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A DEADLY SPIRAL by Philip C. Wilcox Jr. December 9, 2001 It is a popular notion in America that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is intractable because of its history of hatred and zero-sum politics. There are ample grounds for such pessimism, including the savage attacks in Israel in early December by Islamist terrorists, Israel's harsh response, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's virtual rejection of Yasser Arafat as a partner for peace. Today, the Oslo peace process, begun with such hope in 1993, has gone up in smoke, and both sides are bludgeoning each other without any coherent strategy to end the impasse. The current crisis, the latest in a rising tide of lethal violence that began last year after the failure of the Camp David summit and grew after the election in January of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, could not have come at a worse time for the United States. Arab and Muslim governments, whose support the United States needs to combat terrorism, want us, in return, to press Israel much harder to liberate the Palestinians. President Bush had hoped that Secretary of State Colin Powell's eloquent speech on Oct. 19 and the mission of retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni to the region would bring about a cease-fire and set the stage for renewed peace talks. Instead, Zinni was greeted with a new spasm of terror and violence. Is all hope lost for a peace that can reconcile Israelis' need for security and Palestinians' demands for freedom and justice? Not necessarily. The Oslo process was flawed. But it created an historic consensus by Israeli and Palestinian majorities that they needed to end their historic conflict with a two-state solution. Today, polls show, paradoxically, that while majorities on both sides have lost hope in peace and support the use of force, both still want a two-state peace and are willing to compromise.

Yasser Arafat has been justifiably blamed for failing to articulate a coherent strategy. His leadership is now challenged by Islamist terrorists, as well as by a Palestinian "young guard" that resents Arafat's failure to deliver peace and his authoritarian and often inept and corrupt regime.

Arafat blundered when he made little effort to control the violence that erupted after the breakdown at Camp David and it has accelerated ever since. This helped elect the implacable Ariel Sharon and has alienated Arafat's erstwhile allies in Israel and Washington. Now, Arafat faces both Israeli and American ultimatums to lock up armed militants who foolishly believe they can force the Israeli army out of the West Bank and Gaza, and fanatic Islamists who dream of destroying Israel. Many of these militants no longer accept Arafat's authority, and he is now in a tight corner.

It is a mistake, however, to blame the current mess primarily on Arafat. The prevailing Israeli theme, deeply entrenched by now, that Arafat rejected a "generous offer" at Camp David and instigated the violence because he still dreams of destroying Israel is self-serving propaganda. The offer went beyond previous Israeli positions, but it was not "generous," and Arafat did not reject further talks. Indeed, considerable progress was made in talks after Camp David.

Arafat has not turned against peace and a two-state solution. The Mitchell Commission pointed out that the violence erupted as a spontaneous reaction against a prolonged and onerous occupation. Arafat's greatest mistake was his unwillingness to stop the violence in the belief that it would work to his benefit. Instead, it now threatens to devour him.

Ariel Sharon also deserves a heavy share of blame for the current crisis, as do his predecessors. The Palestinians expected that the Oslo Accords would lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. But between 1993 and 2000, this hope vanished as Israel continued aggressive settlement building, doubling the settler populace of the West Bank and Gaza from 100,000 to 200,000. The goal was to block the emergence of a genuine Palestinian state by creating "facts on the ground." Sharon himself has said that without the settlements, Israel would have ended its occupation of the territories years ago.

For Sharon, permanent peace with the Palestinians is less important than land and settlements. He believes passionately that Israel is destined to occupy and settle Jews in its ancient homeland, the West Bank and Gaza. He now concedes the possibility of a Palestinian state in 42 percent of those areas. But he insists that hundreds of settlements and surrounding roads must remain under Israeli control, leaving only small, non-contiguous enclaves for the Palestinians.

Sharon advocates strategic control by Israel over the occupied territories to protect its security. But the reality is that to preserve the settlements, Israel must use force to repress 3 million angry Palestinians who demand a state of their own. This is a formula for chronic conflict and disaster for both Israelis and Palestinians. Without abandoning most settlements and liberating the Palestinians, Israelis will never be secure.

Occupation of a subject people corrupts Israeli democracy and, if perpetuated, would become an ugly system of apartheid.

Sharon has relied exclusively on force to crush the intifada, and he has ordered assassination of terrorist suspects. Israel also has imposed draconian closures and other collective punishments that have made normal life impossible for most Palestinians, humiliated them, and destroyed their economy. The result is rage and violent rebellion.

If Arafat were a Nelson Mandela or a Martin Luther King, he might have risen above these travails, spoken directly to Palestinians and Israelis about ending violence, and offered a plan for peace and justice for both peoples. But Arafat is not a statesman or a communicator. He lacks the vision and imagination to call Sharon's bluff and regain the initiative for peace.

Instead, he has allowed the violence to flow, fearing that if he cracks down hard, he might lose his legitimacy in the eyes of his people and be scorned as a collaborator.

How then, can Arafat stop the violence and regain the support of the Americans and of his former Israeli allies, whom he needs, without risking his leadership?

Arafat's survival skills are legendary and he may muddle through again. But in the long run, he needs to offer his own people renewed hope of winning a Palestinian state through negotiations to stop the uprising. Unless he can present this hope and return to peace talks, the rebellion will continue, and if Arafat falls, the alternative would be far worse.

Sharon will not offer the Palestinians renewed hope. He fears real negotiations since he knows this would confront him with demands to compromise. If he does, he risks a challenge from his right wing rival, Benjamin Netanyahu. If he stonewalls, Shimon Peres and other Labor Party members in his "national unity" coalition would depart and restore an effective opposition.

Sharon says he supports the Mitchell Plan, which calls for a cease-fire, a settlements freeze, confidence building steps, and a return to negotiations. But he has attached unrealistic conditions that guarantee failure; for example, a seven-day period of absolute calm after a cease-fire and "100 percent" success thereafter. He also defines a settlement freeze to allow "natural growth," a ruse that Israeli governments have used to evade previous freezes and to continue settlement expansion. (Since January, Sharon has launched 25 new settlements.)

The only way to break this impasse, since both sides lack the will or incentives to do so themselves, is for the United States to provide a peace plan of its own. This would be a vision of peace that goes beyond the Mitchell Plan and addresses specifically the key issues: security, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees.

This vision would outline principles that most dispassionate observers of the conflict believe are the only viable outcome. It would draw from the near agreement that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators themselves struck at the final round of peace talks at Taba, before Sharon was elected and the process collapsed.

In presenting such a plan, the United States would promise sustained diplomatic support, but only if the violence is severely curtailed. Armed with such an American pledge, Arafat would be emboldened to face down the extremists and his public would support this. Such an American plan also would restore opposition politics in Israel and hope for traumatized Israelis, the majority of whom, unlike Sharon, would trade settlements and territory for real peace.

Sharon would find it hard to oppose such an American plan and preserve his government, if the Palestinians stopped the worst violence and the Israeli opposition signed on.

A bold, sustained American initiative like this, by restoring hope for peace, would be welcomed by the majority of Israelis and Palestinians if handled with skill and empathy. It also would shore up support in the Arab and Muslim world for President Bush's war against terrorism, and it would be welcomed here at home. Most Palestinians and many prominent Israelis now believe that such U.S. intervention is the only way to avoid a grim future for both peoples.

The time has come for American leadership.