VOL. XLVI

No 1

6-January-2003

Time For Making Historic Decisions In The Middle East

By Vahan Zanoyan

The following is an excerpt of a longer paper published by Vahan Zanoyan, President and CEO of the Washington-based Petroleum Finance Company (PFC) in the first issue of the Strategic and Future Series, a publication of the Center for Strategic and Future Studies (CSFS). CSFS is a Kuwaiti think-tank affiliated with Kuwait University, and is directed by Dr Shafiq Ghabra.

The implications of the damage done to the geopolitical status of the Gulf region in the past year are more serious than generally acknowledged or understood in the Arab World.  The Middle East is going through a critical period in its history.  Decisions, policies and events of today will set a course which will determine the fate of the people of the region for at least several generations. 

September 11 empowered a group of conservative thinkers in the US and, in the absence of a credible response from the region, lent credibility to their ideas. A new vision for the Middle East is being promoted, in which old taboos are broken and old priorities discarded. The long-established special relationship between the US and the moderate Gulf states has no relevance in this vision. The objective of forcing a regime change in Iraq, and the downgrading of the Gulf region’s strategic role in global energy markets are important cornerstones of this vision.

What’s at risk is the post-War order in the Middle East. While the last Gulf war was fought in defense of the status quo in the region, the next Gulf war will be fought to destroy it. The aim of this process is to implement the new vision and a new economic-political-security order and to eliminate the perceived threat from the region. An important consequence of the vision would be to promote the interests of the main regional geopolitical actors of the post-September 11 world, namely, Israel, Turkey and Russia.

A fundamental truth about the current situation is that it came about through a combination of the passivity and complacency of the Arab Middle East towards solving its regional problems on the one hand, and the aggressiveness and activism of Israel and the US neoconservative ideologues on the other. The latter filled a vast vacuum created by the former and made full use of the post-September 11 political mood. But it did not create the vacuum, nor did it cause September 11. Only through honest, objective introspection will the region be able to place its current predicament in the right perspective. The Arab Middle East suffers from the very shortcomings of which it accuses the US: a notorious double standard (most vividly demonstrated by the capacity to tolerate home-grown causes of suffering and injustice, while being outraged when lower doses of the same are inflicted by external forces); a chronically biased media (where rarely any coverage critical of the region’s status quo appears); and a profound ignorance about the rest of the world (ignorance, combined with myths and misperceptions, especially about the US).  Although Arab criticism of the US on these issues is largely valid, it is the region’s own shortcomings that need to be addressed most urgently.

The Gulf region is at a crossroads. Its leaders and governments can either choose a minimalist approach, aimed at marginal and superficial damage control, or they can choose to secure the future. The future cannot be secured by muddling through; the minimalist approach will almost certainly mean abdicating the right to have a say in the future of the region and accepting the diktat of larger regional powers. 

One profound dilemma facing policymakers is that the situation requires fast results, without there being any meaningful short-term prescriptions. The idea that governments need to focus on the long-term fundamentals and on securing the future, at a time when it is the present that is in danger, may be dismissed as ludicrous. And when the authorities in the region have typically responded even to the demands of the present with long time lags, it may seem entirely unrealistic and unseemly to ask them to focus on the long-term strategic concerns. But that is precisely what the current situation calls for, because there is no difference between short-term and long-term measures in the current critical circumstances. Today the region is experiencing the cumulative effect of delayed and incomplete responses to a long series of what were “present” dangers in the course of the last few decades. It is important to think in terms of a package of measures, without the freedom to pick and chose, conceived as one integrated strategy, even if implemented in stages. 

The main dimensions of a viable strategy include drastic reforms aimed at: (a) strengthening and broadening the domestic political support base of each government; (b) constructing and articulating a positive vision for the region; (c) re-engaging the world.  Each of these dimensions requires reforms and policies that constitute radical departure from norms, have short-term costs, could represent new types of political risks, and that go against many vested interests. At the domestic political level, this calls for changes in the mode of governance and the establishment of consequential dialogue about the role of religion, the relationship of society with the international community, the objectives of development, the uses of public power and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. At the economic level, the challenge is to get rid of the worst habits of the rentier economies and for policymakers to think beyond short term revenue needs and allocations and concentrate on macroeconomic viability, competitiveness and sustainable growth.  At the regional level, the challenge is to come up with a positive vision that rebuilds the region economically and rehabilitates it politically, not destroys it through war. This, too, implies taking uncharacteristic risks. 

Admittedly, this approach is alien to the Gulf States and goes against a well-established tradition. But that does not make it wrong. The traditional approach has not helped resolve regional conflicts; much worse, it has invited unwelcome intervention, become a point of vulnerability for the Gulf and promoted the geopolitical and economic interests of the competitors of the Gulf States. There is a cost to not being pro-active, to not taking direct charge of one’s vital interests, and to being over-reliant on third parties for addressing regional problems. The current experience in the Gulf demonstrates that cost vividly. By far the most dangerous enemy is complacency. In the current geopolitical environment, every missed opportunity to act has direct and immediate risks associated with it, and every missed opportunity to formulate and promote a positive vision makes room for a competing vision to gain sway. 

What’s At Risk?

It is impossible to predict the exact course of events in the Middle East, but it would not be an exaggeration to say that the potential exists for fundamental change in the status quo, with a drastic change in the current balance of power and possibly even the map of the Middle East. In the extreme case, it would not be farfetched to foresee a partitioned Iraq, with the northern part of the country occupied by Turkey, and the rest divided and in constant upheaval and turmoil. This would open an entirely new “Arab-non-Arab” front, possibly as controversial and sensitive as the Arab-Israeli front has been for the last 54 years; this would present a more direct and imminent source of destabilization for the Gulf States, in addition to creating enormous new distractions for Iran and Syria. Nor would it be farfetched to foresee an expanded Israel that, amid the regional and international distraction with the war on Iraq, has effectively annexed the West Bank and forced a major new exodus of Palestinian refugees into Jordan and other Arab countries. In this environment, one could easily project a highly radicalized and frustrated Arab Street, which would be impossible to contain by the traditional methods employed until now. The “moderate” Gulf governments, even if they survive the initial backlash, would not be in a position to openly display any pro-West policies, and may be forced to resort back to the “oil weapon,” knowing very well that, this time around, such a move may invite further aggression and military intervention in the region, possibly leading to further imponderable changes in the realities on the ground.

In short, the entire post-War order may disappear from the region, and be replaced by a new order and corresponding new political map. 

Less extreme scenarios do not provide much hope for optimism about the future stability and prosperity of the region. The fundamental fact remains that while the last Gulf war was fought in defense of the status quo in the region, the next will be fought to destroy it. A somewhat different outcome than the one portrayed above for Iraq or Israel would still not negate the fact that the underlying motivation is a vision to create a new reality on the ground.  By their own passivity, the countries most affected by this have created a dangerous vacuum and abdicated the opportunity to have a say in the process of change. To take solace in the assumption that the extreme scenario might not be very likely, or to assume that a less extreme scenario implies a lesser risk to the status quo, would constitute a classic case of denial.

Policy Options And “Non-Options”

The Gulf region is faced with some painful decisions and choices. Most of these decisions should have been made a long time ago but they were not, in large part because the favorite strategy of the Gulf region in dealing with slow-simmering problems has been to “muddle through.” In the last 30 years, the Gulf region has been busy protecting a privileged status quo and containing various domestic and regional threats, ranging from Arab nationalism to the Palestinian question to the Islamic Revolution in Iran to the military threats posed by Iraq, in addition to mounting demographic and economic problems at home. In none of these cases has there been truly strategic, long-term consideration given to the problem. The most common policies have been to either buy the loyalty of various actors or to find ways of buying time and hoping that problems and threats will just sort themselves out.  While the entire region seems to be shocked over the Bush Administration’s unilateral determination to cause regime change in Iraq, few have expressed shock at the Arab world’s complacency regarding the status of Iraq for the past 11 years. If the status of Iraq is, first and foremost, a regional problem, why hasn’t the region addressed it?  Why haven’t 11 long years provided adequate time and opportunity to coordinate and organize some type of solution to help rehabilitate Iraq in a way acceptable to the Arab Middle East in general and the Gulf region in particular?  So common and well-established is the muddling through policy that it has become the most logical expectation of observers and analysts; it is the strategy that no one bothers to question.

The region’s initial reaction to the events of September 11 was equally passive and complacent. It was wrought with alarmingly long delays in acknowledging the event and its enormity, and even longer delays in articulating reasonable and responsible responses. The region should have showered the US with the most elaborate diplomatic efforts immediately upon learning the first facts about September 11, and continued to escalate those efforts until today.  There should have been immediate and unambiguous acknowledgement of the nationalities of those involved in the hijackings and unequivocal expressions of sympathy and offers of assistance. The absence of such a response was effectively exploited by anti-Arab interests in the US. Even after it became evident that “doing nothing” was not as safe as it once might have appeared to be, the official reaction from the Gulf was too little too late, and focused largely on improving a tarnished image, rather than addressing fundamental problems. 

It will take more than the best public relations efforts to re-establish some credibility to the Gulf region. Some may argue that Washington’s activism and unilateralism are bound to isolate and weaken the US, and eventually lead to failure, and therefore it may be prudent to just wait out this wave. Or that this is strictly a super-activist Republican Party syndrome, and that when the Democrats win the White House, the policy will change. An extension of this argument could even lead to an advocacy of unconditional and vocal opposition to US initiatives, waiting (and hoping) for the strategy to backfire – eg, major US casualties in a military engagement with Iraq or a severe economic recession at home. The problem with these approaches is that they do not address the inherent weaknesses in the region itself; rather, they count on (or hope for) the failure of the external threat. This, at best, is wishful thinking; it certainly is not strategy.

Another “non-option” is total and unconditional acquiescence to the demands and expectations of the neocons.  This would have been a non-option even if the Gulf could do it from a position of strength. But from its current position of weakness, it would be a disaster. It may imply the unconditional provision of basing rights to the US and the acceptance of an unfair, and therefore unsustainable, peace arrangement with Israel. This would also imply chronic domestic instability and a vicious cycle of dissent and containment of dissent – precisely opposite of the direction in which the domestic affairs of the Gulf States should be steered.

What, then, are the policy options facing the Gulf? As mentioned above, the meaningful choices are those that address fundamental and long-neglected problems, and not merely give superficial treatment to the most visible symptoms of the past year. Some of the steps in such an integrated strategy need to be taken immediately in order to mitigate the impact of potentially disruptive events and buy time for the longer-term reforms to take effect and produce results.  The immediate steps would differ from country to country.  But in none of the countries of the Gulf should such steps be mistaken as adequate policies in their own right; whatever time they manage to buy would be wasted if the entire package of measures is not adopted at the same time. All aspects of the integrated strategy should be considered to be equally important and equally urgent. 

The main dimensions of an integrated strategy would include the following:

Establish A Position Of Strength From Within

Perhaps the single most important step is to strengthen the domestic political support base of each government.  This is important not only to counter the imminent threats to domestic stability, but also because unless each government enjoys considerable popularity, confidence and security internally, it will not be in a position to initiate or even participate in bold new foreign policies. It is also important to help dispel the prevalent perception that the Gulf States are internally weak and vulnerable and therefore dependent on external protection. 

At the political level, this requires major reform in the mode of governance that, while not necessarily taking the form of full democratization, would entail the formal establishment of civil liberties, recognition of limits on the powers of the state, and the establishment of meaningful procedures for popular political participation.  An important pre-requisite to all of the above is a fundamental recognition of the need to establish a consequential dialogue –one that leads to real policy changes – about the role of religion, the relationship of each society with the international community, the objectives of development, the uses of public power and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. 

These issues, which are at the very heart of what each Gulf society is facing today, have rarely been allowed to become part of the public debate, with very notable exceptions and even then only recently. They simply cannot be ignored in the current environment. Each society needs to openly debate the specific implications of these issues for the way of life it chooses to have and for the future of that society. In short, each country needs to “make peace” with itself by arriving at a sustainable domestic political reconciliation, and every GCC government needs to arrive at a new “social contract” with its own population. The model may be different in each country – Bahrain is attempting this through the Constitutional Monarchy route. Others may choose different routes. But it is the government’s responsibility to initiate the process, inspire confidence in it across a wide spectrum of the population, and then see it through, with all the necessary policy and structural changes that the process calls for. 

Unleashing this process carries important risks, which are also largely derived from the neglect of the past few decades. The suppression of free flow of ideas in the past, the pent-up demand for change and the strong sense of frustration with both regional political conditions and domestic economic conditions will combine to give a strong initial lead to those with extremist religious or anti-modernization views. Those aspiring for civil society with liberal ideals, considerable religious and cultural tolerance and modernization are nowhere near as well organized as their opponents, simply because historically they were not allowed to be. Thus, these reforms could backfire if any single group or faction, including the religious establishment, had monopoly access (or even disproportionate access) to the means of influencing public opinion or to setting the agenda for public debate. An important prerequisite to these reforms is a well-informed public and adequate and multi-dimensional forums of expression. None of these have been encouraged in the past, and many have been suppressed. Lifting barriers to the free flow of information and ideas is no longer an internal political choice that governments may consider at their leisure; it is an economic and strategic imperative. 

Governments need not hide the nature of the external dangers from their populations – an understanding of these dangers will help generate moderation and support. The final objective of this process should be to encourage the private sector elite and the population at large to support the government in the many difficult choices and decisions that each country will face. Balance and objectivity need to be introduced in the coverage of especially sensitive issues, such as religion, the plight of the Palestinian people, issues surrounding the Palestinian Authority and the policies of the US. For example, in the current environment of extreme anti-Americanism in the Arab world, where there is a keen awareness of the measures taken by the US authorities to prevent another terrorist act in the US and what these measures have meant for the civil liberties of Arabs living in the US, there is virtually no mention and no recognition of all the positive measures underway in the US to protect the rights of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. Both are important and both are part of the American way. Moreover, while the Arab world is keenly aware of the pronounced pro-Israeli bias of the US media, where one rarely sees any coverage critical of Israel, it takes for granted that the Arab media has an equally pronounced pro-Palestinian bias, where one rarely sees any coverage critical of the Palestinian Authority. Introspection is vital to the political discourse and debate advocated here; only through honest, objective introspection will the region be able to place its current predicament in the right perspective.

The political reforms outlined above are not only important in their own right, but they are pre-requisites for the even more painful economic reforms that every country in the region desperately needs. One of the most important strategic (medium- to long-term) imperatives facing the region is the need to learn to live with lower oil prices. The continued dependence on oil revenues has turned the region’s most important physical asset into its Achilles Heel.  Aside from creating constraints on every part of the system, the continued dependence on oil revenues provides the global oil industry with the means to compete with the Gulf producers. For example, the $20-$25/B price required by every Gulf State is more than adequate for the international oil and gas companies to discover and develop new sources of oil and gas, ultimately threatening the region’s market share and its strategic role. If the Gulf States could live on lower than $15/B oil prices, their natural endowment in oil would have been a strategic asset; today, it is a strategic liability.

Learning to live with lower oil prices embodies virtually every other type of economic reform that the Gulf countries need. In order to achieve a reduced level of dependence on oil, every Gulf state needs to address the structural problems in its economy, meet a host of private sector challenges, eliminate many of the well-established income distribution channels created during the 1970s and 80s, change the culture of dependence on public spending, start creating and supporting meritocracies in both the public and private sectors, establish transparent, fair and enforceable commercial laws and cultivate and promote a culture of accountability and, in some countries, bring the ever-growing ruling family costs under control. These economic reforms require and imply fundamental changes in the role of women in both society and in the economy throughout the Gulf, but especially in Saudi Arabia. Above all, however, each government has to have the support and trust of its population, which makes the political reforms described earlier an important prerequisite to this process. These are not easy tasks – that is the main reason the region’s dependence on oil has not declined in the last 30 years. But achieving these objectives is no longer an option; this too is a strategic imperative. 

An important step in implementing both the political and economic reforms is fully engaging the private sector – one of the most underutilized assets of the Gulf region. In the last 30-40 years, the private sector in the Gulf built substantial global capabilities – vast financial resources, business relations worldwide, access to key policy makers, highly educated and articulate young management, commercial and strategic networks. These are strategic assets that the Gulf States could use very well in the current environment – not only would the reforms be impossible without the full engagement of the private sector, but the short-term economic pain and dislocations implied by these reforms could be minimized by a meaningful engagement of private sector capital and capabilities. 

Be Pro-Active In Addressing Regional Problems

Armed with internal reconciliation and cohesion, the Gulf can become more proactive in addressing some of the most intractable regional problems. Specifically, this would entail a proactive effort to forge a common view and common front on the major outstanding issues – including Iraq, the Palestinian question, Islamic extremism, a multitude of lingering ethnic and sectarian problems, and organizations such as al-Qa'ida. The Gulf States do not have normal relations with Iraq, a country against which the entire region went to war 11 years ago. While abiding by the UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq, most GCC countries have expressed genuine concern for the suffering of the population of Iraq, and some have regularly contributed humanitarian assistance. Every government in the region is (and has been for the past 11 years) keenly aware of the fact that Iraq’s current status is simply untenable and unsustainable. In the late 1990s, some Arab governments tried to have a more supportive policy toward Baghdad.  The question is: What is the optimal mode of rehabilitating Iraq from the GCC perspective? What type of system – government and political structure – would represent the most realistic and constructive “neighbor” for the GCC?  What specific steps can be taken to promote such a solution, first in the Middle East and later internationally? These were the right questions to ponder and act upon right after the liberation of Kuwait 11 years ago. If there had been a methodic, coordinated effort in this direction in the past 10 years, not only could the current impasse have been averted, but the eventual outcome would have been much more in line with the interests of the Gulf States. In the last decade, however, much damage has been done to the prospects of such a strategy by inaction, and it may even be too late to avert a US military intervention to bring about change in Iraq. But it is not too late for the Gulf region to have a pro-active, constructive involvement in shaping the future of Iraq even in the aftermath of an external military intervention. 

The Palestinian question needs the same hands-on attention from the Gulf. Far too much reliance was put on exerting pressure on the US to exert pressure on Israel, and not enough attention was given to what the Gulf, in cooperation with Syria, Jordan and Egypt, could do to help the Palestinian Authority get its own act together and then deal with the Israeli aggression. It should be clear by now to every Arab that the US cannot and will not deliver Palestine.  But, in general and the post-September 11 mood notwithstanding, it will support positive initiatives from the region.  In the past decade, the credibility of the Palestinian leadership has steadily declined in the Gulf region; the recently publicized revelations about corruption and the need for reform have been known to the Gulf leadership for well over a decade. It should have been clear that unless those problems were resolved, it would not be possible to meet the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The message here is similar to the one for the Gulf States – namely, get your own house in order first in order to tackle the formidable external challenges that you face. This does not mean that the region should not use all the means available to it to influence international public opinion and bring pressure on Israel to end the occupation of Palestinian lands. It does mean, however, that such pressure would have more credibility and be more effective if it was combined with parallel attempts at internal reform.

The subject of relations with Iran must remain an important part of the regional agenda of the Gulf States. The geostrategic interests of the Arab Gulf and Iran are more aligned than ever. Iran finds itself surrounded by newly formed US satellite states and under the direct focus of an Israeli offensive campaign to turn it into one of the targets of the war on terrorism. At the same time, it remains deeply divided internally, with no easy end in sight for the many domestic economic and political difficulties. It would be a grave mistake to allow the potential radicalization and isolation of Iran to affect the improvement in Iran-Arab relations of the past several years. Although the options of the Arab countries to assist Iran with its ongoing domestic power struggle are very limited, the GCC can reassure Tehran on regional security and oil policy matters. Specifically, this would mean engaging Iran actively on major regional issues such as Iraq, the Levant, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In addition, this could entail addressing some of the long-standing ethnic and sectarian problems throughout the region. In the 21^st century, with enormous challenges and pressures to overcome, it is entirely self-defeating that the region remains handicapped by outstanding political tensions between various sects of Islam and various ethnicities within the Arab world. In this respect, the economic and political reforms outlined earlier gain an added significance – only through the creation of a common economic base will the region be able to gradually diffuse the ethnic and sectarian tensions that plague it.

Admittedly, the pro-active, hands-on approach to regional foreign policy advocated above is alien to the Gulf States and goes against a very well-established tradition.  But that does not make it wrong.  The traditional approach has not helped resolve regional conflicts; much worse, as demonstrated earlier, it has invited unwelcome intervention, has become a point of vulnerability for the Gulf and has promoted the geopolitical and economic interests of the competitors of the Gulf States. There is a cost to not being pro-active, to not taking direct charge of one’s vital interests, and to being over-reliant on third parties for addressing regional problems, and the current experience in the Gulf demonstrates that cost very vividly.

The proactive approach to foreign policy should be extended to regional economic relations as well. Just as the domestic reforms need both the economic and political dimensions to go hand in hand, so regional relations need to evolve at both levels. But here too the old norms need to be cast aside. Economic cooperation should mean more than flows of financial aid from one capital to another, driven entirely by political considerations. Authorities have to start thinking beyond micro-level issues and focus on macro-level strategic concerns. The ultimate economic objective has to be macroeconomic viability, competitiveness and sustainable growth – not short-term revenue needs and allocations. Financial relief caused by a sporadic increase in oil prices is not the same as an improvement in the economic health of any country or the region in general. The political economy of un-earned income, which threw roots in the region in the 1970s, has long been rendered unaffordable. But, here too the official response has generally been to muddle through, rather than make the necessary, albeit painful, decisions.

Re-Engage The World

Only with a stronger and more credible political base at home and clearer vision for a regional political and economic order will the Gulf States (and the Middle East in general) be ready to re-engage the world in a more comprehensive and constructive way. The ultimate objective should be to offer the region and the world a vision that rebuilds the Middle East economically and rehabilitates it politically, rather than destroying it through war. The Euro-Med initiative is a good example of cross-regional economic engagement. This can be extended into the rest of the Middle East, and combined with a “Marshall Plan” equivalent, initially perhaps not through the US, but through Europe and Asia. The strategy would be to create an environment and the incentives conducive to a meaningful economic engagement with Europe, China, Japan and possibly even Russia. Ultimately, the challenge is one of reconstruction of the entire region – from Morocco to Pakistan. As the past two decades have demonstrated, leaving any part of the region as a festering sore, whether Lebanon, Algeria or Afghanistan, leaves the entire region open to revolution, terrorism, economic disruption and external interference. 

This is not to exclude the US. Quite the contrary, re-engaging the US should be a key part of re-engaging the world.  But the re-engagement with the US should proceed through a much wider audience within it than has been attempted so far. The region needs to get its message to the American people first, and only then will Washington listen. In this period of heightened interest and curiosity about the Middle East, Arabs, Muslims and the American people heard the views of mostly anti-Arab commentators and received the answers to their questions largely from them. Given the current mood in Washington, any direct invitation for US participation in the economic re-building of the region would require genuine reform and openness. A constructive strategy in this case would be to fill the vacuum – create and present positive ideas of economic reconstruction and regional partnerships to replace (and better expose) the more negative views advocated by the super-hawkish neocons. Warning and complaining about rising anti-Americanism in the Middle East is not sufficient to trigger change in the US; only by constructing and articulating an alternative vision of the Middle East to the world and to the US will the region turn the current tide in its favor, in the process also helping re-establish strategic alliances with Washington that will eventually be beneficial to the US as well.

Re-engaging the world also requires some difficult choices and decisions.  Most of the domestic reforms outlined earlier are pre-requisites for a meaningful and fundamental engagement. In addition, however, the region needs to truly open up. With few exceptions and in spite of all sorts of appearances to the contrary, the Gulf region is not really open to direct foreign investment. Some of these economies are closed through direct laws and regulations, others through non-regulatory (procedural, bureaucratic, competitive) barriers. Opening up does not necessarily mean privatizing, nor offering equity ownership of oil and gas reserves to foreign companies. It does mean, however, that the promotion of a vibrant commercial environment where foreign companies actively seek participation becomes an explicit aim, and all rules and regulations governing foreign investment directly recognize this aim. 

This is important because by staying closed, the region only isolates itself.  At a time when virtually the entire rest of the world is open, and companies have an option to go anywhere, keeping any country closed simply excludes that country from the global business traffic – capital, technology, management skills, business innovation, competitive advantages, best practices, etc. Qatar is open in its hydrocarbon sector, but relatively closed in all others. Bahrain and Dubai, which have extremely small hydrocarbon sectors, have had the incentive to be more open in other sectors.  The Saudi gas initiative that started before September 11 and recently suffered major setbacks, should be re-instated in a more workable form and freed from a host of bureaucratic and procedural bottlenecks that plagued the first round. In addition, a broader and more meaningful opening up of every country in the Gulf region should be planned and implemented – going beyond the hydrocarbon sector and covering other industries, finance, and tourism. 

Re-engaging the world also requires understanding it better.  Every country in the region can use the current setback as an opportunity to enhance its information gathering and analysis skills. This requires monitoring and understanding the deep, underlying shifts in geopolitical and commercial interests that cause tremors at the surface. At the very least, the governments of the region should have an ongoing analytical capability in several key areas, including:  (a) the structural and strategic aspects of the global energy business – as opposed to the commercial and market aspects, which the appropriate authorities in each country understand; (b) the geopolitical drivers of key bilateral relationships in the region, including, but not limited to: Israel-Turkey; Russia-Israel; Russia-Turkey; Iran-Russia; Pakistan-Afghanistan; (c) the prospects and benefits of closer political and economic ties between the region and various European countries, China and Russia; and (d) the US, its political system and values.

Understanding the world better is not a requirement just for the governments of the region, but also for the populations. In the context of the consequential political debate and broader participation advocated in this paper, it is critical that the populations at large be better informed about world affairs. This brings us back to two controversial issues: education and the media. There is very little of substance taught at Gulf universities about the West and about the US in particular. Given the impact that the US has on the region, it would seem that every university should have at least one “American Studies” course, covering history, culture and current political history. This is the most basic first step to get rid of some of the ignorant myths that visitors to the region constantly run against. Understanding the US is important regardless of whether one views the US as the arch enemy, a potential strategic ally, or a country that needs to be re-engaged. The ignorance in the Arab World of what America is really about and how it functions is at least as great as the ignorance of the average American about the Middle East – but the Middle East region pays much more for this ignorance than the average American pays for his. 

Finally, re-engaging the world requires better communication skills and a strategy of reaching a much broader audience than has been the case so far. The vast majority of commentators and public opinion makers that the American public listen to are non-Arabs and non-Muslims, giving views on Islam, anti-Americanism in the Arab world and the threat of terrorism from militant Islam. The Arab presence is not much more impressive in the media outside of the US. European public opinion, while less influenced by the Israeli lobby or neoconservative commentators, does not receive any more direct input from the Arab side than that in the US. 

Concluding Remarks

Most of the policies recommended by this paper represent a fundamental departure from traditional modus operandi in the Middle East in general and the Gulf region in particular. Some require that very basic socio-political structures be revised and reconfigured. Most imply short-term pain. But the region is at a historic crossroads that calls for historic decisions. Drastic as some of these recommendations might appear, they are by no means out of the reach or beyond the capabilities of the people of the region. What’s at stake is for the leadership and the people of the region to have an opportunity to shape their own destiny. By far the most dangerous enemy is complacency. In the current geopolitical environment, every missed opportunity to act has direct and immediate risks associated with it, and every missed opportunity to formulate and promote a positive vision makes room for a competing vision to gain sway.