The fog of war in Iraq is gone, only to be replaced, it seems, by the fog of afterwar. Questions sprout like weeds in the rubble of Saddam Hussein’s palaces. Did the war stoke or help curb terrorism? What message did Saddam’s fall send to other dictators? Will it help the world reach a new consensus on how to handle weapons of mass destruction? What is the best way to rebuild Iraq? How can the United States recover its legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world? The answers to such questions will help determine history’s verdict on the wisdom of the war and shape the future for decades to come. In this special report, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working with FOREIGN POLICY, seeks to address some of the afterwar’s most pressing issues and to offer a framework for turning victory into success.
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**THE OLDEST INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THINK TANK IN THE UNITED STATES**

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a nonpartisan policy research institute. Founded in 1910, the endowment develops new ideas and strategies to shape practical, forward-looking policies on the major debates of the day.

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**LIVE AT CARNEGIE: FROM VICTORY TO SUCCESS—AFTERWAR POLICY IN IRAQ**

Join FP editors and the authors of this report on July 24, 2003 for a Live at Carnegie event, aired online. Listen to a discussion about this special report and get the latest updates on Iraq reconstruction, U.S. policy, and the situation in the Middle East. Visit www.ceip.org/afterwar for details and to send your questions.
After months of Iraq dominating the news, why should you care about the war’s aftermath, now that the drama of armed conflict has ended? Because, without diminishing the brilliance of the military campaign, the easier phase is over. The part that the United States is less good at, less practiced in, and less politically ready for is still to come. This more difficult phase will determine whether Americans, and the world, will look back on the Iraq war as not just a victory but a success.

Iraq clearly proves again, hard on the heels of Afghanistan, that the United States chronically underestimates the difficulties of nonmilitary aspects of foreign interventions and wildly inflates nonmilitary goals without committing the resources required to achieve them. Military planning for the Iraq war took more than a year and reached a level of detail down to the location of windows on targeted buildings. The post-war plan was altogether different. It largely ignored not just details but major aspects of Iraq’s political landscape and well-established lessons of prior foreign interventions, like the overriding need to quickly establish an effective policing force. The U.S. plan assumed that Iraq’s government could be removed with minimal disruption to the country’s ability to function and that the United States would be welcomed with open arms. Best-case planning is bad enough; this plan was heavily weighted with wishful thinking.

The difference in how seriously the United States addressed the war and the postwar can be found in the priority assigned to the exercise of force versus that given to other instruments of power and influence, from intelligence to diplomacy to patient economic assistance. It is to be found in the 16 to 1 difference between the peacetime budgets for the Pentagon and for all of foreign operations. Only on the nonmilitary side does the United States indulge in goals, means, and public commitment that bear no relation to one another.

This gap has widened during the past quarter century, under both political parties, to a point where it severely strains U.S. capabilities. The afterwar in Iraq will be a decisive test of whether this trend will be reversed, or whether, like Afghanistan in the 1980s, the intervention in Iraq will be a military victory followed by a costly political defeat.

The stakes are particularly high in Iraq because, if history is any guide, occupation and reconstruction will shape U.S. relations with the Arab world—and perhaps the whole Muslim world—for decades, just as prior military occupations profoundly altered relations with Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may be a historical first for the region, but the United States is not writing history on a blank slate. Each side is ignorant of the other, and there is deep mutual suspicion, colored by the region’s bitter, recent experience of colonial rule and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Achieving a positive outcome requires every ounce of wisdom, patience, and realism the United States can bring to bear.

Following the progress of the war was easy: Troops advanced, targets were destroyed, and cities were taken. But keeping track of the aftermath—phase two of the war—is harder and, over the long term, more important. This special report, produced jointly by FOREIGN POLICY and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is an expert guide to these crucial issues that will be illuminating reading now and a valuable reference for months to come.

Jessica Tuchman Mathews is president of the Carnegie Endowment.
nation building—the restructuring of the governing institutions in foreign societies—is probably the most complex, costly, and, ultimately, frustrating foreign policy undertaking. Even for great powers endowed with unsurpassed military strength and wealth, most attempts to rebuild other nations in their own image have historically ended in disappointment, if not outright failure. To make nation building work in Iraq, the United States must first and foremost recall its own experiences in other countries. Such a historical examination would show that a key aspect of nation-building failures has been a unilateral approach.

According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States has conducted more than 200 military interventions abroad since its founding. Sixteen of these interventions, or about 8 percent, can be categorized as nation-building attempts. These missions have three characteristics. First, their practical goal was to achieve regime change or the survival of a regime that would have otherwise collapsed. (As in Iraq, creating or restoring democracy was not the original mission objective. Rather, core U.S. security and economic interests were the principal drivers of U.S. interventions.) Second, American nation-building efforts typically required that a large number of ground troops be deployed to provide security and basic services. Third, U.S. military and civilian personnel were active in post-conflict political administration. Such deep U.S. involvement in the political life of the target nations allowed Washington to select friendly leaders, influence policy, and restructure institutions.

If we judge these nation-building attempts by whether they created durable democratic regimes after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the results are sobering. Of the 16 attempts (see facing page), only four (Japan, Germany, Panama in 1989, and Grenada in 1983) qualify as successes. In these four countries, democracy, as measured by the widely used Polity democracy index maintained at the University of Maryland, was sustained 10 years after U.S. troops left. In the other 11 countries (excluding Afghanistan), democracy failed to emerge or endure during the same time frame. Worse, in the countries where U.S. nation-building efforts foundered, brutal dictatorships and corrupt, autocratic regimes gained power after the U.S. exit. This record implies a success rate of 26 percent (four out of 15 attempts).

The factors contributing to failed nation-building efforts are complex, and some of them, such as socioeconomic characteristics and governing capacities in target nations, are beyond U.S. control. Yet one factor is not: U.S. decisions to “go it alone.” It appears that unilateral efforts are more likely to cause nation building to fail. Of the 16 cases included in this analysis, 12 were unilateral attempts. Of these, 10 failed.

The key variable in failed unilateral nation-building attempts seems to be the type of interim administration deployed immediately following military
intervention. Of the 16 cases, seven saw interim rule by U.S.-supported surrogate regimes—governments that were almost totally dependent on Washington. The United States picked, or deemed acceptable, the individuals who headed these regimes, and their survival usually hinged on U.S. military and economic support. Such surrogate governments might have served short-term American interests, but the regimes never developed democratic institutions. In the 10 years following U.S. troop withdrawals, none of the target countries ruled by such governments had made the transition to democracy.

One possible explanation is that, in building these interim regimes, the United States facilitated the rise of the target country’s military, an institution indispensable to restoring security and order. Later, strongmen seized the military to advance their personal ambitions. Another explanation is that these surrogate governments, lacking indigenous legitimacy, could survive only through repression after U.S. forces departed.

Another mode of nation building, direct U.S. administration, has a mixed record. This approach failed in Cuba (1898–1902 and 1906–1909) and the Dominican Republic (1916–1924) but worked in Japan (1945–1952).

The ideal form of political transition in nation building appears to be the quick transfer of power to legitimately elected local leaders, as happened in Grenada and Panama. But this approach assumes a functioning electoral system and the existence of credible, moderate local leaders who have genuine indigenous political support. In the case of Iraq, a fully open electoral process is very likely to elevate radical religious leaders to power because they have extensive organizational networks and broad popular support. In other

### If At First You Don't Succeed: U.S. Nation-Building, 1898–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Multilateral or Unilateral</th>
<th>Interim Administration</th>
<th>Democracy After 10 Years?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>26.8 million</td>
<td>2001–present</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>U.N. Administration</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>7 million</td>
<td>1994–1996</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>Local Administration</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Local Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Local Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>7 million</td>
<td>1970–73</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>19 million</td>
<td>1964–73</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3.8 million</td>
<td>1965–66</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>72 million</td>
<td>1945–52</td>
<td>Both*</td>
<td>U.S. Direct Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>46 million</td>
<td>1945–49</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>Multilateral Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>895,000</td>
<td>1916–24</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Direct Administration</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
<td>1917–22</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>1915–34</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>1909–33</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>1906-09</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Direct Administration</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>1903–36</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Surrogate Regime</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
<td>1898–1902</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>U.S. Direct Administration</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The United States won the war as part of the Allied victory over Japan but assumed exclusive occupation authority in Japan after the war.
Don’t Forget Afghanistan | By Anatol Lieven

Developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban was overthrown in autumn 2001 reveal the gap between Western rhetoric supporting democratization and development in Muslim societies and the actual commitment that Western countries are prepared to make. Afghanistan also puts the widespread portrayals of societies thirsting for Western democracy in sharp contrast with the reality of local political structures and traditions.

Afghanistan cannot be developed by its existing weak and deeply divided government—an administration only in name—or by current Western approaches to aid, which depend on working through that government. Yet if the country is not to sink back into the conditions that produced the Taliban and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan must see real development. Since it is out of the question for the United States and its allies to occupy and administer Afghanistan themselves, the West must develop a strategy based on working with, and not against, regional forces.

Eighteen months after the Taliban fell, the overwhelming majority of the population has yet to see signs of economic reconstruction. The Taliban remains active in much of southern Afghanistan and has recently intensified attacks on U.S. troops and Western aid workers. The current timetable calls for national elections in 2004, followed by the establishment of an elected government and a withdrawal of both U.S. troops and international peacekeepers. This plan looks doubtful if not delusional.

For valid reasons of speed, geography, regional politics, and safety, the Bush administration chose to conquer Afghanistan not with U.S. troops but with those of local anti-Taliban forces backed by U.S. airpower. The continuing U.S. hunt for the Taliban and al Qaeda also depends heavily on local Afghan allies, subsidized and armed by the United States. As a result, power in Afghanistan’s regions has fallen into the hands of a variety of warlords and armed ethnic and tribal militias. In Kabul, a dominant political position was seized by Panjshiri Tajik forces belonging to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which retains a tight grip on the command of the so-called National Army and police. This action makes it even less likely that non-Tajik ethnic groups will agree to the deployment of central state forces in their regions.

Meanwhile, the U.N. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains restricted to Kabul. ISAF plays a critical role in preventing conflict between the different elements in the unstable interim administration of figurehead President Hamid Karzai, but without an enormous increase of force, peacekeepers cannot extend this tenuous stability to the rest of Afghanistan.

In these circumstances, rapidly extending the current central government’s military and administrative powers looks hopeless. In the medium term at least, Western development strategy should instead concentrate on two areas: helping the Kabul government establish health and education facilities, which do not directly threaten regional rulers, and using the U.S. military to repair infrastructure, beginning with roads.

A start has been made on the latter with the establishment of three provincial reconstruction teams under U.S. military leadership, but these teams should be greatly enhanced and extended. And they won’t succeed without payoffs to local warlords. But if the alternative is to wait until Afghanistan possesses a real nationwide administration, then reconstruction will be delayed indefinitely—and only the Taliban and al Qaeda will benefit.

Anatol Lieven, a former correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the Times (London), is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.
demonstrates. Afghanistan remains a work in progress.

Still, multilateralism in nation building has great benefits. U.N.-sanctioned nation building garners more international legitimacy than attempts by a lone intervener. In addition, multilateralism helps distribute the costs—in money and manpower—more widely. Most important, multilateralism provides an insurance policy against the huge risks of failure for the image and interests of countries such as the United States.

The poor record of past unilateral nation building leaves a U.N.-led approach as the least risky alternative. In addition to bringing legitimacy, experience in managing post-conflict societies, and economic and military contributions from its members, a U.N.-led interim administration of Iraq will help discredit popular conspiracy theories deriding Washington’s intentions toward Iraq. Since the Bush administration has publicly disavowed an intent to establish long-term military bases in Iraq or to take advantage of its vast oil resources, having the United Nations as the lead partner would give the administration instant credibility.

A U.N.-led effort by no means guarantees success. Multilateralism has its limitations, such as poor coordination and burdensome bureaucracy. Yet history suggests that multilateralism manages risk, while unilateralism invites it. The Bush administration has been undaunted by risk, arguing that no country has ever been as powerful as the United States is today. But in the case of nation building, will that power allow the United States to transcend the lessons of history?


The United States cannot turn to a ready-made model of occupation and reconstruction in postwar Iraq because none fits the country’s condition. Turning Iraq into a politically and economically stable nation is as complex a task as planning for war. U.S. military superiority, which made success of the war a foregone conclusion, does not ensure successful reconstruction.

Making an intrinsically difficult task even more complex, the United States is currently guided by two conflicting models of political reconstruction, each subject to a different logic and different imperatives.

Under the first, the United States would help Iraq create a decentralized, participatory democracy; under the second, the United States would swiftly give control to an interim Iraqi government.

Iraq has all the characteristics that have impeded democratic transitions elsewhere: a large, impoverished population deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines; no previous experience with democracy; and a track record of maintaining stability only under the grip of a strongly autocratic government. The United States enjoys no clear advantage in trying to develop a new political system for Iraq. It has no historical ties to the country and little understanding of Iraqi culture and society. Many Iraqis resent the United States for turning its back on its commitments. And it remains to be seen whether the new U.S.-led government of Iraq will be able to develop an effective civil society or a vibrant private sector that could create jobs and sustain a functioning democracy.

Three months after the fall of Baghdad, a U.N.-led government of Iraq will not be the miracle that many had hoped for. But a U.N.-led government would at least have the potential to bring legitimacy to the reconstruction effort. It would help vindicate the idea that U.S. military power need not be matched by its political power. For the United States, the costs of unilateral nation building have never been fully realized. Multilateralism is the lesson history offers the new U.S. administration.
States as an occupying power. And the factor that made the war so successful—reliance on a relatively small, mobile force whose strength lay in technological superiority rather than manpower—is a serious liability to reconstruction. Stabilizing a country requires a large, visible presence on the ground, not sophisticated weapons.

Before the war, when U.S. President George W. Bush was trying to win domestic and international support for intervention, his administration committed itself to the democratic reconstruction of Iraq and the region. “America’s interests in security, and America’s belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq,” declared Bush in February 2003.

In the following weeks, administration officials outlined how they intended to achieve that goal. The plans presented during this period exuded confidence that the United States had the capacity not only to replace Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime but to alter the character of the state and the very social fabric of Iraq. Under U.S. military occupation, U.S. officials and contractors would vet the Iraqi civil service. They would exclude hard-line members of the regime and the Baath party and rehabilitate those not overly tainted by association with the former government. The United States would also create and train a Baath-free military and police force.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is charged with implementing reconstruction, outlined an extraordinarily ambitious program in its “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq.” U.S. contractors would oversee the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and government services, restoring health services to 25 percent of the population in 60 days and to 50 percent (but to 100 percent of women and children) in six months; they would implement a new educational curriculum for the schools within a year; and they would restore the country’s roads and electrical grids with equal speed.

The plans for political reconstruction were even more remarkable. USAID stated that “the national government will be limited to essential national functions, such as defense and security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, foreign affairs, and strategic interests such as oil and gas.” Local government would be responsible for everything else and would be “required to operate in an open, transparent, and accountable matter.” Citizens would participate in planning the future of their communities and would control the civil administration through elected local assemblies. At a sweep of the U.S. pen, Iraq would turn from a centralized, hierarchical country into a model of participatory democracy.

But this vision for Iraq was completely uninformed by the situation on the ground. As soon as U.S. and British troops entered Iraqi cities, it became clear that the coalition did not have complete control and could only establish it with a much larger U.S. presence and the use of repression. Initial conditions could not be ignored. With resentment toward the occupation mounting even before the war ended, the United States could either stick to the original reconstruction plan and pacify the country by force or take a new approach. Unwilling to increase the size of the occupation force, the U.S. government opted for a new policy.

Within days of the first rumblings of opposition to the U.S. presence, Bush administration officials began discussing a short, light-handed occupation and the swift transfer of power to an Iraqi interim authority (as if that was what they had envisaged all along). Forgetting the detailed plans for a decentralized, participatory system, U.S. officials declared that the United States would not impose a particular political order on Iraq.

Quietly, however, the original, highly interven-
T<br>his time it’s not colonialism or avaricious dictatorship. This time, Iraq’s oil income will benefit the Iraqi people. So promise U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. How will the Iraqi people and outside observers know if this promise is being upheld?

To avoid bribe-borne or crony-cooked deals and unfair pricing, the new oil policy in Iraq must foster transparency and maximum international competition.

The initial goal is to return Iraq’s production to at least 2 million barrels a day. To do so requires repair and safe restart of production, refining, distribution, and export facilities. It should take a year or so. To the extent that American taxpayers pay for this immediate work, it deserves to be performed primarily by American oil service contractors.

However, 2 million barrels a day, earning around $15 billion annually, will not yield a financial surplus to Iraq. These figures are far below the uninformed and wildly inflated prewar estimates used to justify the argument that Iraqi oil would magically pay for the costs of the country’s reconstruction. Much of this $15 billion must be reinvested in the oil fields to modernize and upgrade facilities damaged by two decades of war and economic sanctions. All told, reviving and sustaining a capacity of 2 million to 3 million barrels a day will require an investment of perhaps $30 billion to $40 billion.

The longer term goal is more challenging—to reach and sustain production of 5 million barrels per day (or more). Iraq has the second-largest known reserves in the world—over a hundred billion barrels of oil. But to raise production Iraq must not only revitalize existing fields and associated facilities but also explore and develop new fields and construct new installations for processing and export. Such risky megaprojects can easily cost tens of billion dollars each.

If these large projects have to wait to be funded by existing oil income, they will be delayed for many years. A more timely solution is to invite international oil companies to invest in exploration and production, particularly of new fields. Such a role is entirely legitimate for the international oil industry and capital markets: to take on the risk of investment for an equity rate of return so that public funds do not have to be expended for the development of natural resources.

However, such investment won’t be forthcoming, or at beneficial rates to Iraqis, until Iraq’s political system is stable enough to give investors confidence that future tumult will not cancel their contracts or otherwise harm them. The location of Iraq’s major oil fields primarily in the traditionally Kurdish north and the largely Shia south highlights both the challenge of ensuring political stability and of devising equitable distribution of oil income in Iraq’s diverse society.

Edward C. Chow, a former executive at the Chevron Corporation, is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment.

The rush to bring new oil production on line must not prompt outsiders such as the U.S. government and contractors, or Iraqi elites, to make fundamental decisions, including on privatization, before the larger political structure is stabilized. Better to let the Iraqi political process mature and market forces work than to rush to create an inviting but unstable investment climate for oil in Iraq.

World-class petroleum contracts of the scale called for in Iraq take years to conclude. Witness recent experiences in highly sensitive political environments such as Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. More than a decade after Kuwait reopened itself to international investment in energy sector development, it has yet to reach a single agreement with foreign businesses on major contracts. Even if the contract process in Iraq is handled in an orderly, businesslike manner, it will be more than five years before substantial increases in Iraq’s oil production can start flowing from new investments.

Such investments could help bring oil production capacity in Iraq to 5 million or 6 million barrels per day in 10 years. Other major producing countries, especially those in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Persian Gulf, will respond to avoid losing so much market share to Iraq. These major oil producers have under-invested in production capacity by mismanaging their oil income and by continuing to exclude oil companies from operating in their countries on equitable terms. The right Iraqi model would then spawn wider benefits, but only if it is developed through an open domestic political process and not as a result of external pressures.
communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills and political analysis.” Huge by the standards of political reconstruction programs, such a contract shows that the administration has not abandoned the technocratic project of remaking Iraq into a decentralized, participatory system—despite the United States’ lack of full control.

Also in early April, USAID issued an invitation to contractors to bid on a 12-month, $70 million Iraq Community Action Program, which “will create community committees responsible for identifying and prioritizing community needs, mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation.” This agenda is not the program of a light-handed occupation.

Thus, consciously or not, the United States is simultaneously applying two contradictory reconstruction policies in Iraq. Each has a separate logic and coherence, but combining the two renders both illogical and incoherent. Where the United States has little control, invasive projects of social and political transformation cannot succeed. U.S. contractors cannot channel political participation through the new structures they are supposed to create unless there is an occupying force large enough to curb the influence of religious and tribal leaders. Hoping that a light occupation and a quick transfer of power will result in the democracy the United States promised the world is either deeply cynical or excessively optimistic. Hiding a heavy-handed American occupation behind the facade of a quickly formed Iraqi interim authority could theoretically reconcile the two approaches. Yet Iraqis are likely to notice the strings and turn on both the puppets and the puppeteer.

In the coming months, developments on the ground will reveal whether, after some initial confusion, the Bush administration is making a serious attempt to turn Iraq into a more democratic country, rather than simply one friendly to the United States. One strong indicator will be whether the military finally takes responsibility for establishing and maintaining law and order in the country, thus giving civilian administrators, U.S.

### A Moving Target: The Cost of Iraq’s Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Estimate</th>
<th>Annual Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Bush Administration</strong></td>
<td>$3.5 billion for Iraqi relief and reconstruction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Supporting Our Troops Abroad and Increasing Safety at Home” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center for Strategic and International Studies</strong></td>
<td>$6.2 billion to $7.9 billion over two years for security and police forces, transitional administration, national dialogue process, justice team, debt restructuring, and employment and education programs*</td>
<td>$6.2 billion to $7.9 billion*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Budget Office (CBO)</strong></td>
<td>Between $1 billion and $4 billion per month for occupation. The CBO has provided no estimates of reconstruction costs.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Development Programme</strong></td>
<td>At least $30 billion over the first three years</td>
<td>At least $30 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Council on Foreign Relations</strong></td>
<td>$20 billion a year for reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and post-conflict peace stabilization</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>American Academy of Arts and Sciences Committee on International Security Studies</strong></td>
<td>A “Marshall Plan” for Iraq would cost $75 billion over six years.</td>
<td>$31 billion to $115 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments</strong></td>
<td>$20.6 billion to $118.6 billion over the next five years for occupation force, humanitarian aid, governance training, reconstruction and recovery, and debt relief</td>
<td>$103 billion to $593 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Potential Cost of a War With Iraq and Its Post-War Occupation” (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003)</td>
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*This is a recommendation, not a projection.

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Having successfully driven Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power, President George W. Bush and his top advisors appear to hope that the threat of regime change may also dislodge hostile Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean regimes that support terrorism or are otherwise inimical to U.S. security interests. The decisive U.S. military action in Iraq may well intimidate some unfriendly tyrants and induce them to modify some of their adverse policies. So much the better. However, the example of Iraq is unlikely to produce sudden regime change in the Middle East or elsewhere, even when combined with new, menacing noises from top U.S. officials.

The experience of recent decades shows that while the direct application of military force can certainly oust defiant dictators, military threats and bluster almost never do. While rapid regime change seemingly offers a quick fix for knotty problems, the U.S. government will still need to pursue sustained diplomatic solutions to its security problems, as well as to pursue a broad range of nuanced, nonmilitary efforts to empower the domestic opponents of hostile dictators over the longer term.

In the late 1980s, President George H.W. Bush tried all sorts of measures—military pressure, attempted coups, and harsh economic sanctions—to get rid of Panama’s sordid strongman, Gen. Manuel Noriega. It took military intervention to drive Noriega out. Former President Bill Clinton labored mightily in the early 1990s to pressure Haiti’s ruling generals to allow deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to take back the presidential reins. Yet the generals resisted increasingly pointed military threats and agreed to leave Haiti only when they were sure that the warplanes spearheading a U.S. military intervention were actually in the air. Afghanistan’s Talibans rejected efforts by third parties in September and October 2001 to persuade them to cede power despite a highly credible U.S. threat of imminent force. Saddam rebuffed similar entreaties earlier this year, even when President Bush’s readiness to act militarily was crystal clear.

Dictators cling to power, even in the face of a threatened outside military intervention. For them, stepping down is not just a political concession, it represents total defeat—the loss of a lifetime’s accumulation of power and wealth, as well as the complete deflation of what is often a megalomaniacal sense of...
pride and self-importance. Giving in to anything less than complete military defeat becomes unthinkable. Closed off from reality and surrounded by sycophants, such leaders frequently engage in self-delusional fantasies—that the intervention will not really occur, that some third force will halt the standoff before it runs to its logical conclusion, or that their own military forces will somehow deter the enemy.

Moreover, external military threats often strengthen dictators’ hold. They inflate autocrats with a renewed sense of purpose and determination. The specter of foreign takeover allows swaggering strongmen to play the nationalist card at home and claim the mantle of heroic defender of the nation’s honor and territorial integrity. In the intensifying state of siege, they can smear domestic opponents as pawns of sinister foreign aggressors and distract public attention from the failings of their own rule.

Likewise, neighbors of an autocrat deposed by external military action will not necessarily face emboldened challengers at home. “Domino democratization” has sometimes occurred, such as in Eastern Europe in 1989 or in Latin America across the 1980s. But the power of example in those cases was that of citizens mobilizing to overthrow their own repressive rulers, not outside intervention. U.S. military actions against foreign strongmen are unquestionably powerful events that resonate loudly on the international stage. But none of the interventions of the past two decades—whether in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, or Afghanistan—has produced democratic waves in neighboring countries.

Dictators do not last forever. They are not immune to pressure. And efforts by external powers to foster democratic change in dictatorial settings are not fruitless. But it is crucial to realize that dictators usually fall when they are pushed out by their own people. Short of outright invasion, outside attempts to advance regime change are most effective when they strengthen internal dissenters and democrats rather than stand in for them.

When strongmen allow some limited political space, the United States and other countries seeking to promote democratic change can usefully support those forces within the society that oppose the regime—usually a mix of opposition political groups, civic actors, unions, and independent media. External support to such groups has played or is playing a helpful role in many cases: in Indonesia before President Suharto’s fall, in Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, and in Belarus today under Aleksandr Lukashenko. When an authoritarian leader gambles on elections to legitimate his rule, then outside aid to help make the elections as free and fair as possible can be valuable, as in the 1988 Chilean plebiscite on Augusto Pinochet’s continued rule or last December’s Kenyan elections, in which former President Daniel arap Moi’s handpicked successor was defeated.

Where dictators allow no or next-to-no political space, the ability of outside groups to encourage change is much more limited. Typical measures include beaming in television and radio news from outside the country’s borders, supporting pro-democratic exile groups, and imposing economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure. But as demonstrated by the long-term survival of dictators such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the Burmese generals, the impact of such measures is often regrettably limited.

The United States can and should vigorously pressure noxious dictators and support their opponents. Yet Americans should be careful not to pin too much hope on the power of military threats and bluster to dislodge dictators, despite the example of Iraq. And more U.S. military interventions in the Middle East or elsewhere will come only at a very high cost economically, diplomatically, and possibly militarily. For all the United States’ military might, history suggests it will also be necessary to keep engaging in the messy, slow business of constructing diplomatic, and usually multilateral, approaches to dealing with hostile dictatorships and other troublesome regimes.

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While optimists could still be proved correct and the removal of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein could strengthen moderating elements in the Islamic world, early trends indicate that the war has wounded the cause of moderation. During the war, images of destruction of the historic capital of Islam’s caliphs, Baghdad, were beamed into Muslim homes by a vibrant and increasingly independent Arab media. For hours on end, viewers saw the suffering of their fellow Muslims pounded by an all-powerful United States. The looting that followed was seen as the result of the occupying army’s disregard for the security of the Iraqi people. The burning down of the Iraqi religious affairs ministry that housed the oldest extant copies of the Muslim holy book, the Koran, strengthened the argument of anti-American clerics that the United States does not respect Muslim concerns. Almost nobody in the Muslim world noted that the looters were fellow Muslim Iraqis and not American or British soldiers.

The war in Iraq has definitely increased the number of radical Muslims believing in the inevitability of a clash of civilizations and the need to stand up and be counted for their religious fellowship. Radical Islamists have started building the argument that the United States offers nothing by way of ethical ideas and has become arrogant as a result of its military dominance. This argument finds even greater resonance in the context of the Iraq war. What is new following the collapse of Iraq’s secular Arab nationalist regime is a process of cooperation and convergence between radical Islamists and secular nationalists in the Middle East. Traditionally, secular Arab nationalism viewed radical Islam, with its emphasis on pan-Islamism, as an ideological rival. But the Iraq war has muted that rivalry and, in the process, accentuated the polarization between a Muslim “us” and a Western “them.”

The convergence of secular and fundamentalist Muslim radicals could provide new sanctuaries to radical Islamists while creating operational links between ideologically opposed terrorist groups. It could also pave the way for admission of secular enemies of the United States into groups that operate through their network of mosques and seminaries. More secular recruits would enable radical Islamist networks to overcome their relative lack of knowledge of Western societies, strengthening their operational capabilities.

U.S. promises of building an Iraqi democracy and making a new beginning in the Middle East have not been taken seriously by an overwhelming majority in the Arab Islamic world. In polls in several Arab countries, a majority of respondents now say they are unlikely to change their view of the United States even if it helps to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Few people in the Muslim world liked Saddam. But the Muslim world saw the war largely as an effort to occupy Iraq, not one to liberate it.

Muslim disappointment and anger toward the U.S. government has been growing for some time, not least due to perceptions that the United States is one-sided in its supposedly mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem is getting worse.
Turkey: An overwhelming 90 percent of Turks opposed the Iraq war. Islamic solidarity was one reason. But Turkey was particularly alarmed by the prospect that Iraq’s disintegration would lead to demands by its own Kurdish population for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan. The slightest sign of Kurdish solidarity or independence could provoke Turkish military action.

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will also have to watch for a resurgence of Islamic sentiment within its own rank and file. Although the party has Islamic roots, it has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to Turkey’s secular constitution and to the alliance with the United States. A perceived U.S. failure in rebuilding Iraqi statehood, or Islamist-led unrest in Baghdad, could put Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan under pressure to revert to a more Islamist position. That, in turn, could provoke the avowedly secular Turkish military to act against the AKP government. Turkey’s support for the United States will also depend on U.S. economic assistance and Washington’s ability to influence the European Union in hastening Turkey’s pending membership.

Pakistan: The alliance of Islamic parties, Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which made significant gains in the parliamentary elections of October 2002, gathered more support as a result of the war, which was seen as an anti-Muslim crusade. The MMA is likely to continue anti-U.S. agitation. Its government in the Northwest Frontier Province, adjoining Afghanistan, is already allowing greater Taliban activity against the government of President Hamid Karzai, undermining U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

In the short term, Islamist pressure on the brittle regime of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could increase if violence in the Middle East (including in Iraq) were to rise. Confronted by such pressure in the past, Musharraf would have tried to increase benefits from the United States by helping pursue elements of al Qaeda, while pacifying Islamists by allowing militant groups to organize and operate against India in Kashmir. Now, the professed resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue limits the anti-Indian option because terrorism traced to Pakistan would badly damage Musharraf’s international standing, including with Washington.

The successful transformation of Iraq into a democracy could energize Pakistan’s democratic opposition, which might decide to challenge Musharraf. This reaction would set in motion a destabilizing chain of events upsetting U.S. policy in the region, which now revolves around support for Musharraf.

Indonesia: Pan-Islamic sentiment, fueled by the war in Iraq, is at an all-time high in the world’s most populous Muslim country. With an election due in 2004, this sentiment could put more Islamists in office, though an Islamist president is unlikely. Indonesia’s Muslim moderates have been at pains to distance themselves from extremist groups since the Bali bombings in October 2002. But the need to secure Muslim votes could lead even moderate Islamic leaders to resort to anti-American rhetoric during the election campaign. That kind of political environment could help recruitment for terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad, and might weaken the government’s resolve in clamping down on them.

—H.H.
Gaza, and Russia’s in Chechnya, disproves the theory that overwhelming force can temper the fervor of radical Muslims.

For obvious reasons the United States wants to bolster popular Muslim moderates and marginalize radicals. And there is a long tradition of Muslim leaders looking up to the West. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, told a peasant who asked him what westernization meant: “It means being a better human being.” Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah cited the Englishman’s sense of justice and fair play as the value that binds Muslims with Westerners and sought to emulate U.S. conduct toward Canada in his country’s foreign policy. Even the religiously conservative founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdel Aziz, chose to ally himself with the United States because he found God-fearing Americans better than godless communists.

MORE SECULAR RECRUITS WOULD ENABLE RADICAL ISLAMIST NETWORKS TO MORE EASILY INFILTRATE WESTERN SOCIETIES.

But finding today’s Ataturks or Jinnahs is not so easy. And moderates who appeal to the West may fail to win enough hearts and minds at home. Until now the United States has defined Muslim leaders furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives as “moderates.” It should now widen that definition to include those able to win democratic support at home by focusing on their people’s problems.

Husain Haqqani, a former diplomat and advisor to Pakistani prime ministers, is a journalist and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment.

Despite widespread predications that the march of American forces into Baghdad would unleash either a wave of democratization or a plague of protest and repression throughout the Middle East, the more prosaic reality is that most Middle Eastern states are too preoccupied with their own domestic problems to be moved profoundly by events in Iraq. Indeed, the region seems likely to experience political evolutions rather than revolutions, small steps forward (or back) rather than sudden leaps into a new world of Middle Eastern democracy or brutal retreats to dictatorship.

Iraq’s main impact on the region will be political. The creation of a durable democracy will strengthen reformists and thus encourage more political liberalization. But if democratization provokes conflicts between Kurds, Sunnis, and the dominant Shiites (60 percent of Iraq’s population), or if it produces a new Shiite theocracy, rulers from Rabat to Tehran will
From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq

point to Iraq as good reason to avoid political reform.

The possibility of ethno-religious conflict highlights Iraq’s psychological importance in the region. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s rule showed that when ethnic, tribal, religious, or secular segments of society cannot peacefully resolve their differences, a strongman can at least repress them. And for all Saddam’s exceptional brutality, autocrats throughout the Middle East have also used his model of trying to “resolve” identity conflicts by imposing order from above. If Iraq’s new leaders learn to address such conflicts democratically, they will not only achieve more stable results but their example could then inspire proponents of ethno-religious accommodation everywhere.

Iraq’s neighbors are watching the dramatic reemergence of the country’s Shiite majority to see whether it will learn to tolerate diverse views and cooperate with the Sunni and Kurdish communities, or whether it will instead be authoritarian and intolerant. Radical Shiite clerics may be a minority, but because they are organized, they might impose their views on the wider Shiite community. The radicals know that Najaf, the historically most important Shiite city, will eventually reemerge as a center of Shiite scholarship. If they dominate this dynamic, the radicals will inspire fundamentalists everywhere. But if Najaf becomes a center of religious pluralism, advocates of a more tolerant Islam, particularly among the Arab world’s Shiites, will take heart.

As a neighboring state where Shiites hold sway, Iran is key to the course of this transition. Well before the Iraq war began, some of Iran’s radical clerics expressed happiness about an American-led campaign. They assumed that it would inadvertently bolster Iraq’s radical clerics and thus create a new regional ally for Iran’s own hard-liners. To fill the postwar vacuum before more moderate voices could organize, Iran sent Revolutionary Guardsmen to Iraq immediately after Saddam’s fall. Iran’s reformists, on the other hand, hope that Iraq’s moderate clerics will survive and establish a base in national politics, minimizing the effective convergence of radicals in Iran and Iraq and thus strengthening the political leverage of Iran’s own moderates. Still, given the divisions among the reformists and the entrenched power of the security establishment and conservative judiciary, the most feasible positive outcome in Iran would be a protracted and bumpy liberalization, even if Iraq’s moderate Shiites prevail.

In turn, all Arab states with significant Shiite populations will take cues from events in Iraq: Bahrain’s Shiite majority is ruled by a Sunni monarchy. Many Shiites were disappointed with the reforms initiated by the monarch and boycotted the semicompetitive elections of October 2002. A radical clerical victory in Iraq would embolden those Bahraini Shiites who accuse the king of promoting a fake democracy. Conversely, a pluralistic Iraq might promote an accommodation between the regime and the opposition that makes further liberalization possible.

In Kuwait relations between Sunnis and Shiites are more cordial, in part because Kuwait’s Shiites constitute an influential community (some 30 percent) that has representation in the parliament. With Iraq no longer a threat, the authority of Kuwait’s parliament might increase. But if Shiite radicalism prevails or provokes internal conflict in Iraq, tensions will rise between Kuwait’s Shiite community and the royal family, and between Sunni and Shiite members of parliament, thus diminishing the parliament’s influence.

Saudi Arabia’s royal family has announced a reform program that will enhance the authority of the unelected Consultation Council. Inspired by events in Iraq, Saudi’s small Shiite minority is clamoring for more rights. Saudi reformists may address these demands, but they will be careful not to antagonize the conservative Wahhabi establishment. If Shiite radicals prevail in Iraq, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful political reform in Saudi Arabia.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s authority as spokesmen for the Shiites will be enhanced regardless of whether Iraq emerges as a democracy or a theocracy. Either way, the ties between Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites will be reinvigorated. Yet how Hezbollah projects its influence at home and abroad, particularly in Israel, will depend heavily on Syria. If the Bush administration
of this writing had been postponed twice. But the prospects for such moderation will depend heavily on a revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process, since only a comprehensive peace that includes Syria will give Damascus cause to rein in Hezbollah.

Elsewhere in the Arab world, events in Iraq will be less significant, although hardly irrelevant. In Jordan, the paralysis of the peace process, rising Islamist passions, and economic crisis have prompted King Abdullah to reverse an earlier political liberalization. A resumption of trade with Iraq, and even more, the creation of a pluralistic regime in Baghdad, will set the stage for the holding of elections in Jordan, which as of this writing had been postponed twice. But if Iraq convincing Syria to stop backing Hezbollah, space might open up for a more moderate Shiite leadership in Lebanon. But the prospects for such moderation will depend heavily on a revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process, since only a comprehensive peace that includes Syria will give Damascus cause to rein in Hezbollah.

Egypt’s leaders knew that the creation of a pro-Western Iraq would undermine Egypt’s geo-strategic position. They have pushed to accelerate economic reform and to reinvigorate the semiofficial National Democratic Party. President Hosni Mubarak and his allies are determined to ensure the state’s control over all further political reforms.

Further west, Iraq becomes less relevant. Algeria is still recovering from civil war and is unlikely to move much beyond its state of fragmentation. As for Morocco, until the recent terrorist bombings in Casablanca, further political liberalization seemed in the offing. But
The Iraq war was the first application of the new theory that preventive war can be an effective instrument against the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. “Prevention” invites a medical metaphor. And, indeed, observers often imagine an epidemic when they think of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Yet the best metaphor for proliferation is a cancer that results from environmental causes and metastasizes in predictable patterns from cell to neighboring cell. China gets nuclear weapons, India responds to China, and then Pakistan to India. Israel builds nuclear weapons, then Iraq tries, along with Iran, even as the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by other states adds to the region-wide malignancy. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program prompts worries of proliferation to Japan and South Korea, and so on.

For the Bush administration, the danger from this disease in Iraq was too great to risk further delay. Days before the war began, Vice President Richard Cheney told Tim Russert of NBC News that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein “has, in fact, reconstructed nuclear weapons.” U.S. officials warned that Iraq had imported key elements for new nuclear weapons, improved its facilities to produce thousands of chemical weapons, and expanded its biological weapons program to pre-1991 levels. President George W. Bush said that Iraq had hundreds of tons

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Can Preventive War Cure Proliferation?

BY JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

The Iraq war was the first application of the new theory that preventive war can be an effective instrument against the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. “Prevention” invites a medical metaphor. And, indeed, observers often imagine an epidemic when they think of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Yet the best metaphor for proliferation is a cancer that results from environmental causes and metastasizes in predictable patterns from cell to neighboring cell. China gets nuclear weapons, India responds to China, and then Pakistan to India. Israel builds nuclear weapons, then Iraq tries, along with Iran, even as the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by other states adds to the region-wide malignancy. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program prompts worries of proliferation to Japan and South Korea, and so on.

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chemical weapons and thousands of liters of biological weapons that could kill millions and a hidden fleet of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver them. Worse, Saddam’s “long-standing, direct, and continuing ties to terrorists networks,” the president said, meant that “trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.”

The United States and the United Kingdom successfully excised Saddam’s regime. Yet the ultimate effectiveness of this radical surgery will not be determined for some time. History does postmortems; contemporary analysis is less certain.

As of this writing, U.S. teams have found scant evidence supporting the prewar diagnosis. Possibly the weapons of mass destruction were destroyed before the war. Possibly some were sent abroad. Possibly they exist undiscovered in the vast quantities claimed by the U.S. and British intelligence services. If so, these arsenals would pose an urgent international security and proliferation threat. Whoever does know their location might hoard them for future use against U.S. forces or steal them out of the country for sale to the highest bidder.

### What the United States and Britain Said Iraq Had...

#### Nuclear Program
- Has or soon could have nuclear weapons
- Sought to import uranium and equipment for centrifuges to enrich it
- Rebuilt facilities at sites that were previously part of its nuclear program
- Active cadre of Iraqi nuclear scientists

#### Biological Program
- Biological weapons program far larger than before 1991 war
- Materials to produce thousands of liters of weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, and other biological agents, enough to kill millions
- Large-scale, redundant, and concealed biological weapons agent production capability
- Expanded and improved facilities for weapons production
- Civilian plants that could be and may have been rapidly converted for weapons
- At least seven mobile weapons factories

#### Chemical Program
- Between 100 and 500 tons of chemical agents, enough to fill 16,000 rockets
- Rebuilt and expanded facilities capable of producing chemical weapons
- Civilian facilities embedded in weapons program
- 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological agents
- Weapons ready for launch in 45 minutes

#### Missile Program
- Several dozen Scud-type missiles and launchers
- Programs and test stands to develop longer range missiles
- A variety of unmanned aerial vehicles, linked to devices for delivering weapons of mass destruction

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### A Dangerous Neighborhood

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**KEY:** ◆ Probable weapons or weapons agents ◆ Possible research programs/capabilities

Another possibility is that the weapons programs did not exist on the scale that the United States asserted before the war. Three weeks after the fall of Baghdad, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice spoke of “pieces hidden here and there,” marking perhaps the beginning of efforts to lower expectations. Of course, discovering any banned weapons would be evidence of noncompliance with the 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and last year’s Resolution 1441.

The majority of the American public, proud of the military victory over Saddam’s evil regime, may not care that the Iraqi arsenal was not what the Bush administration had alleged. International opinion, however, might be less forgiving. If the United States does not produce evidence of large, ongoing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in prewar Iraq, the publics and governments in many nations may feel that the United States acted in bad faith. In that case, states whose cooperation or endorsement the United States needs on future international security issues may be less inclined to accept U.S. threat assessments or go along with its recommended actions.

Moreover, to be an effective treatment for proliferation, preventive war must not only remove the direct threat, it must also dissuade would-be proliferators. The United States and other concerned states may yet try to use the Iraq treatment as an object lesson to induce states such as North Korea and Iran to change their behavior. But the early signs are that these regimes have drawn an opposite conclusion. As of late May, U.S. officials were reporting that North Korea is accelerating its nuclear program, not abandoning it. Iran, too, has consciously raised the public profile of its ostensibly civilian nuclear program and insisted that it would acquire full nuclear fuel-cycle capability, thus enabling it to enrich uranium to weapon-grade levels and reprocess plutonium from reactor fuel. Like India’s army chief of staff after the first Iraq war, officials in Pyongyang and Tehran may believe that if one day you find yourself opposed by the United States, you’d better have a nuclear weapon.

Some favor limited military strikes against North Korea’s facilities for reprocessing fuel rods into plutonium or against the nuclear fuel plants now under construction in Iran. Yet even the most aggressive advocates of military surgery acknowledge real problems here. Every good strike depends on great intelligence. Intelligence officials caution that locations of key facilities in North Korea and Iran remain unknown. If you don’t get the whole tumor, the cancer remains. There is minimal—perhaps no—international support for even limited strikes. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun warns that a strike against North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor would be unthinkable, calling it “very, very dangerous.” Iran is too big and too politically dynamic for the United States to attack without creating widespread instability and jeopardizing the prospect for normalizing relations for decades.

Preventive war is therefore no miracle cure. It cannot begin to replace the range of treatments necessary to make those who acquire these weapons give them up, or to prevent states or terrorists from seeking these deadly arsenals in the first place. Any effort to stop proliferation must not only rely on the implementation and enforcement of effective legal and inspection regimes; it must offer states that seek weapons of mass destruction a set of constructive alternatives for redressing insecurities and achieving status and international recognition. Consider the case of Iraq and Iran. Even if democratic transformations sweep the Middle East, a new Iraq and a new Iran might still want nuclear weapons as long as Israel has them and as long as such weapons are seen as the currency of great powers. The Iranian nuclear program began under the shah, when the United States sold that nation its first reactor; that program will likely continue under future governments unless regional dynamics change fundamentally.

The end of Saddam’s regime could be just such a fundamental shift. Iraq posed a serious threat to Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the international security system. The removal of that threat
could spur important counterproliferation gains and lead to a safer regional security environment. After all, a truly effective antiproliferation strategy must also seek to bring a region back to health.

Some may feel this possibility is more hope than prognosis. Yet in past decades, Israel, Egypt, and other states in the region endorsed U.N. resolutions to make the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Those resolutions remain in limbo, but U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reaffirmed this objective in May: “It has always been a United States goal that conditions could be created in this part of the world where no nation would have a need for any weapons of mass destruction.” The necessary conditions do not yet exist; the question is whether relevant governments will now purposefully and energetically use Iraq’s defeat as a basis for creating them.


Terror’s Undiminished Threat  |  By Vincent Cannistraro

Though the war on Iraq was called a major battle in the war on terrorism, the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power will not dramatically reduce the direct threat to the United States from terrorists. Saddam and his regime were not a major influence on international terrorism. The Iraqi government had tenuous, if any, links to the only international terrorist group that has been targeting and killing Americans in the past several years: al Qaeda. (Ironically, northeastern Iraq, which had been an autonomous area protected by U.S. air patrols and outside Baath control, was the only part of Iraq known to harbor an al Qaeda presence. However, the war has denied al Qaeda a new staging area there.) Baghdad certainly harbored some known terrorists, primarily in the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestinian Liberation Front, but neither of these groups has recently promoted anti-American violence. The Iraqi regime also gave refuge to Saudi dissidents plotting against the Saudi monarchy and provided financial assistance to Palestinian families of suicide bombers.

More than reducing direct terrorist threats to the United States, the removal of Saddam’s government and the establishment of a large U.S. military presence in the region are likely to lessen the resistance of local governments to broader U.S. foreign policy goals, particularly the protection of Israel against terrorism. Syria, which has not harbored groups targeting Americans, recognizes the changed strategic balance in the Middle East and may do more to help U.S. intelligence monitor al Qaeda and track down fugitive Iraqi officials. Damascus will continue to provide political support to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but it may be less likely to stimulate Hezbollah military action in southern Lebanon. Iran, the major patron of Hezbollah, is unlikely to abandon the organization but will probably advise caution to avoid antagonizing the United States. Iran also accommodates some al Qaeda leaders within its territory and will face greater internal pressure to expel them in order to deflect American demands. Saudi Arabia may now seriously curtail support of fundamentalist religious terrorists. Of course, ungovernable havens for terrorists such as Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier or Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge will be harder to affect.

If the dynamic U.S. military presence on Muslim soil intimidates governments from confronting the United States, it also may substantially increase grassroots hostility and, potentially, terrorist recruitment against the U.S. government and Israel. Postwar animosity has provoked attacks on a McDonald’s restaurant in Beirut, as well as Coca-Cola and Pizza Hut facilities in Cairo and boycotts of American products throughout Indonesia and other southern Asian countries. The festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict will feed this resentment and draw new recruits to groups that engage in asymmetrical armed struggle against the United States.

Despite popular resentment and official pique among U.S. allies over the war in Iraq, international cooperation on anti-terrorism measures has continued. Law enforcement and intelligence collaboration between the United States and allied countries has been central in detecting al Qaeda cells in France, Germany, and Western Europe as well as in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Central Asia. Where there is a marked difference between the United States and allies is in their opposing views of Hamas, Hezbollah, and some other groups: The United States characterizes them as terrorist units, while several allies believe they are resistance groups, opposing illegal occupation by the Israelis. It is in this area that intelligence sharing tends to be less than fulsome.

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From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq

Concerns over trans-Atlantic relations, American attitudes toward the United Nations Security Council, and the future of multilateralism stem from a single, overarching issue of the post–Cold War era: the issue of international legitimacy. When the United States wields its power, especially its military power, will world opinion and more importantly its fellow liberal democracies, especially in Europe, regard its actions as broadly legitimate? Or will the United States appear, as it did to many during the crisis in Iraq, as a kind of rogue superpower?

“Legitimacy” is an intangible factor in foreign policy, but like so many intangibles it can have great practical significance. Neither this nor any future American administration wants to be regarded as behaving illegitimately when it goes to war; hence President George W. Bush sought U.N. support before the conflict. A perceived pattern of illegitimate behavior can limit the cooperation other countries are willing to offer and put sand in the gears of even a sole superpower. Nor are Americans likely to be comfortable consistently acting in ways that much of the world, and especially other like-minded peoples, deem illegitimate.

The problem is a new one for Americans and very much the product of post–Cold War changes in the international system. After World War II, the fundamental legitimacy of American foreign policy was not seriously questioned by the majority of peoples in Europe, nor by those of America’s Asian allies. The American responsibility for defending “the West” against the Soviet Union and international communism lent some justification, even to questionable policies. It was this widely acknowledged role in leading the common defense that bestowed legitimacy on American policy throughout the Cold War, not American obeisance to the dictates of international law or to the manifestly dysfunctional U.N. Security Council.

How to replace that old and irretrievable source of legitimacy is the challenge faced by this and future American administrations. Unprecedented American global dominance following the collapse of the Soviet Union has created suspicion and resentment even among America’s allies.

The blame for this state of affairs does not lie primarily with this or any previous administration in Washington. It was in the late 1990s that a French foreign minister coined the term “hyperpower”; nervousness about unchecked American power antedates George W. Bush and the Iraq war. Although poor diplomacy and careless rhetoric can exacerbate tensions, the core of the problem lies in the unique structural realities of the present international system. The overwhelming power of the United States and the lack of any plausible peer competitor are naturally unnerving, certainly to those who do not benefit from American dominance, and perhaps even to some of America’s allies, who do.

Global opposition to the Iraq war had much to do with these kinds of fears, which the United States should address. Americans will not always be able to say to the world, “Trust us, we know what we’re doing.”

George W. Bush sought U.N. support before the conflict. A perceived pattern of illegitimate behavior can limit the cooperation other countries are willing to offer and put sand in the gears of even a sole superpower. Nor are Americans likely to be comfortable consistently acting in ways that much of the world, and especially other like-minded peoples, deem illegitimate.

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Simple answers to the problem of international legitimacy will be elusive, however. The disparity of power at the root of the problem is an intractable reality, as many critics of the United States implicitly recognize. Many Europeans, for instance, often express their desire for a world order characterized not by American hegemony, however benevolent, but by checks and balances. Legitimacy would presumably come from a new “concert” of world powers, no one of which could act without the consent of the others.

Yet even under the questionable assumption that a 19th-century balance of power would be a more desirable system than one characterized by American hegemony, a return to multipolarity is not in the cards. A multipolar world cannot be decreed; it must be created. Europe lacks the will to establish itself as a second “pole” capable of balancing American power. Nor would most Europeans want to see multipolarity and global balance created by the rise of a superpower China or the return of a superpower Russia.

Europe’s inability or unwillingness to create actual global multipolarity explains much of the European desire to establish the U.N. Security Council as the sole authority for determining the legitimacy of military action, and especially American action. By investing equal power in the five permanent members, which include France and Britain, the Security Council today produces an institutional multipolarity, at least in theory, to compensate for the lack of genuine multipolarity in the international system.

Yet few Americans, and by no means all Europeans, would agree that the Security Council by itself is the answer to the problem of legitimacy. Europeans are increasingly accustomed to ceding authority to supranational bodies, but even self-proclaimed multilateralists in the United States don’t argue that the United States must always be bound by the decisions or nondecisions of the U.N. Security Council. In 1999 the major European countries themselves, including the French, agreed that a Security Council imprimatur was not necessary to legitimate military action in Kosovo. The fact is, in the decades since the founding of the U.N. Security Council, that entity has never succeeded in establishing itself as the final authority bestowing legitimacy on military action, and it is no closer to doing so today.

In addressing the problem of legitimacy, a simple institutional legalism will not avail. If the United States seeks legitimation for its actions, and it should, it will have to earn that legitimacy the old-fashioned way. It must promote and appear to promote not only its own national interest narrowly conceived, but also the common interests of the liberal democratic world. Even if the Cold War alliances cannot be re-created, this quality of American leadership during the Cold War can and should be emulated today.

Success solves many problems, as the global reaction to the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime has shown. American success in the military campaign and the failure of worst-case scenarios to materialize have not only blunted European opposition but even led to a rethinking of that opposition. Such developments should put to rest some of the more hysterical claims on both sides of the Atlantic that the American invasion of Iraq has irreparably damaged the international order and severed transatlantic ties.

The ultimate legitimacy of the war, however, and of American behavior more broadly, will depend on the course Iraq takes. If the United States is seen to have fostered liberal democracy in Iraq; to have eliminated a security threat to the region and beyond; and to have undertaken the war not only for its own interests but also in the interests of others, then the question of legitimacy will be settled largely in America’s favor. If, however, Iraq is unstable and undemocratic, and the stability of the region as a whole has not improved, then the legitimacy of American actions and of American foreign policy in general will be eroded.

The problem of legitimacy, like most international problems, can never be definitively solved. Perhaps the best test of American foreign policy in the coming years will therefore be whether, through an active and generous diplomacy and through successful actions in the common interest, the United States can win the argument that it has acted in the common good more often than it loses it.


From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq
Want to Know More?

A good primer on nation building is John M. Owens’ analysis of more than 400 years of domestic institutional promotion in “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” (International Organization, Spring 2002). Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper’s policy brief “Lessons From the Past: The American Record of Nation Building” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2003) presents a fuller version of his piece in this special report. See John Dower’s Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999) for an examination of a successful nation-building effort. To learn more about the travails of rebuilding Afghanistan, see “Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction” (Journal of Democracy, January 2003) by Kimberley Zisk Marten. Try also Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven’s policy brief “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2002). Links to the most recent and comprehensive reports and articles on Iraq’s reconstruction can be found at www.ceip.org/Iraq.


For more on the topic of Iraq and its oil reserves, Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) details the history of Iraqi oil starting in the 1920s. Petroleum Economist and the Oil and Gas Journal, both authoritative oil industry periodicals, have run numerous articles on Iraq’s oil.


In “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism” (International Security, Winter 2002–03), Audrey Kurth Cronin traces the terrorist backlash to the U.S. failure to address the unintended negative consequences of globalization. Thomas Homer-Dixon examines how high-tech societies are increasingly vulnerable to crippling attacks in “The Rise of Complex Terrorism” (FOREIGN POLICY, January/February 2002). Michelle Cottle explores what would happen if a terrorist bomb wiped out the U.S. federal government in “Norman Ornstein’s Doomsday Scenario” (Atlantic Monthly, June 2003).


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