Director's Statement at the Launch of Strategic Survey 2001-2002

9 May 2002 by Dr John Chipman

Introduction

Welcome to the launch of the 2001-2002 Strategic Survey, the annual analysis by the IISS staff of 'The Strategic Year That Was.' As in recent years, this publication includes the best survey of events around the world of strategic significance and a look forward to the types of challenges that governments and others will face in the months ahead. The publication of Strategic Survey allows the Institute to take stock of the main strategic trends, and alert its audience of opinion formers and policy makers to issues that need to be addressed.

As a whole, the IISS has in the last year put itself in a better position to do this on a daily basis and on a global scale. I am glad to remind this audience that last July we opened an office of the IISS in Washington, located on Pennsylvania Avenue, and directed by Terence Taylor, formerly Editor of The Military Balance. We have appointed experts in Latin America and biotechnology issues to cover these areas from our US office. The establishment of the IISS in Washington gives us more direct access to our large US membership and an opportunity to engage with it on a more regular basis. We are pleased that our many corporate members in the US can benefit from a 'forward deployed expertise' and that our members elsewhere in the world can benefit from the closer interaction we can have with policy-makers in Washington. Similarly, last October we opened our Asia office in Singapore and this has been helpful in providing us with key support for our increased activity in the Asia Pacific region. At the end of May, the IISS will be hosting in Singapore a major meeting that will bring together defence ministers from some 15 Asian states as well as their counterparts in the US, Canada, UK and Russia. This meeting, styled the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, will be of path breaking importance in creating real opportunity for multilateral dialogue between ministers who rarely meet. Our hope is that through this event the IISS will be able to create circumstances that encourage more effective military diplomacy between the states of the Asia Pacific.

And so while the IISS is known for the quality of its information and analysis, we intend also to work directly as facilitators in key regions, bringing people together who otherwise might not meet, and thereby provide some of the oil that eases the friction of international affairs.

Our aim today, is to review the nature of that friction and to answer some of your questions on the trends that we have identified in this years' Strategic Survey. We have done this as usual through a mix of regional and thematic chapters. Like last year we have a rich section of Strategic Maps, showing the extent of the Al Qaeda network, trends in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation, the population boom in the Middle East, and illustrating numerous other important emerging strategic issues.

Today I am joined on the podium by a number of IISS Senior Staff members including Director of Studies, Dr Mats Berdal, Senior Fellow for Russia and the CIS Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation Gary Samore, Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs and Editor of Survival Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for Europe Klaus Becher, Editor of Strategic Survey, Jonathan Stevenson, Editor of Strategic Comments, Adam Ward, and Research Fellow for the Middle East Paul Lalor.

The World After 11 September

If there is a single message to capture from the nearly 400 pages of text that we put before you today it is this:

The events of 11 September and responses to them reshaped not only strategic relationships and alliances but also the very nature of international relations. The terrorist attacks highlighted the transnational nature of today's strategic challenges. This means that effective foreign policy must be intrusive and that the normal strictures against interfering in the domestic politics of other states simply must be waived because it is dysfunctional domestic politics that can produce international crises. As foreign policy develops in the light of the over-arching campaign against terror, policy also will be developing on the appropriate limits to sovereignty. In a world where sub-state actors can wield such wide-ranging power and influence the challenge is to articulate an international jurisprudence that recognises the contemporary reality that states no longer hold a monopoly of organised armed force. Equally, it will be important to develop an internationally recognised process by which the laws of armed conflict can be revisited to ensure that there exists adequate jurisprudence to handle issues like the capture and detention of international terrorists whose activity falls outside the normal definitions of lawful combat.

International Law and Transnational Threats

US policy makers in particular are publicly ruminating about the inadequacies of a system of international law that prizes the protection of state sovereignty above two contemporary challenges. The first problem is the effective defence against international threats emanating from within states but not necessarily controlled by them. International law should develop to underpin the notion that what is illegal if done by a state should also be illegal if done by a transnational non-state actor. There should be a more organised international understanding, rooted in law, about the responsibilities states have to prevent non-state actors operating from their territory performing acts abroad recognised as illegal.

A second problem, already raised through the 1990s with the crises in Iraq and in the Balkans, is the effective protection of people within states ruled by leaders who commit atrocities against them. States that abandon their raison d'etre – protection of citizens – in the interests of raison d'etat, chip away at the legitimacy that insulates them from external interference. It is becoming more difficult for dictators to immunise themselves from external interference or even attack by claiming that the territory they control has greater rights than the inhabitants they suppress. Of course considerations to undertake humanitarian interventions will still very much be ruled by realpolitik considerations. But the law is still in evolution, and clarification will be necessary. Bodies like the G8 and the UN will need to address these issues head-on.

The Campaign Against Terrorism

The attacks of 11 September unleashed an American response intentionally styled 'the war against terrorism.' Successful prosecution of this campaign will require the US to become hyper-engaged in the politics of key states. This may require the US, with allies, to strengthen weak states that might otherwise become unwilling hosts for terrorists or for other authors of transnational threats. Every US government statement of the campaign against terrorism has underscored that the military response constitutes only part of the long-term solution to the scourge of terrorism This in turn implies that from time to time the US will need to see nation-building as part of Grand Strategy. Indeed in some circumstances, a refusal to engage in 'nation-building' could constitute a gross act of strategic negligence. This is why the campaign against terrorism will require leaders to focus on long-term political goals as well as on short-to medium-term military objectives.

For the moment, the foreign policy gaze is levelled at dealing with specific authors and agents of terrorism and weapons proliferation. Indeed the campaign against terrorism has also morphed into a campaign against weapons of mass destruction. This has taken place given the renewed concern about terrorists getting their hands on WMD, but also in light of the long-standing concern that WMD in the hands of rogue states is an intolerable risk. As the Bush administration's counter-terrorism effort becomes routinised, the emerging focus on state actors and WMD could have a more dynamic and potentially revolutionary effect on international relations than counter-terrorism itself.

As a result of these trends, Grand Strategy is having a new lease on life.

We are entering an era when the ground-rules for international action are shifting, concepts of deterrence are giving way to policies of pre-emption, and the prospects of orchestrating long term strategic change, not seen since the end of the Cold War, are immense.

The question is whether US foreign policy will have the staying power that its ambitions demand.

US Foreign Policy

The US since 11 September has put itself psychologically on a war footing and its foreign policy has been shaped by the sense that the country is acting in self-defence. It has accepted, even welcomed, the need to act with allies where possible, and has acknowledged, even insisted, on the need to act alone when necessary. Multilateralism a la carte, and unilateralism a dégustation has been awkward for allies to deal with. It is, for the foreseeable future, the way in which the US will approach its external activity, and it could become habitual.

In addition, foreign policy has taken on a more ideological tone. George Bush spoke on Chinese soil about the need to pair freedom with law, and on American soil has railed against the axis of evil of Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. This phrasing draws on an appreciation that international stability is best assured when domestic political arrangements are consensual and when states with potentially offensive policies are deterred.

In examining and working with US foreign policy, other states will need to focus on the policies rather than their phrasing. 'Axis of evil' animated a curiously academic and sometimes virulent debate between policy makers across the Atlantic. The actual policies and their impact have been less controversial: The US remains ready to deal with North Korea at any place and at any time, there is a more public debate in Iran about opening a government-government dialogue with the US, and no one doubts the desirability of eliminating Iraq's WMD programme in one way or another.

In a sense, the goal of outside powers with respect to the US has not changed, but it has become harder to pursue. The challenge of how to insert oneself early and effectively in the American policy debate is now more difficult than ever.

The Middle East

For most outside observers the most curious aspect of US foreign policy in late 2001 and early 2002 was the relative passivity of its approach to conflict in the Middle East. For most of the period covered by Strategic Survey, the Middle East was the one area of the world where the US appeared willing to allow the local actors to set the regional strategic agenda. In light of US determination to prosecute its campaign against terror effectively, and to create conditions abroad that drain support for terrorist activity, the delay in producing a peace plan for the Middle East cannot be justified much longer. However vague the Saudi peace proposal, its presentation shifted the nature of the political debate. A key Arab country finally made clear that it had no existential disputes with Israel only a political and territorial one. A statement should have followed the Saudi initiative from the US outlining its own broad conception for a final settlement. With the proposal of a Middle East conference formally on the table it will be important for the US to develop a detailed plan for a Middle East settlement that deals with borders and refugees, and to push hard to see its plan implemented. The basic contours of a final deal that could be made to work are known. The US needs to move from offering its good offices to those that need but shun them, to pushing through a fair plan against inevitable resistance.

The need for a peace conference in the Middle East has become more pressing, just as the US is contemplating options for a military attack on Iraq. The challenge for the US and the West while all this is happening is to ensure that its policies are directed carefully to shape political outcomes. Blowing on, and then rolling the dice, will not be enough.

Russia

Throughout the year, President Putin has proved unwavering in his commitment to move Russia politically westward. This strategic choice meant that he would not resist even unpalatable US policies that he knew he could not change. The motivation for this shift includes the appreciation that its own domestic security goals, especially in reducing regional support for Chechen rebels, can best be achieved by co-operation with the West where possible. The reduction of Russian debt from Germany, a rise in the import of Russian oil and gas by the West and agreement to move forward on WTO membership for Russia have all been useful accomplishments.

Putin's policy continues to draw criticism with in the security elites in Russia, partly because of the strengthened US and Western military presence in Central Asia. While overall Putin's audacious policies have paid off domestically and internationally, there remains a need for him to be able to demonstrate at home his gains abroad. Two such gains would include: a successful conclusion of the proposed legally binding arms control arrangement between the US and Russia that is to be signed at the end of May and a final agreement on the shape of the new NATO- Russia Council at the same time.

Europe

During this period European countries have expressed their solidarity with the US and generally supported the wide-ranging campaign against terror. Some have been surprised that despite the invocation of Article V of the Washington Treaty, NATO played such a limited role in the military campaign against Afghanistan. The desire of the US to be unfettered in its execution of its right to self-defence largely explains this. However, the decision to keep NATO at arms length points to a profound reluctance on the part of the US to have its military objectives confused by the necessary bargaining inherent in coalition warfare. The Prague summit will have to re-define the way in which NATO operates, and re-state in an appropriately modest manner, the true relevance of NATO in today's context. Unless this is done, NATO, as the main instrument of transatlantic security co-operation, risks suffering an identity crisis. It remains a vital organisation to organise the military power of states that continue to pool their military assets for a common purpose. But its political centrality is not what it was. Once the alliance expands to include several more members, and solidifies its new arrangements with Russia, there is a risk that NATO will be perceived as little more than the OSCE with an integrated military command. That may be no bad thing, but it is to be hoped that the alliance is able to serve as a truly relevant centre for the exchange of security ideas between its members, and between the members and Russia. Given the many fora for consultation that now exist and are used, it will be a special challenge to keep the primacy of NATO in these many political inter-actions.

Conclusion

Critics of the Clinton administration derided its proclivity to engage in peacekeeping, nation building, conflict resolution, and economic development as the 'foreign policy of social work.' Whatever the truth then, in the era of transnational terrorism and WMD these efforts can no longer be considered non-strategic. While the concentration of effort in the early part of the campaign against terror has appeared largely military, the political scientists will need to join the battle if overall victory is to be achieved. That task will be hardest in respect of the potentially big developments in the Middle East.

Soon after 11 September people spoke of the event as having epoch-making significance. The opportunities to re-shape the relations between peoples within states, the nature of international politics, and the international law that underpin them are many.

For non-Americans, the big challenge of the next year is how they find a way to shape US policy and ensure that it does not return to the itinerant habits of previous years. Maintaining the aim in this broad campaign against terrorism will be difficult as the appearance of threat recedes, and the political challenges look overwhelming.

Thank you for your patience. I look forward to taking your questions.