Seeking a "Social Contract for Saudi
Arabia
Toby
Jones
(Toby Jones is a doctoral candidate in history at
Stanford University.)
|
Bird
market in mostly Shi’i town of al-Qatif. (Moulouk Y. Ba-Isa/AP
Photo) |
For most of its history, the royal family of Saudi Arabia has
maintained public order by exercising absolute, at times brutal,
control over the people of the country. The House of Saud has
tolerated neither resistance nor the questioning of its authority.
But in the mayhem of 2003, with war to the north, terrorist car
bombings in the capital of Riyadh and running gun battles in Mecca
and Medina, something strange is happening in the oil monarchy. In
the spring and summer, several bold groups of Saudi Arabian citizens
pressed the royal family to rescue the country from the forces
crippling it and open up to political reform. This time, Saudi
rulers appear to be listening to, and even encouraging, dialogue.
Has the age of reform dawned at long last in Saudi
Arabia?
There are reasons for optimism. Crown Prince Abdallah's
highly publicized embrace of the various reform groups suggests
that, if nothing else, talking about reform has become a legitimate
element of public life. Editorial pages of Saudi Arabian newspapers
openly call for greater freedoms and debate possible ways to
ameliorate long-standing problems. The new reformers, by aligning
themselves with the regime, have shrewdly maneuvered the royal
family into a stance from which they cannot easily back down. With
the requisite endurance, the reformers may ultimately accomplish
their task, but for now, the reasons for skepticism are abundant and
powerful. There are significant questions about the strength of the
social base supporting the cause of the moderates. Reactionary
forces are on the rise, and power struggles among the royal family
continue to stymie forward motion.
Looming Disaster
|
Fireman
takes a nap near site of Riyadh car bombing, May 13, 2003.
(Bilal Qabalan/AFP) |
It
is well-known that the economic, social and political systems in the
kingdom demand urgent overhaul. Saudi Arabian author Turki al-Hamad
recently remarked that "ten, 20 years ago, we had the luxury of
time. We could choose the kind of reform pace we wanted.... Now, we
either reform or collapse."[1] Since the bottom fell out of the oil boom in
the mid-1980s, the strength of the Saudi economy has flagged
considerably. Subsequent shocks to the economy, especially the heavy
cost of subsidizing the 1991 Gulf war, wreaked havoc on an unstable
system almost wholly dependent on the whims of the international oil
market. Rapidly compounding social pressures promise additional
dangers if not remedied soon. Although accurate data is rare, it is
clear that government expenditures outstrip revenues, continuing a
trend toward greater indebtedness begun in the early 1990s. Most
disturbingly, over 40 percent of the budget continues to be
allocated to defense rather than human development or other more
pressing matters.
In
1981, US and Saudi Arabian per capita income levels were equivalent
at roughly $18,000 per year. In the 20 years since, while the US
level has grown to $36,000, the average Saudi Arabian household
income plummeted, now hovering around $7,500. Social services,
including quality health care and reasonably priced housing, have
declined and the Saudi Arabian infrastructure is in a steady state
of decay. The county's population continues to grow at an alarming
pace annually, according to the US Embassy, with the fertility rate
at seven children per female. Predictions suggest that Riyadh alone,
today a city of around 5 million, will reach the 11 million mark by
2020. The overwhelming majority (figures range between 60-70
percent) of the Saudi Arabian population, which totals around 20
million, is under 25 and unemployed.[2] Considering the country's almost total
reliance on foreign labor, jobs will likely continue to remain in
rare supply. With the state no longer able to subsidize the nation's
welfare, the future looks bleak.
Augmenting anxieties generated by economic futility and the
specter of total social disarray is the authoritarian regime itself,
long at the vanguard of the world's oppressive governments.
Religious minorities are marginalized. The Shi'a, who live mostly in
the oil-rich eastern province of al-Hasa and make up between 10-20
percent of the population, have been ruthlessly oppressed. The
monarchy's record on women's rights and most other measures of human
rights is worse than abysmal, as documented by Human Rights Watch,
the State Department and others. Foreign laborers toil in virtual
slavery, subordinate to vague labor laws that allow their unlimited
exploitation. Arrest without formal charge is frequent, the torture
of criminal and political prisoners is common, and due process is
mythical. Forced confessions fill the police records, while capital
and corporal punishments are handed out with frightening regularity.
The top-heavy regime is corrupt and cruel, and maintains domestic
order through fear and the threat of violence.[3]
Demands for reform of the dysfunctional Saudi system are not
without precedent. In fact, the limited success of the contemporary
reform movement owes much to an earlier generation of political
pioneers. An Islamist social movement, organized throughout the
1980s as a result of the expansion of religious institutions and the
return of the mujahideen from Afghanistan, erupted in anger in the
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war. While exasperation with the regime
festered unspoken in the past, the war and the country's reliance on
US soldiers galvanized dissenters who shattered the silence. In
addition, the Islamist opposition movement had finally tired of
government corruption and betrayal of the austere Islamic principles
the Al Saud purported to uphold. Throughout the 1990s, the regime
cracked down on the dissidents, leading some to proclaim their
defeat. As Gwenn Okruhlik has argued, however, while the Islamist
opposition failed to topple the regime, such a yardstick for success
is not wholly appropriate. The Islamists fundamentally altered the
terms of political discourse in the kingdom, forcing the royal
family to take them seriously. Yet even in the new era of discussion
and debate about the nation and the proper relationship between the
state and citizen, the brutal regime endured.[4] What appeared to be significant political
compromises, like the creation of the consultative council and the
1992 Basic Law, actually enabled the Al Saud to centralize power
more completely and erode already limited political access.[5]
"Better That It Happen from Above"
In
mid-January 2003, Crown Prince Abdallah, de facto ruler of the
kingdom since his brother King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995,
issued a call for political reform across the Middle East. When
asked about Abdallah's initiative, Mohammed al-Mohaissen, the
secretary for one reform group, replied that "I believe he is
sincere, but for his thoughts to be credible, they must first be
applied in Saudi Arabia." He continued sarcastically that "I also
believe that he has reflected many of our ideas and so perhaps news
of our discussions has already reached him."[6] It was al-Mohaissen's group, 104 strong, that
presented Abdallah with the first of the year's petitions, called
"The Vision" (al-Ru'ya), later that same month. The letter
demanded sweeping changes. It recommended broad reforms including
public election of the consultative council (Majlis al-Shura),
social justice, civil rights, ending corruption, an independent and
reformed judiciary, the creation of human rights institutions and
economic diversity, as well as freedom of speech, assembly and
association. Emphasizing the Islamic roots of citizenship, the
document underscored that scripture mandates fairness on the part of
governments and that they were bound to consult with the community
in "affairs."[7] There were, however, no women signatories and
the demand for women's rights was addressed in vague
terms.
The
end of April witnessed the second petition, as 450 Shi'i men and
women signed an ambitious entreaty for reform. As with their
predecessors, the Shi'a emphasized Islamic and national unity as
well as explicit support for the royal family. The document, titled
"Partners in One Nation," expressed solidarity with the January
group in calling for structural change as well as "justice,
security, equality and stability." More importantly, though, they
petitioned for relief from the forces that continue to operate
against them in the country. Urging an end to discrimination and the
"fanatical sectarian tendencies stimulating hatred," the document
called for equal representation of Shi'is in government positions
such as the Majlis al-Shura (of the 120, there are two Shi'i members
at present), the cabinet, diplomatic posts and in military and
security fields. The petition implored the regime to stop "unlawful"
arrests, interrogation, the deprivation of travel, detention at
borders and "the personal frisking associated with insult." They
also demanded educational reform, a national program promoting
tolerance, human rights, intellectual and religious freedom, laws
allowing for the prosecution of hate crimes as well as a public
announcement "by leaders of this country to respect Shi'a rights in
the Kingdom and equality with other citizens."[8] Finally, the petitioners requested greater
freedom for worship and religious institutions, the right to publish
religious books and the creation of an official government
organization to oversee their religious affairs, as well as the
institutionalization of religious courts with "suitable legal
executive power."
Whether Abdallah had Saudi Arabia in mind or not when he
called for regional reform, he has been accommodating to Saudi
Arabian activists, meeting each group for extended discussion. The
crown prince's willingness to welcome them may have had less to do
with the actual content of their reform agenda than it does with
their tone and timing. While efforts in the past have challenged the
royal family, the 2003 generation has aligned itself with the
regime. Hajib al-Khunayzi, who signed the January letter and
attended the first meeting with Abdallah, remarked in February that
"whether we like it or not, change will come -- from above or below.
It's better that it happen from above."[9] Emphasizing Islamic and national unity, they
have appeal as progressive-moderate Islamic reformers who would
prefer the current regime to a more reactionary alternative. A
decade ago, reformers demanded accountability from the Al Saud. In
2003, the talk is of the "social contract" and mutual interests.[10]
Intense Unease
What
appears to be the melding of mutual interests is more likely a
shared understanding of the precarious positions of both the
reformers and Abdallah at the moment. The September 11 attacks and
the revelation that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian has
generated intense international scrutiny of the regime, particularly
from the United States. The subsequent war on terrorism has had two
visible effects on politics in Saudi Arabia. First, a deep fear that
external forces threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the
country has taken root, particularly as the US expands its military
efforts globally. Compounding the fear, a cottage industry in the
American media and certain "intellectual" circles has dedicated
itself to Saudi-bashing. While criticism of the royals is clearly
justified, the vituperative tone of much of the maligning has worked
to engender paranoia among ordinary Saudis that the Americans are
coming. The Iraq war exacerbated the intense unease. Turki al-Hamad
captured much of the pre-war sentiment: "Iraq is just a starting
point. Saudi Arabia could be the next target, since America
considers it the cradle of terrorism."[11]
The
war amplified the anxiety, and even fostered unjustified distrust
between Saudi Arabian reformers. In the drive to war, an article in
the Wall Street Journal -- subsequently translated in Arabic
and widely distributed -- suggested that the Shi'a in al-Hasa would
be amenable to separating from the kingdom.[12] After the article circulated, rumors swirled
that "liberating" the eastern province had in fact become official
US policy and that residents in the predominantly Shi'i areas sought
to re-establish Greater Bahrain, the ancient name for the eastern
part of the peninsula, what is now southern Iraq, Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf island nation.[13]
Shi'a community leaders scrambled to fend off suggestions
that they intend to join forces with the newly "liberated" Iraqi
Shi'a and that they are partial to other meddling external
influences. Jaafar al-Shayeb, one of the petition's co-authors,
declared that the group's "demands were made toÉclose the door to
any outside party wanting to exert pressure on the kingdom and
threaten its unity."[14] In fact, it is clear that the Shi'a document
in particular is neither a knee-jerk reaction to the Iraq war nor an
attempt to generate pressure by soliciting outside support. To the
contrary, the petition states that "at this stage, our Arab and
Islamic nation faces the most dangerous challenges. There is a
massive global hostile campaign intending to give a false image
about Islam and Muslims. Additionally, the Zionist crimes were
unleashed in the Palestinian occupied territories, at the time when
the American and British forces started their intensive attack
against Iraq, with no consideration for the Security Council, the
United Nations and worldwide opinion, and they are raising threats
to other Arab and Islamic countries."[15] Additional materials suggest that such
sentiments are more than mere political grandstanding. Summaries of
weekly meetings held for the last three years in Qatif, the largest
Shi'i city in the eastern province, and obtained for this article
indicate that community leaders gathered regularly to discuss local
politics, social issues and their vision of how best to become more,
not less, integrated into Saudi society.[16]
Second, the horror and magnitude of September 11 forced
Abdallah and reform-minded Saudis to come to terms with the
reactionary powers in their midst and their possible mobilization
due to the war on terrorism. Mohammed al-Mohaissen admitted in an
interview with an American journalist that "[September 11] raised a
lot of questions," including "What was behind it? Who was
responsible? The government realized it must listen to inside voices
and find a margin of freedom for these questions to be discussed."[17] He editorialized before the Iraq war that
"current US military plans have only destabilized societies and
strengthened the hand of reactionary forces in the region."
Al-Mohaissen's fear that the US effort to remake the Arab world
would engender enduring difficulty for domestic activists is
powerful. He claimed that Washington's "attempts to appropriate the
goals and language of our grassroots efforts has set us back
considerably by risking the perception that ours is a movement being
imposed from the outside."[18] His worries about such forces proved
prescient when on May 12, terrorists carried out a deadly assault on
American and Saudi interests in Riyadh.
For
the Shi'a, similar forces operating in the kingdom may have played a
direct role in the timing of their missive. Al-Ahram Weekly,
published in Cairo, reported that their petition "came just after
authorities announced an investigation into a number of Shiite
mosques in the Eastern Province set ablaze in apparent arson
attacks."[19] While it is difficult to verify the
al-Ahram account, it has been widely reported that several
places of worship in the east were attacked days after the
Qatif-based group submitted their petition to Abdallah. Other
instances of sectarian strife have been reported, including physical
violence between Shi'i and Sunni youth as well as the desecration of
a Shi'i cemetery in Annak -- a village south of Qatif near the
Persian Gulf.
The
real power of these reactionary forces is largely unknown. As the
social and economic data mentioned earlier makes clear, there are
material forces leading to despair -- fodder for radical Islamists.
Conversely, the social base supporting reform is also unknown. The
middle class is vanishing, creating a large group of poorer Saudi
Arabians who continue to harbor hopeful expectations with few real
prospects. An alternative clergy, much more radical in its message
and feared by moderates, capitalizes on the resulting anxiety.[20] Several Saudi Arabians told the author that
the extremists outnumber the more progressive-minded by a wide
margin. The certainty with which individual citizens will attest to
this "fact," even without being able to cite precise data, makes it
a powerful truth whatever the reality. Even after the May bombings,
which did not discriminate among religious or national groups, we
know very little. The government has taken to speaking about
terrorism more openly and claims to be fighting against the
"evildoers."[21] However, there is little consistency in
their position.[22] The government splashes its claimed
victories -- which all happen to occur when presumed militants crash
through police roadblocks -- across national newspapers, but its war
on terrorism raises more questions than it answers about the extent
of the radical Islamist threat.
Islamic Unity and the Boundaries of
Reform
Fundamental to the new reform initiative is the principle of
Islamic unity. Theoretically, it is hoped that space will be opened
for Saudi Arabia's diverse population to participate. In the early
summer, the crown prince hosted a gathering of religious leaders
from around the kingdom in Riyadh to promote pluralism.
Al-Majalla, a weekly based in Jidda, called the National
Forum for Dialogue "the first of its kind in Saudi history." The
group included "salafi Hanbalis, Twelver Shi'a (from Qatif,
al-Hasa and Medina), Isma'ili Shi'a (from Najran) as well as
representatives from the Maliki and Shafi'i Sunni schools. To a
limited extent, Sufis were represented."[23] Dialogue focused on a familiar set of
progressive themes, especially defining national unity and the
centrality of Islamic law and the clerics to the process. Other
topics included expanding efforts to oppose forces threatening the
"dissolution" of the nation, promoting diversity of thought, the
rights and responsibilities of women in society, freedom of
expression and contemporary religious rulings (fatawa) --
their connection to social reality and their effects on national
unity and internal cohesion. The coming together of historically
oppressed religious leaders was hailed by various participants. Abd
al-Aziz al-Khadr, an Islamic journalist and writer, remarked that
the meeting represented "a huge step" in moving past long-standing
divisions. Qays bin Muhammad al-Sheikh Mubarak, professor of
jurisprudence at King Faisal University in al-Hasa, commented that
it symbolized a "cornerstone" in building a national identity.[24]
But
promoting a shared vision for Islamic unity, while also including
room for a plurality of ideas, is a daunting task. Historically, the
official religious authorities in Saudi Arabia have been given
tremendous power in shaping the kingdom's theological orientation
and infrastructure. As is well-known, the "official" religion of the
kingdom is a puritanical variant of Islam deriving its theology from
the fifteenth-century thinker Ibn Taymiyya and the
eighteenth-century preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
Historically, Wahhabis have not welcomed the principle of plurality.
As late as 1991, high-ranking official religious leaders railed
against the Shi'a, for example. That year, Sheikh Abdallah bin
Jibrin, a noted religious scholar, called for their extermination.
Although it has not been reported in the press, in the weeks after
the Shi'a reform group met with Crown Prince Abdallah, a Sunni
cleric in the east reiterated this call, leading predictably to
heightened tension.
The
crisis over Islamic principles transcends sectarian conflict. The
question of who has ultimate authority to define, or even discuss
religion and religious institutions, has played out in the press,
demonstrating the impotence of dialogue alone. On May 27, the
Minister of Information unceremoniously fired Jamal Khashoggi from
his post as editor of the "liberal" Saudi newspaper al-Watan
for being critical of powerful religious interests. Khashoggi
had previously written on other progressive reform efforts, but
stood out for his critical handling of the Saudi religious police
(mutawwa'in), officially known as the Commission for the
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. In the May 22 edition of
al-Watan, he published a controversial piece critical of Ibn
Taymiyya, blasting those responsible for the May 12 bombings and for
their corrupted justifications of jihad. In the editorial, which
cost him his job, the former editor wrote in strikingly similar
terms to those discussed just a few weeks later at the National
Forum for Dialogue. Regarding the importance of protecting the
nation, he wrote "the homeland, which we fear may become a second
Algeria, is a million times more precious and important to us than
Ibn Taymiyya."[25]
Later in the summer, a similar incident occurred. On July 1,
Saudi Arabian columnist Hussein Shobokshi penned an article in which
he fantasized about the liberalization of the kingdom, challenging
the stance of conservatives on women, human rights and sectarian
differences. The public response to the article was mixed. While
some found it courageous, Shoboshki also received death threats. One
e-mail warned him to "know your limits or you will be punished by
God and by his followers on earth." Shobokshi said that the Crown
Prince wrote him remarking that "he liked the article, but that I
shouldn't make so many people angry."[26] Abdallah's comment hardly reflects a firm
stance on the issue of reform, indicating that he too is unable or
unwilling to confront the reactionary forces operating in the
kingdom. The vulnerability of those challenging the status quo was
reconfirmed weeks later when Shobokshi was quietly fired over the
affair. Episodes such as these raise serious concerns about
intra-royal politics and the familiar gambit of playing rival social
and political groups against one another to forestall challenges to
power.
Security Is Freedom
Whatever his true intentions, Crown Prince Abdallah does not
yet have the authority to implement the reform agenda. There are
other sources of support for the project in the royal family, but
they are limited. In an article in the London-based, Saudi-funded
newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi
ambassador to Great Britain, stated that "reforming the kingdom is
not a choice, it is a necessity." He embellished a bit when he
claimed that "the Saudi leadership has always been at the vanguard
in implementing reforms," and suggested that "we have become more
open and keen on reform after the attacks of September 11 while the
US has become more closed."[27] Even so, his position is on the public
record. While some of the Al Saud do appear to be encouraging
progressive change in public, there are also clear warning signs
that meaningful reform will be sacrificed on the altar of the
family's internal power struggle.
One
of Abdallah's chief rivals for power, Prince Nayif, who serves as
Minister of the Interior, head of the intelligence services and
chief of police as well as overseer of the mutawwa'in, is
most active in stalling serious reform efforts. When asked about the
January reform letter, Nayif remarked impatiently, "I have said it
clearly -- no to change, yes to development." According to Nayif,
"change means changing something that already exists. Whatever
exists in the Kingdom is already well-established; however, there is
scope for development -- development that does not clash with the
principles of the nation." He crushed hopes for the formation of
political parties, one of the main demands of the reformers. "This
[system of political parties] does not exist now. But, as everyone
knows, what exists in the country is something almost like it."[28]
As
head of the various non-military police services, Nayif is
principally concerned with domestic security, a position that grants
him tremendous power. Remarking specifically on the reformers and
the issue of their requests, Nayif argued that since threats to the
country's safety, security and stability have yet to be overcome,
"the current circumstances are not conducive to raising or speaking
about such matters." When probed about the future prospects for
change, he commented that "reforms are going on whether people ask
for them or not. But now we should focus on the current critical
situation around us." Speaking about the threat of terrorism, he
concluded, "every country today is concerned about coming out of
this critical situation with minimum losses. They don't think about
anything else but this painful situation."[29] The Riyadh bombings, several months later,
substantiate Nayif's comments that there are forces threatening the
security and stability of the kingdom.
It
would be a stretch, however, to conclude that Nayif was seriously
concerned with the extremists in the Saudis' midst. Rather, Nayif
has consistently manipulated his "worries" about security to
maintain a huge intelligence service and project his control as
widely as possible. Before the May attacks, Nayif regularly remarked
that security was tantamount to freedom, although he never
identified specific threats. In fact, it is clear from comments in
the fall of 2002 that Nayif refused to admit that a specific
domestic threat existed. In an interview given to al-Sharq
al-Awsat in late November 2002, Nayif outlined his views about
the national situation. When asked about al-Qaeda sleeper cells, he
proffered that while there were indeed those in Saudi Arabia who
harbored "violent thoughts," they posed no serious threat because
they benignly sought to present "advice to officialsÉand some
demands." Furthermore, "of course you find discussion by these
groups on Internet magazines," but they are characterized by
"exaggerations and absolute nonsense." He implied that the
seriousness of the threat is non-existent "as "the positions of
these groups are not consistent with reality" and "those who give
voice to [their positions] are not concerned with accountability
because they do not leave their backsides."[30] Nayif appeared unconcerned that his comments
contradicted his standard refrain that Saudi Arabian security is
constantly under threat. Meanwhile, reforms that might ameliorate
the crises affording the reactionaries their social base are halted,
and more than 30 people died in violent attacks that the Saudi
security forces were either too ill-prepared or unwilling to
handle.
Considering his public proclamations on security, it would
seem that the May 12 bombings would undermine Nayif's credibility
and potentially erode his power. After all, Saudi security forces
failed to arrest a single suspect in the week before the attacks,
when the police discovered their hideout and a huge cache of weapons
in the same part of Riyadh in which the blasts occurred. All the
suspects on that occasion fled into the night, while the police
refused to pursue. Instead, the inverse is true. Saudi Arabians on
the street now speak of the urgent need for security and that change
should not come at the expense of stability. In spite of his
penchant for assuming contradictory positions simultaneously, Nayif
has shaped the current national discourse on which is more urgent --
reform or security. Even Abdallah has fallen into line. In early
August the Crown Prince announced on Saudi television the
establishment of the Center for National Dialogue in Riyadh, one of
the steps called by participants in the National Forum for Dialogue.
According to the Arab News, the center's opening represented
"a further step toward fostering a national dialogue between people
who hold different views."[31] Yet Abdallah's vague remarks diminished the
significance of pluralism, let alone reform, focusing instead on the
need for national unity in the face of the threat to security. "The
responsible expression of opinion," he commented, "will have an
impact on the fight against extremism and provide an atmosphere
where considered views and new ideas that reject terrorism and
extremist thought can emerge." That the militants can best be
combated through structural and political change -- the message of
the reformers -- is being ignored.
It
is difficult to say what will happen if the powers that be continue
to drag their heels on the reform agenda. For now, the reformers are
not speaking publicly about the consequences of inaction. Jaafar
al-Shayeb is no doubt close to the mark, however, when he says "I
think that the time is right forÉseriously treating the [reform]
issue with absolute devotion to unifying the nation and its
security, rather than leaving it [so that] it becomes critical and
danger arises and transforms into a social dilemma we cannot
control."[32]
