards
black Africans. This is easily detectable on the
street whenever, for example, an Egyptian
football team is defeated by an African one.
Many Egyptians are also unaware that many
Africans understand Arabic, and they are
therefore aware of the racial slurs Egyptians
may utter against them among themselves, which
sometimes happens even at international
gatherings.
There is now a trend in Africa
demanding that Arabs apologise for their role in
the slave trade and pay compensation. Africans
build their argument on the fact that former
British prime minister Tony Blair apologised for
his country’s role in the slave trade, while the
Arabs have yet to do so.
Dr Abdel-Malek
Auda: As Egypt’s revolutionary strategy in
Africa became ineffective, historical attitudes,
such as this sense of superiority stemming from
our previous military rule over some African
countries, once more rose to the
surface.
Ties related to Arab and Islamic
heritage in Africa also became more important.
Unfortunately, while Egypt played a leading role
in promoting this heritage on the continent, it
lost its advantage in this respect by the end of
the Cold War. Various Arab Gulf states and
Islamic associations appeared on the scene with
greater funding abilities. Saudi Arabia, for
example, sponsored the building of new
universities in Uganda, Chad and Niger, and
Libya has built Islamic centres around West
Africa. Although these centres are largely
staffed by Egyptians, their policies are set in
Saudi Arabia and Libya.
Mr Mohammed
Fayeq: Cultural relations are highly important.
I remember when I first started working with
President Abdel-Nasser, he assigned me to find a
way to deal with the Ethiopian presence in
Sudan. I checked with our ministry of foreign
affairs only to realise that our representation
in Africa was limited to a mission in South
Africa, an embassy in Addis Ababa and another in
Liberia. There was complete political separation
between Africa’s north and south. Al-Azhar
University was the only place where contacts to
establish relations with Africa could be found.
I went to Al-Azhar where students from different
African countries, such as Chad and Nigeria, had
their own study groups. I was able to make
contacts in various African countries through
these students. Scholarships allowing African
students to study at Al-Azhar are one of our
most important links to Africa. I am talking
here about the cultural bond. The Arab and
African cultures have become deeply intertwined
in Africa, to the extent that they often cannot
be distinguished from one other. The Arabic
language is of specific importance. If we look
back through African history, we often find it
documented either in Arabic or using the Arabic
alphabet. This shared cultural history is a good
basis on which to build strong
relations.
Amb Ahmed Haggag: Enhancing
cultural relations is the preferred starting
point for strengthening our presence in Africa.
However, we have to realise that this is not
restricted to us exporting our culture, but also
must extend to improving our knowledge of
African culture. There has to be, for instance,
an extensive project to translate African
literature. We know little about Nobel prize
winning authors from south of the Sahara, or of
African cinema, despite the large number of
awards it has received. We do not even
participate in the Carthage Film Festival for
African and Middle Eastern cinema held every two
years in Tunisia, although it is of respectable
international standing.
I believe in the
idea proposed by President Hosni Mubarak of
having a satellite television channel
broadcasting to Africa. Egypt must proceed with
such a channel even if it lacks African support.
Yet it must not be a propaganda machine for
Egypt, but operate according to international
media standards, following in the footsteps of
the BBC for example. It must broadcast, for
example, African music, African football matches
and African cooking programmes.
Dr Iglal
Raafat: There is not strong public awareness in
Egypt regarding African or even Sudanese
affairs, and we have to work on developing this.
I remember once I attended a performance by a
Sudanese band at the Cairo Opera House and was
almost the only Egyptian in the audience. I
would like also to highlight that the number of
Egyptian cultural centres in Africa is
decreasing. There used to be around 16 during
Nasser’s term in office; now, to the best of my
knowledge, there is only one. I agree that we
should host African artistic exhibitions,
translate African literary works, and hold
related discussions and forums.
It should
be noted, however, that the general attitude of
the Egyptian media in its coverage of Africa is
not helping to strengthen relations. More than
90% of Egyptian writing on Africa takes an
Arab-oriented perspective on African issues.
These issues are often approached in the context
of the Arab-Israeli conflict or Arab-African
relations. Moreover, Egyptian analysts tend to
support Somalia, for example, solely because it
is an Arab country, without benefit of any
objective analysis. Those covering Sudan tend to
support the stance of the government in the
north because it is Arab and Islamic, and take a
negative stance towards the south. I think
changing the manner in which the Egyptian media
cover Africa will take a long time.
Dr
Ahmed Youssef Al-Karie: I agree on the important
role cultural exchange and media coverage can
play in changing the image we have of Africa. In
this context, I think we must address the
general absence of African studies from the
curricula of Egyptian universities. Only Cairo
University’s Faculty of Economics and Political
Science has African studies as part of its
curriculum, in addition to the African Research
and Studies Institute. Looking at the academic
output and publications of various Egyptian
universities, including those of Alexandria and
Assiut, it is clear that there is almost no
attention given to Africa.
On the media
level too, little attention is given to Africa.
In the 1960s, there used to be weekly pages
devoted to African matters in leading
newspapers, including Al-Ahram and
Al-Gomhouriya. On the cultural level, African
representation in exhibitions is minimal.
Moreover, we have statues of Latin American
figures in major squares as part of an exchange
project with Latin America; we should have a
similar programme with Africa, particularly as
many African countries already have statues of
President Nasser in major cities. This year, we
are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the
African Society. Most leaders of African
national liberation movements have visited the
society during those years. I suggest that we
must establish on its premises a museum
honouring these leaders, their histories and
their achievements.
Amb Ahmed Haggag: I
would like to point out that we must not
belittle the efforts currently being exerted by
Egypt to maintain ties throughout Africa. I
would argue that Egypt hosts and educates more
African students than any other country on the
continent. Our African Society, for example,
sponsors some 15,000 African students.
We
need to admit that Africa’s peoples and its
leaders today are different to those we dealt
with in the past. On the other hand, we must not
be intimidated by emerging African powers such
as South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa’s
president, Thabo Mbeki, has been widely
criticised by his own people for sending South
African troops to intervene in the internal
affairs of other African countries. South Africa
is perceived regionally as a domineering state,
trying to impose its point of view on others.
There are also strong internal divisions between
those leaning towards Africa and those favouring
the West. At the same time, South African
society is still suffering from serious
problems, with the economy, trade and media
still largely controlled by the white minority.
Nigeria, likewise, is not a shining regional
example, particularly given the high rates of
corruption prevalent there.
Egypt’s
policy towards Africa should be revitalised, but
it must adopt the premise of cooperation, rather
than competing with or trying to undermine other
leading African players. In this context, the
Coptic Church can play an active role as it
enjoys a special status, being of authentically
African origin. During my work as ambassador for
Egypt in Nairobi, I saw 15 Coptic churches
established in less than four years. Encouraging
the Coptic Church to play an active role in
Africa would enhance Egypt’s position, but
unfortunately this idea has not gained
widespread support in Egypt.
Mr Mohammed
Fayeq: I agree that cultural relations are
highly important. In this respect, they should
not be defined in religious, either Islamic or
Christian, terms. In much of Africa there is a
different approach to religion than in Egypt. It
is possible to find African families with
Muslim, Christian and Animist members. The
establishment of Quranic schools and the
activities of preachers during the fasting month
of Ramadan never used to be a sensitive matter.
Problems regarding religious activities emerged
as a result of political exploitation. In Sudan,
for example, the government promoted the notion
of jihad in the south, which was a grave
mistake, and served to deepen divisions between
Africans and Arabs. It also soured Sudan’s
relations with some of its neighbouring
countries.
Amb Ahmed Haggag: Our
relations with Africa should be based on the
pursuit of mutual interests. We must realise
that the Arab role is losing ground in Africa.
Meanwhile, the Arab world is still in
disagreement and disarray regarding its African
policy. The Algerian-Moroccan problem hinders
any prospect of Arab-African cooperation in the
context of the Arab League. The only
Arab-African conference was held in 1977, during
Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat’s term of
office.
When I worked for the African Union,
I participated in the creation of a project for
Arab investment in Africa, which could have
served as a prototype for wider economic
cooperation. But whereas this project received
the support of African countries, the Arabs
preferred to pursue relations on a bilateral
level.
Dr Iglal Raafat: It might be
better for Egypt to focus on its ancient
civilisation as its entry card to Africa rather
than its Arab credentials, which are a cause for
concern in a number of African states.
Mr
Mohammed Fayeq: Even in Sudan, there is a weak
following for pan-Arabism. It is more or less
limited to the population concentrated around
the Nile. For populations dispersed further out,
the unifying idea is Islam. Therefore, when a
weak regime reaches power in Khartoum, like the
one headed by Jaafar Numayri, it tends to adopt
an Islamist stance in order to rally all the
population in the north.
Dr Ahmed Youssef
Al-Karie: Egypt’s Arab dimension is a gain for
Africa, just as its African roots are a gain for
the Arabs. Egypt has to preserve both its
African and Arab identities, but must not impose
its Arab identity or Arab issues on its
relations with Africa.
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