How Iran Wound Up On The Axis Of Evil

VOL. XLV

No 8

25 February 2002

IRAN

How Iran Wound Up On The Axis Of Evil

By Robert H Pelletreau

The following is a speech given by US Ambassador Robert H Pelletreau to the Iranian-American Bar Association in New York on 12 February 2002. Mr Pelletreau was US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from February 1994 to January 1997. He is now a partner in the law firm Afridi, Angell and Pelletreau in Washington, DC, and serves as Of Counsel to Baker Potts LLP.

Introduction

When I spoke to the Washington branch of the American-Iranian Bar Association in early December, my conclusion regarding Iranian-American relations was that both governments were interested in pursuing better relations but both had missed opportunities. As a result, the prognosis at that time was that both governments would continue a cautious approach and that no rapid change in the relationship seemed likely in the months ahead.

What then has caused the clear deterioration in relations over the past few weeks? What led President Bush to include Iran along with Iraq and North Korea on the Axis of Evil so prominently highlighted in his 29 January 2002 State of the Union message? Without seeking either to justify or condemn this latest American action, let me trace the course of US-Iranian relations over the past year and try to explain what happened to derail initially hopeful prospects.

When President George W Bush took office on 20 January 2001, there was considerable optimism within the business communities of both nations that relations would improve at a more rapid pace than the slow-motion minuet of reciprocal gestures that had characterized the second Clinton Administration. The pro-business, pro-trade attitude of the new Administration, the previous involvement of the President and Vice President in the energy industry, and Secretary Powell’s commitment in his confirmation hearings to undertake a comprehensive review of US sanctions policy all seemed to point in the direction of better relations with Tehran.

Initially, however, the Administration saw no urgency in addressing the Iran portfolio. It decided to begin with comprehensive reviews of energy policy and sanctions policy before bilateral relations with Iran would be addressed.

Looking back, the Administration was caught unprepared when, on 23 May, a bill for the renewal of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act was introduced in the House of Representatives with over 200 co-sponsors, followed shortly by a parallel bill in the Senate backed by a veto-proof majority of Senators. Despite the fact that this legislation had been unenforceable during its initial five years, the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee had decided to make renewal a priority issue in 2001 as a way of highlighting both its own influence and Iran’s continuing, unremitting hostility to Israel. Faced with the inevitable passage of ILSA II, the Administration could only meekly and unsuccessfully suggest a three-year rather than five-year renewal and secure the addition to the bill of a mandatory 18-month report which might conceivably lay the foundation for early reconsideration of the law if conditions warranted. The added practical effect of ILSA’s renewal was to reduce the likelihood of major modifications to the Executive Order sanctions owing to the specter of strong Congressional opposition to any initiative of this nature which might come from the Administration. In Iran, Conservatives interpreted the renewal as a hostile act and used it to reinforce reciprocal Iranian hostility toward Washington.

September 11 And Its Aftermath

This was the situation on September 11 when terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon launched America’s war on terrorism. Initial reactions from Iran to the attacks were sympathetic, reinforced by reports of candlelight vigils by ordinary citizens and a message of condolence from the Mayor of Tehran to Mayor Giuliani of New York. This positive image, however, was almost immediately undercut by searing public criticism of American arrogance from the Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamanei.

While some voices in Washington argued for the need to reach out beyond America’s traditional friends and allies to explore cooperation with other governments willing to cooperate against terrorism, reactions in Iran made this opportunity much narrower in reality than it appeared. Continuing internal tensions between Conservatives and Reformers made it difficult for Iranian figures even to suggest reaching out to the US, let alone propose an initiative. Among those who favored a rapprochement, moreover, some miscalculated Iran’s bargaining power, assuming that its 560-mile border with Afghanistan would give it greater leverage than proved to be the case.

In the course of several exchanges, Iran expressed its willingness to assist US pilots forced down in Iran or escaping to Iranian territory but was unwilling to allow US overflights. It also opened the port of Bandar Abbas for humanitarian shipments of wheat bound for Afghanistan, and the State Department obtained a special waiver of the sanctions to permit internal transport across Iran. Later, Iran used its influence with the Northern Alliance to help achieve agreement on the framework for an interim Afghan government during the UN-sponsored conference in Bonn. These gestures, however, were far short of the assistance and facilities offered by other nations bordering Afghanistan, such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Unlike President Musharraf, whose bold shift of policy laid a foundation for removal of US sanctions on Pakistan, Iran’s leaders provided no such platform from which the Administration could propose to a skeptical Congress a similar lifting of restrictions. Foreign Minister Kharrazi was reportedly surprised and disappointed when all he received from Secretary Powell at a 6-plus-2 group meeting in New York in November was a verbal thank you for his words of sympathy about the American Airlines crash and a handshake, but in truth Iran had not laid a foundation for anything more.

Here the relationship might have languished, registering neither improvement nor deterioration, were it not for a combination of events in late December-early January that brought Iran to the attention of US policymakers in a very negative way. The first and most alarming of these was the capture of the Palestinian ship Karine-A with a cargo of some 50 tons of Iranian-manufactured weapons destined for the use of Palestinian forces in the West Bank and Gaza. The weaponry involved, Katyusha rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars and C-4 explosive material would have provided Palestinians with the ability to hit targets in Israeli territory, fire on Israeli armored vehicles and arm legions of new suicide bombers. Seeking to import such arms, however rationalized as a self-defense measure, was a clear violation of the Oslo Accords which limited Palestinian rearmament to light arms for internal police forces, a provision specifically agreed between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators in the presence of US and Egyptian witnesses. The Iranian origin of these arms and confirmation by US intelligence services of the involvement of Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces in their delivery constituted a new level of Iranian intervention in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in a way which directly confronted US interests.

The second influential event occurred in Afghanistan where evidence reached the US that Iranian Revolutionary Guards were supplying arms and training to some of the forces supporting warlord Ismael Khan against the interests of the interim Afghan Government organized and operating under the auspices of the United Nations. Here again, Iranian actions clashed with US interests.

A third contributing factor which provided the connecting glue between these otherwise unrelated events was evidence that Iran was continuing its efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons along with long-range delivery missiles on the one hand and to purchase sophisticated conventional weapons on the other. The picture which emerged before US policymakers from these various activities was of an Iran willing to export arms to militant groups in other states in direct confrontation to US interests while at the same time making efforts to acquire even more dangerous and destructive arms for its own arsenals. The clear implication was that in the future Iran’s leaders would not hesitate to provide more and more lethal weapons to groups considered as terrorists by the US who would be using those weapons against US interests and perhaps against the United States, itself. The specter of such Iranian actions was powerful enough to override the modest level of practical coordination on Afghanistan coming from other parts of the Iranian Government. No longer, President Bush has decided, can the Iranian Government continue to have it both ways, that is, having different parts of the government following inconsistent policies without having to choose between them. Henceforth, the Iranian Government as a whole will be held responsible for the actions of any one of its parts.

The Road Ahead

Iranian-US relations are now in a much more difficult situation than they were before the above-described incidents and President Bush’s speech. The phrase “axis of evil” has now become one of the most recognized and commented on aspects of President Bush’s foreign policy. It is being referred to in the media as “the Bush doctrine.” This means it will not be easy to change or erode. Moreover, Israel and its supporters are reinforcing the message that Iran cannot be trusted and are reporting a massive Iranian armament of Hizballah in Lebanon, facilitated by one of the FBI’s “Ten Most Wanted” criminals, Imad Mughniyeh, and a new contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. On the eastern front, US officials are concerned that Iranian agents may be offering refuge to Taliban or al-Qa'ida fighters or assisting them to transit Iran to some third country safehaven even as other parts of the government try to arrest them or prevent their entry.

Visa and entry restrictions are tougher for Iranians wishing to come to the US than before September 11. Applicants for non-immigrant visas must make two visits to a US consulate outside Iran, first to submit the application and answer a personal questionnaire and then to obtain the visa after a careful Washington review. Special treatment waivers for sponsored Iranian visitors at US ports of entry are now exceedingly rare and the entrant is likely to be subjected to an interrogation in addition to being fingerprinted and photographed. Figures are not available, but surely the number of Iranians visiting the US has declined since September 11.

When, in the days following the President’s speech, the State Department Spokesman seemed to indicate that the US still saw opportunities for improvement in the relationship, the White House quickly cautioned US diplomats not to try to interpret the President’s words or undercut their meaning. It fell to Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his testimony before the House International Relations Committee on February 7, to amplify the US position in answer to a question from Congressman Ben Gilman. After noting that some parts of the Iranian Government had played a positive role in the Bonn Conference and the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference, he said, “We’re making it clear to the Iranians that you’ve got to choose. If you want to be part of a world that’s moving forward, it’s time to stop being a state sponsor of terrorism.”

What this means in practical terms is that positive actions and statements by parts of the Iranian Government are not going to have much influence in Washington so long as other parts of the Iranian Government, such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Information and Security, are pursuing policies inimical to US interests. In applying this approach, the US is not likely to soften its opposition to Iran’s application to join the WTO. Nor are officials of the Administration charged with enforcing sanctions likely to make expansive interpretations of permitted activities in the months ahead. On the contrary, we can expect strict enforcement of the Executive Order to the extent that OFAC’s overstretched staff can do so and very careful and cautious attention to requests for licenses or waivers. At the same time, however, there has been no indication as yet that the Administration will try to enforce the virtually unenforceable Iran Libya Sanctions Act against European companies making investments in Iran’s petroleum sector. It will probably take the more implementable course of asking European governments to restrain their companies’ enthusiasm for investing in Iran as part of a renewed effort to mobilize European pressure on Tehran to end objectionable policies. When these demarches prove ineffective, as they likely will, it is not out of the question that the ILSA champions in Congress, with the backing of AIPAC, may try to tighten the screws further either by pressing the Department of State to investigate and enforce the Act or by threatening to remove the Act’s national interest waiver.

One consequence of the President’s speech has been a modest monarchist public relations campaign by supporters of Reza Pahlavi, but so far it does not seem to have attracted any significant support either in Iran or the US.

While Iran’s immediate reaction has been to mobilize angry public demonstrations against the US, it is not clear that placing Iran on the Axis of Evil will have much effect on internal Iranian dynamics over the longer run, any more than identifying the US as the “Great Satan” has caused any policy shifts in Washington. Emotional reactions by Iranian leaders, such as turning off all existing forms of communication and cooperation with the US or moving closer to Iraq, are likely to be short lived, as it becomes clear that the US wants to continue talking and is not preparing to launch a military attack or trying to overthrow the existing regime. Each nation has its own governing context dictated largely by historical experience and internal pressures, and neither understands very well the way policy decisions are reached by the other or the interplay between various centers of power in each other’s capital. The persistent belief by Iran’s leaders that the President could simply lift sanctions by a wave of his pen, without consulting Congress, or that Iranian reactions are a major daily preoccupation of US policymakers, reflects this lack of understanding.

The prospect, therefore, is for continuation of the over 20-year estrangement between two great peoples and their governments even though the case for a warmer, more productive relationship is stronger than ever. The US presumably wants and needs Iran’s cooperation in all aspects of the campaign against terrorism, including financial controls, law enforcement and intelligence sharing, all of which require communication and interaction on an ongoing basis. Iran’s stake in long-term stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan and the establishment of a viable government and economy which can reabsorb the millions of Afghan refugees is at least as great as that of the US. In addition, Iran’s role in the orderly development of Central Asia, in helping to meet global energy requirements, and in achieving the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Gulf and in the Arab-Israeli conflict is very important.

What this means is that those of us in the non-governmental sector, like the Iranian-American Bar Association and the American-Iranian Council which I helped found, have a lot of work to do not only in helping to remove the underbrush of misunderstanding that has grown up during the over 20 years of no relations, but also through track two dialogues and exchanges in improving communication between those elements of both societies who hope for an eventual normalization.

For now, however, President Bush has resolved internal differences within the Administration and chosen his course. Iran, also, needs to choose even though that choice may be a long time in coming.