Since the ouster of the Taliban regime, US policymakers
have feared becoming bogged down in Afghanistan. This has
locked them into a fixed approach, supporting a Northern
Alliance (NA)-dominated central government and buying the
cooperation of provincial warlords. However, ironically, the
danger of being bogged down is rising owing to the failure of
the US to show the tactical agility required to shape the
political-military situation in a way that would encourage
stability.
Adverse dynamics
In keeping with the desire to reduce the strategic
instability emanating from the country, the US objective is to
create an Afghan government that represents the aspirations of
the people; maintains a balance among ethnic groups; involves
various political groupings; serves as a competent partner for
economic reconstruction; and respects human rights. However,
the prospect of achieving this objective is rapidly receding
as a result of three dynamics and the inadequate US response
to them.
Firstly, the Panjshiri faction of the NA, a narrowly based
group of Tajiks led by First Vice-President and Defence
Minister Mohammed Fahim, wishes to monopolise power. Its grab
for power began when it unilaterally seized Kabul last autumn
against the express wishes of US President George W. Bush. The
faction occupied all ministries and appointed senior staffs to
them, while its leader, Burhannudin Rabbani, ensconced himself
in the presidential palace. At the December 2001 Bonn
conference, the NA exploited its dominant position on the
ground to win control over the key ministries – defence,
interior and foreign affairs – as well as the intelligence and
security service. NA leaders have used their control over the
instruments of force to coerce and intimidate political
rivals.
At the Loya Jirga in June 2002, Fahim and his
faction threatened to take up arms if the US did not block the
candidacy for head of state of the Pushtun former king, Zahir
Shah (who had the support of two-thirds of delegates). After
the US caved in to Fahim's demands, the Panjshiris
increased their control over the cabinet and key ministries.
Although their interior minister, Yunus Qanooni, nominally
gave up control of this ministry, his replacement – the
83-year-old Taj Mohammed Wardak – was related to the
Panjshiris by marriage and was too old to wrest control of the
ministry from the NA-appointed senior staff. Qanooni was soon
given oversight responsibilities for interior affairs. More
broadly, two-thirds of the cabinet positions were allocated to
individuals from groups aligned with the NA, while the Rome
group, centred around the ex-king and the NA's only organised
political rival, lost virtually all of its posts. Most
significantly, Fahim was given the additional post of first
vice-president, making him next in line to President Hamid
Karzai.
Secondly, regional powers have begun to intervene in
Afghanistan and the stage is being set for future proxy
battles. Fahim has secured support from Russia, both in
terms of money and advisers. Uzbekistan has supported favoured
ethnic Uzbek warlords. Meanwhile, Iran has played a
three-level game. Officials around President Mohammed Khatami
have cooperated, on the surface, with US diplomatic efforts.
Meanwhile, Iranian intelligence has been providing support to
its longstanding clients in the NA, both in Kabul and among
the warlords. Iran has also established two Hezbollah-style
clandestine networks, Sepah-e Mohammed and Sepah-e Sahaba,
that can be activated to attack US and coalition targets.
Pakistan appears to be preparing for a more active role once
the US presence wanes. Elements of Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) have reportedly been sheltering Taliban and al-Qaeda
leaders in tribal areas and cities. US officials have noted
that captured caches in eastern Afghanistan have contained
relatively new equipment that has probably come from Pakistan.
Thirdly, the warlords in virtually every region have
strengthened their positions. The US continues to fund
warlords seen as useful in the hunt for the remnants of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda. Others are backed by Iran, Russia or
Uzbekistan. Many have developed independent means of support.
For example, those who control border provinces, such as
Ismail Khan in Herat, are seizing virtually all customs duties
and passing little to the central government. Moreover, in
ethnic Pushtun, Uzbek and other areas where Afghans are
fearful of the Panjshiri-dominated government, warlords have
secured allegiance by providing some protection from the
perceived threat of Fahim's troops. As a result, the Karzai
government has had little or no success in extending its writ
beyond Kabul.
A move against Karzai?
The greatest immediate danger is that Fahim and the
Panjshiris will move against Karzai. Although Karzai has
consistently capitulated to the Panjshiris on personnel and
policy matters, the Panjshiris are unlikely to remain content
with him as head of state. Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayaf, the
political leaders of the NA, pointedly walked out during
Karzai's swearing-in ceremony. In public meetings since the
Loya Jirga, Fahim has been dismissive of Karzai,
telegraphing the message that Karzai rules at Fahim's
pleasure.
With Fahim now 'a heartbeat away' from the presidency, his
and the Panjshiris' next move could take several forms. From
the inside, controlling all the instruments of force, they
could execute a coup. Alternatively, they could engineer the
assassination of Karzai by individuals or groups giving them
plausible deniability – as many believe was the case in the
killing of Haji Qadir, the ethnic Pushtun vice-president who
reportedly had raised Fahim's ire by vying for control over
the interior ministry. Fahim and the Panjshiris can count on
support from radical Islamists, led by Rabbani and Sayaf, who
have been agitating against Karzai in mosques. It was not
without reason that Karzai requested that his Afghan security
forces, which reported to the Panjshiris, be replaced by US
Special Forces.
A secondary danger is a rebellion in the Pushtun areas.
Accounting for 40–60% of the population, Pushtuns are
significantly under-represented in the cabinet. The recent
skirmishing in western Afghanistan between Tajik and Pushtun
warlords may be a sign of renewed ethnic turbulence. If the
current political imbalance in Kabul radicalises a larger
segment of the Pushtuns, and if Pakistan's ISI organises and
supplies an opposition movement, civil war would not be far
away. If this transpired, the US and the coalition would be
left supporting a narrowly based and unpopular government.
Remedies
required
While these dangers require dramatic remedies, Washington
is being inactive or pursuing counterproductive policies in
virtually all areas:
• Rebalancing the cabinet. The transitional
administration's legitimacy was doubly undermined at the
Loya Jirga when the US blocked the selection of Zahir
Shah as head of state and Karzai ignored the evident demands
of the delegates to reduce the power of the Panjshiris; the
cabinet announced at the Loya Jirga contained no
Pushtun of political significance. The US further alienated
many Afghans by presenting the Loya Jirga as a great
success. Since the Loya Jirga, Karzai has taken minor
compensating actions, appointing one leading Pushtun from the
former king's movement to a newly created vice-presidency and
another to the commission to oversee the building of national
armed forces. Taking stronger actions to create a better
political balance would require the US to face down Fahim.
• Supporting moderate and secular political
movements. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, one of the
major cleavages is between radical Islamists and the moderate
and traditional forces typified by the former king's movement.
Washington appears not to understand that its policies are
tilting the playing field toward the Islamists. Almost all of
the political factions of the NA are pushing a radical
Islamist agenda. Unless Washington acts with dispatch, it will
be difficult to prevent the adoption of a constitution
grounded in a radical interpretation of sharia. This
would entrench Islamists and destroy the potential for greater
respect for human rights.
• Creating national armed forces. While US
policymakers have stated that Washington cannot disengage
until a national military has been created, the programme to
do so is progressing at a snail's pace. A factor here has been
Fahim's wish to make his own militia the foundation of a new
military. He has already appointed a command structure in the
ministry of defence that is dominated by NA commanders and
former Communist generals. US officials have recently
completed training of the first 350-man brigade. At this rate,
if the US intends to meet its commitment to build a
80,000-strong force, its training command will have to remain
in Afghanistan indefinitely.
• Undercutting regional warlords. Instead of
weakening the warlords, the US has been strengthening them.
Warlords have extracted US funds by selling themselves as
military proxies or as supposedly indispensable sources of
intelligence. In other cases, warlords have extorted
payments by periodically threatening to break with Karzai.
There is no credible strategy for bringing the warlords to
heel.
• Curtailing interventions by regional powers.
Afghanistan requires a strategy to limit external
intervention. However, the US and the coalition have addressed
this problem in an ad hoc fashion, mainly by pressuring
Islamabad to remain on the sidelines, but also by undertaking
a number of unsuccessful approaches to Tehran. The role of
Russia in buttressing Panjshiri power has not been addressed.
US policymakers appear oblivious to the fact that, if nothing
is done to reduce the dominance of Iran and Russia's clients
in Kabul, Islamabad will feel forced to react.
• Accelerating economic reconstruction. The cabinet
assembled at the Loya Jirga augurs badly for economic
reconstruction: fewer than half a dozen ministers have
advanced education or relevant professional competence in the
jurisdictions of their ministries. With many ministries
occupied by deputies of warlords and uneducated senior staffs,
the US and the coalition lack a competent partner to
accelerate reconstruction. Because providing large-scale
resources to a government of the present kind would be
irresponsible, donors may soon conclude that serious
reconstruction must be delayed for two years, when elections
are to be held.
Policy problems
Few in Washington recognise the need to recalibrate
the US approach. The internal policy contradictions have
developed for several reasons. Early on in the war, Bush made
the decision to choose the NA as the principal American proxy
in Afghanistan, and the problems resulting from this choice
have not yet made an impact at a high enough level to force a
reconsideration. Meanwhile, the National Security Council has
failed to play a strong coordinating role, so that agencies on
the ground – such as the armed services and the CIA – have
been able to pursue approaches that lack integration. The
military is comfortable with its arrangements with the NA and
individual warlords and is loath to roil the waters. The CIA
takes the view that the path to stability is to create a
government bringing all warlords together.
Facing down Fahim?
Impatience with Fahim is growing, and some US voices are
arguing for the need to marginalise him. However, this remains
the minority view: many US policymakers believe that the risks
of confronting Fahim are too great. They hope that, given
time, the present course will somehow work out. Yet matters
could change if Fahim moves against Karzai directly or threats
to Karzai from Fahim become undeniable. This is likely to
happen at some point before the elections, because the Loya
Jirga showed that the Panjshiris lack the popular support
to prevail in a vote.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – as
well as the residual US forces in Afghanistan – are the
principal restraints on Fahim and the Panjshiris, warlords who
might vie for more power, and groups unhappy with their roles
in the new regime. Without this military presence, open
conflict would quickly break out. However, partly because of
its small size (4,500 troops) and partly because its mission
is defined as 'assisting' the Kabul government's security
ministries, ISAF alone will not be able to create an
environment free of armed intimidation – at least not in its
present form. Ideally, the number of ISAF troops in Kabul
would be increased substantially, creating a large enough
presence to allow for demands that NA militias be withdrawn
from Kabul garrisons. However, the Pentagon is deeply
reluctant to expand ISAF, largely because of its aversion to
peacekeeping operations and because of the danger that ISAF
would become ensnared in local conflicts among warlords.
In the event that the US chooses to face down Fahim, the
key lever will be US strike capability. If Washington levies
major political demands, Fahim and the Panjshiris would
probably back down, knowing their own forces are relatively
undisciplined and having seen what happened to the Taliban on
the battlefield. To date, this proposition has not been
tested, because the US and the coalition have made concessions
whenever the two sides have differed. As Fahim and the
Panjshiris contemplate their next step, and as discontent
builds among Pushtuns and other disenfranchised groups, the US
risks an explosion in Afghanistan that would result in a
sudden descent into a quagmire.
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