By Anwar Syed
Sectarian conflict has plagued Muslims since the early beginnings of their
history. It has derived from doctrinal differences, political rivalries, or a
mix of these two elements. Two rival groups surfaced soon after the fourth
pious caliph, Ali ibne Abu Talib,
took office. His supporters came to be known as "Shi'yan-i-Ali"
(partisans of Ali).
Some of his opponents, notably, Talha bin Abdullah, Zubair bin Awan, and Muawiya bin Abu Sufyan declined
to accept him as the rightful caliph and waged war against him. Muawiya's son and successor, Yazid,
authorized the slaughter at
During the Umayyad rule (661-750), and more particularly during that of the
Abbasids (750-1258), the Shias were persecuted and
thousands of them were killed, especially in
Simple fanaticism can also lead to sectarian violence. At the beginning of the
16th century, when the Safvids made Shiaism the state religion in
At about the same time, the Hazaras (a Shia tribe) in
We know of cases in which doctrinal differences led the parties concerned to
persecute, even kill, one another. Some theologians in early eighth century
justified the wicked actions of certain Umayyad rulers on the ground that,
being pre-destined, these actions were part of a divine plan, and that
therefore the rulers bore no responsibility for them.
Hasan al-Basri (d. 728),
leader of a Qadri group, and his disciples rejected
this interpretation, advanced the doctrine of free will, and condemned the
impious rulers. Two prominent spokesmen of this school, Mahad
al-Juhani and Ghaylan al-Dimashqi were executed in 699 and 749 respectively.
Wasil ibn Ata (ca.
700-748), a disciple of Hasan al-Basri,
founded an important theological school, known as "Mutazilism"
and distinguished by its commitment to rationalism. In addition to the doctrine
of free will, the Mutazilah maintained that God had
created the Quran for a specific period of time,
implying that, like His other creations, it was time-bound.
The traditional theologians, including Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal
(780-855), found this view to be outrageous. They believed that the Quran, being the word of God, was a part of His being,
co-eternal with Him, that it had existed since the beginning of time, and that
it had been placed on the "Preserved Tablet" ("Lauh-i-Mehfooz").
The Mutazilah became exceedingly popular with the
Abbasid caliph, Al Mamun, himself a rationalist and a
friend to science and philosophy. In 827 he issued the notorious ruling that
any judge (qazi) who did not subscribe to the Mutazilite view of the Quran
would be dismissed or imprisoned. During the rule of one of his successors,
Imam Hanbal, leader of the opposing school, was
publicly scourged and thrown into jail.
Al-Mutwakkil, who came to the throne in 847, released
Hanbal and reversed the religious policies of his
three predecessors. Now the Mutazilah came under
severe persecution. Within the next three or four decades thousands of them
were put to death and open profession of their views receded from Muslim
theological discourse.
Returning to the Sunni-Shia conflict, it is safe to
say that the Shia were
persecuted where Muslims formed the overwhelming majority of the population
and, among them, the Shias were a minority. This was
not the case in the Indian subcontinent. Here the Muslims, all of them put
together, amounted to a rather small minority.
Encountering a much larger and potentially unfriendly external force, they did
not fall upon one another quite as much as they might otherwise have done. Most
of the Muslim kings, and later the British, had an overriding interest in the
maintenance of public tranquillity, and accordingly they discouraged religious
and sectarian strife.
In sum it may be said at this point that historically sectarian conflict tended
to be intense when political power and religious doctrine were allied. In
post-independence
During British rule and during the first three decades after independence, the
Sunnis and Shias lived peacefully together for the
most part. A few persons on each side may have found some of the other's
beliefs to be offensive, a few more may have felt estranged, and they did have
a fight once in a while. But theological differences did not keep the great
majority of them from being friendly to one another.
Following Ziaul Haq's
usurpation of power in July 1977, the government's secular disposition gave way
to a professed determination to Islamize society in all of its dimensions. This
gave the ulema a sense of political efficacy that
they have not had before. It was further enlivened by the revolution in
Ziaul Haq proceeded to
enforce the "hudood" prescribed by the Shariat, imposed Islamic taxes, inserted numerous
Islam-related provisions in the Constitution, established Shariat
courts, encouraged the ulema to establish "madressahs" and funded them. The ulema
as a class and the Islamic political parties worked as his allies, their
occasional assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.
Not unexpectedly, they wondered which theological persuasion would prevail if
they were to become participants in the country's governance. Would the Sunni
have to share power, and its rewards, with the Shia? Would
it not be more prudent to intimidate them into a mode of quiet subservience?
The ulema's expectation of acquiring political power
in the foreseeable future is, in my view, one of the basic causes of the
heightened sectarian conflict that we have lately been witnessing. It has been
aided by other developments such as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran
during the course of which each side encouraged and funded its partisans in
Pakistan; the rise of militant forces like the Taliban and later Al Qaeda and the spread of their influence to certain
categories of public officials and private individuals in this country.
Is there anything wrong with the ulema gaining
political power? Yes, and it is that, even though we humans have been sent down
to live in this world, the ulema's whole approach to
worldly affairs is unprogressive, and they remain
entangled with issues that have little relevance to the improvement of our
lives here and now. The editors of this newspaper noted recently, as have other
perceptive observers, that our ulema impart to their
audiences lessons in "obscurantism," intolerance and hatred, towards
groups other than their own.
Let us go back for a moment to the controversy between the Mutazilah
and the traditionalists. Surely this was not an issue over which believers
should have been ready to kill and get killed. Taken as the word of God,
injunctions in the Quran are binding upon Muslims
regardless of whether it was revealed at the beginning of time or at some
subsequent stage. Clearly, this was a futile debate.
I should like, at this point, to cite Allama Iqbal's chiding of our ulema. The
opening poem in the last volume of his Urdu verse (Armaghan-i-Hijaz)
is entitled Iblis ki Majlis-i-Shura (the Consultative Council of Satan). Satan
appears to be worried and his counsellors wonder why. They debate whether the
rise of communism, fascism, or democracy might be the cause. Satan says, no, he
is worried because he sees the danger that Muslims may begin to understand the
real message of Islam.
This must be prevented. His agents must keep the Muslims occupied with abstract
theological issues such as: whether the son of Mary is dead or eternally alive;
whether the attributes of God are part of His being or separate from Him;
whether the one to appear before the Last Day is meant to be Jesus of Nazareth
or a revivalist who will have the qualities of Mary's son; whether the word of
God (Quran) goes back to the beginning of time or it
is a "creative accident."
Satan thinks these theological concerns, these gods and goddesses of idol
worshippers ("Lat" and "Manat"),
should be enough for Muslims in this age. Go out then, he says, and keep them aloof from the life of action so that they meet
defeat in the battles of life; keep them trapped in poetics and mysticism so
that they remain blind to the realities of life and abandon this world for
non-Muslims to manage. (My free translation).
It may not be an exaggeration to say that many of our ulema
(though surely not all of them) are sending out the same message to Muslims
that the protagonist, in Iqbal's poem, wants them to
absorb. If that is indeed their message, they would appear to be doing his
work, even if unwittingly and inadvertently.
If sectarian conflict in
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the
Email: anwarsyed@cox.net
Dawn
24/10/2004