Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection
E-mail: basel@ksu.edu
JEL Classifications : O53, C25
Keywords: intifada, suicide attacks, Palestinian economic
conditions, economics of political crimes
Abstract:
This paper argues against the
findings of Krueger and Maleckova (2002) and that of Berrebi (2003). I provide evidence that Palestinian economic
conditions are related to the level of attacks against Israelis from 1990-2002.
The results of the negative binomial regression suggest that the number of
shooting attacks against Israelis will rise with the number of Palestinians
killed. However, I don’t find suicide attacks to be correlated with the number
of Palestinians killed. The empirical results indicate that the economic
determinants of political violence in the WBGS are significant and their
statistical sign conform to the predictions of deprivation theory. Precisely, an
increase in the Palestinian income per capita will reduce Palestinian attacks
against Israelis. Likewise, the model predicts that a reduction in the
unemployment rate would reduce the incentive for young Palestinians to
participate in political violence.
“The policy of curfews and closures
is harming
Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, IDF Chief of Staff
In their papers Krueger & Maleckova (2002, henceforth KM) and
Berrebi (2003, henceforth B) claim that there is no
connection between Palestinian education and economic deprivation for the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), on the one hand, and suicide and other violent
attacks, on the other. But it would be wrong to infer from these findings that
economic factors are insignificant or that other forms of personal hardship are
inconsequential. In fact, data from the Palestinian case indicate that relative
deprivation (a downward trend in economic well-being, regardless of the initial
starting point) and emotional grievance (from physical injury or personal loss
regarding family and friends) are strongly associated with increasing use and
public support for the most desperate and devastating form of contemporary
political violence, the suicide attack.
A major methodological problem with KM and B lies in their neglect of the
nature of the political struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and
the authors’ failure to account for the sociopolitical pressures resulting from
it. Instead KM and B preferred to focus solely on economic variables. In this
writer’s view, studies of the determinants of violence, including suicide
attack, must include both political and economic aspects as will become evident
in the empirical section of this paper. Nevertheless, Krueger and colleagues
have made an important contribution to our understanding of contemporary forms
of terrorism that stem from the Middle East by demonstrating that standard
economic models of (blue-collar) crime do not reliably account for the patterns
of violence in the Middle East.
Therefore, the main thesis of this paper is to argue against the findings
of KM and B by providing empirical evidence indicating a strong correlation
between economic conditions in the WBGS and the number of Palestinian attacks
during the period from 1990-2002 in which Israel initiated its policy of
political and economic separation from the WBGS. Also, I will explain why
economic factors in the WBGS have become, since 1990, a motivating factor in the
attacks against Israelis. The findings of this paper will suggest that an
enhancement in economic conditions in the
The fact that most of the Palestinian militants and suicide bombers did
have a source of income from civilian employment shows that Palestinians don’t
seek to join the resistance movement mainly for the purposes of earning income
or other monetary benefits. It is the implied assumption in KM and B that the
utility function of Palestinian militants depends only on quantifiable economic
variables and nothing else that is problematic.
The problem in their studies can be traced to using the economic theory
of crime to predict the determinants of political violence, an
oversimplification that is tantamount to committing a fallacy of composition. In
general, economic theory of crime predicts that “a rise in the income available
in legal activities or an increase in law-abidingness due, say, to ‘education’
would reduce the incentive to enter illegal activities” (Becker, 1968, p.
177). But participation in
collective political violence is not necessarily identical to participation in
criminal activities. Unlike criminals and outlaws, individuals joining
insurrectionist political groups don’t consider their activities illegal. Hence,
the determinants of political unrest should not be restricted only to education
and poverty—the focus of the economics of crime; rather, a set of other
variables that measure political tensions, variables ignored by KM and B, should
be included: for example, the desire for retaliation and revenge or the
individual's commitment to nationalist aspirations of freedom and independence.
Incorporating only economic factors as the sole determinants of political
violence in the WBGS is erroneous.
Unlike KM and
B, economists always found evidence that violent political conflicts have
economic roots. For instance, Parvin (1973)
demonstrates the importance of economic variables as “[the] main explanatory
variables of political violence”. His results indicate that income inequality,
gross national product, and the growth rate of the economy can explain a
significant percentage of the variations in the level of political unrest in 26
countries. Stein (1990) compared the Palestinian uprising of 1988 with the Arab
revolt of 1936. He observed that the period prior to either of the violent
episodes was characterized by growing and intolerable political frustration in
the Palestinian street. Moreover, fueling this frustration was “economic
hardship borne of unemployment and underemployment, the drying up of traditional
sources of capital import, and dramatic price drops, particularly in
Agriculture”.
Nafziger and
Auvinen (2000) provide evidence from cross-country
studies of the significance of economic factors in predicting the emergence of
conflicts. The authors show that their measures of conflicts are inversely
associated with real GDP growth, GNP per capita, food output growth, and IMF
funding. They indicate that “stagnation and decline in incomes exacerbate the
feelings of relative deprivation” that can be responsible for social unrest and
anger. Similarly, other studies confirm the critical role economic conditions
play in generating collective political unrest (e.g., Khawaja, 1995; Ben Meir, 2001;
Berger and Spoerer , 2001 ;
The paper will proceed in the following manner; in the second section I
will explain the critical role economic conditions play in WBGS as a source
motivating attacks. In the third section, I will discuss the method of
collecting data on Palestinian attacks. In Section four, I will present evidence
that Palestinian militant groups specialize in their method of attack. In
section five, I will introduce the empirical results of the count data
regression that show a significant correlation between Palestinian attacks, on
the one hand, and real GNP per capita and the unemployment rate, on the other.
Section six is the conclusion.
II. Israel’s Policy
of Separation and Economic Conditions in the WBGS
The Oslo Peace Accord (OPA) brought with it the promise for a better
future for the whole
For the two economies on either side of the Green line the period from
1990-2000 was a period of wide disparity in the achieved rates of economic
growth and prosperity. While Israelis, in general, enjoyed unprecedented
favorable economic conditions, the Palestinians living in the WBGS experienced a
level of economic hardship unforeseen since before the first intifada of 1987.
Simply, the period after OPA is characterized by a rapidly rising inequality
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For when the Israeli economy was
enjoying an economic boom- a result of the flourishing high-tech industry and
improved investment climate after the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan
and the Palestinians.
The policy of closure was first instituted in January 1991 as a temporary
measure during the Gulf War. In March 1993, that policy became permanent. The
Israeli government has been enforcing three types of closures depending on the
security situation: general, total, and internal. The general closure restricts
the movement of Palestinian labor and goods between the West bank and
The sector that was most affected by the closure policy was the
Palestinian labor sector. Historically the Palestinians depended on
With no alternative means
for employment in the WBGS, the economic situation deteriorated sharply in the
Palestinian territories. To cope with the sharp reduction of disposable income,
Palestinian households surveyed stated that they have reduced their expenditure
on basic needs (food and clothing, education, etc.), and delayed the payment of
bills (PCBS). Moreover, the chronic unemployment situation has increased the
“discouraged workers” phenomenon in the Palestinian economy. Faced with
protracted closures, mobility restrictions, and macroeconomic depression, an
increasing number of Palestinians appears to have given up finding employment
altogether.
Also the closures policy created a unique pattern in the unemployment
statistics in the WBGS which was prevalent all through the 90s and is worth
examining. The unemployment rate varies considerably within a given year due to
border closure policy and not as a result of cyclical or seasonal fluctuations
in business conditions. For example, in 1996 the official unemployment rate as
reported by the PBCS was 23.9 percent. On the other hand, the United Nations
Special Coordination Office (UNSCO) reported that unemployment ranged from about
20% of the labor force to as high as 50% by the end of the year (Table 1). This
amounts to approximately 30% spread in one year, and leads to instability of
disposable income, savings, and consumption for many families living in the
WBGS. Such large variations in labor market conditions could depress the motive
to join labor market and/or increase the burden on younger members of the
families to join the labor force at an early age, thereby creating a child labor
problem in the WBGS. The following table presents the high/low levels of
unemployment rates as reported by major sources.
Table 1: High-Low unemployment rate
during selected years
|
|
1995 |
1996 |
2000 |
2001 |
|
Lowest |
11% WB & 17% GS |
20% |
9% |
26.9% |
|
Highest |
30% WB & 33% GS |
50% |
28% |
35.5% |
Source:
World Bank, International Labor organization, Palestinian Ministry of Labor
(MOL),PCBS, IMF, UNSCO.
Clearly, the
pattern of fluctuations in the unemployment conditions in the WBGS, and the
resulting instability in incomes and consumptions, increased the stress borne by
the Palestinians and intensified the incentive to join Palestinian resistance
groups or the support for them. Most importantly, Palestinians consider
The evidence
above shows that the unemployment rate in the WBGS is a political problem rather
than an economic one.
III.
Dataset
For this study, I constructed a dataset on the number of daily, monthly,
and annual attacks against Israelis from 1990-2002 coded by the type of attack
(shooting, bombing, suicide) and the Palestinian organization claiming
responsibility for the attack (Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, DFLP, and al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades or al Fateh). I used two sources for collecting the data. From
1990-1999, the data source is the electronic archives of the International
Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) (www.ict.org.il). The archives list news reports of attacks
by Palestinians against Israeli targets dating back to1970. All of the reported
attacks appear as summaries of news reports that were reported in Israeli
newspapers and media or international news organizations such as the
Associated Press and Reuters among others. For the attack data
during the years 2000-2002, I culled the relevant data to my work by searching
the electronic news archives of the Jerusalem Post Internet edition
(http://www.jpost.com).
I identified four major patterns of attacks: (1) shooting attacks are all
incidents that involved firing a gun or tossing a hand grenade on an Israeli
target, (2) suicide attacks which involve a Palestinian detonating an explosive
device strapped around his(her) body or detonating a bag filled with explosives
in a closed location (bus, restaurant, mall, or hotel) or among pedestrians, (3)
Bombing attacks which include any attack where explosives were planted on a car
or a boat then crashed into an Israeli target. Other methods of attacks were
also identified (e.g., lynching, knife attack, pipe bomb, mortar fire, attacks
by a vehicle and kidnapping).
In general five Palestinian resistance groups are involved in the attacks: al-Fateh, Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and DFLP. The category of “other groups “ designates attacks that went unclaimed by any political group, or claimed by two groups at the same time, or at very rare occasions, included attacks by Hezbollah members and the Forces of Omar Al-Mukhtar, a group associated with the Palestine Liberation Front (PFL). Figure 1 presents the total number of Palestinian attacks from 1993-2002.
Figure 1
The unemployment figures were obtained from The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PBCS) and UNSCO quarterly reports. Finally, the annual and quarterly number of Palestinians killed was obtained from B’TSELEM [1] and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) websites (all data can be obtained from the author by request).
IV. Do Militant
Groups Specialize in a Specific Method of Attack?
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the data on
Palestinian attacks. We can use the two tabulated data to investigate whether
Palestinian militant groups specialize in one method of attack and not the
other. For example, do
the religious militant groups use suicide attacks more frequently than secular
groups?
Table 2: Total attacks by group and method From
1990-2002
|
|
Shooting Suicide
Bombing Other
|
Totals |
|
PIJ DFLP PFLP Other |
18(80%) 21(14%) 4(3%) 5(3%) 47(38%) 46(37%)
14(11%) 18(14%) 12(23%) 25(48%) 11(21%) 4(8%) 3
0
0
0 10(62.5%) 1(6%) 3(19%) 2(12.5%) 50(41%) 8(6.5%) 13(10.5) 52(42%) |
148 125 52 3 16 123 |
|
Totals |
240
101
45
81 |
467 |
Without any loss of generality the analysis will proceed by focusing on the three militarily active organizations (Hammas, PIJ, Fateh). Table 3 is a 3-by-3 contingency table with data only pertaining to al-Fateh, Hamas and PIJ. Accordingly, is there any statistical evidence that the two classifications (militant groups versus attack method) are dependent? That is, do militant groups randomly select their method of attack or certain attacks are selected by certain groups?
Table 3: 3-by-3 Contingency Table with Observed and Estimated
Expected
Counts (in Parentheses)
|
Organization |
Shooting Suicide Bomber Bombing
|
Totals |
|
PIJ |
118(84.93) 21(44.14)
4(13.91)
47(63.55) 46(33.03)
14(10.41)
12(28.51)
25(14.81)
11(4.67) |
P1 P2 P3 |
|
Totals |
Ph
Ps
Pb
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
We can use the
X2= 
to compare the observed and expected counts in each cell in
the contingency table (McClave & Benson 1988).
Under the null hypothesis of independence, the sampling distribution of the
X2 is approximately a 
probability
distribution with (r-1)(c-1) degrees of freedom, where
r is the number of rows and c is the number of columns in the table. Substituting the data of Table 3 into the expression for the
X2 test yields X2= 67.86 with four degrees of
freedom. This large value of X2 implies that the observed and
expected counts do not closely agree and therefore the hypothesis of
independence is false, and we can conclude that the type of any attack carried
out does depend on the organization behind it. What this implies is that
militant organizations specialize in a certain method of attack.
We can also use a Two-by-Two table to get inference about whether we can
connect religious militant groups to suicide attacks and secular groups to
attacks by means other than suicide (Table 4). Using the same test statistics
yields X2 = 63.13 (p<0.0001) which is significant, indicating a
correlation between the religious organizations and suicide attacks. The data
suggests that suicide attacks seem to be a preferred attack tactic by PIJ and
Hamas compared to al-Fateh group. Particularly, the PIJ ranks first among all
militant organizations in terms of the frequency of using suicide bombers
relative to other groups. About half of the PIJ attacks against Israeli
civilians and military targets are suicide attacks. On the other hand, one out
of every seven attacks by Fateh group was a suicide attack and one out of
every three attacks by Hamas
was a suicide attack.
Table 4: Two-by-Two Contingency Table
|
|
Suicide
attack |
other
attack |
|
Religious organizations (PIJ &
Hammas) |
96
(61.5) |
59
(93.4) |
|
Secular organizations (Fateh,PFLP,DFLP)
|
29
(63.4) |
131
(96.5) |
|
Total |
125 |
190 |
The statistical evidence suggests that Palestinian religious
organizations are keener to use suicide attacks than secular groups. What is not clear, however, is whether
religious groups tend to use suicide attacks because they are religious, or
because there are other elements that determine what method of attack the
militants will choose. So why the
PIJ and Hamas seem to prefer attacking Israeli targets using suicide bombers?
And why al Fateh group seemingly
has a preference towards carrying out shooting attacks?
Some researchers are
attributing this organizational behavior to religious doctrine that encourages
martyrdom. However, such an argument does not explain the behavior and pattern
of attack in its entirety. For instance, al- Fateh (a secular group) carried out
more suicide attacks in 2002 than Hamas and PIJ combined (20 versus 18) from
January to September 2002. To fill in this gap, I propose three hypotheses
explaining the recent ascendancy of suicide attacks by all Palestinians
groups.
The first hypothesis is
the economic rational for using suicide attacks. Like any businesses entity, the
militant groups will use the most efficient attack method. Efficiency in an
attack, in this context, is defined as causing the largest number of casualties
with the least resources. Certainly then, suicide bombings are very efficient
attack tactic relative to other methods of attacks. The cost of preparing a
suicide mission is relatively inexpensive, even at times cheaper than procuring
a weapon from arms dealers in Gaza, yet more lethal. For example, Atran (2003)
reports that the total cost of carrying out suicide attacks is about $150, and
the most expensive item is the transportation of the suicide bomber. The
components of a suicide bombing mission, the person and the material, are
readily available. The cost of human labor to the militant organization is zero
since all suicide bombers are volunteers. Suicide attacks can reflect the mode
of desperation, bitterness, and hopelessness that is spread among young
Palestinians. The premise that militant groups use suicide attacks because these
are cost effective means that the elimination of suicide attacks requires both
restricting the access to physical material, a costly and perhaps impossible to
implement, and to subdue the incentive for individuals to agree to a suicide
mission. Economic opportunities, humiliation, and the motive for retaliation and
revenge which are a strong component of the Arab political culture are all
important factors. Therefore, not only the PNA should be responsible for
stopping suicide bombers, also
A second hypothesis for the rise in suicide attacks is the level of
competition amongst different Palestinian groups. If studied within the context
of an oligopolistic strategic behavior, then suicide
attacks are perhaps the best response function for the various Palestinian
militant organizations. Since Hamas and PIJ were gaining support in the street,
al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade increased the number of suicide bombings as a strategic
behavior to guarantee its survival. Militant groups are simply adopting their
strategies to the competitive pressure to maintain or win more support in the
Palestinian streets. Palestinian public opinion polls by Jerusalem Media &
Communication Center of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 – April 2003)
concerning suicide attacks, (favorable or strongly
favorable) showed that support for suicide attacks has been in steady rise (S.
Atran, personal communication, October 2003). For instance, in May 1997, about
24 percent of the Palestinian public supported suicide attacks. This figure
reached 66 percent at the beginning of the intifada and remains high to this
day. Since a wide majority of Palestinians support suicide attacks it is hence
conceivable that the leaders of the militant groups are aware of the popularity
of suicide attacks, hence, they increase such attacks to enhance their
popularity. In this respect, suicide attacks serve as a recruitment strategy and
a way to boost the morals of its cadres and give them more political influence
in the Palestinian streets.
Another plausible scenario is the potential link between the size of the
militant organization and the tactic adopted. PIJ, the smallest militant
organization in terms of its followers has the most extensive use of suicide
bombings. On the other hand, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades ranks third after
Hamas in sending out suicide bombers. As the size of the organization decreases,
so does the resources available to it. A small militant organization will want
to economize on its resources thus ending up adopting the lethal yet relatively
inexpensive attacks—suicide mission. Al-Fateh movement
is thus responsible for about 50% all shooting attack while Hams and PIJ claimed
responsibility for 70% of the suicide attacks.
Although Palestinian
religious insurrectionist groups are using suicide attacks, it is not a proof
that religion is the sole driving force for such a behavior. It is possible that
religious groups are responding to a set of challenges and constraints (economic
and social) that can be steering them into this direction. More research in
needed in this subject.
V. A Poisson
Model for the Attack Data
In this
section I examine the significance of the Palestinian unemployment rate and real
GDP per capita in determining the number of attacks after controlling for the
number of Palestinians killed. The number of Palestinians killed is a measure of
conflict intensity which KM (2002) and B (2003) did not account for in their
econometric analysis. Palestinian militant organizations almost always cite
retaliation against Israeli attacks when issuing a statement claiming their
attacks. Therefore the validity of studies by KM and B which did not control for
noneconomic motivations for attack is
questionable.
Let Y be a random variable indicating the number that a particular method of attack (suicide, shooting, all attacks) occurred during a given year from 1990 to 2002. Following Cameron and Trivide (1998), I estimate a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood model to account for heterogeneity in the data. Two separate specifications are considered:
where unemp(t), income(t), and Pkill(t) are the unemployment rate, real income per capita , and the logarithm of the number of Palestinians killed at time t, respectively. The dependent variable y(t) is measured in three different ways: Suicide attacks, shooting attacks, and total number of attacks. Therefore each specification was estimated three times for each type of attack method. Table 5 shows the results for the maximum likelihood estimation using the two equations. Detailed results can be obtained from the author.
According to the estimated
models, the level of political violence as measured by the number of
Palestinians killed by IDF is an important determinant for the level of total
attacks in
As for the economic determinants of political violence in the WBGS, they
are highly significant and their statistical sign conform to the prediction of
deprivation theory. Precisely, an increase in the Palestinian income per capita
will reduce Palestinian attacks against Israelis. Like wise, the model predicts
that a reduction in the unemployment rate would reduce the incentive for young
Palestinians to participate in political violence.
The above results reveal an important distinction between attacks that
can be reduces by improving economic and political conditions in the Palestinian
Territories (shooting attacks) and attacks that depend strictly on
socio-political factors (suicide attacks). Therefore, an improvement in economic
conditions will reduce the level of resistance to
VI. The Role of
Grievances in Suicide Attacks: The ignored link
There are few
things we know about Palestinian suicide attackers that most scholars would
agree on. First, they are in their twenties, with the average age of 22 years.
Second, a considerable number of them had more than 12 years of education, which
indicates that they were recruited from university campuses (Saleh, 2003). With
regard to their economic status, the information remains speculative with no
conclusive evidence depending on which variable is used to measure the level of
poverty. Researchers, however, are only focusing on the economic status or
educational achievements as the prime factor contributing to suicide attacks.
But could there be other salient factors stimulating suicide attacks against
Israelis besides poverty and literacy which are ignored by researchers?
One such
relevant factor is the extent to which Israel Defense Force (IDF) military
operations in the
The Israeli
Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon recognized
the influence of grievances when he criticized Israeli government’s closure
policy saying that such a policy is increase the support for militants.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3228843.stm). Two weeks later, four former
Israeli security chiefs of the Shin Bet Security Agency, the agency responsible
for protecting Israelis from attacks, sharply criticized Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon’s military incursions and policy indicating that such a policy will
backfire and does not buy security for the Israelis
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3270491.stm). Yet, KM (2002) and B
(2003) did not acknowledge in their study any role for anger, bitterness, and
alienation that result from Israeli harsh policy of collective punishment. Highest ranking military Israeli
officials have already recognized that grievances can be a major force harnessed
by militant groups looking for Palestinians to carry out attacks. However, this is an omitted variable in
the KM and B studies.
Researchers on suicide
militancy have been neglecting the grievance factor. As a result, terrorism
experts, narrowed their focus on what seemed, on the surface, to be relevant
factors (age, marital status, educational level, and poverty). Some times they
simply attempted to extend what we already know from research on crime to
research on suicide attacks (Fallacy of Composition).
But evidence on Palestinian suicide bombers is growing. I have collected data on Palestinian
suicide attackers from the official websites of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ). By reading through the
published biographies of Palestinian militants, I compiled a database on 87
suicide attackers who carried out suicide bombings or suicide shooting attacks
inside
Table A-1 in
the appendix lists the date and information on 44 suicide attacks that were
carried out by Palestinians who had been exposed at some point in the past to
IDF military measures—grievances that are listed in the second column of the
table. 11 of the 44 suicide attackers with grievances had a relative (father,
brother, or cousin) killed by IDF in the past. Almost all of the 44 were
arrested or had one of their brothers arrested by IDF. Jessica Stern (2003)
asked the recently assassinated Hamas spokesman Abu Shanab if there are any psychological differences between
those who join the military wing and those who do not. He replied “they are more religious
than typical. Often they are angry-they may have seen someone being hurt. It’s
also a question of the general atmosphere they live in”. Hamas is aware of the power of personal
grievances that some Palestinians have and has successfully used these
grievances as a source of recruits for suicide attack.
Simply, recent research on Palestinian suicide militants has failed to
consider the full range of stressors leading to suicide attacks. Restricting
attention to only economic factors or level of education has resulted, for
example, in no understanding of why young Palestinians carry out suicide
attacks. As a result, the Israeli government decided on more inhumane treatment
of Palestinians through very heavy handed military incursions. The existing
research is responsible for providing moral support to militarily aggressive
policies against the general population in the
Academic research is always the basis of informed government policy.
Unfortunately, research on Palestinian suicide bombers is conducted in away to
justify not inform and guide Israeli and
Recently, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz
reported that the two suicide bombers that struck
VII.
Conclusions
The typology
of existing studies on suicide attacks has narrowly limited their search to only
economic and educational backgrounds of the attackers—other relevant variable
have been ignored and are lacking even though they might be dominant and
salient.
Studying the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict by focusing only on economic factors will lead to counterintuitive
conclusions. Since 1990 to the
present, economic conditions in the WBGS have been shaped largely by Israeli
closure policy. Although economic causes are not a prime cause for political
violence in the WBGS, they are still strong facilitators that feed the conflict.
When considering the number of Palestinians killed in the empirical model, I
conclude that the economic factors have become statistically significant. The
statistical results indicate a strong direct relationship between the level of
violence and the average unemployment rate in the
Including the number of
Palestinians killed as a measure of conflict intensity produced estimation
results that prove the ineffectiveness of the current Israeli government
policies in preventing attacks. The
results show that shooting attacks against Israelis will rise with the number of
Palestinians killed. This result is
consistent with the views voiced by the Israeli Chief of Staff, retired former
directors of the Shen Bet, and the soldiers in the
“Courage to Refuse” campaign.
In conclusion,
the most serious effect of the current conflict is not on the economic loses,
but in the great divide the intifada created between the two people.
Unfortunately, the lasting impact of the intifada is making violence an
acceptable way to settle disputes. Nafziger (2002) explains that “A tradition of
deadly political violence makes societies more susceptible to its return. Past
violence…is likely to lower the threshold for using violence to express dissent,
making intensive forms of political conflict normatively justifiable,”(p.3).
Regardless of the root causes of
this conflict, the current Israeli-Palestinian fighting moved the two peoples
further away from peace than ever before.
Endnote: I am grateful for
the helpful comments I received from Wayne Nafziger,
Scott Atran and Shelly Regenbaum.
Appendix Table
A-1
Family or Self
exposure to IDF actions: Forty-Four suicide attacks with
recorded explicit grievances resulting from Israel Defense Force (IDF) military
operations in the West Bank and
|
Date of
attack |
Grievances as mentioned
in their bios as posted in the official website for Hamas, PIJ, and
al-Aqsa Brigades. |
|
Hamas Suicide
Attack date |
|
|
|
His cousin killed in a gun
fight with IDF. |
|
|
Arrested in 1995 for one
year. |
|
|
Arrested twice
before. |
|
|
IDF killed his older brother in
the First Intifada. |
|
|
(i) Arrested once before. (ii) Lost three fingers
in the first intifada after the IDF shot him in the
hand. (iii) IDF shot and injured
three of his brothers and had two arrested. |
|
|
Arrested in the First
Intifada and lost part of his eye sight and developed arthritis while in
|
|
|
Arrested in the First
Intifada. |
|
|
(i) His cousin was assassinated with a car bomb by
Israeli Mosad. (ii) His older brother
arrested by IDF. (iii) He was arrested in 1997
by IDF. |
|
|
(i) IDF killed his brother in
1988. (ii) He was arrested by
IDF. |
|
|
Injured by IDF gun fire
before. |
|
|
Injured by IDF gun fire in the
First Intifada. |
|
|
Arrested for the first
time when he was still in high school and the second time when he was in
college. |
|
|
His father died when he
was young and he had to quit school at age 16 to help earn income for the
family. |
|
|
(i) IDF injured him during the First Intifada in the
eye. (ii) IDF killed one of
his brothers
in 1987. (iii) IDF shot and fully
paralyzed his other brothers. |
|
|
Left a farewell note to
his family informing them of his intention to carry out an attack in
revenge for the actions of the IDF in Jenin Camp during the
incursion. |
|
PIJ Suicide Attack
date |
|
|
|
IDF arrested him several
times. |
|
|
(i) He was arrested twice and spent 2 ˝ years in
Israeli jail. (ii) He was orphaned at
the age of 10. |
|
|
Was arrested three times in
1989 and 1994. |
|
|
He was arrested twice and
injured by IDF twice. |
|
|
The IDF has beaten to death his
brother during the First Intifada. |
|
|
(i) IDF arrested his brother in 1986
. (ii) The IDF broke his
arm after arresting him. |
|
|
IDF arrested him twice
and injured him 3 times. |
|
|
(i) Injured by IDF gun fire in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF arrested him
twice. (iii) PA arrested him three
times. |
|
|
(i) IDF killed his brother in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF arrested him three
times before. |
|
|
(i) IDF shot and killed his father after his father
attempted to stab a soldier. (ii) IDF shot his young
brother 7 times in his body. (iii) IDF shot his sister in
the head. She suffers form full paralysis. |
|
|
(i) IDF injured him 7 times in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF arrested his two
brothers one for 3 years and the other for 1 ˝
years. |
|
|
He was injured several times
during the first intifada. |
|
|
He was arrested at the
age of 15 when still in school. His farewell letter states that his attack
was in revenge for the assassination of the leader of Islamic Jihad Dr. Al
Shiqaqi. |
|
|
Few days before his
attack and IDF tank fired at a house in his refugee camp killing the
entire family except for a little child. |
|
|
IDF killed two of his uncles
(not specified when this happened). |
|
|
IDF killed his
brother. |
|
|
He was injured by IDF gun
fire before. |
|
|
(i) IDF shot him in the leg in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF arrested him for
1 ˝ years before. |
|
|
(i) His three brothers were in Israeli prison when he
carried out his attack. (ii) He was arrested in the
first intifada when he was very young. |
|
|
IDF arrested him in the first
Intifada for 1 ˝ years. |
|
|
(i) IDF killed his best friend few days before he
carried out the attack. (ii) He was arrested
before |
|
|
IDF arrested him twice,
the first time when he was only 15 years old. The second time when he was
17 years old. He spent a total of 4 years in Israeli
Jail. |
|
|
(i) IDF arrested him twice in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF shot him twice
in the First Intifada. The doctors could not remove one of the bullets
form his body. |
|
Al Aqsa Brigades
Attack data |
|
|
|
(i) IDF assassinated his cousin who was a leader of
Islamic Jihad in (ii) The father of the
suicide bomber said that his children became unemployed after the intifada
death is better than living their lives the way it
is. |
|
|
(i) Her cousin carried out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv
almost a month before her (ii) Her mother and
sister indicate that when Israelis shot and killed two pregnant women next
to her home trying to cross the check point, she decided to avenge their
killing.
|
|
|
(i) Arrested in the First
Intifada. (ii) IDF shot his brother in
the stomach. |
|
|
(i) Her father ill and can’t
work. (ii) her sister had a chronic disease. (iii) left school at the 7th grade to work to
support the family. |
|
|
His two brothers were
arrested before and one of them spent 4 years in
jail. |
Notes:
SSA=Suicide Shooting Attacks.
SBA=Suicide Bombing Attacks.
FI=First Intifada.
Endnotes
[1] B’TSELEM (2003, December). The IDF uses a variety of means to obstruct Palestinian movement: Physical obstacles that block roads. Summary reports available at
http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Siege/Statistics.asp.
Full report can be downloaded from Humanitarian Information Centre in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA)
http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/OCHA/WBN33.pdf
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