

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in the wake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections. These developments highlighted the movement's political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur'anic schools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftist and pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create *de facto* political parties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almost *ex nihilo*, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt political one. There should have been very little surprise, therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80 seats in Parliament.

Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.¹ Since the foundation of the Emirate of Transjordan by 'Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet's tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been in the Hijaz. The ideology of the "Great Arab Revolt" was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpreted by the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.² King 'Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselves as believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.³ The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Islamic law (*Shari'a*) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the *Shari'a* courts. (However, in contrast to other Muslim countries where Islam plays a pivotal role, the Jordanian regime steered a middle course. It never declared the *Shari'a* as the sole source of legislation nor did it ever consider the implementation of the *hudud* as in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan

and Sudan. The constitution also guaranteed the civil rights and equality before the law of non-Muslims.)⁴

Political Islam has been an integral facet of the Jordanian regime and has traditionally played a prominent role as a social and political force with widespread influence in the mosques and schools. The earliest and strongest representative of the Islamist trend in Jordan is the Muslim Brotherhood, which made its debut in Transjordan and Palestine in the late 1940s and remained one of the most tenacious and deep-rooted political and social forces on both banks of the Jordan ever since.

As of the 1950s, the regime cultivated the movement and allowed it a wide range of religious, political and economic freedom in striking contrast to the ban on other political parties. The *raison d'état* behind this policy was the need to provide a counterweight to the clandestine political parties which denied the very legitimacy of the "Jordanian Entity": the Communist Party, various Nasserist groups, the pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi Ba'ath parties, and later on, the Palestinian fida'i organizations. At the same time, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood was vehemently anti-Egyptian. Giving the exiled Egyptian (and later Syrian) Brothers political asylum and a base for action in Jordan (fully integrated into and supported by the Jordanian Brotherhood) was Jordan's response, albeit low-profile, to incessant Egyptian subversion against the Hashemite regime.⁵ Under the protection of the regime, the Jordanian Muslim Brothers succeeded not only in developing their local infrastructure, but also in forging ties with their less fortunate counterparts in Egypt, Syria and as far afield as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Being one of the few branches of the Brotherhood which was not suppressed enhanced the relative importance of the Jordanian group.

The Islamic movement in Jordan should not be viewed only in its domestic political-ideological context. Like most other political movements in the country, the Islamic movement is part of a larger movement within the Arab Muslim world. The success of the movement in Jordan must be viewed, therefore, not only through the prism of Jordanian domestic politics but through that of the larger Islamic movement. Another, and no less important aspect, is the socio-ethnic dynamic of Jordanian society. The cleavage in Jordanian society between East Bankers, whose vested interests lay in the continuity of the "Jordanian Entity" as such, and the more volatile and less loyal Palestinian component, plays a pivotal role in the

make-up of most Jordanian political parties. The origins of the leadership of the Islamic movement and the extent to which it focused on the Palestinian constituency are crucial for understanding the politics of the movement. Finally, the Islamic movement in Jordan relates not only to the “masses” it wishes to lead, but to the regime to which it is opposed. The Jordanian regime (as represented in the ruling elite) has become more and more “secular” over the years; the devoutness which characterized King ‘Abdallah and much of his entourage, widely praised in the Islamic movement’s historiography, is not typical of the modern-day Western-educated Jordanian elite.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which is the main focus of this paper, is but one, though by far the largest and most threatening in the long run, of the Islamic movements in Jordan. Other political movements and underground organizations also base their political agenda on a fundamentalist or purist interpretation of Islam. Many of them, such as the Islamic Liberation Party (*Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami*) the various factions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian Hamas have their roots in Jordan and play a political role in the Kingdom. But they are basically “Palestinocentric” in their constituency and political orientation. Others, such as the *Da‘wa wa-Tabligh* (Call for Prayer and Mission), of Pakistani origin,⁶ and the Saudi *Salafīyyun* movement were “imported” from outside and, as such, remain outsiders to Jordanian politics.

The Birth of the Movement

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has its origins in the merging of two separate groups which represent the two components of the Jordanian public: the Transjordanian and the West Bank Palestinian. The movement evolved more or less during the same period of time both in Palestine and in the Emirate of Transjordan. Only after the West Bank was united with Transjordan, did the Islamic movements from both sides of the Jordan merge completely.

The Muslim Brotherhood (*Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, popularly abbreviated as “*al-Ikhwan*”) was founded in 1929 in Egypt by the Imam Shaykh Hasan al-Banna against the background of the political, social and intellectual crisis prevalent in British-dominated Egypt. The charismatic

al-Banna began his *Da'wa* (call to Muslims to repent and return to Islam) in the villages of Upper Egypt, and by the mid-1930s had founded a mass movement based on principles of general commitment to Islam as the cure for all the ills of society. Al-Banna's *Da'wa* was based on the puritanical Hanbali school of jurisprudence, relying heavily on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (fourteenth century) coupled with inspiration from the nineteenth-century *Salafi* teachings of Muhammad 'Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Rashid Rida. The essence of this old-new credo was the affirmation of the eternal relevance of Islam as set down by the Prophet (i.e., for the modern age as well), the need to purify Islam and return it to its original state (or the "straight path"), the identification of all Muslims as part of one *Umma* (nation) and an integrist view of Islam as both "religion and state" (*din wa dawla*). In accordance with this basic concept, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed as a state within a state, with its own mosques, charity organizations, schools, hospitals, youth movement and, later on, underground apparatus (*al-Nizam al-Khass* or *al-Jihaz al-Sirri*). However, the basic principle of the mainstream of the *Ikhwan* remained the building of an alternative Islamic society, which would eventually reform the state and bring the regime under true Islamic control.⁷

The *Da'wa* of the Egyptian *Ikhwan* outside the borders of Egypt began at an early stage of their development. The second article of the group's "Basic Regulation" (*Nizam Asasi*) states that "the Muslim Brotherhood is a universal Islamic body," i.e., not merely an Egyptian political association, but one destined to spread all over the Muslim world. Accordingly, the organization took the initiative from the mid-1930s onward in setting up links with like-minded groups in other Muslim countries (including non-Arab countries such as India and Afghanistan).

The first and most active external chapter of the organization was in Syria, mainly in the north of the country, in Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Latakia, but also in Damascus. These chapters, while linked to the Egyptian Brotherhood, were known by various names, though among themselves they referred to the movement in general as *Shabab Muhammad* (the Youth of Muhammad). Only at the fifth congress of the Islamic groups in Aleppo in 1944 did they assume the common name of the "Muslim Brotherhood."⁸ The sixth convention of the Syrian Brotherhood (in Yabrud, 1946) set the stage for a more active proselytizing role of the Syrian organization outside the country. It appears that the Syrian *Ikhwan* were

in contact with Palestinian supporters in the early 1930s,⁹ and were involved in the founding of a branch of the movement in Haifa.¹⁰

The first contacts between the Egyptian *Ikhwan* and Palestinians took place in 1927 when Shaykh Hasan al-Banna met with Hajj Amin al-Husseini in Cairo.¹¹ The meeting took place as part of the latter's drive to mobilize support for the Palestinian position in the conflict with the Jews over the *Haram al-Sharif* in Jerusalem and to boost his own legitimacy as the head of the Supreme Muslim Council. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was, of course, supportive of the Palestinian struggle, but the ties remained low key. In 1945, Hasan al-Banna sent his son-in-law, Sa'id Ramadan to Jerusalem to help set up a branch of the movement, followed by the official founding of the Association in Jerusalem on 26 October 1945.¹² Branches were formed in Lydda, Jaffa and Haifa.¹³ While the Jaffa branch was, by far, the largest and most active, the Jerusalem branch was, by the decision of Hasan al-Banna, to become the group's official headquarters and center of activity (until the unification with the Transjordanian branch).¹⁴

The support of the Mufti for the movement was self-evident: the new branch was headed by the deputy chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, Jamal al-Husseini. Shaykh As'ad Imam al-Husseini was chosen as Secretary General of the movement and Tawfiq Salih al-Husseini also played a prominent role in the new group.¹⁵

After the establishment of the Jerusalem headquarters, the movement continued to grow. By the beginning of 1947 it encompassed twenty-five branches in Jaffa, Ramleh, Tulkarem, Jenin, Nablus, Gaza, Khan Yunis, Beersheba, Nazareth, Acre and other towns, and boasted a membership of 12,000.¹⁶ All of these chapters considered themselves branches of the Egyptian organization (in contrast with the semi-autonomous character of the group in Syria at that time),¹⁷ and were founded under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, at the same time, the Mufti continued to be the primary religious authority in the eyes of most members, and the Brotherhood's political positions were indiscernible from those of the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee.¹⁸

The Palestinian movement held its first large conference in October 1946, in Haifa, with the participation of members from Transjordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The conference called for support of Pan-Arabism, for putting the Palestinian problem before the UN Security Council, for purging Palestine of Zionism (allowing the "Palestinian Jews" to remain),

for spreading the *Ikhwan Da'wa*, for support of the movement's General Guide, Hasan al-Banna, and of the movement in other countries.¹⁹ However, there is no doubt that the Palestino-centrism of the Palestinian *Ikhwan* was their outstanding trait at a time when other movements emphasized their transnational Islamic identity.

Meanwhile, the movement took root in Transjordan as well, under the leadership of Shaykh 'Abd al-Latif Abu Qura (b. 1909), a native of Salt from a prominent family of Syrian origin, who had moved to Egypt, where he received his religious education and became acquainted with the teachings of the Imam Hasan al-Banna. Abu Qura returned to Transjordan in the mid-1930s as the manager of the Transjordanian branch of a large trading company and began spreading the ideas of the *Ikhwan* in the country. The original group of the Brotherhood in Transjordan apparently banded together under Abu Qura in 1934 and included eight members of an Administrative Council (*Majlis Idari*): Abu Qura, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (a lawyer from Salt, later Abu Qura's successor as General Supervisor [*Muraqib 'Amm*] of the Brotherhood in Jordan), Ahmad al-Khatib, Yusuf al-Barqawi, Shaykh Jamil Barqawi, Mamduh al-Sarayira, Muflih al-Sa'd and Muslim al-Nabulsi. The group registered as a charitable association in 1935.²⁰

The official founding of the Association of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, however, came later. In 1945, Hasan al-Banna's son-in-law, Sa'id Ramadan, visited Transjordan as part of the tour which had brought him to Palestine.²¹ After prolonged lobbying, on 9 November 1945 the Association of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Jam'iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) was officially registered and Abu Qura became its first General Supervisor.²² On 19 November, the new movement inaugurated its General Center (*Maqar 'Amm*) in Jabal Amman, under the auspices of Emir 'Abdallah. He expressed his hope that the movement would have "no other aim but utter devotion to God, to His work for His sake and for the benefit of the Muslim Brothers." 'Abdallah invited Hasan al-Banna to visit Amman,²³ and even offered, in a letter to al-Banna, to nominate one of the members of the Egyptian movement, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abadayn, to a ministerial post in Transjordan.²⁴ The sympathetic attitude of 'Abdallah toward the Brotherhood was expressed on numerous other occasions over the next few years.²⁵ This attitude did not come to an end with 'Abdallah; the bond between the Hashemites and the *Ikhwan* in Jordan was to continue, albeit

with “ups and downs” due to the vicissitudes of political circumstances, well into the 1980s.

A short time after the official founding of the organization in 1947, it held elections for its Administrative Committee (*Haya Idariya*) or General Bureau (*Maktab ‘Amm*) and Abu Qura was officially designated the *Muraqib ‘Amm* (General Supervisor) of the movement (to differentiate the post from the *Murshid ‘Amm*, the General Guide of the Egyptian Brethren). As in Palestine, the movement soon became popular. According to one of the leaders of the Jordanian Ba‘th Party, the Brotherhood was the only real contender for the loyalties of the youth in Salt in the second half of the 1940s.²⁶

The Ikhwan in the 1948 War

As the political situation in Palestine deteriorated and the option of partition became more imminent, the Muslim Brotherhood—in Egypt, Syria and Transjordan—increased its interest and involvement in the Palestinian issue.

The height of this involvement came with the mobilization, by the end of 1947, of a “regiment” of volunteers of the organization from Egypt, Syria and Transjordan. *Ikhwan* sources place the number of volunteers who took part in the war at 10,000. Actually, the *Ikhwan* force comprised three “battalions.” The main force was about two companies of Egyptian volunteers deployed in the Negev in April 1948, which took part in the attacks on Kfar Darom, Nitsana (‘Uja) and Mashavei-Sadeh (Bir ‘Asluj) and finally fought in Bethlehem. An Egyptian-Syrian company eventually joined the force in the Negev and in Jerusalem. A third company consisted of about one hundred Transjordanian *Ikhwan* of the “Abu ‘Ubayda” company, under the formal command of Shaykh Abu Qura, the military command of an Arab Legion civilian officer, Mamduh Sarayira, and answering to the general command of the Transjordanian commander, ‘Abd al-Qadir Basha al-Jundi. The Transjordanian company deployed on 14 April in ‘Ayn Karem near Jerusalem, participated in the fighting over Ramat Rahel (Sur-Bahr) near Bethlehem and was later put under the operational command of the Egyptian *Ikhwan* commander. The friction between the Arab Legion and the Egyptian forces in the Jerusalem area

apparently contributed to the lack of confidence of the Legion's High Command toward the *Ikhwan*, and the company was abruptly withdrawn from the front "by orders from above" and sent back to Amman at the end of July 1948.²⁷

This ended the not especially significant participation of the Transjordanian *Ikhwan* in the Palestine campaign. The Palestinian *Ikhwan*, as a distinct group, took no organized part in the fighting. Nevertheless, their participation in the war was to become a major part of the political mythology of the Jordanian Brotherhood, which, unlike its Egyptian and Syrian compatriots, lacked a martyrology of regime oppression.²⁸

The Merger of the Palestinian and Transjordanian Brotherhoods

As the fighting subsided, the Jordanian Brotherhood sent Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa and Yusuf al-'Azam to meet with their Palestinian counterparts who had just come under Jordanian rule. As a result of these meetings, the Transjordanian *Ikhwan* founded a number of charitable organizations and youth movements.²⁹ There is no indication of a viable Palestinian organization at this point and it seems that the Palestinian Brotherhood was still under the trauma of defeat.

According to Khalifa, the Palestinian and Transjordanian chapters of the movement merged, *de facto*, as early as 1946.³⁰ However, it seems that the actual process of merging of the East Bank and West Bank movements began only after the war had ended and after it had become clear that Jordan had no intention of relinquishing the West Bank. It culminated with the nomination of Khalifa as *Muraqib 'Amm* in 1953. This process was basically reminiscent of the dynamics of merger of the Palestinian National Liberation League and the Transjordanian Marxist Cells to create the Jordanian Communist Party. However, unlike the pronounced Palestinian predominance in the leadership and ideology of the Communists,³¹ and despite the numerical majority of the Palestinian component in the Jordanian Brotherhood, the Palestinian *Ikhwan* seem to have joined the Transjordanian movement and not vice versa. The apparent reason behind this was the leadership void in the Palestinian Islamist

camp, which resulted from the defeat and dispersion of the Husseinis, who had been the backbone of the Palestinian movement. Their identification with the Mufti, 'Abdallah's nemesis in Palestine, also weakened the Palestinian Brotherhood (headed by Jamal al-Husseini) and would have made their prominence in a united movement more of a liability than an asset.³²

This disadvantage was highlighted further by the violent conflict between the *Ikhwan* in Egypt and the Egyptian authorities. After the war, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt increasingly fell out of favor with the government, eventually leading to the banning of the organization and to the subsequent assassination, by the *Ikhwan*, of the Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Fahmi Nuqrashi in December 1948. By that time, the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who was still most influential among the Palestinian *Ikhwan*) was closely identified with the Egyptian *Ikhwan* as well. The Mufti even testified in favor of Nuqrashi's assassins during the trial.³³

While the Palestinian *Ikhwan*'s ties with the Mufti disqualified their leadership in Jordanian eyes, the Jordanian movement enjoyed a strong leadership of its own, and the *Muraqib* 'Amm Abu Qura was perceived both as a close confidante of the Imam Hasan al-Banna (a claim that none of the Palestinian *Ikhwan* could make) and as a true *Mujahid*, having commanded the Brotherhood battalion in the war.

The Leadership Change in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

Shortly after the merger, however, Abu Qura found himself dealing with incessant challenges to his leadership. From 1951 on, his role in the day-to-day politics of the organization steadily diminished. During the second half of 1953 two wings emerged within the organization: a liberal wing which stressed religious rather than political activity (apparently closer to the ideas of Abu Qura) and a more politically oriented wing. The dispute was inflamed by a series of developments: the suppression of the Egyptian movement by the Egyptian government;³⁴ visits to Jordan (September 1953) by Egyptian Brothers, who advocated greater militancy; and alleged lobbying among the Jordanian *Ikhwan* for Abu Qura's

replacement, by a leader of the “Secret Organization” of the Egyptian Brotherhood.³⁵ The internal dissension within the Jordanian movement, along with Abu Qura’s flagging health, gradually weakened his position and finally led to his resignation.

The assassination of King ‘Abdallah in Jerusalem in July 1951, followed by the “liberal era” of King Talal, the uncertain early years of King Hussein’s reign and the increasing radicalization of the Egyptian Brotherhood all fuelled demands to replace the old guard with a younger, more energetic and militant leadership.³⁶ According to Abu Qura’s son, Ghalib, a major reason for his resignation was the internal debate within the organization concerning the expansion of the movement’s activities (until then only a “charitable organization”) to include participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Most of the membership supported a more politicized agenda than Abu Qura was prepared to accept. He submitted to the will of the majority and resigned.³⁷

On 26 December 1953, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, a *qadi* in Madaba (born in Salt), was elected by the movement’s administrative committee as the new *Muraqib ‘Amm*, a post he held until 1994. While Khalifa, like his predecessor, was an East Banker, his election seemed to have reflected the new political and national make-up of the organization. Unlike many of his colleagues who had received their religious and academic education in Cairo, Khalifa had been educated from 1934 to 1944 in various schools in Syria and Palestine. During this period, he established close ties with Palestinian Islamists. He was jailed for about eight months in 1948 by the Jordanian authorities for his criticism of the incompetence of the Arab armies in the war.³⁸ As mentioned above, Khalifa had headed the delegation of the Transjordanian Brotherhood to the West Bank after the war. The “Palestinian chapter” in his biography became an important asset when the movement had to decide on a new leader.

Organizational Structure and Membership

The new *Muraqib ‘Amm* began by reorganizing the movement, adapting its structure to the Jordanian environment through a new basic code (*qanun asasi*) and internal regime (*nizam dakhili*). The structure was based on

that of the Egyptian movement before its development of a more clandestine organization, but was not identical to it, considering that Jordan was a much smaller country. The structure of the movement, from 1954 onwards, was based on two levels: the local branch (*shu'ba*) which usually corresponded to a city or a group of villages; and the national level. The *shu'ba* was managed by an administrative committee (*haya idariya*) or general committee (*haya 'amma*) headed by a delegate (*na'ib*), which elected the members of the national level consultative council (*majlis shura*). Every four years the *majlis shura* elected a managing body, known as the general bureau (*maktab 'amm*) or executive bureau (*maktab tanfidhi*), and the *Muraqib 'Amm*. Unlike the Egyptian organization, the Jordanian movement lacked both the clandestine unit—*usra* (family), which served in Egypt as a compartmentalized sub-division of the branch—and intermediary provincial structures.³⁹

Upon reorganizing the movement, Khalifa applied for, and received, a license from the government (under Tawfiq Abu al-Huda) as “a comprehensive and general Islamic Committee,” instead of the previous basis of operation under the “Societies and Clubs Law.” Khalifa justified the need for this step by alluding to the complex essence of the movement:

We are not a political party, though we believe that political action is part of Islam. Neither are we a charitable society, though charitable action is an indivisible part of our call, and we are not a sports club, though physical training goes hand in hand with our spiritual education and ideological culture...The decision [to license the movement] has given...sanction to spread its call in the mosques, public places and the Brotherhood's premises. It also enables it to open branches all over the country, to be administered by general committees and to act in absolute freedom without intervention of the security authorities, unless a breach of law occurs.⁴⁰

The sociological make-up of the movement differed from rural to urban areas and from the West to the East Bank. The majority of the members came from the upper-middle class (merchants, craftsmen, property owners, teachers) and included relatively few professionals.⁴¹ By 1955, the movement had approximately 6,000 members in at least 19 branches in Jordan: on the East Bank, in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Zarqa, Jarash, Karak,

and the refugee camps of Karama and Jabal Hussein, and on the West Bank, in Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, and the refugee camps in Jericho. Thus, the Palestinian *Ikhwan* were totally absorbed into the Jordanian movement and did not maintain any formal separate organizational identity. Nevertheless, the regime had reservations about the spread of the movement in the West Bank (in contrast to its acceptance of the movement in the East Bank) and even occasionally withheld authorization of new branches, out of concern that the Palestinian branches might serve as a cover for the activities of the exiled Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini.⁴² In addition to the formal branches, the movement also ran a para-military Boy Scout movement, which indoctrinated its members according to the teachings of the *Ikhwan* and mobilized them for political demonstrations whenever necessary.⁴³

Despite the movement's ubiquitous presence in the refugee camps, its leadership and senior members came mainly from upper class East Bank families. The predominance of the East Bankers in the central leadership of the movement is striking. These included Khalifa, 'Abdallah Abu Qura ('Abd al-Latif's brother and one of the richest men in Amman), Shaykh Hamza al-'Arabi (of Hijazi origin and the head of the *Shari'a* courts in Jordan), and Shaykh Hilmi al-Idrisi (inspector general for the *Shari'a* courts). West Bankers in the leadership were few and far between. Most of them were religious scholars educated in al-Azhar, who joined the Brotherhood during their studies in Egypt.⁴⁴

Crystallization of the Ideology

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, unlike its Syrian counterpart, regarded itself first and foremost as the Jordanian chapter of its Egyptian predecessor. This is readily apparent from the adoption of the name, symbols and style of leadership of the Egyptian movement and is likewise reflected in the Jordanian organization's ideological tenets. The basic ideological document which served the group in its initial years was the May 1948 constitution which outlined the movement's religious, social and political goals. Article Two of the constitution describes the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization which works for "the realization of the aims for which Islam has come to earth." These are:

1. To preach the doctrines of the Qur'an.
2. To bring Muslim individuals and groups together by familiarizing them with the principles of the Qur'an.
3. To develop, protect and liberate the national wealth and raise the standard of living.
4. To realize social justice, combat poverty, disease, vice and ignorance.
5. To restore Palestine and liberate the Nile Valley, the Arab countries and the Muslim countries from any foreign power, assist Muslim minorities, support the unity of Muslims, and work for Islamic federation.
6. To work for the creation of the righteous state, which will implement Islamic doctrines and teachings internally and propagate them abroad.
7. To support international cooperation and to participate in the consolidation of peace and human civilization.⁴⁵

These general principles were augmented on 3 April 1954 by a set of principles which referred directly to the Jordanian character of the movement. These stipulated that:

1. Jordan is an inseparable part of the Islamic world.
2. The Muslim Brotherhood rejects any regime which is not based on Islam.
3. The Muslim Brotherhood will not support any government unless it implements Allah's law (*Shari'a*).
4. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is part of the Islamic movement in the Islamic world (according to a different version, "part of the Islamic movement in Egypt" [sic]).
5. The Muslim Brotherhood regards the Palestinian problem as an Islamic problem and will concentrate all its material and moral resources to liberate Palestine from world Jewry and the international Crusaders.⁴⁶

The ideology of the Jordanian Brotherhood vacillated between strident demands for the reconstruction of the Islamic state, following the example of the Prophet and the first four righteous Caliphs, and the *de facto* legitimization of the Hashemite regime. The support for the regime frequently placed the movement in an ideological bind. The incorporation of "infidel" (British) law in the judicial system, the equality of non-Muslims (i.e., Christians) before the law (in contrast with the Islamic concept of *Dhimma*), the regime's Western educational orientation, and the non-enforcement of Islamic precepts in reference to the status of women all contributed to the ideological dissonance inherent in this situation.

The Brotherhood's stance on current political issues, on the other hand, was much easier to reconcile with its support of the regime. Jordan's political rivals were frequently identical with those of the Brotherhood (Egypt for most of the 1950s and 1960s; Syria in the early 1980s; Israel except for periods of peace initiatives). Jordan's Arab allies (Saudi Arabia from the mid-1950s) enjoyed the Brotherhood's support, and international issues it supported were legitimate in the regime's view (Algeria's liberation struggle, anti-Communism, and opposition to Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni civil war). It was, therefore, fairly easy for the Brotherhood to promote its ideas without coming into conflict with the regime.

A subject which was central but shrouded in ambivalence in the Brotherhood ideology was the attitude toward Pan-Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*). The Brotherhood, apparently influenced by Sayyid Qutb's rejection of Arab nationalism as contradictory to the Pan-Islamic identification, regarded this brand of transnational identity as Nasserist in form and content, and as totally contradictory to the goal of Islamic unity. It was therefore unacceptable. This all-out rejection of Arab nationalism was even more vehement than the position of the Egyptian Brotherhood on this subject. However, while the regime could accept the anti-Nasserist feature of the Brotherhood's rejection of *qawmiyya*, the call for a radical Islamic unity was less appealing to the monarchy.⁴⁷

Hizb al-Tahrir

The predominance of East Bankers in the Jordanian *Ikhwan* seems to explain the identification of the *Ikhwan* leadership with the "Hashemite entity," if not necessarily with all its policies. However the communal constitution of the organization was one of the factors behind the breaking away of the mainly Palestinian and radically anti-regime *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami* (Islamic Liberation Party). The party was founded by Taqi al-Din Ibrahim Yusuf al-Nabahani and was led by him until his death in 1977. Shaykh Nabahani was born near Haifa and studied (1928-32) at al-Azhar in Cairo. During the course of his studies, Nabahani concluded that the only cure for the troubles of modern-day Islam was the restitution of the *Khilafa* (the regime of the Caliphs within one united Muslim state). Upon his return to Palestine, Nabahani served as a lecturer on *Shari'a* and later

on as a *qadi* and became known as a follower of the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini. In 1941 he founded, together with Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib, an Islamic society in Haifa, *Jam'iyat al-I'tisam*, which in the course of time became a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nabahani refused, however, to accept the merger of the association with the Brotherhood and continued to maintain his own independent position.⁴⁸

During the 1948 war, Nabahani fled to Syria. He subsequently returned to Jerusalem where he secured a position as a *qadi* in the *Shari'a* Court of Appeals through his connections with the Mayor of Jerusalem, Anwar al-Khatib, and the Jordanian Military Governor, 'Abdallah al-Tall. During his period, he began to attract followers, including Shaykh As'ad Bayud al-Tamimi (years later the head of the Bayt al-Maqdas Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and others, almost all Palestinians. Many of Nabahani's followers were initially involved in the Palestinian branch of the *Ikhwan*. However, the two groups differed ideologically over the centrality of the Palestinian cause in their Islamist ideology (Nabahani placed Palestine at the core of his early writings) and on the course toward the establishment of the Islamic State. While the *Ikhwan* called for an incremental reform of Muslim society in order to achieve political power and then to form the Islamic State, Nabahani formulated a program for the re-creation of the Caliphate following the stages of the Prophet's Mission: first, underground activity; then, *Jihad* and *Da'wa*; and finally, after taking control of the regime, the Islamization of *Jahili* society.⁴⁹

Tahrir's position on clandestine activity was probably the major obstacle to cooperation between Nabahani's group and the Brotherhood. In 1952 the group asked for recognition as a political party, but the licence was refused on the grounds that the party's ideology might provoke religious tension among Jordan's citizens. Leaders of the party were also arrested in order to drive home the government's disapproval of their radical intentions.⁵⁰

While the *Ikhwan* served for the most part as a "loyal opposition," *Tahrir* was never accorded formal legitimacy in Jordan, neither as a political party nor as a religious association. All the same, *Tahrir* candidates stood for election for parliament in 1954 and 1956. Only Ahmad Da'ur from Tulkarem was returned—in both elections—and even then through cooperation with the local *Ikhwan*.⁵¹ In the early 1950s there were a number of attempts to absorb *Tahrir* into the Muslim Brotherhood, but all

failed. Their ideologies and policies had drifted apart to such an extent that there remained very little basis for unification.⁵² Since the party had to operate underground, authoritative data on the scope of its membership is hard to come by. In 1955 its membership was estimated by the American Embassy in Amman at over 6,000 (which seems exaggerated),⁵³ whereas by 1958 the party was barely mentioned by the same source as “a small grouping of...fanatic Islamic ‘fundamentalists’...”⁵⁴ Its local Jordanian leadership was arrested and expelled by the late 1950s. Despite attempts to launch a campaign for public support,⁵⁵ in 1961 its local core membership was estimated to be no more than 300.⁵⁶

The Ikhwan in Jordanian Politics, 1953-1956

One of the first demonstrations of political muscle by the Jordanian Brotherhood after the unification of the two banks was the convening of the General Islamic Conference (*al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-'Amm*) in Jerusalem in December 1953, ostensibly to discuss religious matters pertaining to the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque.⁵⁷ About sixty Muslim Brotherhood delegates from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Maghrib participated in the conference along with representatives from Jordan.

Despite the purported religious goals of the conference, its resolutions focused on the political aspects of the conflict with Israel. They called for:

1. The acceptance of responsibility by the Islamic peoples for the Palestinian question, regarding the defence of Palestine as the “inescapable and immediate” personal duty of every Muslim.

2. The non-recognition of the “situation caused by the Jews in Palestine”—its partition and occupation—considering it an aggression against all Muslims.

3. The rejection of peace or dealings with Israel, considering them as treason that ought to be punished as such. (Considering the allegations against King ‘Abdallah just three years before, such a resolution was clearly directed against Jordan.) Moreover, any thought of internationalizing Jerusalem should be considered a plot against the Muslims.

4. The preparation of equipment and popular forces to struggle for the return of the refugees.

5. Warning the imperialist powers, which established Israel, of the

hostility of the Islamic peoples.⁵⁸

The tolerant, or even sympathetic, attitude of the Jordanian regime vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood under ‘Abdallah faded as Jordanian politics became ever more tumultuous in the early 1950s. The change in the domestic political climate in Jordan stemmed from numerous causes: the annexation of the West Bank along with the enormous population of embittered Palestinian refugees; the assassination of ‘Abdallah, the uncertainty of Tallal’s reign and the perception of Hussein as a young and inexperienced ruler whose days may be numbered; Hussein’s own “democratic” proclivities put into practise by Prime Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi; and the inflammatory effect of border clashes with Israel (such as Qibya, 14 October 1953; Nahhalin, 28 March 1954). These new circumstances came to bear in the elections to the new Jordanian Parliament in October 1954. Ideologically-oriented political parties began to emerge and it was clear that the country was entering a time of uncertainty, if not instability.

Until 1954, the Jordanian Brotherhood was seen by outside observers as relatively innocuous and basically supportive of the regime. However, domestic developments did not leave the Muslim Brotherhood unaffected. The incorporation of the Husseini-affiliated Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood into the Jordanian movement also added a new and hostile dimension to the movement’s challenge in Jordan. Furthermore, the movement’s strong affinity with and support of their Egyptian colleagues made them a liability for the already beleaguered Jordanian regime. After a short “honeymoon” the relations between the Egyptian Brotherhood and the Free Officers regime began to deteriorate; in January 1954, the movement was outlawed and its leaders were arrested. The struggle between the new regime and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood evoked a popular response in Jordan, which tended to radicalize the Jordanian movement.

The movement began to flex its political muscle by organizing large demonstrations against Israel, “Western imperialism” and the Egyptian regime. The Brotherhood was the first political group in Jordan to organize a protest after the Israeli reprisal raid on Qibya. In February 1954, the movement accused the Egyptian regime of disbanding the Egyptian Brotherhood in order to pursue a policy of “peace with Israel and friendship with Britain and the United States.” While the Brotherhood was still perceived as a mainly “religious force,” politics were assuming a greater

share of its religious teachings.⁵⁹ The Jordanian government was even said to have confiscated a shipment of arms from the Egyptian Brotherhood to the Jordanian movement.⁶⁰ While the shipment may have been destined for the (para-military) National Guard, which the Brotherhood openly dedicated itself to arming, the confiscation was indicative of the deteriorating mutual trust between the government and the movement.

The new leadership of the Jordanian movement became increasingly involved in contacts with sister movements in other countries. ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa was one of the more radical and outspoken delegates at a meeting in March 1954 in Damascus, the first of its kind, of Brotherhood organizations from all over the Arab world, convened to discuss the situation of the Egyptian movement and the general political situation. During the meeting Khalifa vociferously attacked “American and British plots” and, more ominously, castigated the Arab leaders and the Arab League, warning that revolutions might break out in “some Arab countries” as a result of their acquiescence in the repression of the Egyptian Brotherhood.⁶¹ A few days later, possibly encouraged by Khalifa, who could not make such severe anti-Jordanian statements with impunity, the leader of the Syrian Brotherhood called for the Arabization of the Arab Legion, attacked the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and, appealed for the arming of the refugees along the border with Israel, accusing Jordan of neglecting their security.⁶²

In June 1954, the *Ikhwan* instigated demonstrations at an agricultural experimental station near Amman, in protest against the station’s serving of beer on its premises. They called for the dismissal of two ministers, the closure of all cabarets in Jordan, the dismissal of Glubb Pasha and the Arabization of the Arab Legion. Jordan could not afford to ignore the politicization of the movement. The incremental change in policy began in early 1954. Khalifa was rebuked by Prime Minister Abu al-Huda after approaches through indirect channels failed to bring him to heel and he was warned that the Brotherhood had no right to interfere in politics.⁶³ The General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Hasan al-Hudaybi, while on a tour of Arab countries, was barred in June from entering Jordan, where masses of Jordanian followers awaited him.⁶⁴ The official organ of the Muslim Brotherhood *al-Kifah al-Islami* (The Islamic Struggle), which began to appear in May 1954, was shut down by the authorities. It reappeared on 8 August 1954, only to be closed again two weeks later, along with the Ba‘thi (*al-Yaqza*), the Communist (*al-Jabha*)

and the Qawmiyyun's (*al-Ra'y*) newspapers, for their campaign against the British officers in the Arab Legion.⁶⁵ Finally, at the end of 1954, the Jordanian government refused to allow the "Islamic Conference" to convene,⁶⁶ and deported its Egyptian secretary, Kamil al-Sharif, along with other Egyptian *Ikhwan*, who then transferred the activities of the Conference to Damascus.⁶⁷ Ironically, but typical of King Hussein's *modus operandi*, Sharif was later granted asylum in Jordan and Jordanian citizenship and would become the Jordanian Minister of *Awqaf*. The Conference too was eventually co-opted by the Jordanian regime and became a tool of the Ministry of *Awqaf*.⁶⁸

The run-up to the parliamentary elections of October 1954 was an unsettling period for Jordan. The controversial elections coincided with other destabilizing political developments: the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of July 1954; the American attempts, during 1954, to organize a "Northern Tier" defense pact against the Soviet Union, which culminated in the Baghdad Pact (the Turkish-Iraqi treaty was signed in February 1955, and Britain, Pakistan and Iran acceded in April, September and October respectively); and the growing Nasserite pan-Arab sentiment in the entire Arab East, including Jordan. All of these contributed to King Hussein's uncertainty and to a retreat from his initial liberalism to the more cautious and heavy-handed domestic policy of his grandfather.⁶⁹

The resignation of Prime Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi in May 1954 and his replacement by the old-guard and hard-line Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who remained in office after the October elections, were indicative of the new conservative mood. The election campaign was the most volatile Jordan had ever seen. While the Brotherhood refrained from participating in the elections as a political party, it was active in protests and demonstrations against the proposed Western alliance. The authorities arrested large numbers of opposition figures, and many opposition candidates withdrew from the race at the last moment under pressure from the regime. These measures led to widespread disturbances and to charges immediately following the elections that they had been rigged. Needless to say, most of the opposition nationalist and Ba'athi candidates had failed to win seats in Parliament.⁷⁰

While the regime was wary mainly of the Communists and the Ba'ath, the political atmosphere generated ever increasing repression of all ideological parties. In the wake of the elections, the new Minister of

Interior, Riyad al-Muflih, obviously with the backing of the king, initiated a policy of close surveillance of the Muslim Brotherhood and “full support of Egypt in its campaign to deal with the Brothers.” The preachers in the mosques were “advised” to include expressions of support for the monarchy in their Friday sermons,⁷¹ and a new “Sermons and Guidance Law,” regulating activities in the mosques, was introduced.⁷² At the same time, the authorities began to crack down on *Tahrir*. Nabahani himself had already gone into voluntary exile in Beirut in 1953, and in 1955, at least ten prominent leaders of the party were arrested for infringements of the “Sermons and Guidance Law.” The government also issued new directives to contain *Tahrir* activities within the Arab Legion.⁷³

The tension between the more vociferous Brotherhood and the Abu al-Huda government reached new heights in mid-March 1955. The Minister of Interior issued a warrant for the arrest of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, who had been “visiting” in Damascus ever since the wave of arrests that had preceded the 1954 elections. The purpose of this move, according to the Under-secretary of Interior, Sa’d Jum‘a, was to deter Khalifa from returning to Jordan and thus to facilitate his replacement as head of the movement by a “less fanatic and more reasonable” leader. The warrant was cancelled in May by the personal intervention of the king, following petitions by the Iraqi *Ikhwan* leader, Shaykh Muhammad Mahmud al-Sahhaf and a Syrian *Ikhwan* delegation to the king, headed by the Syrian *Muraqib* ‘Amm, Shaykh Mustafa al-Siba‘i.⁷⁴ During this period, in April 1955, the Jordanian Chief of Staff stressed in a directive dealing with the “destructive organizations” operating in the country (i.e., Communists, etc.) that while the Muslim Brotherhood was not to be included in this category, it should be closely watched to ensure that it did no harm to the interests of the Kingdom. In the West Bank, where the Brotherhood was in fierce competition with more radical groups, the authorities put restrictions on their regular activities (lectures, etc.).⁷⁵

In the winter of 1955-56 the Jordanian domestic scene was driven to the brink. In April 1955 Britain joined the Baghdad Pact and ‘Abd al-Nasir took the public opinion of the Arab world, Jordan included, by storm with his triumphant appearance at the Bandung Non-Aligned Conference. East-West friction was exacerbated in September by Egypt’s announcement of its Czech (i.e., Soviet) arms deal. At the end of the year, King Hussein was coming increasingly under Western pressure to join the pro-Western

Baghdad Pact. The Jordanian public took to the streets in unprecedented anti-Western riots. Suggestions by the king to stem the tide of violence by dissolving Parliament and calling for early elections were of no avail. The riots continued and the king informed the British that accession to the Pact had become impossible.⁷⁶

Under these circumstances, despite the regime's clear warnings to the Brotherhood, it became increasingly militant, adopting the primarily leftist-defined political agenda in the country. The Brotherhood was actively involved in the Egyptian- and Saudi-instigated rioting against the Baghdad Pact (their antipathy to Nasir notwithstanding). On 9 and 12 January 1956, the Brotherhood collaborated with its greatest political adversary, the Communists, in planned attacks on a Quaker development project at 'Ayn Dibbin and the Baptist Mission Hospital in 'Ajlun. (However, after attacks on Christians in Madaba, the Brotherhood took care to distance itself by issuing a call to its followers not to indulge in "fanatical religious disputes"—apparently after having been pressured by the government.)⁷⁷ They did, however, join the left in agitating for the dismissal of Glubb Pasha and the Arabization of the Arab Legion. The General Supervisor and other leaders of the Brotherhood were arrested again in an attempt to cool the movement's populist enthusiasm.⁷⁸

The Crisis of 1956-1958 the Ikhwan s Alliance with the Regime

The king acceded to popular pressure and dismissed Glubb on 1 March 1956. Subsequently, on 26 June, in the prevailing atmosphere of national euphoria and inter-Arab rapprochement, he dissolved Parliament and called for elections to be held on 21 October. Meanwhile, the growing strength of the leftist and pro-Nasserist parties brought about a re-assessment of the regime's policy toward the *Ikhwan*. From July 1956 on, the officials of the General Islamic Conference (with its undisguised *Ikhwani* identity) were permitted to renew their activities in Jerusalem and Sa'id Ramadan and Kamil al-Sharif were allowed back into Jordan. However, the regime put Shaykh Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti at the head of the Conference and from 1958 onwards employed it as another tool in the struggle against

the United Arab Republic (UAR).⁷⁹

The elections of 1956 presented the Brotherhood with a new dilemma. The “Association” was not registered as a political party and had refrained from presenting candidates in previous elections. Furthermore, non-participation was the natural choice of some of the members of the movement, who had by this time come closer to the views of the radical Egyptian *Ikhwan* leader, Sayyid Qutb, who regarded Jordan as an unviable and illegitimate entity whose only redeeming political value was its potential as a base for the struggle against Israel.⁸⁰ The new political situation in Jordan, therefore, confronted the movement with difficult political and ideological options. Non-participation in what promised to be the freest elections ever in Jordan seemed tantamount to political suicide, especially since *Hizb al-Tahrir* was expected to run. Registration as a political party, on the other hand, would have stripped the movement of the advantages it enjoyed as a purely religious association. Moreover, while the movement shared some of the left’s political agenda, there was little room for positive co-operation between the Brotherhood’s Islamist anti-Egyptian platform and the secularism of the Communists or the Ba‘th or the pro-Nasserism of Sulayman al-Nabulsi’s National Socialists. The movement found the happy medium by presenting its candidates on non-party tickets, while clearly indicating its support for them. Thus, the movement, as such, did not declare itself a political party nor forfeit its preferential status as a religious association.

Despite its ambiguous political status, and even more ambivalent ideological and political position vis-à-vis the regime, the Brotherhood succeeded in returning four deputies—three from the East Bank and one from the West Bank—and thus became the second largest faction in Parliament.⁸¹

On 27 October, the king called on Sulayman al-Nabulsi (who had been defeated as head of the National Socialist Party in Amman by the Muslim Brotherhood candidate) to form the first, and to date the last, left-wing Jordanian government. The king’s decision put the Brotherhood on the horns of yet another dilemma: they approved of the government’s anti-Western platform but detested its support of ‘Abd al-Nasir. Its deputies supported the new Government in the initial vote of confidence along with all other deputies (except for Shaykh Ahmad Da‘ur from *Tahrir*). However, their antipathy toward Nasir and his Jordanian supporters

effectively precluded their participation in Nabulsi's government.⁸² During Nabulsi's short-lived term in office, the Muslim Brotherhood MPs remained in opposition, taking full advantage of the political constraints on the new government, which prevented it from actually implementing many of its positions on foreign policy. The Brotherhood MPs ridiculed Nabulsi's hesitant approach to the Suez crisis, which broke out a short time after he took office, and voted against the government-approved technical and economic agreement with the United States.⁸³

On 2 February 1957, the king sent a letter to the Prime Minister which was subsequently published in the press, warning him against the "strange views (which) have infiltrated into our midst..." and urging the government to ensure that "no gap be left to allow the propaganda of Communism to ruin our country."⁸⁴ It was reported at the time that the king had met with 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa before releasing the letter, in order to guarantee the support of the *Ikhwan*.⁸⁵ This support was indeed forthcoming in the form of an enthusiastic front page editorial by Khalifa himself in the Brotherhood's organ *al-Kifah al-Islami*, entitled "This is Part of What We Want,"⁸⁶ and in pamphlets distributed by the Brotherhood in the streets of Amman.⁸⁷ The conflictual relationship between the Nabulsi government and the throne came to a head on 10 April when the king forced Nabulsi to resign. The king later explained the move as stemming from the Cabinet's disregard for his directives and its permission for subversive elements "to sow seeds of discord and sedition in the country."⁸⁸

The king's expectation of support from the Brotherhood against Communism was well founded. The animosity between the two diametrically opposed ideological movements was the fiercest in Jordanian politics. The Brotherhood stood firmly behind the throne both at this juncture and during the ensuing 'Ali Abu Nuwar coup attempt.⁸⁹ Members of the Brotherhood in Jericho even received arms to assist the regime in intimidating the leftist opposition,⁹⁰ and Brotherhood preachers called upon their flock to assist the authorities in searching for Communists in hiding and to turn them in.⁹¹ This position proved to be one of the Brotherhood's most prudent political moves since its appearance on the Jordanian scene. When all political parties were outlawed in April 1957, the Brotherhood was allowed to continue to operate, ostensibly because of its "religious" vocation, but in practice because it was perceived to be a most effective counter-weight to the secular leftists.

The relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood was soon to be tested again. In July 1958, a *coup d'état* toppled the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. King Hussein's fear of a subsequent attempt by the UAR to follow suit in subverting the Jordanian regime forced him to call for the support of British troops. Their deployment in Jordan provoked a critical response from the Brotherhood which called for a debate in Parliament on the issue and organized anti-British demonstrations in the streets. 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa was arrested yet once more (in August) as a pre-emptive measure against more radical actions on the part of the Brotherhood. He was released three months later.⁹² The political activities of the Brotherhood continued to be curtailed and the organization as a whole considered Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i as its arch-enemy. However, the necessity for co-existence with what had proved to be an essentially stable and powerful regime caused a split between a conservative faction in the movement led by Khalifa, and a more activist group apparently headed by Yusuf al-'Azm,⁹³ the radical former editor of *al-Kifah al-Islami*. The more militant wing began to publish a six-page monthly under the name *Jaridat al-Saff* (The Newspaper of the Rank and File) which was inspired by the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. It was most critical of the regime and was only distributed clandestinely.⁹⁴ The militancy of some of the members of the Brotherhood was the background for another deterioration in its relations with the regime. The authorities cracked down on its propaganda apparatus, which had been criticizing the regime's policy on the Palestinian problem, and Khalifa was arrested again.⁹⁵

Samir al-Rifa'i's resignation, in May 1959, and the nomination of Hazza' al-Majali as Prime Minister improved the atmosphere in the relations between the government and the Brotherhood. From the beginning of 1960, Majali sought to win their support for his domestic policies and in his rivalry with Samir al-Rifa'i. Moreover, the Brotherhood was even becoming something of an asset. It was considered a potent force against the "Palestinian entity" idea, promoted by Iraq and the UAR and flatly opposed by the Jordanian regime. The Brotherhood's deep-rooted animosity toward the Egyptian regime and its ideological position in favor of Muslim unity placed it on the regime's side, in support of the unity between Jordanians and Palestinians on both banks of the Jordan.

In January 1960 Khalifa reiterated that the Brotherhood was not a political party and that its members joined together solely for religious

reasons. His statement was apparently aimed both to curry favor with the regime and to restrain his more radical colleagues. He was duly rewarded for his prudence by government permission to publish (from June 1960) a new daily newspaper, *al-Manar*. The Brotherhood continued to act as an ideological, but generally loyal, opposition to the regime. Even though Khalifa still faced periodic incarceration,⁹⁶ the Brotherhood tended to stand by the regime in periods of crisis. The assassination of Hazza' al-Majali in August 1960 was a case in point. The fact that the assassination was attributed to the UAR made such support all the more natural. In the October 1961 elections to the sixth Jordanian Parliament, Khalifa was re-elected in Amman, now the only member of the Brotherhood in Parliament.⁹⁷

The Ikhwan and the Debate over the Palestinian Entity

During the early 1960s the question of the "Palestinian entity" assumed a place of prominence on the political agenda of the Arab world. The call for an independent Palestinian entity or for a representative organization of the Palestinian people was anathema to the Jordanian regime, and was perceived as a direct threat, at least to the territorial integrity of the Kingdom (the West Bank being the most obvious site for a Palestinian entity) if not its very existence. The leftist and Arab Nationalist opposition took up the cause with fervor. Naturally, most of the support for the idea in Jordan came from these circles in the West Bank.

The Muslim Brotherhood found itself again in a political quandary. It was certainly *bon ton* to support the cause of a Palestinian entity, especially among West Bankers and Palestinian refugees in the East Bank. However, such a stance was untenable both politically and ideologically. Politically, it was clear that support for what was tantamount to a call for the dismemberment of Jordan would incur the wrath of the regime and the loss of the privileges that the movement enjoyed in the Kingdom. Ideologically, the *Ikhwan* stood for preserving Jordanian-Palestinian unity until an eventual unification of the entire Muslim *Umma*.

The Brotherhood initially supported the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 but was soon to be disillusioned. The movement had backed the PLO's first chairman, Ahmad Shuqayri

and mobilized support for the creation of the PLO. However, when Shuqayri formed the PLO's Executive Committee, they were excluded, while persons known for their leftist inclinations were appointed.⁹⁸

The Jordanian-Egyptian detente set in place by the Arab summits of 1964 naturally took its toll on the relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The king gave Nasir full backing for his suppression of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 1965. However, within less than a year, the situation turned full circle, as Jordanian-Egyptian relations reverted to their former hostility. Demonstrations of the Jordanian *Ikhwan* against the execution of Brotherhood leaders in Egypt (August 1966) were held with the acquiescence, if not orchestration, of the regime, and exiled members of the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhoods were welcomed in Jordan.⁹⁹ The Brotherhood's candidates ran in elections for the seventh Parliament in April 1967, and three were elected. 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, however, lost his seat in Amman.¹⁰⁰

The June 1967 War and its Aftermath

The immediate challenge facing the Jordanian Brotherhood in the wake of the *naksa* (the setback, as the June 1967 War is commonly called) was the expansion of the Palestinian fida'i movement in the country. After having enjoyed a decade of exclusivity as the only tolerated political movement, the Brotherhood was now compelled to compete with the more secular and leftist-oriented Palestinian organizations, which enjoyed widespread public sympathy for their armed struggle against Israel. However, unlike the opposition in the 1950s, popular support for the fida'iyyun was now echoed by the king himself. In the April 1957 crisis, when Sulayman al-Nabulsi convened all the opposition parties to pressure the king,¹⁰¹ the Brotherhood could safely step aside. In the public atmosphere of 1968 this kind of abstention was no longer possible. The presence of the king himself (though uninvited) at the March 1968 meeting of Nabulsi's *al-Tajammu' al-Watani* (National Gathering) in the wake of the battle of Karama,¹⁰² and his proclamations in favor of fida'i activity ("we all may become fida'iyyun")¹⁰³ left very little room for an *Ikhwan* policy of non-cooperation with their ideological rivals, who, albeit reluctantly, accepted them as political allies.

Still, political co-operation with the East Bank opposition was one matter, and active involvement in the Palestinians' armed struggle against Israel, and the insubordination toward the Jordanian regime which it entailed, were another. Following the latter course would have meant casting their lot with those who gambled on the regime's demise, with potentially dire consequences, were the king to emerge triumphant.

The Muslim Brotherhood's participation in the fida'i movement—aside from the above-mentioned moral support—was marginal at best. There is no evidence that the movement was substantially involved in Hajj Amin al-Husseini's initiative to form the "Islamic Fatah" organization (*Fatah Islami*) at the beginning of 1969. In any case, this group never encompassed more than a few hundred activists and was practically demolished in fighting with Fatah in the Wahdat refugee camp in June 1969. Another fida'i group which was linked both to the *Ikhwan* and to the Mufti was the *Jihad al-Muqaddas*. These units were formed at the same time, as a revival of the military force of that name which operated in the 1940s. However, *al-Jihad al-Muqaddas* was soon dismantled and incorporated into *Fatah* under the terms of an agreement between the Mufti and 'Arafat.¹⁰⁴ The *Ikhwan*'s own forces were based on three "companies" of the movement from Egypt, Sudan, and other countries in four small bases in the Jordanian countryside. The Brotherhood, however, did not form its own guerrilla movement and could only boast thirteen martyrs in their *Jihad* against Israel in this period. This is especially noteworthy in the light of the plethora of such groups linked to almost every political movement on the Jordanian scene (including the Communists, despite Moscow's dislike of the phenomenon). This omission is rather lamely explained by the *Ikhwan* as the result of a conscious decision on their part to leave the field free for the Fatah movement.¹⁰⁵

A small and relatively insignificant part of the Jordanian movement formed an armed organization called *Bayt al-Maqdas* and led by Shaykh 'Abdallah 'Azzam. 'Azzam himself was an especially militant exception among the Jordanian *Ikhwan*. His books¹⁰⁶ became a sort of *vade-mecum* for radicals who had abandoned the conservative gradualist doctrines of the Brotherhood. Like many other Islamic radicals who felt constrained by the "local-patriotism" inherent in the *Ikhwan*'s struggle for support on their own domestic turf, 'Azzam searched for a wider Islamic point of reference. In the early 1980s he left Jordan to take part in the *Jihad* in

Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, where he was killed in 1989. No other major leader of the Jordanian Brotherhood with serious religious credentials has since picked up his mantle as a pan-Islamic militant. The radical anti-regime position remained the province of *Tahrir*, fervently pan-Islamic in its ideology but strictly Palestinian in its membership. It was *Tahrir* and not the *Ikhwan*, therefore, who were involved in two attempted *coups d'état* in 1968 and 1969.¹⁰⁷

The 1970s: The Ikhwan and Civil Society

The regime crackdown in September 1970 and the final expulsion of the Palestinian organizations from Jordan in July 1971 changed the conditions again for all political activity in Jordan. At the height of the conflict, the Brotherhood had called on both sides not to open fire on their “brother Muslims.”¹⁰⁸ However, after the regime’s victory became evident, it expressed satisfaction with the expulsion from Jordan of the “heretics” (i.e. the leftist Marxist organizations).¹⁰⁹ The remnants of the Palestinian organizations, their “front” organizations in Jordan, and their left-wing sympathizers, all of whom had enjoyed unbridled political freedom for over three years, were forced underground or compelled to channel their efforts into other more innocuous activities. At the same time, the death of ‘Abd al-Nasir in September 1970 symbolized the final demise of Nasserism, which had captured the imagination of the Arab masses in the 1950s and early 1960s, but had already been losing ground for years. The reconciliation of Nasir’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the concurrent new wave of Islamic revival throughout the region, all served to strengthen the position of the Jordanian Brotherhood and its domestic influence, at the expense of the secular left.

The loyalty of the Brotherhood was rewarded by the nomination of Ishaq al-Farhan, a sympathizer of the movement,¹¹⁰ as Minister of Education in five consecutive cabinets (October 1970–November 1974). From 1972 on, he also served as Minister of *Awqaf*. He resigned over Jordan’s position vis-à-vis the 1973-74 peace process with Israel.¹¹¹ Control over the largest, and potentially one of the most influential ministries afforded the Brotherhood the opportunity to build up the educational system as an important power base. Hundreds of education ministry officials, at all

levels, were identified with the Brotherhood, as were many of the school principals, one of the more secure expressions of Brotherhood power within Jordanian society.

The reinforcement of the ban on political parties after 1970 gave rise to the extended activities of the professional associations (doctors, engineers, writers, journalists, lawyers, etc.) and academic clubs as a substitute for party politics. These organizations had traditionally been the home ground of the leftists as the Brotherhood had previously shown little interest in this sort of sectorial activity.¹¹² Now, however, while it strengthened its traditional strongholds in the schools and mosques, with financial support from the oil rich Gulf States,¹¹³ the movement became increasingly involved in the professional associations as well. The Islamist infiltration into the strongholds of the left in the professional associations began with the engineers and the lawyers in the mid-1970s.¹¹⁴ Here again, at least initially, an alliance of convenience between the Brotherhood and the Fatah movement was still evident. In the elections for the doctors and engineers associations, the two groups even ran on a joint ticket.¹¹⁵

The regime was fully aware of the Islamist surge in the Kingdom. In May 1975, the General Islamic Conference, now under a sort of informal condominium of the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, and the official Council of Islamic Organizations and Associations, held the First Islamic Thought Forum in Amman. The purpose of the Forum was to discuss “moral corruption in society” and was attended by Brotherhood members with very little official representation. The second Colloquium in February 1977, demonstrated the growing investment of the regime in Islamic issues. The king himself delivered the keynote speech and a number of high-level officials participated in the proceedings.¹¹⁶ The regime’s recognition of the need for a more effective co-optation of the Brotherhood was exemplified by the nomination of Kamil al-Sharif as Minister of *Awqaf* in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Prime Ministers ‘Abd al-Hamid Sharaf and Mudar Badran.

The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process
and the Iranian Revolution

In the second half of the 1970s the Brotherhood underwent a process of radicalization. The possibility of Jordanian involvement in the peace process after the October 1973 war brought the Brotherhood into conflict with the regime. Due to its protests against the visit of U.S. President Nixon to Jordan, Khalifa and other key members of the movement were arrested and only freed after a meeting with the authorities, presumably to redraw the red lines of permissible dissent.¹¹⁷ The movement persisted in its protest against the peace process as it evolved. However, since the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations over interim agreements in Sinai in 1975 were criticized by the regime itself, the Brotherhood's protests were tolerated.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, the regime condemned the Brotherhood for acts of violence and intolerance toward Christians in the country.¹¹⁹

The growing radicalization of the Brotherhood in Jordan can be attributed both to socio-economic and foreign political causes. On the domestic scene, Jordan enjoyed unprecedented economic growth from 1975 onwards, due to the flow of oil money into the economy and as a result of the Lebanese civil war and the subsequent transfer of international economic activity from Beirut to Amman. However, this blessing took its toll in terms of domestic economic stability. High inflation rates (around 20%) and spiralling prices of staples and property exacerbated disparities between rich and poor and contributed to social unrest. The Brotherhood, which had always been socially sensitive, became ever more critical of government policy.¹²⁰

The main external political causes for radicalization were the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Brotherhood in Jordan denounced President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent negotiations with Israel. This position placed the Brotherhood on a potential collision course with the king, who had taken a more moderate stance, leaving the door open for future Jordanian participation in the process.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was an historical watershed for the Islamic movements in the Middle East. Despite Khomeini's Shi'i ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood regarded the revolution as a victory for Islam in general. Pro-Khomeini demonstrations were staged in Salt in March 1979, and the General Islamic Conference, which also convened in March under Kamil al-Sharif, praised the Iranian Revolution and denounced the Camp David accords and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty as "a stab [in the back of] the Arab and Islamic Nations."¹²¹

In contrast, *Tahrir* was disillusioned after a brief infatuation with Khomeini. Following a number of meetings with the new Iranian leadership, in which the party proposed that Khomeini appoint himself as Caliph, the *Tahrir* became disenchanted with the Iranian Revolution and denounced Khomeini as an American agent.¹²²

The pro-Iranian proclivity of the Brotherhood became even more evident after the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. The regime occasionally accused the movement of maintaining links with the Iranian embassy, and the Brotherhood's student body published a pro-Iranian paper, *Sawt al-Islam*.¹²³ However, the pro-Iraqi sentiment of the regime in Jordan during the Iraq-Iran War and the perception of Iran as a major threat to the Kingdom made any explicit admiration of the Islamic regime in Tehran a precarious venture. Thus, the Brotherhood opted, as usual, for caution. When a "leading Muslim Brotherhood official" in Jordan was asked in 1983 about the movement's position toward Iran, he expressed his "respect," qualified by the judgement that "bloody violence is part of their nature as Shi'is."¹²⁴ Even toward the end of the 1980s, Khalifa demonstrated utmost caution in refraining from allocating guilt either to Iraq or to Iran for the war or from declaring Iran an enemy,¹²⁵ and though leaders of the Jordanian Brotherhood occasionally visited Tehran, they took care to distance themselves from any pro-Iranian stigma.¹²⁶

Along with the sensation of victory attached to the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and the Jordanian Brotherhood in particular, a new cause to champion. 'Abdallah 'Azzam, who had spearheaded the *Ikhwan* involvement in the fida'i movement in the late 1960s, left for Afghanistan along with a small group of Jordanian and Palestinian volunteers from the ranks of the Jordanian movement. From his headquarters in Peshawar, he became a new inspiration for the radicals in the movement as a religious leader who not only preached but also conducted *Jihad* himself against the *kafir* (infidel).¹²⁷ Jordanian participation in the Afghan *Jihad* was more Palestinian than East-Bank Jordanian and eventually 'Abdallah 'Azzam's ties with the Jordanian movement lapsed. Even so, he is still venerated by the Brotherhood in Jordan as one of its more famous sons.

The Jordanian regime viewed the Iranian Revolution and Islamic radicalism with trepidation. In June 1979, the Ministry of *Awqaf* organized a World Islamic Conference, with the stated purpose of dispelling "prevalent

misconceptions on Islam.” However, the militant mood of the Jordanian Islamists was not suppressed in the deliberations of the Conference: the resolutions called for *Jihad* to liberate Jerusalem and stated that any concession of the Muslim land of Palestine to “the Zionist enemy” was “a betrayal of Allah.”¹²⁸ The regime continued its efforts (mainly orchestrated by Crown Prince Hasan) to highlight its own religious credentials and, simultaneously, to moderate the Islamist trend in the country. In January 1980, the Arab Thought Forum was held under Prince Hasan’s auspices. The Forum founded the Ahl al-Bayt Foundation for Islamic Studies and Research and emphasized the Islamic mission of the Hashemite family and the Great Arab Revolt. The Forum’s final communiqué attributed the challenge of Islamic radicalism to the failed attempts of the revolutionary regimes “to make national (*qawmi*) thought a substitute for Islamic thought...or to change the internal environment of these societies” which led to “confusion and instability.” Jordan, needless to say, was not guilty of the follies of Arab Socialism, nor was it in need of Islamic revolution. The communiqué therefore called for *Da‘wa* missionaries and ‘*Ulama* to be “characterized by openness...far from fanaticism and narrowness” and “marked by lack of prejudice.” While urging moderation, the regime also engaged in an effort to appease the Islamists. In 1979, the government issued a plan for a 25% income tax exemption for payments of the traditional *zakat* tax and nominated leading *Ikhwan* figures to key positions in government Islamic institutions.¹²⁹

The Pan-Islamic Role: Support for the Syrian Brotherhood

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood achieved a predominant status among the Arab Brotherhood movements. It flourished in the absence of repression (which hindered many of the other movements) and benefitted also from the seniority of the Jordanian *Muraqib ‘Amm*, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, and Jordan’s geopolitical centrality. As a result, the Jordanian movement was frequently involved in mediation in the matters of other branches as it was instrumental in the activities of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the late 1970s, the Jordanian movement was animated by the *Jihad* of their Syrian brethren against the Ba‘thi regime of Hafiz al-Asad. The armed struggle of the Syrian *Ikhwan*, led by ‘Adnan Sa‘d al-Din and Sa‘id Hawa, began on 8 February 1976. The leaders of the Jordanian Brotherhood made no secret of their disdain for the secularist sectarian (‘Alawi-dominated) Syrian regime. After the massacre by members of the Syrian *Ikhwan* of cadets at the Aleppo Artillery Academy on 16 June 1979, Khalifa accused Syria of having imprisoned 2,000 Syrian Brotherhood members without due legal process and of generally governing in a manner conflicting with basic Islamic tenets. He warned the Syrian regime that the Muslim Brotherhood might “have to defend itself” if the persecution persisted.¹³⁰

Initially, the Jordanian Brotherhood openly admitted their patronage of “training camps” for members of the Syrian Brotherhood in northern Jordan. However, by the end of 1979, under pressure from the government, it lowered the profile of this operational support,¹³¹ though the rhetoric against “Asad and his gang of ‘Alawis” continued unabated.¹³² The *Ikhwan* thus became a major irritant in deteriorating Jordanian-Syrian relations. These reached one of their all-time low points with Syrian attempts to assassinate Syrian *Ikhwan* leaders who had sought refuge in Jordan, the subsequent execution of two Syrian intelligence operatives and the massive mutual deployment of troops on both sides of the Syrian-Jordanian border during the Amman Summit in December 1980.

Hostilities were averted, but the Jordanian *Ikhwan*’s support of the Syrian Brotherhood continued unchecked until the Syrian crushing of the February 1982 uprising in Hama. The Brotherhood was purported to have had the backing of prominent Jordanian government officials, including Prime Minister Mudar Badran (an ex-chief of general intelligence) and his successor (both as chief of general intelligence and as prime minister), Ahmad ‘Ubaydat,¹³³ as well as the sympathy of Crown Prince Hasan. The struggle of the Syrian *Ikhwan* against the Syrian army was reported in the weekly press of the Jordanian *Ikhwan* (*al-Liwa*) as acts of *Jihad* and heroism (in a regular section of the newspaper entitled “News of the *Jihad*”). According to the leader of the Syrian *Ikhwan*, ‘Adnan Sa‘d al-Din, the Jordanian Brotherhood had considerable influence over the Syrian movement. The meetings of its *Majlis Shura* were held, at least from 1981, in Amman. The Jordanian Brotherhood leadership supervised the

internal elections of their Syrian counterpart and even mediated in political conflict that beset the leadership of the Syrian group.¹³⁴

These developments emboldened the Brotherhood leadership in Jordan. In January 1980 the Brotherhood succeeded in bringing about the resignation of two Cabinet ministers (including the powerful Minister of Interior, Sulayman al-'Arar) after reporting incriminating evidence of their sexual misconduct to the king.¹³⁵ When the December 1980 crisis was at its peak, Khalifa expressed his desire to see "the teachings of the Qur'an followed more closely" in Jordan and defiantly warned the government that while it could stop the Brotherhood from publishing, or close its offices, it could not "stop our tongues" or shut down the mosques.¹³⁶

The mosques, however, were not the only area of *Ikhwan* activity. In 1985, the Brotherhood had become the strongest student group in both the Yarmuk University in Irbid and the Jordanian University in Amman. Its student organizations had a membership of thousands and overturned the traditional predominance of the leftist, Palestinian and Arab Nationalist student unions. Islamic student groups appealed to men to grow beards and tried to enforce the *hijab* and Islamic dress on women at the universities.¹³⁷ The growing influence of the movement on the campuses, with the active assistance of prominent faculty members, contributed to its self-assurance. The support for the Syrian movement and the apparent willingness to defy the government were an additional source of legitimacy in the contest with the enfeebled left. The movement, however, did not throw caution to the wind. It did not support the attempts, in Sudan and Pakistan, to impose the *Shari'a* by military regimes and made it clear that the implementation of the *Shari'a* had to be an act of society and not of an individual acting for political gain.¹³⁸

Even so, the growing self-confidence of the Brotherhood eventually drove the king to curtail its sway. In the 'Ubaydat cabinet, formed in January 1984, the *Ikhwani* Minister of *Awqaf*, Kamil al-Sharif, who had filled the post for almost a decade, was replaced.¹³⁹ In early 1985, the king reiterated his growing concern over the dangers presented by Iran and "radical Islamic fundamentalism,"¹⁴⁰ and with the return to the premiership in April 1985, of Zayd al-Rifa'i (who had overseen the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement during his previous term in office in 1975 and was considered "pro-Syrian"), a change in the regime's approach toward the Brotherhood was clearly afoot. On 2 November, in his speech from the throne, the king

urged the legislators to deal with “uncontrolled...preaching.” A week later, Hussein offered Syria a public apology for having been “deceived, along with a large section of the Jordanian people, by this criminal group [of Syrian *Ikhwan* in Jordan]” and “warned this straying group, which abused our trust, that it no longer had a place among us.”¹⁴¹ Within days, Jordanian Intelligence was rounding up Syrian *Ikhwan* and extraditing them to Damascus, and the government hastily passed new regulations, prohibiting preachers in mosques from dealing with political issues.¹⁴²

The regime’s crackdown on the Syrian *Ikhwan* and its warning to the local movement only added to the Brotherhood’s public prominence. Their involvement in local protest came dramatically to public attention during the disturbances at the Yarmuk University in Irbid in May 1986. The Yarmuk protest began as a local university issue in which the Brotherhood was not initially deeply involved. However, as the disturbances gained political momentum, the Brotherhood stepped in. The attempt to negotiate with the protesters through Brotherhood MP Ahmad Kufahi and the pro-Brotherhood Mayor of Irbid, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Tubayshat, indicated that the authorities, at least, considered the *Ikhwan* as one of the key forces in the confrontation. However, while negotiations were still in progress, security forces stormed the campus and at least three students were killed in the ensuing fracas. The official account of the Yarmuk affair put the blame on an alliance of “Communists, Fatah and Muslim fundamentalists.”¹⁴³ Even so, the regime and the *Ikhwan* continued to avoid all out confrontation.

Parliament and Power Sharing with the Regime

The suspension of Parliament in February 1976 had created a political vacuum in Jordan which was filled, in part, by the activities of the political clubs and professional associations. These were controlled, in the main, by anti-establishment forces. Thus in April 1978, after a wave of disturbances in protest against Israel’s “Litani Operation” in south Lebanon, the king tried to fill this void by the establishment of a National Consultative Council (*Majlis Watani Istishari*) of sixty (later seventy-five) appointed members. These included a number of members or sympathizers of the Brotherhood.¹⁴⁴

The Brotherhood's more substantial comeback to parliamentary politics began in the March 1984 by-elections for vacant seats in the newly-revived Parliament. Islamists (Ahmad Kufahi in Irbid, 'Abdallah al-'Akayila in Tafila and Layth Shubaylat in Amman) won three out of the six seats designated for Muslims (two other vacant seats were designated for Christians). The regime took note of the trend, and in by-elections that took place in Irbid, in June 1986, the authorities intervened to prevent the election of the Islamist candidate Dr. 'Abd al-Majid Nusayr. Yet the Brotherhood's success in subsequent municipal elections in Irbid and Aqaba was symptomatic of a countrywide disaffection, which the government had failed to contain.

The Palestinian Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza, with its Islamic overtones, and the appearance of Hamas in the Palestinian political arena added to the Jordanian Brotherhood's expanding resonance, especially among Palestinians in Jordan. While the Brotherhood did not have much of a role in the initial outbreak of the Intifada, it immediately supported and identified closely with the radical Islamic trends in the West Bank and Gaza. The leadership of the Jordanian Brotherhood was instrumental in drafting the Covenant of Hamas that was published in August 1988. A number of Palestinian leaders of the Brotherhood assumed the tasks of Hamas public relations officers, or even of a sort of leadership in exile. Among these were Dr. Ahmad Nawfal (who had been active in the Islamic student movement), Ibrahim Ghawsha and others. The Hamas-Brotherhood activists operated openly in Amman, including undisguised visits to government offices and to facilities of Jordanian General Intelligence. The relationship between many of the West Bank Hamas leaders and the Jordanian regime, along with continued Jordanian support for Hamas-oriented religious institutions in the West Bank, provoked accusations from the PLO that Jordan was actively promoting Hamas through the Jordanian Brotherhood in order to undermine the PLO.¹⁴⁵ Given the experience of the Jordanian Brotherhood's connections with its Syrian counterpart, the charge was not devoid of political logic.

The Brotherhood saw no contradiction between its abstention from confrontation with the monarchy and its support for Hamas. However, Article 11 of the Hamas Covenant stated that "Palestine is an Islamic *Waqf* consecrated...until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a

single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that.”¹⁴⁶ This was not only directed against the PLO, but at King Hussein as well. Furthermore, given the king’s adamant opposition to any form of terrorism from Jordan, the role the Jordanian Brotherhood leadership played in the Hamas decision to turn to “armed struggle” was no less problematic for the Brotherhood’s relations with the regime. The strong links between the two groups notwithstanding, subtle differences began to emerge. Thus, unlike its Palestinian offspring, the Jordanian Brotherhood opposed the king’s announcement, in July 1988, on disengagement from the West Bank, as “unconstitutional” (actually, contradictory to the Brotherhood’s belief in Islamic unity) and rejected the PLO’s declaration of independence of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. In retrospect, the Hamas connection brought the Jordanian Brotherhood a step closer toward conflict with the regime.

The Brotherhood in Jordan reached the zenith of its influence in the November 1989 elections, winning 22 seats of its own, with independent Islamists taking an additional 12 (out of 80 seats in Parliament). They also succeeded in pushing through the election of a member of the Brotherhood, ‘Abd al-Latif ‘Arabiyyat, as Speaker of the House. The Islamist landslide may be attributed to a combination of factors. The large number of candidates and the bloc voting system (each voter casting as many votes as there were seats in the constituency) split the vote and gave a relative advantage to the Brotherhood, which had fielded a large number of candidates. The election law, which still banned political parties, did not disqualify the *Ikhwan* nor prevent their exploitation of the mosques and their organizational infrastructure. The PLO (more specifically, Fatah) refrained from participation in the elections. The *Ikhwan* capitalized on the oppositionary leanings of the Palestinian refugee camps, after having made a pre-election pact with the government (presumably brokered by Mudar Badran, then Chief of the Royal Court) which resulted in gerrymandering in the large cities adjacent to the camps in a manner favorable to the Brotherhood. And the Brotherhood took full advantage of female suffrage, mobilizing the women family members of the movement to vote. However, above and beyond these technical explanations, the vote for the Brotherhood reflected its own genuine widespread popularity and the dramatic decline

of the secular left.¹⁴⁷

The opening months of 1990 seemed to bode well for the cause of Islam. In the wake of the Jordanian Islamists' success, the Algerian *Front Islamique de Salut* (FIS) scored an impressive electoral victory in provincial and municipal elections in June 1990. (The Brotherhood openly supported the FIS and denounced the military government in Algeria which subsequently prevented an Islamic takeover.) Less than two months later, the Gulf Crisis ("Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm," August 1990-February 1991) placed the Brotherhood in Jordan on center stage. The mosques in all major cities in Jordan were packed with worshippers and sights of thousands of faithful praying in the streets near the mosques were common. The position of the Brotherhood in respect to the crisis was more or less compatible with that of the king: calling for an "Arab solution" to the crisis and avoiding war. This compatibility, however, was superficial and fragile. While the king's goal was to weather "Desert Storm" without involving Jordan in any hostilities, the militant wing of the Brotherhood saw the upcoming conflict as a golden opportunity to reinstate the legitimacy of popular *Jihad*. One of the leaders of this wing (and of Hamas), Dr. Ahmad Nawfal, founded Islamic Committees for Popular Action (*lijan Islamiyya lil-'amal al-sha'bi*) and called on the public to prepare arms to confront an Israeli or Western invasion of Jordan. This position strained the Brotherhood's relations with Saudi Arabia and with the Kuwaiti Brotherhood, two of the Jordanian group's main external sources of financial support.

At the height of the crisis, in January 1991, the king, to insure the good behavior of the Brotherhood, co-opted it into Mudar Badran's government. Five Muslim Brothers and two independent Islamists were given the coveted portfolios of Education, Justice, *Awqaf*, Social Development, Health, Agriculture, Transport and Communications. These included mostly first-generation East Bank *Ikhwan* (Yusuf al-'Azm, MP from Ma'an; 'Abdallah al-'Akayila, MP from Tafila; two non-members of parliament, Dr. Ibrahim Zayd al-Kaylani from Salt and Dr. 'Adnan al-Jaljuli from Tira on the West Bank). Another new minister, Muhammad Ibrahim al-'Alawna, MP from Irbid, was appointed as an independent Islamist, but had actually been a member of the Brotherhood in the past. The younger generation was represented by Dr. Majid 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (MP from Salt, the son of the *Muraqib 'Amm*) and an independent Islamist representative

from Karak, Jamal al-Sarayira. The establishment press in Jordan stressed the “collective responsibility” of the government and the fact that, for the first time, the Brotherhood could be held accountable for both its deeds and misdeeds.¹⁴⁸ The decision to join the Cabinet did not go down easily with the Brotherhood leadership and the internal debate gave rise to rumors of a split within the movement.¹⁴⁹ In an effort to silence the internal debate, the leadership of the movement issued an extraordinary directive, urging the acceptance of the decisions of the legitimate bodies of the movement.¹⁵⁰

The Ikhwan, the Regime and the Madrid Process

However, this arrangement lasted for no more than six months. The Brotherhood bloc in parliament succeeded in passing an overwhelming vote against Jordanian participation in the upcoming Madrid peace conference, ignoring King Hussein’s unwavering support for participation and the traditional prerogative of the throne to run the Kingdom’s foreign policy. In June, the king dropped the Islamists from the government. At the same time, the *Muraqib ‘Amm* called for “struggle against the imperialist hegemony in the region” and the withdrawal of the coalition forces which had “no other purpose but aggression, hegemony, humiliation of the region’s peoples and usurping their natural resources”; escalation of the struggle for implementation of the *Shari‘a* in the daily life of the Muslims; uncovering “the true faces of the repressive regimes” which had brought about the Kuwaiti catastrophe and urging caution toward those of the “tyrants who exploit Islamic slogans” (i.e., Saudi Arabia).¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, the Brotherhood, as always, was cautious not even to hint at a resort to violence.¹⁵²

The rift between the regime and the Brotherhood continued to widen. The Brotherhood leaned more toward an uncompromising Palestinian and Islamic agenda as the king broached a peace treaty with Israel. Not only did the Brotherhood vehemently oppose Jordan’s participation in the peace process, but it also lent political support to the military activities of Hamas in the West Bank.

At the same time, the Brotherhood’s religious agenda (especially in limiting women’s rights and their strictures on moral issues such as alcohol,

blasphemy and segregation of sexes)¹⁵³ undermined their popular support from constituencies which had expected them to attach higher priority to social issues like poverty. Some of the Brotherhood leaders, even the more ideologically strident like Yusuf al-‘Azam, realized the electoral damage of some traditional positions and qualified their support for the implementation of certain elements of the *Shari‘a* (such as the *hudud* amputation of limbs for certain crimes).¹⁵⁴

The regime, aware of the growing dissatisfaction with the Islamists’ domestic agenda, seized the opportunity to clip their wings and thus restrain their attacks on the regime’s foreign policy. In 1992, the government approved the Political Parties Law which legalized political parties for the first time since 1957. A plethora of political parties began to organize, among them the Muslim Brotherhood and independent Islamists, now under the name of the Islamic Action Front (IAF)—*Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami*. According to the new Political Parties Law, a political party could not have administrative or financial links with any foreign power or political group. Accordingly, the IAF defined itself as an indigenous party and took care to obscure its links with the Muslim Brotherhood abroad.

Since the new party incorporated both members of the Brotherhood and independent Islamists, its political program reflected a political flexibility which the Brotherhood could not allow itself. In contrast to the Brotherhood’s traditional positions, the IAF supported the access of women to all posts (except for head of state) and other political liberties, albeit “within the framework of Islamic *Shari‘a*.”¹⁵⁵ However, in the process of forming the party’s institutions, the latent friction between the Muslim Brotherhood members and the independents burst into the open. The elections to the party’s *Majlis Shura* left the independents a small minority. Nine independents resigned in protest, publishing letters accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of having taken exclusive control over the party. Although independents had been relegated to the margins, the party’s composition still differed significantly from the *Ikhwani* establishment. Whereas the Brotherhood leadership was controlled overwhelmingly by East Bankers, the IAF *Majlis Shura* included a large number of relatively young Palestinians,¹⁵⁶ who were generally more hawkish than their East Banker compatriots.

Along with the formation of the IAF, a number of other Islamist parties were formed including *al-Haraka al-‘Arabiyya al-Islamiyya al-*

Dimuqratiyya (The Democratic Arab Islamic Movement);¹⁵⁷ *al-Hizb al-Urdunni al-Islami* (The Islamic Jordanian Party);¹⁵⁸ *Hizb al-Tajdid al-'Arabi al-Islami* (The Arab-Islamic Reform Party);¹⁵⁹ *Harakat al-Inqadh* (The Salvation Movement);¹⁶⁰ *Hizb al-Tajammu' lil-'Adala* (The Justice Group Party);¹⁶¹ and *Dar al-Qur'an* (The Qur'an House, headed by the maverick politician Layth Shubaylat). The Palestinian *al-Jihad al-Islami—Kata'ib al-Aqsa* (Islamic Jihad—al-Aqsa Battalions) and *al-Jihad al-Islami—Bayt al-Maqdis* also registered as parties.¹⁶²

The regime's permitting of party pluralism was intended to provide a counterweight to the Brotherhood. Success was limited, as the Brotherhood and its party, the IAF, remained, by far, the most organized and widely supported of all political parties.

Meanwhile, in the run-up to the November 1993 elections, the regime took measures to curtail the strength of the Brotherhood which had brought them their landslide victory in 1989. In August 1993 a new Election Law was passed by Royal Decree. The new law substituted the "bloc voting" procedure (which had been so advantageous to the well-organized Brotherhood), by a "one person, one vote" system. The government also banned public rallies, prevented preachers from delivering sermons at mosques and transferred influential Brotherhood civil servants from their electoral districts. In June 1993, the Brotherhood's official organ *al-Ribat* was shut down and its (more moderate) replacement, *al-Sabil*, was only authorized to appear after the elections. There were even rumors that the regime had reached a tacit agreement with 'Arafat that he would support pro-regime candidates in order to weaken the pro-Hamas Brotherhood among Palestinian voters.

The regime's measures did not go down well with the rank and file of the Brotherhood, and the *Majlis Shura*'s decision to take part in the elections almost split the movement. The radicals accused the leadership of the IAF of collusion with the regime and of betraying their Islamic principles for an illusion of parliamentary influence.¹⁶³ The controversy in the ranks of the movement was exploited by the regime. The Islamists lost about a third of their strength in the elections. The Islamic Action Front declined from twenty-two to sixteen seats (independent Islamists won an additional six including two identified with the IAF). However, since the liberal and leftist parties fared even worse, the Brotherhood (through the IAF) remained the most influential party in parliament.¹⁶⁴

Palestinization and Radicalization of the Brotherhood

Towards the middle of the 1980s, the radicalization within the Brotherhood, coupled with the failure of the traditional Palestinian organizations to achieve Palestinian national goals, enhanced the support for the Islamic trend in general. The swelling of the Brotherhood ranks with Palestinians, in both origin and political orientation, left its imprint on the attitude of the movement toward the “Hashemite Entity.” The Palestinians who joined the ranks of the Brotherhood saw themselves as representatives of the refugee and displaced Palestinian population and champions of the social, economic or political “underdogs” of Jordanian society—though they themselves came mainly from educated, socially mobile Palestinian families. These trends added undercurrents within the movement calling for more militant positions toward the regime and for a younger and more activist leadership.¹⁶⁵

Along with the critique of the old guard, radicals within the movement’s leadership and the young leadership within, or oriented toward, the Palestinian sector began to challenge the traditional pro-Hashemite orientation of the movement. This trend was fuelled by the outbreak of the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (December 1987) and by admiration for the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) in Algeria. Although the IAF had pretensions to unite all the Islamic political forces in Jordan, it remained, to all intents and purposes, a political incarnation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The *Tabligh*, *Tahrir* and Sufi groups kept their distance from the IAF, which was now also being challenged by more radical groups.

The radicalization among Islamist supporters created a new situation for the Brotherhood. The revival and overt activity of the *Tahrir*,¹⁶⁶ the political activities of independent non-*Ikhwan* Islamists, and the appearance of a variety of extreme, violent and clandestine Islamic groups,¹⁶⁷ presented an Islamic alternative to those radical youth who had become disenchanted with the establishment stance of the Brotherhood. The very existence of these groups served to pressure the Brotherhood leadership to distance itself from the regime and adopt more radical positions.

While the failure in the 1993 elections was widely attributed to the

political machinations and gerrymandering of the regime, it served to exacerbate the conflict within the Brotherhood between the radicals and the conservatives. The radicals, who had opposed participation in the elections under the new election law, called for a reckoning with those in the leadership who had played into the hands of the regime. The Royal nomination to the Senate of the former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, caused a furor in the ranks of the Brotherhood and radicals demanded his expulsion from the movement. Ziyad Abu Ghanima accused the *Majlis Shura* of the IAF of having lost sight of the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and of abandoning the Palestinian cause.¹⁶⁸ A few months after the national elections, the new Executive Committee of the IAF reflected the victory of the old guard and their desire to project a more moderate image: radicals such as Ahmad al-Kufahi, Kandil Shakuf and Ziyad Abu Ghanima were excluded from the Executive Committee and 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zant was not even re-elected to the *Majlis Shura*.¹⁶⁹ These changes did not put an end to the quarrels within the ranks of the movement and some of the radicals began to boycott the meetings of the leadership.¹⁷⁰

The Changing of the Guard and the 1997 Elections

Less than a year after the 1993 parliamentary elections (and a month after the signing of the Washington Declaration by King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin), the Muslim Brotherhood held elections for the post of *Muraqib 'Amm* (21 August 1994). 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, who had held the post for over forty years, stepped down and was replaced by 'Abd al-Majid Muhammad Dhunaybat.¹⁷¹ The official claim that the change in the leadership was due to Khalifa's failing health seems to have been an attempt to conceal the deep divisions within the movement. Like Khalifa, Dhunaybat is a lawyer by profession (i.e., has secular and not religious education) and was born (in 1945) and educated on the East Bank and in Syria (University of Damascus). However, the election of the relatively young Dhunaybat symbolized a change of the guard at the head of the Jordanian movement. The fact that Dhunaybat had risen to his post thanks to his activity in the IAF was yet another example of the increased politicization of the movement.

The first test of the new leadership was its engagement with the government over the newly signed peace treaty with Israel. Although the new leadership of the Brotherhood came from a relatively moderate background, by flatly opposing the king's strategic move toward Israel it entered into one of its most severe confrontations with the regime. Radicals such as 'Abd al-'Aziz Jabir and 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zant were summoned for questioning regarding their sermons against the signing of the peace treaty with Israel.¹⁷² Other Brotherhood preachers who spoke out against the treaty were prevented from preaching.¹⁷³ The Brotherhood– Hamas affinity became more pronounced as the Brotherhood attacked the newly formed Palestinian Authority and praised terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas.¹⁷⁴

While most of the Brotherhood leaders continued to affirm the “special bond” between the Jordanian regime and the movement, to forswear violence against the regime, and to point at the dangers of the Algerian example, there was no doubt that the movement in Jordan was undergoing a sea change. The radicalization and politicization of the Brotherhood under the new leadership exacerbated the growing schism within the movement between the “doves” who wished to continue the tradition of a tacit alliance with the regime, and the “hawks” who saw the Brotherhood, and the IAF, as the vanguard of the opposition to the regime. This dichotomy seemed to correspond increasingly with the East Banker–West Banker divide within Jordanian society. As the former endeavored to strengthen their position within the movement's decision-making bodies, the latter became more strident in their attacks on the government (elegantly refraining from direct attacks on the king, whose policy the government was implementing). The Brotherhood's criticism of the government in the wake of the August 1996 bread riots which erupted in Karak and other areas in the South strained relations between the regime and the Brotherhood even more, and a number of prominent members of the movement were detained. The distribution in Amman of leaflets signed by “the Youth (*shabiba*) of the Muslim Brotherhood” in November 1996, threatening to resort to violence against the regime if it continued its “oppression” of the movement,¹⁷⁵ seems to have been engineered by the radicals within the leadership in order to indicate that the rank and file could get out of control if their line was not adopted. The ideological split between the two wings of the Brotherhood extended into the movement's political party, the IAF, as

non-*Ikhwan* members of the IAF became more and more resentful of the dominance of the party by the Brotherhood.

The power struggle between the moderate old guard and the new more radical leadership and the resulting dissonance between the Brotherhood and the IAF peaked on the eve of the November 1997 parliamentary elections. The appointment of ‘Abd al-Salam Majali’s government in early 1997 was perceived as yet another effort by the regime to curb the Islamist opposition and to guarantee election results which would prove the Jordanian public’s support for the peace process. The Brotherhood called for a general boycott of the elections if the government refused to fulfill its demands: to repeal the “one person, one vote” law and the May 1997 amendments to the 1993 Provisional Press and Publication Law;¹⁷⁶ to enact constitutional reforms to enhance the authority of the legislative branch; to halt the “oppressive measures” against the political parties and the institutions of the opposition; to implement an economic policy which would not accept the “dictates” of the IMF; to enhance civil liberties; and to put an end to the “normalization” of relations with Israel.¹⁷⁷ Islamist pragmatists, on the other hand, such as ‘Abdallah al-‘Akayila, proposed to deal with the new situation by joining a united list with the leftist opposition parties,¹⁷⁸ while others, such as the Secretary General of the IAF, Ishaq al-Farhan, and Bassam al-‘Umush, called for participation in the elections under any circumstances.¹⁷⁹

The Brotherhood’s conditions were completely unacceptable to the regime, and negotiations with the government, which continued until early September, came to a standstill. The government agreed only to *discuss* a new election law in the first session of the newly elected Chamber. The decision to boycott the elections brought relations between the Brotherhood and the regime to a new nadir.

The November 1997 elections returned only ten Islamists (as opposed to sixteen in the 1993 Parliament), two of whom were IAF members, who, along with ten other members who did not win seats, had disobeyed the boycott and were subsequently expelled or suspended from the party. As the Brotherhood also boycotted the Senate,¹⁸⁰ it lost its representation in both houses of Parliament. However, the radicals of the Brotherhood who had imposed the boycott could point to the low level of participation in the elections (55% as opposed to 68% in the 1993 elections) as a sign of its influence over the Jordanian public, or at least over the urban

public.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, the boycott brought the struggle within the ranks of the Brotherhood between the “hawks” and the “doves” to a new impasse, as the “doves” in the Brotherhood Executive Committee—Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Akur and ‘Adnan al-Jaljuli—threatened to resign. The realization within the movement that the policies adopted under the influence of the radicals were leading the movement on a collision course with the regime wrought a turnabout in the elections, in December 1997, to the new IAF *Majlis Shura* and Executive Committee. The “doves,” led by the outgoing Secretary General, Ishaq al-Fahran (elected as Chairman of the *Majlis*) and ‘Abd al-Latif ‘Arabiyyat (elected to succeed Farhan as the new Secretary General) and the moderate camp won about 80 per cent of the *Majlis* seats and 11 out of 13 seats on the Executive Committee.¹⁸² The IAF, yet again, stepped back from the precipice and opted for action within the legal framework of Jordanian politics, as prescribed by the regime.

Concluding Remarks

In the few political histories of modern Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is relegated to the sidelines as a political force which, despite occasional differences with the regime, had generally been supportive of the Hashemite regime. It has come into the public view only since the late 1980s, when its political ascendancy transformed it into a formidable oppositionary force to the throne. In the past, as Uriel Dann noted: “Nationalist and Muslim-fundamentalist radicalism [were] the two prongs of the ideological onslaught on the (Hashemite) Entity.” However, the Muslim Brotherhood was “too preoccupied with their quarrel with ‘Abd al-Nasir to turn their attention to the Hashemite regime.”¹⁸³ The Brotherhood did not change its spots overnight from a docile “domesticated opposition” to a militant movement threatening some of the fundamentals of the Jordanian State. The militant components of the movement were present even in periods of harmony with the throne. Now, however, these are coming increasingly to the fore.

The incremental changes the Brotherhood has gone through since King ‘Abdallah offered its leaders to join his government, has resulted from a gradual demographic and generational shift away from the center of Jordanian politics. The increasing role of the Palestinian constituency—

especially the refugees—has left an indelible mark on the Brotherhood's political agenda.¹⁸⁴ The teachings of Sayyid Qutb and 'Abdallah 'Azzam which had remained dormant—or at least had been overruled by the more conservative leaders of the movement—have become increasingly prominent both in the personal backgrounds and views of the new leaders of the movement and in its political orientation. As Robert Satloff put it, already in 1986, “the time-honored patron-client relationship between the King and the *Ikhwan* [was] breaking apart.”¹⁸⁵

The causes behind the change in the Hashemite-Brotherhood relationship are rooted, to a great extent, in the Brotherhood's evaluation that it is on the verge of a breakthrough “from leading a movement to leading the masses.” “Leading the masses” also calls for a readiness both to be led by them and to suffer the reaction of the regime, which regards itself as the only legitimate leadership of the country. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is still in the heat of debate over the future role of the movement. The leaders of the movement are split along the same lines that divided the Egyptian movement in the 1940s: between those who call for focusing all efforts on *Da'wa* and the reforming of society through the creation of a truly Islamic counter-society, which will eventually grow and take over society at large; and those who see the political struggle (elections to Parliament, municipalities and the professional associations) as the main instrument for achieving the movement's traditional goals. This controversy was behind the reluctance of many of the *Ikhwan* to enter Mudar Badran's Cabinet in 1991 and the criticism voiced by these same circles against the continued political docility of the IAF's members of Parliament. This is also the background for the criticism made by some of the more hard-line members of the movement, that the leadership has conceded on demands for the implementation of the *Shari'a* in return for co-operation with the regime and other political parties.¹⁸⁶ Having come close to the brink in its opposition to the king's policy toward peace with Israel, the Brotherhood leadership pulled back, possibly fearful of the ramifications of a head-on collision with the regime and with the memories of 1970 and the Algerian model still fresh in their minds.

Moreover, moderates in the IAF still question the political logic of making participation in the government conditional on the abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel. These moderates, 'Abdallah al-'Akayila, Bassam al-'Umush and others, argue that the objective of the Brotherhood's

participation in national politics is to gain influence in order to implement the Islamist platform. Therefore, they contend, refraining from taking part in government raises doubts about the logic of participating at all in politics. These moderates, however, did not carry the day in the *Majlis Shura*.

A survey of the changing fortunes of the Islamic trend in Jordan tempts one to propose a prognosis for the future. This would be rash. However, there is no doubt that the defining traits of the Hashemite regime—a pro-Western orientation, moderate domestic and foreign policies and a strategic choice for peace with Israel—stand in stark contradiction to the Islamization of the Kingdom. It would, therefore, be safe to say, that if such Islamization were to take place on the East Bank of the Jordan, it would most probably mean the end of the Hashemite order as we know it.

Notes

1. As the Jordanian Minister of Interior, Riyad Muflih, put it to the US Ambassador in 1954: “Monarchy and religion are the cornerstones of security in Jordan...” US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 27 November 1954, National Archives, Washington (NA), 785CC/11-2754. For a general discussion, see Robert B. Satloff, *They Cannot Stop Our Tongues: Islamic Activism in Jordan* (Policy Papers, No. 5, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, 1986). Other sources on the pivotal role of Islam for the Jordanian regime, see Michael Winter, “The Arab Self Image as Reflected in Jordanian Textbooks”, in Asher Susser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz (eds.), *The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann* (London, 1995), pp. 207-20. See also remarks by Zayd al-Rifa’i to *al-Hawadith* (Lebanon), 22 August 1986, that “there is no place for religious outbidding” with the Hashemites, since the king is a descendant of the Prophet.
2. Israel Gershoni, “The Arab Nation, The House of Hashim and Greater Syria in the Writings of ‘Abdallah,” *Hamizrah Hehadash*, vol. 25, nos. 1-2, 3 (1975) pp. 2-26, 162-83 (Hebrew).
3. For a sympathetic Islamic description of ‘Abdallah’s piety, see ‘Awni Jadu al-‘Ubaydi, *Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Urdunn wa-Filastin 1945-1970, Safahat Ta’arikhyya* (Amman, 1991), pp. 38-41.
4. *Dustur al-Mamalaka al-Hashimiyya al-Urdunniyya*, 1952, chapters 1, 2, 4, 6.
5. Examples of Egyptian exiles who received not only political asylum but a warm welcome in Jordan include Kamil al-Sharif (during the 1970s, Minister of *Awqaf* in the Jordanian government), his brother, Mahmud al-Sharif (a leading journalist) and ‘Abd al-Mun’im ‘Abd al-Ra’uf (a former member of the Free Officers movement who defected to Jordan). Among the Syrian *Ikhwan* who were accorded asylum from 1963 onward were Shaykh Mustafa al-Zarqa and Shaykh Muhammad al-Mubarak (see *al-Nashra* [Athens], 6 April 1987) and, during the 1970s, ‘Adnan Sa’d al-Din.
6. Founded in the 1930s by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas in Nizamuddin near Delhi, India. Adherents are in the millions worldwide. The annual *ijtima’* (gathering) in Raiwind (province of Punjab, Pakistan) attracts more than a million people. The movement was originally founded to return the “*Mewatis*”—villagers who had so intermixed with Hindus—to Islam. The movement spread to Jordan in 1964. See Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-‘Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب al-Siyasiyya al-Urdunniyya* (Amman, 1992), pp. 148-51; Dr. Mahmud Salim ‘Ubaydat, *Athar al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya al-Maydani Khilal al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin* (Amman, 1989), p. 289.
7. For a concise but analytic description of the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (New York, 1995), pp. 73-88; Ishak Musa Husseini, *The Moslem Brethren* (Beirut, 1956). See also Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford, 1969).
8. Ishak Musa Husseini, *The Moslem Brethren*, pp. 73-77. For the independent appearance on the stage of the Syrian movement, see interview with ‘Adnan Sa’d al-Din (one of the leaders of the Syrian *Ikhwan*), *al-Dustur* (Lebanon, London), 13 June 1988.
9. According to Mustafa al-Siba’i, the *Muraqib ‘Amm* of the Syrian Brethren (who commanded one of the *Ikhwan* volunteer forces in the 1948 war), Shaykh Nimr al-Khatib (one of the

- leaders of the National Committee of the Palestinian Arabs in Haifa), visited him in Damascus in 1942 or 1943 and tried to urge the Syrian Brotherhood to take action on behalf of the Palestinians. Mustafa al-Siba'i, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Filastin* (Dar al-Nadhir, n.p., 1985), pp. 16-18.
10. Husseini, *Moslem Brethren*, p. 77; "Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun" in *al-Ushbu' al-'Arabi* (Lebanon), 26 November 1979.
 11. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 13, 21. See also "al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun" in *al-Ushbu' al-'Arabi* (Lebanon), 22, 29 October 1979; 12, 19, 26 November 1979.
 12. US Consulate (Jerusalem) to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1947 (Truman Institute Library, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
 13. Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967* (Ithaca and London, 1982), p. 144. See also 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 48.
 14. US Consulate (Jerusalem) to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1947.
 15. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 48.
 16. Husseini, *Moslem Brethren*, p. 81; 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 50; US Consulate (Jerusalem) to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1947.
 17. Husseini, *Moslem Brethren*, p. 81.
 18. US Consulate (Jerusalem) to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1947.
 19. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 56.
 20. Interview with Khalifa in *al-Watan al-'Arabi* (Lebanon), 9 June 1989.
 21. Jamal al-Sha'ir, *Siyasi Yatadhakkir—Tajriba fi al-'Amal al-Siyasi* (London, 1986), p. 28.
 22. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 36.
 23. Husseini, *Moslem Brethren*, p. 81.
 24. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 37.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41.
 26. Jamal al-Sha'ir, *Siyasi Yatadhakkir*, p. 28.
 27. For the "Ikhwan" point of view on their participation in the war, see Mustafa al-Siba'i, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin* (especially pp. 6-8 on the Jordanians); Kamil al-Sharif, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*; 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 31, 53-66. For the personal viewpoint of the Transjordanian commander, 'Abdallah al-Tall, see his memoirs, 'Abdallah al-Tall, *Karithat Filastin, Mudhakkirat 'Abdallah al-Tall, Qa'id Ma'arakat al-Quds*. For the Israeli viewpoint, see IDF History Dept., *The History of the War of Independence* (Tel Aviv, 1959), pp. 200-201, 216-17 (Hebrew). Regarding the involvement prior to the official outbreak of the war, see US Consulate (Jerusalem) to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1947.
 28. Ziyad Abu Ghanima, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya wa-Qadiyyat Filastin* (Amman, n.d.), pp. 60-62; 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 53-66.
 29. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 182-83.
 30. Interview with Khalifa, *al-Watan al-'Arabi* (Lebanon), 9 June 1989.
 31. Shmuel Bar, *The Jordanian Communist Party, An Historical Analysis*, Occasional Papers, Dayan Center, Tel Aviv, November 1988 (Hebrew).

32. In fact, the regime prevented the founding of branches of the Brotherhood in strongholds of the Husseinis. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 148.
33. Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti* (Tel Aviv, 1990), pp. 113, 118, 122, 125 (Hebrew).
34. Despatch from US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 11 March 1954, NA 785.00/3-1154.
35. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 107.
36. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355. According to this despatch, the Brothers named Khalifa as Abu Qura's successor as early as 1951.
37. Quoted in an interview by 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 108.
38. Interview with Khalifa, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 9 June 1989. Khalifa's claim that he was not involved in the *putsch* against Abu Qura is supported by Mamduh Sarayira, a member of the administrative committee, who also claims that Khalifa, then a *qadi* in Madaba, did not take part in the decisive meetings ('Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 107).
39. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 115; Cohen, *Parties*, pp. 154-60.
40. Hani Hourani et. al, *Islamic Action Front Party* (Al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, Amman, 1993), p. 12; 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 115.
41. Cohen, *Parties*, pp. 164-65.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
43. US Embassy to State Department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355. Cohen counts only 700-1,000 members of the movement in the West Bank. This seems to be an underestimate which is based only on the more prominent members. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 162. On the branch in Karak, see Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan* (London, 1973), pp. 135-37.
44. Cohen, *Parties*, pp. 169; US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355.
45. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, *ibid.*
46. Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب al-Siyasiyya al-Urdunniya* (Amman, 1992), p. 94. See also Hammad al-Dabbas, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdunn*, 'Ard Mujaz (Markaz al-Urdunn al-Jadid lil-Dirasat, March 1995), p. 17. The version according to which the Brotherhood in Jordan is part of the Egyptian Brotherhood is found in the first edition of Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Suttur* (Cairo, 1978), pp. 33-34. The second edition omits this point; Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Suttur* (Cairo, 1990), p. 104.
47. Cohen attributed this to a lack of sophistication and rivalry with the nationalism of the Nasserists and the Ba'th. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 202-206.
48. For a detailed exposition of Nabahani's early career, see Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London, 1996), pp. 1-10; Muhsin Muhammad Salih, *Al-Tayyar al-Islami fi Filastin wa-Atharuhu fi Harakat al-Jihad* (Kuwait, 1988), pp. 430-31. *Tahrir* is popularly considered a "faction" of the Muslim Brotherhood. This view derives apparently from the fact that many of its members were people drawn from the ranks of the Brotherhood, who found their original movement too conservative and cooperative with the regime. However, none of the memoirs of the Jordanian *Ikhwan* or the movement's pamphlets of the time refer to Nabahani himself as involved in

the movement at any stage. His refusal to go along with the merger of *al-I'tissam* with the Brotherhood, his non-involvement in the Brotherhood's military activities during the war and his attempt to stand for office in Jerusalem in the 1950 elections all seem to suggest that he was not been formally connected with the Brotherhood. However, Nabahani may have met with Hasan al-Banna in Cairo and was reputed to have had great respect for him and his teachings. See 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 122.

49. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahzab*, p. 106.
50. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahzab*, pp. 104-15; US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 5 February 1955, NA 785.00/2-555.
51. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 216. The *Tahrir* candidates stood in Tulkarem, (where Ahmad Da'ur was returned twice with the help of the local *Ikhwan*), in Jerusalem (Da'ud Hamdan in 1954 and Faris Idris in 1956), in Hebron ('Abd al-Karim Zalum, As'ad Bayud al-Tamimi and 'Abd al-Ja'far Katiba in 1954; in 1956 Katiba was replaced by Yusuf al-Zughayr) and in Jenin (Muhammad Musa 'Abd al-Hadi in both elections).
52. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 123; Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest*, pp. 10-16. The most serious efforts for merger of the movements was the attempt to form *Al-Ukhuwa al-Islamiyya* through the mediation of the Palestinian intellectual 'Arif al-'Arif in June 1953 and after the Egyptian *Murshid 'Amm*'s visit to Jordan in 1954. By late 1955 the efforts had ended.
53. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 5 February 1955, NA 785.00/2-555.
54. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 9 December 1958, NA 785.00/12-958.
55. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest*, pp. 23-27.
56. British Embassy (Amman) to Foreign Office, 28 April 1961, Foreign Office (FO) 371/157520-1349.
57. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 125-26 mentions two conferences: the first in 1953 in which no more than 16 religious leaders participated, and the second in 1954 in which some 60 delegates took part. 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa makes the same distinction between the 1953 meeting and the "second" conference in 1954, *ibid.* pp. 147-49. Actually, the first one went almost completely unnoticed whereas the "second" one in December 1953 was seen as a precedent by political observers of the time. Despatches from the British embassies in Amman and Beirut to Foreign Office, 4 January 1954 and 13 January 1954. FO 371/110840 1349; US Embassy (Amman) to State department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355.
58. The conference also called for the formation of a standing committee to deal with plans for military conscription of refugees. British Embassy (Amman) to Foreign Office, 4 January 1954, FO 371/110840 1349.
59. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 11 March 1954, NA 785.00/3-1154.
60. US Embassy (Amman) to State department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355.
61. British Embassy (Damascus), to Foreign Office, 24 March 1954, FO 371/110840 1349.
62. British Embassy (Damascus), to Foreign Office, 6 April 1954, FO 371/110840 1349. See also 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 184.
63. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 13, 17 June 1954, NA 785.00/6-1754.
64. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 17 June 1954, NA 785.00/6-1754.
65. Nasir Aruri, *Jordan; A Study in Political Development, 1921-1965* (The Hague, 1972), p. 111; Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 59-63.

66. British Embassy (Damascus), to Foreign Office, 15 September 1954, FO 371/110840 1349; US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355.
67. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 3 January 1955, NA 785.00/1-355.
68. Martin Kramer, *An Introduction to World Islamic Conferences*, Occasional Papers, Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv, June 1978, pp. 21-22.
69. Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 21-22.
70. For a concise description of these developments, see Aruri, *Jordan*, pp. 109-15.
71. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 27 November 1954, NA 785.00/11-2754.
72. Raphael Patai, *The Kingdom of Jordan* (Princeton, 1958), p. 230.
73. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 27 November 1954, NA 785.00/11-2754.
74. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 10 May 1955, NA 785.00/5-1055.
75. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 149.
76. Dann, *King Hussein*, pp. 21-30.
77. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 23 January 1956, NA 785.00/1-2356 and 24 January 1956, NA 785.00/1-2456. British Embassy (Amman) to Foreign Office, 16 May 1956 in *Records of Jordan, 1919-1965*, vol. 9 (1955-1956), (Archive Editions, 1996), p. 325.
78. ‘Ubaydi, *Jama‘at*, p. 162; Hasan, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 62.
79. See details on the proceedings of the Congress on 1 May 1958 in *Filastin*, 4 May 1958, *Hamizrah Hehadash*, April-June 1958. The Congress reconvened on 5 February 1959, January 1960, January 1961. See *al-Jihad*, 26-31 January 1960, in *Middle East Record (MER)*, 1960, p. 321. In all these meetings the attacks on Nasir and the Egyptian regime were the rule.
80. Lawrence Tal, “Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan”, *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 3, (Autumn 1995), pp. 139-56; Dr. Ranad al-Khatib Iyad, *Al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdunn wa-Nass al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urdunni* (Amman, March 1991), p. 18. The affinity between the Jordanian *Ikhwan* and Sayyid Qutb can also be deduced from the extent to which the Jordanian Brotherhood’s historiography deals with his personality (for example 17 pages in ‘Ubaydi, *Jama‘at*, pp 132-49, whereas Hedaybi, the *Murshid* of the Egyptian Brotherhood after Banna, did not even merit one page).
81. Al-Mamlaka al-Hashimiyya al-Urdunniya, Wizarat al-Thaqafa wal-I‘lam, *Majlis al-Umma al-Urdunni*, 1972, pp. 125-28.
82. According to Mahmud al-Hasan, the *Ikhwan* were invited to join the cabinet but they declined; see al-Hasan, *al-Ikhwan*, p. 65.
83. *Hamizrah Hehadash*, January-March 1958, p. 196.
84. For full text of King Hussein’s “open letter” see King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London, 1962), pp. 159-60.
85. Aruri, *Jordan*, p. 139.
86. *Al-Kifah al-Islami*, 8 February 1957.
87. John B. Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London, 1957), p. 436.

88. Aruri, *Jordan*, p. 140.
89. See editorials of *al-Kifah al-Islami*, especially 31 May 1957.
90. According to Israeli observers of Jordan at the time and Jordanian Public Security archives.
91. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 189.
92. Aruri, *Jordan*, p. 163.
93. US Embassy (Amman) to State Department, 9 December 1958, NA 785.00/12-958.
94. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 171.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
96. He was arrested for demonstrating against an American dance troupe (July 1960), but was received by the king only three months after his release (January 1961). *MER*, 1960, pp. 320-21.
97. *MER*, 1961, p. 360. Khalifa, speaking years later, continued to call himself *Na'ib al-Murshid al-'Amm* (deputy general guide) and member of the *Maktab al-Irshad* of the World Muslim Brotherhood movement. Khalifa to *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 9 June 1989.
98. In the wake of this disappointment, the movement sent Dr. 'Ali Hawamda to take advice from the most venerated of the Egyptian Brethren in the eyes of the Jordanian movement: Sayyid Qutb. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, pp. 169-71.
99. When Jordanian Brotherhood members, including Kamil al-Sharif, were accused by Egypt of being involved in an attempt to assassinate Nasir, the Jordanian Government took steps to lower the profile of those implicated, British Embassy (Amman) to Foreign Office, 15 December 1965 in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965*, vol. 14 (1963-1965) (Archive Editions, 1996), p. 700; Dann, *King Hussein*, p. 157.
100. *MER*, 1967, pp. 399, 407.
101. Dann, *King Hussein*, p. 60.
102. For first hand accounts of Hussein's unexpected entrance to the hall in Amman where the gathering was held, see al-Sha'ir, *Siyasi*, p. 222. See also *MER*, 1968, p. 599.
103. *MER*, 1968, pp. 588-89.
104. Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, pp. 151-52.
105. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 187; Ziyad Abu Ghanima, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya wa-Qadiyyat Filastin*, pp. 124-26.
106. Such as *al-Haqq bil-Qafila; al-Difa' 'an Aradi al-Muslimin; Aham Furud al-'Ayn* (Jedda, 1987); and *Min al-Jihad Adhab wa-Ihkam* (n.p., 1987); *Fi al-Jihad—Fiqh wa-Ijtihad* (n.p., n.d.); *A'lan al-Jihad* (Peshawar, 1990); *Ayyat al-Rahman fi Jihad al-Afghan* (Pakistan, 1985). In his books 'Azzam "proves" that the *Jihad* in defense of Muslim lands, in Palestine, Afghanistan and elsewhere, is a personal duty—*fard 'ayn*—incumbent on every Muslim (like the Fast, Shahada, etc.) and not a communal duty—*fard kifaya* incumbent on the society as a whole and dealt with by the leaders.
107. On details of the *Tahrir* coup attempt, see Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest*, pp. 27-29.
108. At least according to a later pamphlet of the Brotherhood, (15 June 1985) quoted in Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 85.
109. *Al-Nashra* (Athens), 6 April 1987.

110. Farhan, a native of Ein Karem near Jerusalem, joined the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood in 1948. His membership was suspended for having joined Wasfi al-Tall's cabinet in 1970. He was reinstated in 1980 as a member of the Executive Bureau of the movement. Later he resigned from the leadership of the Brotherhood upon becoming the Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front. Hourani et. al, *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 59-60.
111. Shmuel Bar, *The Jordanian Entity: Reconstruction, Change and Continuity—A Political History of Jordan: 1971-1979* (PhD thesis submitted to Tel Aviv University, November 1988), p. 510 (Hebrew); Hourani, p. 60.
112. This is so at least in the West Bank. One may assume that the absence of any evidence to the contrary (including in very comprehensive histories of the labor and professional associations in Jordan, written by the leftists) shows that there was very little activity in this sphere. Cohen, *Parties*, p. 159; "30 'Ammā 'ala Nushu al-Haraka al-Niqabiya wal-'Umaliya al-Urdunniyya," *al-Urdunn al-Jadid*, no. 1, vol. 2 (December 1984), pp. 17-54. For a brief survey of the growth of "civil society" in Jordan in the early 1970s, see Shmuel Bar, *The Jordanian Entity*, pp.75-78.
113. On the Saudi and Gulf States' support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (and elsewhere) during the 1970s, see Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam," pp. 139-56.
114. *Al-Nashra* (Athens), 6 April 1987.
115. For the Ba'thi perception of the *Ikhwan*-Fatah alliance, see Sha'ir, *Siyasi yatadhakkir*, pp. 238-52.
116. RBC, "Islamic Thought in Jordanian Society" in *Readjusting Perspectives on Nationalism, Religion and Culture*, Cemam Report, Beirut, vol. 7, 1980, pp. 137-56.
117. Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 69-70.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 71. Regarding the Jordanian position on the peace process after the Rabat Summit, see Shmuel Bar, "The Jordanian Entity," p. 251.
119. *The Times* (London), 13 November 1978; *New York Times*, 14 September 1979.
120. Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam," p. 142. A description of the socio-economic developments at that time can be found in Shmuel Bar, *The Jordanian Entity*, pp. 75-77.
121. Jordanian News Agency, 2 April—FBIS, 4 April 1979.
122. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest*, p. 31.
123. See Ahmad 'Ubaydat to Parliament, quoted in *al-Nashra* (Athens), 6 April 1987.
124. "The Brothers in Jordan: 'A Movement against Dictatorship'," *The Middle East*, May 1983, p. 28.
125. Khalifa to *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 9 June 1989. As for the Islamic delegitimization of the Iranian regime by the king, see Robert B. Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank* (New York, 1986), pp. 48-49.
126. Ziyad Abu Ghanima in *al-Shira'*, 12 August 1991 in *JPRS-NEA*, 30 October 1991, p. 22.
127. 'Abdallah 'Azzam, *Ayyat al-Rahman fi Jihad al-Afghan*.
128. *Jordan Times*, 28 June 1979.
129. A number of the *Ikhwan* are members of the executive board of the "Council for Islamic Organizations and Associations in Jordan" and the "Islamic Association for Science and Research." See *Al-Nashra* (Athens), 6 April 1987.

130. *Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS)*, vol. 3 (1978-1979), pp. 631-32.
131. Khalifa's interview on the subject to *Le Monde*, 26 February 1980.
132. Khalifa to *New York Times*, 26 February 1980.
133. Badran's connections to the Brotherhood were well known in Jordanian political circles at the time. See Robert Satloff, "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform," in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York, 1992), pp. 142-45; *Sourakia* (London), 18 December 1989. As for 'Ubaydat, one indication is the fact that he is praised by 'Abdallah 'Azzam in his memoirs on the period of *Ikhwan fida'i* activity. 'Ubaydi, *Jama'at*, p. 189. Rumors also explained his dismissal in April 1985, as deriving, inter alia, from the King's dissatisfaction with his soft policy towards the Brotherhood. *Middle East International*, 19 April 1985.
134. Interview with 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, *al-Dustur* (London), 13 June 1988.
135. Robert Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank*, pp. 42-43, 123.
136. Khalifa to *The Times* (London), 8 December 1980.
137. See Robert Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank*, pp. 45-46; Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam," p. 142.
138. Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 87-89.
139. Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank*, p. 49. In Zayd al-Rifa'i's April 1985 cabinet, Da'udiyya was replaced by the traditionalist pro-Hashemite (but ex-*Tahrir*) 'Abd al-'Aziz Khayyat, *ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
140. Jordan TV, 28 January—FBIS, 29 January 1985.
141. See *Jordan Times*, 11 November 1985, for full text of Hussein's letter.
142. *Jordan Times*, 17 November, 21 December 1985.
143. Robert Satloff, "They cannot Stop our Tongues," p. 25.
144. See Shmuel Bar, *The Jordanian Entity*, pp. 212, 225-27 regarding the subject of the Parliament in Jordan; see p. 516 on the Consultative Council's makeup.
145. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada* (Tel Aviv, 1990), p. 238 (Hebrew).
146. *Mithaq al-Haraka al-Islamiyya*, Pamphlet.
147. For various analyses of the 1989 elections, see: Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam," p. 144; on the success of the Brotherhood candidates in the refugee camps, see Schirin Fathi, *The Palestinian Component in Jordan's 1989 Parliamentary Elections* (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, East Jerusalem, August 1990), pp. 21-22.
148. For the biographies of the new ministers, see *al-Ra'y* (Jordan), 2 January 1991. For analysis of the co-optation of the Brotherhood in government see editorials in *al-Ra'y* and *al-Dustur* (Jordan), 2 January 1991.
149. Interview with the Brotherhood Spokesman, Ahmad Qutaysh al-'Azayida, to *Filastin al-Muslima* (London), November 1991. Muhammad Abu Faris even published a *fatwa* against participation in the Government (*Hukm al-Musharika fi al-Wizara; the rule of participation in the Government*).
150. The directive was "leaked" to the Jordanian press.

151. *Al-Ribat* (Jordan), 18 June 1991.
152. Interview with the Brotherhood spokesman, Ahmad Qutaysh al-'Azayida, to *Filastin al-Muslima* (London), November 1991.
153. For example, the Tujan al-Faysal affair, when the Brotherhood tried to force a divorce on a secular woman on the basis of her being a "heretic." The king, sensing the public disapproval of the Brotherhood's position, gave support to the liberals by meeting with them. *Petra*, 1 August—FBIS, 2 November 1989, *Jordan Times*, 4 November 1989.
154. Yusuf al-'Azam to *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Jordan), 18 November—FBIS, 20 November 1989. It is noteworthy that in a manifest of the brotherhood of 15 June 1985, the article dealing with "implementing Islamic *Shari'a*" only states that "this country is the country of the Muslims... which was judged by the *Shari'a* for long centuries until the enemies of Islam invaded it and judged it with Western and un-Islamic laws." There is no ultimative demand to implement the *Shari'a* in all its aspects. Mahmud al-Hasan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 81.
155. Hourani et. al, *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 20-28; *al-Ribat* (Jordan), 20 January 1993; press conference with Ishaq al-Farhan, *al-Liwa* (Jordan), 24 January 1993; the programme of the IAF in *al-Liwa* (Jordan), 24 February 1993; interview with Ishaq al-Farhan, *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Jordan), 8 March 1993.
156. See particulars of the members of the *Majlis Shura* in Hourani et. al, *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 70-76; *al-Liwa* (Jordan), 24 February 1993.
157. Dabbas, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya*, pp. 31-38; Dr. Ranad al-Khatib Iyad, *al-Tiyyarat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdunn*, pp. 25-26; 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, pp. 136-142. The movement, aware of the strength of the *Ikhwan* in the mosques, called on the Minister of *Awqaf* to prevent the exploitation of the mosques for political purposes during the elections. *Al-Dustur* (Jordan), 30 June 1993.
158. Originally formed in September 1990 as *Hizb al-Haqq al-Islami* (The Islamic Right Party); *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Jordan), 3 September 1990. The Secretary General of the party, Jamal al-Ma'luwani, stressed the call for Arab and Islamic unity and for support of the Palestinian cause. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, pp. 115-17.
159. A "rationalist" party founded on 13 August 1990 as an alternative to the three trends it saw as having dominated the Arab scene: the Islamic, the Pan-Arab and the Marxist. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, pp. 117-22.
160. This party emphasized the "salvation of the nation" from the foreign capitalist states and support for the Palestinian Intifada. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, pp. 130-31.
161. A Pan-Arab Islamic Party founded in late 1990 by Muhammad Khayr 'Abdallah Zayd al-Kaylani (engineer, civil servant and journalist, born in al-Salt, 1949); see *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Jordan), 17 November 1990; 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, pp. 132-36.
162. 'Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahزاب*, p. 129.
163. Samih al-Mu'ayita, *Al-Tajriba al-Siyasiyya lil-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Urdunn* (Amman, 1994).
164. For a description of the 1993 elections and their circumstances, see Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam," pp. 146-47; Ben Wedeman, "The King's Loyal Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's Foray into Jordanian Politics," *Middle East Insight*, January-February 1994, pp. 15-19.

165. *Al-Nashra* (Athens), 6 April 1987; "The Shifting Fortunes of Syria's Muslim Brothers," *The Middle East*, May 1983, pp. 25-28.
166. See the Khilafa Home Page on the Internet [Http://www-personal.umich.edu/~luqman](http://www-personal.umich.edu/~luqman); Ben Wedeman, "The King's Loyal Opposition?" In 1990 it established a post of "spokesman" of the party in Jordan filled by 'Ata Abu al-Rishta, a Palestinian from Hebron who had served as the head of the "Jordanian area" of the party since 1986. Abu al-Rishta began to act openly in the name of the party, lecturing on its ideology and its positions on current affairs in mosques, *Shari'a* colleges and even professional associations. The party began to publish a clandestine newspaper, *al-Wa'i*; see Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamentalist Quest*, pp. 156, 163; *al-Bilad* (Jordan), 5 December 1995.
167. Between 1991 and 1994 radical groups under the names of *Jaysh Muhammad* (Muhammad's Army), *Shabab al-Nafir al-Islami* (Youth of the Islamic Bugle), *al-Tajdid al-Islami* (Islamic Renewal) and members of *Tahrir* were accused of plotting to assassinate senior military and security officials, including members of the Royal Family.
168. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi* (Lebanon), 17 December 1993.
169. See analysis of the trend in the IAF in *Jordan Times*, 31 January 1994.
170. *Al-Ufuq* (Jordan), 29 June 1994.
171. *Al-Dustur* (Jordan), 22 July 1994.
172. *Al-Bilad* (Jordan), 3 August 1994.
173. According to Brotherhood MP, Dr. Muhammad 'Uwayda in *al-Sabil* (Jordan), 29 November 1994, and the organ of the IAF, *al-'Amal al-Islami* as quoted in *al-Aswaq* (Jordan), 20 August 1995.
174. Dhunaybat to *al-Shuruq* (Sharjah), in trying to refute the claim that the Muslim Brotherhood had engaged in terrorism in the past against Muslim regimes, emphasized that the movement in Egypt had only fought "against the English and Zionists." The official organ of the movement, *al-Sabil*, regularly praised attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians (*al-Sabil*, 15 November 1994, 12 March 1996) and prominent members in the movement issued a *fatwa* legitimizing suicide attacks on Israelis (*al-Urdunn*, 20 March 1996).
175. *Al-Majd* (Jordan), 4 November 1996.
176. For the Brotherhood's reaction to the new Press Law in May 1997, see *The Star* (Jordan), 22 May 1997; Dominic Evans, "Jordan Unveils Tough New Press Law," Reuter, 18 May 1997; *Jordan Times*, 19 May 1997; *al-Ra'y* (Jordan), 3 June 1997.
177. *Al-Ra'y* (Jordan), 3 June 1997; *al-Dustur* (Jordan), 13 July 1997.
178. *The Star* (Jordan), 27 March 1997 (Internet edition).
179. *The Star* (Jordan), 3 July 1997 (Internet edition).
180. The decision to boycott the Senate as well was not taken easily, and according to the Jordanian press was passed in the absence of the *Muraqib 'Amm*, Dhunaybat. *Al-Ra'y* (Jordan), 12 November 1997.
181. *Jordan Times*, 10 November 1997 (Internet edition).
182. *Jordan Times*, 20, 21, 28 December 1997 (Internet edition).
183. Uriel Dann, *King Hussein*, pp. 169-70.
184. Half of the IAF MPs after the 1993 elections were Palestinians (8 out of 16). For an analysis

of the “Palestinization” of the Islamic camp in Jordan, see Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 373-87.

185. Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank*, p. 58.

186. Mu‘ayta, *al-Tajriba al-Siyasiyya*.