Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs in
Iraq
Testimony
of Charles A.
Duelfer
Resident Visiting
Scholar
Center for
Strategic & International Studies
Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats & Capabilities Armed Services
Committee of the United States Senate
February 27,
2002
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
your Committee. I would like to make my presentation in
two parts. The first part will address the motivations,
concepts and organizations supporting the Iraqi WMD
programs. The second will discuss the ensuing programs
and their probable status today.
UNSCOM had long pressed Iraq to provide
information and documents describing the requirements
and operational concepts for the BW, CW, Ballistic
Missile and nuclear programs. Iraq refused until shortly
after Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal
defected to Jordan in August 1995. Hussein Kamal was the
most senior regime official with control over these
weapons programs. Baghdad was concerned about what Kamal
would reveal and sought to limit the damage by a burst
of controlled cooperation and admissions.
On
September 18, 1995, I had a long, late night meeting
with several senior Iraqi ministers and other officials.
The meeting was arranged to discuss the Iraqi concepts
and requirements for their WMD development and
production programs. Previously, Baghdad had refused to
engage in such a discussion. I remember the meeting
quite well, not simply because there was an unusual
amount of candor, but because I suddenly realized how
unlikely it was that the government would ever comply
fully with the UN demand to completely give up all WMD
capabilities forever. Consequently, the UNSCOM
inspectors had an ultimately hopeless task under the
conditions it was permitted to operate.
Iraq
revealed that evening how weapons of mass destruction
were viewed from the position of the Presidency. (They
even provided selected presidential documents.) Partial
descriptions of the origin of WMD efforts were
discussed. They also discussed how these programs had
been used and their importance to the regime. In
essence, the possession of WMD had saved the regime on
two occasions. The first was in the war with Iran in the
1980's when Iranian human wave infantry attacks were
repelled with chemical munitions (UNSCOM learned that
101,000 were reported "consumed" during this period).
The
second instance where WMD preserved the regime was more
surprising. I had asked about the decision by the Iraqi
leadership not to employ WMD in the 1991 Gulf War. In a
carefully worded response, the impression was conveyed
that the President thought if Iraq used chemical or
biological weapons against the coalition, retaliation
would end his regime and probably him personally. He was
successfully deterred. However, my interlocutors went on
to describe how they had loaded BW and CW agent into
various missile warheads and bombs before hostilities
began in 1991. Moreover they dispersed these weapons and
pre-delegated the authority to use them if the United
States moved on Baghdad. The Iraqis stated that
these actions apparently deterred the United States from
going to Baghdad.
Whether the Iraqi leadership believes this was
the only reason the United States did not go to Baghdad
in 1991 is unknown. However, clearly they are convinced
that the possession of WMD contributed to keeping the
Americans away and thus was vital to their survival.
The
Iraqi WMD programs, which were begun in the mid-1970's,
and consumed large material and human resources
throughout the 1980's were well worth the investment
from the perspective of the leadership. It was difficult
then and more difficult now, to imagine circumstances
under which this regime would end these programs. Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said on more than one
occasion, "You are not McArthur. You did not occupy
Iraq. Therefore, there are limits to what you can do."
He was absolutely correct. Inspectors would be
inherently limited in what they could do and accomplish.
Nevertheless, we did eventually obtain a pretty good
picture of the extent of Iraq's programs. From that, and
from evidence that continues to be available even now,
it is possible to make a reasonable judgment about
Iraq's current capabilities and intentions.
Organizations The key organizations of the
Iraqi programs included not just the Ministry of
Defense, military services and Military Industrial
Corporation, but also the intelligence services. The
role of the latter was particularly relevant to the BW
program and contributed to our lack of understanding in
that area. The military services had clear roles in the
chemical area. Air Force and Army forces stocked and
used a variety of munitions for battlefield purposes.
The long-range missiles were in a separate unit and had
special warheads that could be loaded with chemical or
biological agents. The Military Industrial Corporation
(or organization) was and is now the ministry that
coordinates all military research, development, and
production. A special department of the Iraqi
Intelligence Service or Mukhabarat plays an important
supporting role, especially in arranging overseas
procurement of weapons-related items. They coordinate
purchasing missions and establish front companies or
work through companies who conduct largely legitimate
business.
The
Special Security Organization (Amn al Khass) had a
special role in the BW program that was carefully
concealed. UNSCOM only obtained fragmentary information
on this but it was clear that much of the original work
on agent development was at the instigation of this
security organization. The purposes of such research
were therefore uncertain, but not related to military
requirements. The Special Security Organization and the
elite military units of the Special Republican Guard are
responsible for protecting and concealing WMD
elements.
The
place where all these programs came together was in the
office of the President (or Diwan). Only top
presidential advisors had the full picture and gave
direction and committed the resources to these programs.
Key among them is Presidential Secretary Abid Hamoud who
plays a role like the US national security advisor, but
more so. (He has more command authority.)
Incidentally, the reason UNSCOM pressed so hard
to gain access to presidential sites, including palace
areas, was because this is where we believed we could
find the program and planning data that would allow us
to verify the full extent of the Iraqi programs. The
top-level control of these programs will not have
changed today.
Long Range Ballistic Missile Status. The
bulk of Iraq's long range surface to surface missiles
derived from imported SCUDs from the former Soviet
Union. They imported 819 missiles and eleven mobile
launchers. Many were expended: against Iran, for
testing, and in the 1991 war. Iraq unilaterally
destroyed others in an elaborate ruse to preserve a
limited force in 1991. UNSCOM pursued a long and
tortuous process to account for these missiles, which
was made more difficult by the discovery in 1995 that
Iraq had a program to produce such missiles
indigenously. This program was at least somewhat
successful. At the end or our work in Iraq there
remained uncertainty over the disposition of a
relatively small number of SCUD missiles. In my view it
is likely Iraq retains a small long range missile force
(perhaps 12-14 missiles) that would serve the purpose of
a strategic reserve.
However, Iraq also retained a missile development
and production infrastructure. This is permitted under
UN resolutions for missiles up to 150 kilometers. Iraq
has an active development program for a liquid fueled
missile dubbed the al Samoud which utilizes engine
technology from the anti-aircraft missile SA-2 (Iraq had
over 1400 of these missiles) and some technology derived
from its SCUD missiles. This program continues today and
there are reports that Iraq may be seeking the ability
to extend its range and develop longer-range missiles.
Key
areas Iraq needed to work on included, warhead fusing
(their CW/BW missile warheads in 1991 had impact fuses
which would greatly limit their effectiveness),
guidance, and engine production. Another area where Iraq
is undoubtedly working is on staging. The Iraqi surface
to surface missiles in 1991 were single staged. However,
they were doing research on ways to add stages and
increase range. It should be noted that Iraq continued
these research and development efforts even while UNSCOM
was inspecting during the early 1990's.
Chemical Weapons Status. While UNSCOM
attempted to obtain documentation covering missions and
requirements from the Ministry of Defense we never
succeeded--despite some very intrusive inspections.
Nevertheless, we gained a general picture of the
chemical weapons programs up until 1988, or the end of
the Iran-Iraq war. The agents and munitions developed
and used were nerve and mustard agent. They had clear
battlefield applications and we were able to account for
much of the weapons and production capacity. Remaining
issues included such matters as discrepancies about
munitions consumed. (A key document found by UNSCOM in
the Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 was seized
back by Iraq. Inspectors had copied the data, which
contradicted earlier Iraqi declarations accounting for
nerve and mustard munitions.) There also was production
equipment which UNSCOM had evidence existed in Iraq, but
never located. There also was no way of verifying the
disposition of much of the stocks of precursor chemicals
Iraq had acquired.
It
was certainly the case that the work Iraq pursued in CW
after 1988 was the most tightly protected by Iraq. The
one document that Ministry of Defense document UNSCOM
did receive provided guidance to continue to develop the
types of Chemical Weapons, attempting to manufacture the
most dangerous types in large quantities. It was in this
period that development and production of the advanced
nerve agent VX was conducted. There remains considerable
uncertainty about the extent of this program and its
disposition. There was a pattern to Iraqi revelations
that they gave up the oldest and least advanced projects
and materials most readily.
UNSCOM accounted for and destroyed huge amounts
of chemical agent, munitions, production equipment, and
precursors. Yet, there certainly remained unaccounted
materials for the production of both precursors and
final agent. Iraq can make munitions indigenously and
can probably make need chemical production equipment
indigenously. The expertise for such work
remains.
Areas where Iraq could be expected to be doing
development would be in producing stabilized VX and
improving their munitions and dispersal systems. In
particular, the aerial bomb designs Iraq had in the
early 1990s were not efficient for dispersing nerve
agent. Fusing was a problem. It was apparent that Iraq
was beginning to look into cluster munitions. Such
munitions could be much more effective battlefield
weapons. Aerial spray devices, possibly attached to
remotely piloted vehicles, were under development and
had application for both chemical and biological
agents.
Biological Weapons Status. The biological
weapons program was the least well verified of all
Iraq's WMD programs. Part of the reason is because, as
noted earlier, it emerged from the security
organizations. The original purposes probably were not
military in nature. This program was also not admitted
until 1995, or four years after UNSCOM began work in
Iraq. We know that the BW program largely shared the
same munitions as CW. However, the production levels and
disposition of both agent and production equipment has
significant uncertainty.
The
three biological agents Iraq states it produced for
weapons were anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.
There were many other biological agents on which Iraq
conducted research and development. These included
clostridium perfringens (causes gangrene), ricin, wheat
cover smut and some early work on viruses. Iraq had
begun some early genetic engineering work as well. Iraq
conducted experiments mixing lethal and non-lethal
agents such as CS, commonly used as a riot control
agent.
Iraq
never made clear the purposes of many of these programs
and experiments, extensive though they were. It seemed
probable that military use was not the only purpose. In
fact, the military seemed to have almost no interest or
relationship to the program. It is difficult to
understand why Iraq would produce and put into aerial
bombs, aflatoxin. It has the effect of causing cancer
over a period of several years. Experiments Iraq
conducted in mixing aflatoxin with riot control agent
appear particularly insidious as they would mask the
exposure of individuals to this cancer causing
agent.
The
experiments with wheat smut are evidently aimed at
developing economic weapons.
It
was clear that Iraq understood that depending on the
method of dispersal, the origin of the agent could be
concealed. In other words, they understood the potential
for conducting an attack that would be near impossible
to connect to Baghdad as the responsible
actor.
The
sites where Iraqi BW work was known to have occurred
were accounted for by UNSCOM. The largest, al Hakam was
destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1996. Another, the
Daura Foot and Mouth disease facility is being used for
civilian purposes according to public accounts. There
were elements of production equipment that UNSCOM
understood were shipped into Iraq, but which were never
located.
Nuclear Weapons Status. The nuclear
weapons program is the most critical and most difficult
for Iraq to achieve. While successful in all other WMD
areas, Iraq did not quite achieve a nuclear weapon
capability before invading Kuwait. Iraq had a huge
sustained investment in nuclear weapons development
throughout the 1980's. The IAEA accounted for most of
the program and key facilities were destroyed. However,
the intellectual capital remains, as does the will of
the leadership to achieve a nuclear capability. Even
during the time UNSCOM and IAEA were still in Iraq,
there was a pattern of the former staff of the nuclear
program being reassembled in common locations according
to their expertise, e.g. specialists from former
centrifuge enrichment program can be found clustered at
one facility. Of course Iraq claimed they were engaged
in activities allowed by the UN resolutions, but
coincidences like these occurred too often.
Key
facilities where personnel congregated included Al Majd
Center, the Ibn Sina Center, Al Raya Center, Sa'ad
Center (right across from the Rasheed Hotel familiar to
all visitors) and the Al Tahaddi Center. These centers
have legitimate rationales for their on-going work, but
the presence of teams of alumni from the nuclear weapons
program is a key tip-off.
A
recent defector who worked as a design engineer
(evidently in the Al Majd Center) stated that an
explicit order to reconstitute the nuclear teams was
promulgated in August 1998, at the time Iraq ceased
cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA.
The
key hurdle for Iraq to surmount to obtain a nuclear
weapon is the acquisition of fissile material. Iraq had
a viable weapon design and the capacity to produce all
the elements of a weapon. Predictions on when Iraq will
achieve a weapon depend on whether Iraq can obtain
fissile material by smuggling or they have to produce it
themselves which will take much longer. Predictions are
particularly uncertain. The German intelligence
authorities made an oft-quoted estimate last year in
which it was stated that Iraq could, in the worst case,
have a nuclear weapon in 3-6 years. German intelligence
noted the growth in Iraqi procurement efforts in
particular for weapons-related items. However, how this
projection was made is not public and it may include
significant unceraity.
While precise estimates of the Iraqi nuclear
program are impossible, what is certain is that Baghdad
has the desire, the talent, and the resources to build a
nuclear weapon given the time to do so.
Where are they headed? Typically, the
regime in Baghdad will devote full resources to its
weapons programs. All evidence suggests this has not
changed even under sanctions and while the Iraqi civil
society has been decaying. The regime has ruthlessly
used a combination of reward and punishment to achieve
all of its objectives, whether protecting itself
internally or expanding its influence internationally.
The use of force comes naturally and weapons of mass
destruction are a vital element of the spectrum of power
the regime applies. The regime exhibits a fundamental
view that if you are not feared, you are nothing.
The
regime seeks to dominate the region. It generates fear
in its neighbors but also has the inherent capacity to
reward them due to its oil wealth. It has skillfully
played these two levers. Its influence in the region has
steadily and incrementally grown since the debacle of
1991.
The Current and Future WMD Threat. Iraq
has significant WMD capabilities in all areas with the
exception of nuclear. It is probable that a small force
of SCUD derived missiles remain in Iraq. Defectors have
reported their existence and this is consistent with the
remaining uncertainties of UNSCOM's work. Moreover, the
ongoing Al Samoud liquid propellant missile is
proceeding quite actively. Iraq has also been active in
developing solid propellant engines. Iraq had a project
called Badr 2000 which aimed to import non-SCUD missile
technology. UNSCOM eliminated much of this program, but
it embodied an objective Iraq retained in its missile
programs-a multi-stage surface to surface missile. It is
a reasonable assumption that such development work
continues. Even during the time UNSCOM was in Iraq, a
facility for the production of Ammonium Perchlorate, a
key ingredient in solid missile propellent, had been
established (to eliminate the need to smuggle such
material).
Key
things to look for in the Iraqi missile program will be
testing of separating warheads, fusing for detonation
above ground, and perhaps employment of supersonic
parachutes to retard warheads. Evidence of Iraqi
interest in these areas before UNSCOM left and such
testing would indicate important advances in CW and BW
missile warheads.
The
chemical weapons program must be assumed to remain
albeit in a diminished state from the huge industrial
production of the 1980's. Dual-use facilities, even at
known locations such as the production plants at
Falluja, have the ability to produce chemical agents
clandestinely. Chemical weapons have proven utility to
Iraq on the battlefield against large troop
concentrations. Iraq will retain the capacity to produce
significant amounts of agent and fill munitions in a
period of strategic warning. Storable, persistent VX
agent may well have been produced since UNSCOM left in
1998. CW munitions for the battlefield can be produced
in existing Iraqi munition factories.
The
biological program is the most problematic for a number
of reasons. First, it is the least visible. Facilities
can be hidden or made mobile. UNSCOM had received
reports of mobile BW facilities. Unlike nuclear
programs, BW programs have a small signature. The best
window into the Iraqi program will be from defectors.
Some have been providing such information. Another key
concern about the biological programs is that Iraq can
accomplish everything indigenously. They can produce all
the production equipment (fermenters, dryers,
centrifuges, etc.). Iraq is also quite able to produce
dispersal weapons of various sorts. Finally, they have
access to seed stocks for a whole range agents.
The
types of research Iraq is known to have conducted points
to their interest in BW not just as a battlefield
weapon, but as a strategic weapon, an economic weapon, a
terror weapon, and possibly a genocide weapon. It
remains to be learned precisely what agents were used in
Kurdistan and whether they were strictly chemical
agents.
BW
is the most difficult present threat posed by Iraq. They
certainly have the capacity to deploy it clandestinely
or through surrogates should the regime so decide.
Moreover, it is possible that such things as wheat smut
could be spread without any way of tracing the source.
It is not impossible to imagine an economic disaster
like the British Foot and Mouth disease outbreak that
could be secretly directed from Baghdad and we would
never be able to prove the source.
Biological weapons remain a high priority for the
regime. Defector information indicates recruitment
efforts among top Baghdad University biology students.
It is also interesting to note that people associated
with the biological weapons programs have been promoted.
One key individual is now deputy director of the
Military Industrial Corporation-the state run defense
research, development and production center.
Saddam Hussein has stated his policy on weapons
himself. In a televised meeting with top officials of
the Military Industrial Corporation on 12 June 2000, he
said, "If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons
and keep only swords, we will do that. We will destroy
all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if
they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right
to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long
as the rifle has become a means to defend our country
against anybody who may have designs against it, then we
will try our best to acquire the rifle."
Finally, and most recently, the official
newspaper of the Iraqi Bath party, Ath-Thawra wrote that
"Acquiescing to Israel's, but not Arab, possession of
such weapons (WMD) is a case of double standards. But no
matter how much those who pursue double standards try to
obstruct the Arabs, they will not stop their efforts to
achieve this goal, be they overt or covert, in future.
Acquiring weapons of mass destruction is consistent with
"the right to self-defense and the requirements of
national security, irrespective of the nature of a
ruling regime."
Of
course, the difference in the regime is everything. The
present regime in Baghdad will not give up WMD even if
inspectors go in again. The present regime will also
remain quite willing to use them.
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