The Bush
Administration once again is gearing up for war against Iraq.
It's a war that could cause a massive loss of life and could
end with the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or
Israel. It's a war that is unnecessary, a war we--as
progressives, as peace activists--have an obligation to oppose
with all nonviolent means at our disposal.
The attack-Iraq
lobby argues that the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein is
a necessary part of the war on terrorism. Saddam is indeed a
brutal tyrant and a perpetrator of terrorism against his own
people and neighboring countries, but there is no solid
evidence that he supported the Al Qaeda attacks of September
11. Bush has emphasized the danger of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction as a justification for deposing Saddam. Iraq's
weapons programs are certainly a threat to security, but there
are more effective ways of containing this danger. U.S.
officials would like nothing less than the installation of a
pro-American government that will do Washington's bidding and
open the country's oil wealth to Western companies. For these
purposes, the White House believes that the war option remains
a necessity.
The preparations for
battle are already under way. Senior U.S. commanders have
moved to the Persian Gulf region and have brought with them
1,000 war planners and logistical support specialists. General
Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command, has developed
options for deploying heavy tanks and mechanized infantry
divisions. Armored vehicles are already pre-positioned in the
region. The Air Force is transferring some of its operations
from Prince Sultan Air Base, where Saudi officials may refuse
permission for bombing raids against Iraq, to the al-Udeid
base in Qatar, where American pilots will be able to operate
freely. The Defense Intelligence Agency has produced a
classified report that identifies a long list of potential
targets for air attack. British officials have ordered their
commanders to begin preparations for possible operations in
Iraq. The stage is being set for what could be a large-scale
and bloody conflict.
Kenneth M. Pollack,
former Iraq specialist on the National Security Council,
argued in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs that
the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein would require a major
ground invasion by 200,000 to 300,000 U.S. troops. Air power
alone would not be sufficient. There is no equivalent in Iraq
of the Northern Alliance, which shouldered most of the burden
of fighting in Afghanistan. Kurdish forces in northern Iraq
and Shi'ite groups in the south fought against the Baghdad
regime after the Gulf War but were betrayed by Bush's father.
They are no match for Hussein's army of perhaps 400,000
troops. Although weakened by more than a decade of sanctions,
the Baghdad government retains a large military apparatus.
Removing the present regime and installing a pro-American
government will require the invasion and occupation of Iraq by
a substantial number of U.S. ground forces.
The onset of war, if
it comes, will likely occur in the first half of 2003.
Considerable time will be required for the transport and
deployment of military forces to the region. Arms
manufacturers will need additional months to replenish the
precision weapons expended in Afghanistan and to stockpile
inventories. Political factors will also complicate the
Administration's timeline. The conflict between Israel and
Palestine poses a dilemma for the war planners. A military
attack on Iraq would be unthinkable while the blood continues
to flow in Palestine and Israel. The Bush Administration's
interest in quieting the conflict in Palestine is motivated,
in part, by a desire to clear the way for military actions
against Iraq.
The U.S. electoral
calendar will also be a factor. The Administration does not
want to begin a major ground war with uncertain outcome before
the midterm elections, where control of the Senate is at
stake. Military preparations might be under way by then (to
rally the flag for Republican candidates and trump Democratic
criticisms of the Administration's domestic policy), but the
actual start of hostilities would likely come after the
November vote. Similar considerations suggest that the
Administration would want the war to be completed before the
2004 Presidential elections. Political and logistical
considerations thus point to the possible start of hostilities
in 2003.
Another complication
in the war scenario is the fate of U.N. weapons inspections.
If the goal is eradicating Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction, as President Bush insists, the surest means to
that end is not war but the resumption of intrusive
inspections. The destruction of Iraq's Scud missiles and most
of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons during the
1990s resulted not from U.S. military attacks but from U.N.
weapons inspections. The return of inspectors could neutralize
whatever remains of Iraq's weapons programs. The U.N. Special
Commission, UNSCOM, achieved considerable success in
dismantling Iraq's weapons during the 1990s, although it ran
into relentless resistance from the Baghdad government and was
forced to leave the country in December 1998, just ahead of
U.S. and British bombing raids. The successor agency, the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission, UNMOVIC, is ready to return inspectors to Iraq and
could complete the disarmament mandate if the Baghdad
government is willing to cooperate.
Saddam Hussein
recently re-opened the weapons inspection question in response
to U.S. war threats. Three rounds of talks have been held with
Secretary General Kofi Annan on the possible resumption of the
U.N. disarmament mission. Iraq has linked the return of
inspectors to an end to U.S. military threats and the lifting
of economic sanctions. Washington has refused to consider a
lifting of sanctions, however, even though the 1991 Gulf War
cease-fire resolution, which the United States helped to
write, specifies that sanctions will be lifted when the
disarmament mandate is completed. The promise to lift
sanctions in return for compliance with weapons inspections
would be a powerful inducement for Iraqi cooperation. It could
help to resolve the dispute over weapons and end the prolonged
sanctions-related suffering of the Iraqi people.
Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and others are openly dismissive of U.N.
weapons inspections. Rumsfeld claims that inspections could
never be intrusive enough to satisfy concerns about Iraq's
weapons programs. "I can't quite picture how intrusive
something would have to be," said Rumsfeld at an April press
conference. He and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
fear that a drawn-out diplomatic tangle over the terms of
inspection could impede the preferred use of force.
The debate about
weapons inspections will be crucial to the prospects for war.
The United States might attempt to take advantage of the
inspections issue to build support for military action. If
Baghdad refuses to permit inspections, or if it places new
obstacles in their way, Washington might provoke a crisis by
issuing an ultimatum. Iraq's refusal to comply with such an
ultimatum could then become the pretext for war.
There are many
reasons for opposing military action in Iraq. The first and
most obvious is the lack of a justification for war. Iraq has
not attacked or credibly threatened the United States. Its
weapons programs, while a serious concern, do not pose an
immediate threat to neighboring countries or the United
States. Under international law, one country is justified in
attacking another only when it is under attack or about to be
under attack. There is no casus belli here.
A second reason is
the potential human cost of war. Saddam has demonstrated his
willingness in the past to permit appalling losses of life in
the pursuit of his military and political ambitions. If he is
pushed against the wall in a final showdown with the United
States, he will bring many Iraqis and Americans down with him.
More than 100,000 Iraqis could die in such a conflict, and
casualties among U.S. forces might be significant, as
well.
Third, war in Iraq
could lead to the very use of weapons of mass destruction that
the Bush Administration says it wants to prevent. U.S. claims
about Iraqi weapons are greatly exaggerated, but it is likely
that Baghdad retains some chemical and biological weapons
capability. Saddam Hussein showed his willingness to use
chemical weapons against Kurdish villages and Iranian troops
in the 1980s, while he was a U.S. ally. If faced with military
defeat, Saddam might launch an attack against the only targets
he is capable of hitting--Israel or the assembled U.S. forces
in the region. If Iraq were to kill hundreds of Israelis, the
Sharon government might respond in kind, perhaps even using
nuclear weapons. The Pentagon's new doctrine, as articulated
in the Nuclear Posture Review, envisions the use of
nuclear weapons for precisely such purposes--to counter the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction by supposed
rogue regimes in the developing world. If large numbers of
U.S. troops were killed in an Iraqi chemical weapons attack,
the pressure for a nuclear response would be great.
A fourth concern is
the political damage that would result from war. The United
States would be acting almost entirely alone, and in the face
of strong opposition from many nations, especially in the Arab
world. The political rage sparked by an American war could
destabilize governments in the region and increase turmoil and
political extremism throughout the Middle East and beyond. It
would exacerbate anti-American hatred and produce new recruits
for suicide bombings against the United States or Israel.
A unilateral war
would also undermine the political cooperation needed for the
international campaign to isolate and de-fund Al Qaeda and
other terrorist networks. The success of this campaign against
terrorism depends on cooperation among police officials,
central bankers, and customs officers in many countries,
especially in the Middle East. This cooperation would be
jeopardized by unilateral U.S. action in Iraq. The United
States might win the battle against Iraq but lose the war
against terrorism.
A U.S. military
campaign against Iraq would set a dangerous precedent of
preemptive attack that violates the charter of the United
Nations and undermines the very foundations of international
law. U.S. and British officials speak openly of preemption as
a necessary response to the threat of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction. President Bush told West Point graduates in
June that "our security will require . . . preemptive action
when necessary." A senior British official recently told a
London seminar that the Western democracies can no longer
afford to rely on deterrence. They will not wait to be
attacked before responding, but will strike first to eliminate
perceived dangers before they arise.
This is the doctrine
of imperial arrogance. It is a philosophy little different
from that of aggressors throughout history. It is a formula
for endless war and military mobilization. Already the
Pentagon budget has jumped to nearly $400 billion a year, and
it will rise even further if the cycle of war and vengeance
spins out of control.
Because the dangers
of attacking Iraq are so grave, it may still be possible to
prevent this war. There are sharp differences of opinion in
Washington about whether and how to proceed with military
action. Conservatives as well as liberals fret over the costs
and uncertainties of war. Senior military commanders are
nervous about the possible use of chemical weapons and the
prospects of a prolonged military occupation. Some officials
are concerned about over-reach and question whether the United
States can meet continuing military commitments around the
world, including in Afghanistan, while mounting a major new
operation against Iraq.
Members of the
Senate are likely to demand a formal debate on military action
in Iraq as their constitutional prerogative. In the current
political climate, with Bush enjoying 70 percent approval
ratings, most Senators would probably go along with the
President if he decides to use force. A Congressional debate
would nonetheless place an obstacle in the way of the
Administration's march toward war, and it could provide a
focal point for mobilizing popular opposition.
Opinion polls show
considerable public skepticism about invading Iraq, despite
strong support for the war in Afghanistan. An April poll by
NBC and The Wall Street Journal found 88 percent
approval for the military action in Afghanistan, but more
limited support for possible war against Iraq. When asked if
the United States "should take military action against Iraq,"
57 percent said "should," while 28 percent said "should not,"
with 8 percent saying "it depends," and 7 percent undecided. A
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in March found
support for air strikes against Iraq but opposition to the use
of U.S. ground troops. When respondents were asked if they
favored using ground troops to invade Iraq, 50 percent said
no, while 46 percent said yes. Though this opposition to the
use of ground troops fell to 34 percent in a June Gallup Poll,
it is still significant. It means that the movement to oppose
the war in Iraq begins with an important base of potential
support.
As the prospect of a
U.S. ground invasion becomes more apparent, public skepticism
will only increase.
In order to build
and solidify anti-war opposition, it is imperative that peace
and justice activists mount an effective campaign of public
education and action. We must sound the alarm about the
imminent threat of war, highlight the costs and consequences
of military action, and propose viable policy alternatives. We
need to win the support of many of those who favored the war
in Afghanistan, as Michael T. Klare, professor of peace and
world security studies at Hampshire College, noted at a Tufts
University conference back in December. This means focusing on
the dangers of war in Iraq rather than dwelling on U.S.
misdeeds in the past. We should frame the anti-war message in
ways that appeal to mainstream audiences. We can do this by
emphasizing widely shared values and themes, such as
protecting the innocent, winning the campaign against
terrorism, cooperating with allies, and preventing the rise of
anti-Americanism. We should strive to ride the patriotic wave
and offer forward-looking solutions that uphold the best
traditions of American democracy.
It is also important
to provide constructive alternatives to war. We can't simply
ignore the Iraqi weapons threat or dismiss the menace that
Saddam Hussein poses to his people and his neighbors. But we
can argue that there are better ways of addressing these
concerns. The United States should work through the U.N.
Security Council to return weapons inspectors to Iraq. This
will require diplomatic flexibility and a willingness to offer
the lifting of all remaining civilian sanctions if Baghdad
accepts and cooperates with U.N. inspections. The United
States should also work with other nations, including Russia
and Iraq's neighbors, to enforce an effective arms embargo
after civilian sanctions are lifted. This would be a step
toward "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from
weapons of mass destruction," as specified in the original
Gulf War cease-fire agreement. These are viable policy options
that could address the Iraqi weapons threat without resorting
to war and with the full support of the United
Nations.
To convey our
anti-war message we must take action. Arrange delegation
meetings with members of Congress. Organize demonstrations and
vigils. Activate the religious community. Organize teach-ins
on college campuses and in communities. Raise the issue at
candidate forums. Introduce resolutions in professional
associations. Write letters to the editor and appear on radio
and television talk shows. Where funds are available, conduct
advertising and public relations campaigns. We must use every
means of citizen action at our disposal to build a chorus of
opposition to the madness of war in Iraq. It is not yet too
late to stop this war before it begins.
David Cortright is president of
the Fourth Freedom Forum, based in Goshen, Indiana
