Addressing the Iraqi WMD Threat
Testimony
of Robert J.
Einhorn
Senior Adviser
Center for
Strategic & International Studies
Subcommittee
on International Security, Proliferation,
and
Federal Services
Senate Government Affairs Committee
March 01,
2002
Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the Subcommittee on the question of how the
United States should deal with the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) threat posed by Iraq.
Although President Bush has put Iraq in the same
category as Iran and North Korea as states hostile to
the U.S. that are seeking WMD capabilities, the current
regime in Baghdad is truly in a class by itself. It has
invaded Iran and Kuwait (seeking to absorb the latter),
harbored terrorists, repressed and terrorized the Iraqi
people, ignored United Nations Security Council
resolutions, violated its international arms control
obligations, fired ballistic missiles at its neighbors,
pursued the full range of WMD programs, and used
chemical weapons against Iran and its own people. Iraq
has earned the right to be considered the world's number
one outlaw state.
Iraq
poses a critical test for the international community.
Can a state defy the U.N. Security Council with
impunity? Can it be allowed to regenerate WMD and other
proscribed military programs and then use those
capabilities to threaten its neighbors and other states
farther away? We have an enormous stake in how those
questions are answered, not just in terms of the
stability of the Gulf region and the world at large, but
also in terms of global efforts to prevent the
proliferation of WMD and missile delivery
capabilities.
If
Iraq's WMD ambitions are not thwarted -- in a situation
where a country has engaged in clear-cut acts of
aggression, been defeated on the battlefield, been
caught red-handed violating arms control agreements, and
been subject to the most far-reaching verification
measures every put in place -- a damaging precedent will
be set for stopping proliferation in future cases where
the circumstances for enforcing compliance are not
nearly as promising. More specifically, if we fail to
stop Iraq's WMD programs, we will have a much more
difficult time heading off attempts by Iran to acquire
corresponding capabilities. And a nuclear arms
competition north of the Gulf would be sure to stimulate
interest in such programs elsewhere.
Iraq
deserves its place on the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism. We should continue to investigate its
possible links to anti-American terrorism, and we should
continue to be concerned that it might in the future
share WMD-related materials and expertise with terrorist
groups. But National Security Adviser Rice was right
when she said that we don't need evidence of a Baghdad
connection to September 11th to know that Iraq is a
menace to its neighbors and to international security.
Iraq's determined and illegal pursuit of WMD
capabilities is a sufficient basis -- independent of
whatever role it may play in global terrorism -- to
treat it as a dangerous threat that must be
neutralized.
Current Iraqi WMD programs and
capabilities
Despite persistent Iraqi efforts at deception,
evasion, and concealment, the U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) did a remarkable job for much of the 1990s in
ferreting out and destroying a large share of Iraq's
prohibited weapons and related infrastructure. However,
when U.N. inspectors departed Iraq in December 1998,
their work was far from done. Significant disarmament
tasks and unresolved compliance issues remained,
especially in the biological and chemical weapons
categories but also, to a lesser extent, in the missile
and nuclear areas.
The
absence of U.N. inspectors and operational monitoring
equipment now for well over three years has magnified
our uncertainties about Iraqi WMD programs and
capabilities. During that period, there has been an
increase in illicit Iraqi oil revenues, which are the
proceeds of sales made outside the U.N.-mandated
Oil-for-Food Program and are paid directly to Iraq
rather than to the U.N. escrow account. These illicit
oil sales, together with illegal surcharges paid to Iraq
by disreputable oil traders operating within the
Oil-for-Food Program, have been a source of unregulated
income that Baghdad has used for clandestine purchases
of goods to maintain the loyalty of regime supporters
and to augment Iraq's conventional and non-conventional
military capabilities. This acquisition of smuggled
imports has been facilitated by the woefully inadequate
monitoring of trade by Iraq's neighbors at their land
borders with Iraq. Moreover, in addition to goods
smuggled outside the Oil-for-Food Program, there is a
growing risk -- in the absence of knowledgeable U.N.
monitors in Iraq to do post-shipment checks -- that
dual-use items imported legally under the Oil-for-Food
Program will be diverted to proscribed weapons
uses.
While acknowledging that Iraq's refusal to admit
inspectors has been a serious handicap in keeping track
of WMD-related developments, the CIA nonetheless judges
that, "given Iraq's past behavior, it is likely that
Baghdad has used the intervening period [since December
1998] to reconstitute prohibited programs."
(Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30
June, 2001.) The following is a brief summary of the
status of Iraqi programs.
Nuclear. A combination of Desert Storm air
strikes and UNSCOM/IAEA disarmament activities
essentially eliminated the physical infrastructure of
Iraq's pre-war nuclear weapons development program --
the nuclear facilities, equipment, and materials.
However, the "intellectual infrastructure" remained
largely intact. CIA Director George Tenet told the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 6th:
"We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons
program. Iraq retains a significant number of nuclear
scientists, program documentation, and probably some
dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support
a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program." It is
generally assumed that teams of Iraqi specialists have
been kept together by the regime and are engaged in
theoretical weapons design work and other low-profile,
laboratory-scale activities, including the development
and perhaps the fabrication and operation of machines
for the enrichment of uranium. Most IAEA and other
experts on Iraq's nuclear program believe that, if Iraq
could obtain sufficient weapons-grade fissile material
(either through smuggling or producing it indigenously),
it could construct a workable nuclear device in a matter
of several months to a year.
The
key, then, is access to bomb-grade nuclear material --
especially highly-enriched uranium, which is a much more
likely choice for Iraq than plutonium. A year ago, the
Pentagon reported that "Iraq would need five or more
years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the
infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear
weapon. This period would be substantially shortened
should Baghdad successfully acquire fissile material
from a foreign source." (Proliferation: Threat and
Response, January 2001.) A critical question is whether
Iraq, using either the centrifuge or diffusion method of
enrichment, could produce enough weapons-grade uranium
to build a bomb without being detected by remote
intelligence-gathering means. Many experts believe it
could.
Biological. After repeatedly denying the
existence of a BW program, Iraq was forced to admit in
1995 that it had produced anthrax, botulinum toxins, and
aflotoxins and that it had filled both missile warheads
and aerial bombs with BW agent. The story it has stuck
to in recent years, without providing any credible
substantiation, is that all BW agents and munitions from
its program were destroyed by Iraqi authorities. UNSCOM
believed, however, that Iraq had produced three or four
times more BW agent than it had declared and that large
amounts of growth media, agents, and munitions remain
accounted for. The CIA maintains that Iraq has continued
dual-use research that could be used to enhance its BW
capabilities and assesses that Iraq "may again be
producing biological warfare agents."
Chemical. UNSCOM destroyed large
quantities of Iraqi chemical warfare agents and
munitions, but important questions remain about the size
and disposition of the CW program. An Iraqi document
once seen by a U.N. inspector suggested that Baghdad had
under-declared its CW munitions and may have hidden
about 6000 weapons. UNSCOM also reported that over 500
tons of precursor chemicals for the nerve agent VX
remained unaccounted for. Despite repeated denials by
Iraq that it had produced VX in weapons-usable form,
physical evidence of such weaponization was discovered
and confirmed by international panels of experts. Since
the Desert Fox bombing strikes in December 1998, the
Iraqis have rebuilt several dual-use chemical facilities
that formerly engaged in production for Iraq's CW
program but are also capable of producing chemicals for
legitimate industrial purposes. The CIA assesses that
Iraq has the capability "to reinstate its CW programs
within a few weeks to months."
Missiles. UNSCOM believed that it had
accounted for the elimination of all but a handful of
Iraq's SCUDs, although the U.S. intelligence community
judges that a small covert force of SCUDs may still
exist. More worrisome is what Iraq is currently doing
under the guise of missile programs permitted under U.N.
resolutions (i.e., missiles with ranges below 150
kilometers). Its liquid-fueled Al-Samoud missile is
probably already capable of exceeding the range
threshold and, in any event, the program is widely
assumed by experts to be a test bed for longer-range
missiles. Its short-range Ababil-100 missile program is
providing Iraq with a solid-propellant infrastructure
and other important technologies that can be applied to
more capable, longer-range missiles in the future.
In
his State of the Union speech, President Bush vowed to
"prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the
United States and the world." He also noted that "time
is not on our side. I will not wait on events while
dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws
closer and closer."
How
close is the peril of Iraqi WMD? Today, or at most
within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks
with chemical or biological weapons against its
neighbors (albeit attacks that would be ragged,
inaccurate, and limited in size). Within four or five
years, it could have the capability to threaten most of
the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed
with nuclear weapons containing fissile material
produced indigenously -- and to threaten U.S. territory
with such weapons delivered by non-conventional means,
such as commercial shipping containers. If it managed to
get its hands on sufficient quantities of
already-produced fissile material, these threats could
arrive much sooner.
Thwarting Iraq's WMD ambitions
By
now -- after close to three decades of clandestine Iraqi
efforts that were extraordinarily expensive in terms of
the country's most productive human and material
resources and after over a decade of subterfuge and
sacrifice to protect that huge investment -- it should
be clear that the current government in Baghdad is
deadly serious about retaining and enhancing its WMD
capabilities. The importance that the regime places on
those capabilities can be measured not just by the
monumental costs of the programs themselves but also by
the national income -- estimated at well over $100
billion -- that the leadership has chosen to forgo
rather than to do what was necessary to have the
economic sanctions removed.
Those outside Saddam's inner circle can only
speculate about why those WMD programs and capabilities
have been valued so highly. Perhaps Saddam calculated
that they would give him a decisive military advantage
in pursuing aggressive designs against Iraq's neighbors
or an important political symbol in bolstering Iraq's
claims to dominance in the Gulf region and leadership in
the Arab world. Especially in recent years, Saddam may
have regarded them as a counter to Iran's WMD programs,
as a deterrent to American-led coalitions that might
wish to attack Iraq, and as a means of ensuring the
survival of the regime.
But
one thing is for sure: the present regime in Baghdad
will not voluntarily come clean about its current
efforts and give up WMD and missile delivery
capabilities for the future. The experience of recent
years -- including the erosion of international support
for sanctions, the growth of illegal oil sales and
imports, and the end of Baghdad's diplomatic isolation
-- has given Saddam confidence that momentum is on his
side and that he can have his cake and eat it too (both
the end of sanctions and the retention of Iraq's WMD
programs). Indeed, Saddam may figure that he comes out a
winner whether or not the sanctions are removed. If they
are removed, he has prevailed. If not, he gets credit
for defying the U.S., sympathy for being a victim, and
an excuse for maintaining an iron grip at home. No
inducements or blandishments -- not even the growing
prospect of military action by the Bush Administration
-- are likely to produce a genuine change of heart, and
a decisive and credible change of behavior, as far as
WMD is concerned.
In a
February 7th letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit,
Saddam Hussein wrote: "As pertains to the weapons of
mass destruction, Iraq which no longer has any of these
weapons and has no intention of producing them, is in
the forefront of those who are keen that our region be
free of weapons of mass destruction." It is doubtful
that anyone in the world believes this statement. It is
equally doubtful that Saddam, having repeatedly staked
out this position, will now reverse himself, make a
confession about past and present transgressions, and do
what would be required to give his reversal
credibility.
Given these considerations, one must conclude
that the only reliable and durable way of preventing
Iraq from regenerating and enhancing its WMD and
proscribed missile programs is to replace the current
regime in Baghdad with one that is prepared to abide by
its international obligations. Of course, there is
no guarantee that a successor regime will be any less
interested in Iraqi WMD capabilities than the present
one. That will depend on such factors as its political
complexion, the circumstances in which it came to power,
its relationship with the United States and its
neighbors, the attitudes of Russia and other Security
Council members, and the status of WMD programs in Iran
and elsewhere. But those uncertainties are subject to
positive influence and are far preferable to the
certainty of a Baghdad government that is bound and
determined to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range
means to deliver them -- and sooner or later will
succeed.
A
consensus seems to be developing in Washington in favor
of "regime change" in Iraq, if necessary through the use
of military force. The debate is no longer over
"whether" but over "when" and "how." This hearing of the
Subcommittee was not convened to discuss the questions
of when and how. But because a strategy for regime
change is likely to take additional time to develop,
prepare for, and execute -- anywhere from several months
to a year or more -- we should give consideration to the
interim steps we should be taking now to address
the Iraqi WMD threat.
Smarter sanctions
An
important interim step will be to revise the current
U.N. sanctions regime so as to expedite the delivery of
humanitarian and other civilian goods to the Iraqi
population while focusing the sanctions more narrowly on
items that could contribute significantly to proscribed
weapons programs. The U.N. Security Council agreed in
November 2001 to make such revisions. If current
negotiations stay on track -- and specifically if Russia
joins the other P-5 members -- a modified system will
take effect on May 30th.
Under current arrangements, almost all contracts
for exporting goods to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food
Program must be approved by members of the U.N.
Sanctions Committee, including the United States. Under
the revised approach, only contracts containing items on
an agreed list of dual-use equipment and technology
(i.e., the Goods Review List) would be referred to
Committee members, who would either approve or deny
them. All other contracts would receive "fast-track"
approval without review by the Committee. Key elements
of the U.N. sanctions regime would not be affected:
revenues from oil sales would still have to be deposited
in the U.N.-controlled escrow account; imports of all
arms and arms-production technologies would still be
prohibited; and the U.S. and other members of the
Sanctions Committee would still have the right, acting
on their own, to block the export of any items on the
Goods Review List if they judged that there was a
significant risk of diversion to a proscribed weapons
program.
Focusing the "smart sanctions" only on dual-use
items that have the potential to contribute
significantly to proscribed weapons programs would
markedly reduce the workload of U.S. reviewers and
enable them to give more careful scrutiny to the most
sensitive cases. The more streamlined procedures would
also cut down on delays and bottlenecks in the approval
process and facilitate the expeditious delivery of
civilian goods to the Iraqi people. This would help
reduce the strong criticism that the U.N. sanctions
regime has received, especially in the Arab world, for
the adverse effect the sanctions are believed to have
had on Iraqi civilians. (In fact, the Iraqi government
deserves much of the blame for its failure to draw on
the ample funds that exist in the U.N. escrow account to
purchase civilian goods for Iraq. Rather than spend
those funds on the needs of his people, Saddam chose to
leave the money sitting there and to blame the UN for
the resulting suffering. By expediting the delivery of a
wider range of civilian goods, the smart sanctions can
make clear who is to blame for any shortages the Iraqi
people continue to endure.)
While helping to shore up international support
for the remaining, more tightly focused restrictions on
Iraqi imports, the smart sanctions will not solve two of
the most serious deficiencies in the current operation
of the sanctions regime.
The
revised approach will not stop or even reduce illegal
oil sales, which give Iraq the revenue to purchase
sensitive goods clandestinely. Iraq provides oil outside
the Oil-for-Food Program to neighbors such as Jordan,
Syria, and Turkey at heavily discounted rates. The
beneficiaries of these discounts will be extremely
reluctant to terminate the existing arrangements.
Moreover, they argue that much of the money earned by
Iraq from these discounted oil sales is not available
for imports of sensitive technology because it is used
to purchase non-sensitive goods (albeit outside the
Oil-for-Food Program) from them. Given the strong views
held on this matter by such close friends of the U.S. as
Turkey and Jordan, this is an extremely hard problem to
solve. Still, the Administration must do whatever it can
to minimize Iraq's illicit oil revenues -- by pressing
the neighboring states (especially Syria) to limit their
purchases of Iraqi oil or to put those purchases under
the Oil-for-Food Program and by strengthening the effort
to stop middle-sized oil trading companies from paying
illegal surcharges to Baghdad.
A
second serious problem not addressed by the smart
sanctions is clandestine Iraqi imports. Truckloads of
goods come into Iraq unmonitored and, with more
countries resuming flights into Baghdad International
Airport, the potential for using air cargoes to smuggle
in sensitive goods is growing. Past efforts to get
Iraq's neighbors to take a more serious approach to
border controls have been met with resistance on the
grounds that they lack the resources to do the job and
that more rigorous screening would be highly disruptive
of cross-border trade arrangements critical to them
economically. Despite this resistance, the
Administration should do what it can -- including
increasing its technical and material assistance for
border controls -- to persuade Iraq's neighbors to do a
better job stopping illegal Iraqi imports. It should
also press states that trade with Iraq to scrutinize
exports more carefully to ensure that they are not
contributing to proscribed Iraqi programs.
Return of the inspectors: verification gain or
trap?
In
the last several weeks, President Bush and his senior
advisers have repeatedly called for the return of U.N.
inspectors to Iraq. However, a number of experts outside
the government -- as well as some Administration
officials -- have expressed skepticism about the value
of resuming U.N.-mandated verification in Iraq, and have
even suggested that the return of inspectors could
undermine U.S. objectives. Uncertainty about the
Administration's attitude has led to speculation that
its calls for inspection are intended to provide a
justification for military action if Baghdad -- as
expected -- refuses to admit the inspectors. It is
therefore useful to review the arguments for and against
returning the inspectors.
Critics of sending inspectors back to Iraq say
that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) would not have the intrusive and
comprehensive inspection rights enjoyed by UNSCOM and,
in any event, would not exercise them as aggressively as
its predecessor had. Moreover, they argue, the
resumption of inspections would not provide much
verification benefit, both because the Iraqis have had
years to perfect their concealment methods and because
they would simply deny access if the inspectors got near
anything incriminating. Early on, the critics warn,
Iraq's supporters on the Security Council, especially
Russia, would start demanding the suspension and lifting
of all remaining sanctions on the grounds that the
failure to find evidence of non-compliance shows that
there is nothing to find. According to this scenario,
Iraq would be given an unwarranted clean bill of health
and strong pressures would develop for ending the
sanctions regime altogether.
Just
as worrisome, assert the critics, is that having the
inspectors in Iraq will complicate a strategy of regime
change. In addition to the practical matter of ensuring
that inspectors do not become targets or hostages in any
military action, the return of inspectors would give
other countries, including the Europeans and states of
the Middle East, an excuse for arguing that military
action should be deferred while inspections are "given a
chance" to resolve the WMD issue.
Risks are not as great as
feared
Some
of the concerns of the skeptics are exaggerated. On
paper, at least, UNMOVIC has the same rights as UNSCOM.
Security Council resolution 1284 states that "Iraq shall
allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities,
equipment, records and means of transportation which
they wish to inspect." Moreover, while UNMOVIC's
operating style would be less aggressive than that of
UNSCOM, what we know about UNMOVIC's leadership and its
plans for resuming work in Iraq suggests that the new
body would carry out its mandate in a meticulous and
thoroughly professional manner. Hans Blix, UNMOVIC's
Executive Chairman, has taken the view that "cosmetic
inspections are worse than none," and that the Security
Council has not authorized him to provide Iraq any
"discounts" on its obligations.
With
respect to concerns about the hasty suspension of
sanctions, Security Council resolution 1284 prescribes a
necessary sequence of milestones that must precede any
decision on suspension. Given the need to set up
equipment, re-establish a monitoring baseline at
hundreds of sites throughout Iraq, approve a work
program, and evaluate the degree of Iraqi cooperation
for a required length of time (120 days), such a
decision could come no sooner than about 9-11 months
after the inspectors returned.
With
respect to concerns about Iraq receiving an unwarranted
clean bill of health, resolution 1284 makes clear that
no decision to "suspend" sanctions can be taken until
UNMOVIC and the IAEA report that Iraq is cooperating "in
all respects" and making progress in resolving "key
remaining disarmament tasks." The mere absence of new
discoveries of non-compliance would not constitute
cooperation; Iraq would have to provide the necessary
access to locations and people and work actively to help
solve remaining issues. In the event that Baghdad
blocked inspections, refused to turn over documents, or
rebuffed attempts to interview specialists, UNMOVIC and
the IAEA would have a powerful weapon at their disposal.
They could simply report that Iraq is not cooperating --
in which case resolution 1284 specifies that sanctions
could not be suspended or, once suspended, would be
reinstated. No decision to "lift" sanctions altogether
could be taken until all remaining disarmament issues,
not just the "key disarmament tasks," are resolved.
Moreover, decisions to suspend or lift sanctions must be
taken by the Security Council, and an affirmative U.S.
vote would be required.
The
critics are probably right that the inspectors would
rarely, if ever, be able to find -- or be allowed by the
Iraqis to gain access to -- proscribed weapons,
equipment, and facilities that Baghdad has taken pains
to conceal. But even if the inspection teams are unable
to finish the job of disarming Iraq and bringing it into
compliance with its obligations, their presence in Iraq
would still be of value in terms of understanding and
constraining the WMD threat -- especially compared to
the current situation.
The
installation of sophisticated monitoring equipment at
hundreds of locations and the constant movement of
inspection teams around the country would complicate
Iraq's covert programs, making it harder and more
expensive to keep those efforts hidden and probably
slowing their pace and decreasing their scale. By
closely monitoring Iraq's missile production and testing
facilities, the inspectors would gain a better
appreciation of the nature of Iraq's missile programs
than we now get through remote means. With respect to
known dual-use chemical and biological facilities and
other installations now considered suspicious, special
sensors and site visits could provide confidence -- at
least while the monitoring equipment was operating and
the inspectors had access -- that prohibited activities
were not taking place at those locations. U.N. monitors
could also do post-delivery checks within Iraq to verify
that potentially sensitive dual-use equipment and
materials imported through the Oil-for-Food Program have
been put to their declared use rather than diverted to
weapons programs.
These benefits do not add up to stopping Iraq's
illegal weapons programs. But in terms of keeping track
of WMD-related developments in Iraq, they would
constitute a significant advance over what we can do
today.
But some concerns are
well-founded
While the critics tend to exaggerate the risks
and minimize the benefits of resuming U.N.-mandated
verification in Iraq, they do make some telling
arguments.
In
particular, they are right that U.N. inspectors cannot
compel compliance and therefore cannot end the WMD
threat posed by Iraq. At their very best, U.N.
monitoring and inspections can complicate, constrain,
and slow Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us a better
picture of what is going on in Iraq than we currently
have. But that amounts to containing or managing the
threat, not eliminating it.
Moreover, the critics are right that a resumed
U.N. verification effort in Iraq would hardly be a
stable or durable arrangement. The Iraqis, in the
expectation that sanctions would soon be dropped, might
be on their best behavior, at least at the outset. For
example, they would probably not interfere with the
installation of equipment at previously monitored
facilities. But as UNMOVIC and the IAEA sought to
monitor and inspect new sites, and as they pressed Iraq
for documents and interviews to help resolve outstanding
issues, the "cat and mouse" game would begin. Iraq's
lack of cooperation might be passive at first (e.g.,
failure to produce documentation) but could be expected
to grow more active (e.g., blockage of inspection
teams). When UNMOVIC and the IAEA reported Iraq's
non-cooperation to the Security Council and the prospect
of suspending sanctions was pushed further into the
future, Iraq would grow increasingly impatient and
frustrated. Sooner or later a confrontation would almost
surely take place. Iraq might evict the inspectors again
or the U.N. might decide to withdraw them because their
situation had become untenable. If this is an accurate
forecast -- and the experience of the 1990s gives little
reason to believe it is not -- it raises serious
questions about the value of sending the inspectors back
at all.
The
resumption of U.N. inspections could also lead to
serious disputes within the P-5, especially between
Russia and the United States. We could expect Russia and
perhaps other P-5 members to minimize the significance
of unresolved disarmament issues, find excuses for Iraqi
non-cooperation, and seek the earliest possible
suspension and lifting of sanctions. The Russians would
be supported by many countries that have long favored
the removal of sanctions and the avoidance of a
confrontation with Iraq at any cost. While the U.S.
could, if necessary, exercise its veto to prevent a
premature and undeserved removal of sanctions, pressures
for removing them could build (regardless of the extent
of Iraqi cooperation) and the U.S. could find itself
increasingly isolated for what would be portrayed as an
excessively demanding position.
Finally, the return of U.N. inspectors could
indeed complicate a strategy of regime change. A large
number of countries could be expected to make the case
that, as long as there is any prospect that U.N.
inspectors can resolve the WMD issue peacefully,
military action should be put off. The controversy over
whether military action was "premature" under the
circumstances could make it harder to gain the support
of the key countries needed to execute a strategy of
regime change.
Will Iraq admit the inspectors?
The
debate about whether the inspectors should return is
probably moot. So far, Iraq has showed no willingness to
accept UN inspections on terms the U.S. could
conceivably support. In a recent interview in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine, Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz offered -- knowing that it was a
non-starter -- that Iraq would allow inspectors only if
other countries (i.e., Israel) admitted them to ensure
the absence of WMD anywhere in the Middle East.
Still, we cannot altogether rule out the
possibility of an Iraqi reversal on admitting the
inspectors, especially if the Bush Administration's
recent tough posture has made Iraq nervous and if the
Russians are applying strong pressures on Baghdad. If
the Iraqis surprised us and said the inspectors could
return, the Administration -- especially after what it
has been saying recently about the need for the
inspectors to return -- would presumably have no choice
but to go along. But it would have to insist on a clear
understanding among the P-5 that U.N. verification would
be carried out in accordance with existing Security
Council resolutions (including with respect to the
timing and the conditions for considering a suspension
of sanctions) and not on the basis of any new rules Iraq
wished to establish.
Conclusions
Iraq
already can threaten its neighbors with chemical and
biological weapons. Unless it is stopped, it will sooner
or later have nuclear weapons. We just don't know how
long that will be -- and we don't even know whether we
will be able to detect Iraq's achievement of a nuclear
capability. Clearly, time is not on our side.
There are steps we can take now to address the
Iraqi WMD threat. We can put in place smarter sanctions
that can help shore up international support for
retaining restrictions on sensitive Iraqi imports. We
can seek to minimize illicit Iraqi oil revenues, urge
tighter monitoring of trade at Iraq's borders, press
supplier governments to adopt more rigorous scrutiny and
control over exports to Iraq, and work with other
governments to interdict sensitive cargoes headed to
Iraq when we receive information about such shipments.
And if Iraq agrees to admit U.N. inspectors on terms
provided for in existing Security Council resolutions,
we can give our full support to that resumed
verification effort, while stressing to the other P-5
members the need to be resolute and unified in the face
of any Iraqi failure to provide full
cooperation.
Taken together, such steps may be able to buy
some additional time. But they cannot provide any
assurance that current Iraqi WMD programs will be
stopped and prevented from regenerating. That -- as more
and more Americans of both political parties are coming
to agree -- will require replacing the regime in
Baghdad.
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