|
By Wendy Feliz
Sefsaf
The US
government has devised a plan to repair its image in the Arab World.
This plan includes generously-funded, government-sponsored
international broadcasting, known in the past as Voice of America or
Radio Free Europe. Today, under the guidance of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG), two new programs have been developed for
the target Arab audience: Radio Sawa and the Alhurra satellite
television network. From a public communications standpoint, US
international broadcasting will have a difficult time achieving its
goal of reaching mass audiences in the Arab and Muslim world in
order to further US public diplomacy because: (1) the research is
lacking, (2) the audience is highly resistant to the messages, and
(3) the strategies and messages lack cultural
appropriateness.
This article
summarizes a research project, primarily qualitative, conducted in
the spring of 2004. To our knowledge, it was the first of what will
surely be countless reviews and analyses of the US International
Broadcasting strategies in the Arab world. The study describes the
strategy and critically analyzes the Broadcasting Board of Governors
efforts.
America's image
abroad and most dramatically in the Arab and Muslim world is
declining. In 2002, Zogby International released the Ten Nation
Impressions of America Poll and concluded that US policy towards
Muslim nations was given low marks by those polled in Egypt, Iran,
Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. A recent poll by the
Pew Research Center for the People and The Press (2003) showed that
the US is facing a public relations crisis in the Muslim world and
that their image has been tarnished in many nations including among
NATO allies, in Eastern Europe, and in Muslim societies.
As a result, the
US government has come up with a plan to increase public diplomacy
programs in the region in order to repair its image. With these
intentions, the US has increased its government-sponsored
international broadcasting efforts, known in the past as Voice of
America or Radio Free Europe. Today, under the guidance of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), two new programs have been
developed for the target Arab audience: Radio Sawa and the Alhurra
satellite television network.
The US General
Accounting Office reports that the "approximately $1 billion
nonmilitary budget for US public diplomacy is split almost evenly
between the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, which oversees the activities of US government-sponsored
broadcasting overseas" (GAO 2003, p. 34).
International
broadcasting is not a new public diplomacy technique for the US
government, but it is one that has had many incarnations since it
began in the 1940's. The most recent model is an
audience-research-driven approach targeting mass audiences. This is
in contrast to the traditional focus during the Cold-War on elites
and decision makers.
Traditional US
public diplomacy focused on foreign elites-current and future
overseas opinion leaders, agenda-setters, and decision makers.
However, the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other
trends have forced a rethinking of this approach, and the State
Department has begun to consider techniques for communicating with
broader foreign audiences (GAO 2003, p. 4).
The Broadcasting Board of Governors
In 1994, the
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) was formed by the
International Broadcasting Act, and created a nine-member,
bi-partisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The IBB was
originally part of the US Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was
disbanded in October 1999, the IBB and BBG were established as
independent federal government entities
The current BBG
differs in many ways from the individuals who have run international
broadcasting entities in the past like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and
Voice of America (VOA). The BBG is currently comprised of
individuals from the commercial broadcasting world, including Norman
Pattiz, the founder and chairman of Westwood One, America's largest
radio network. Westwood One owns, manages, or distributes the NBC
Radio Network, CBS Radio Network, the Mutual Broadcasting System,
CNN Radio, Fox Radio Network, Metro Networks, Metro Traffic, and
Shadow Traffic. Another member is Steven J. Simmons, chairman and
CEO of Patriot Media and Communications, LLC, a new company formed
to purchase cable companies in the United States. The Secretary of
State also holds a permanent seat on the board.
The BBG's stated
vision is "to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven US
international broadcasting system" (BBG Strategic Plan, p.4). In
2002, the BBG created a new strategic plan for the agency. The plan,
entitled "Marrying the Mission to the Market," outlines their future
plans in great detail along with a discussion of current
limitations.
This new
strategic plan calls for substantive research, including defining,
segmenting, and understanding target audiences. The BBG has
contracted much of this audience research out to InterMedia, an
organization which conducts audience research in developing
countries. InterMedia's clients include many other international
broadcasting groups including the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and Deutche Welle, the national German broadcasting group.
Some of the
market challenges cited in the report include: media
competitiveness, lack of branding, poor broadcasting strategies,
poor development of target audiences, dated broadcasting formats,
and poor marketing and promotion. Therefore, they suggest that the
various ways in which they will attempt to address these challenges
include "strengthening our multi-media profile, funding and
conducting research, carrying out marketing and promotion, (and)
securing talented language-qualified journalists, broadcasters and
technicians" (BBG Strategic Plan, pg. 25).
It is clear that
the BBG is moving towards reforming the "Cold War" style of
international broadcasting and attempting to create a hip and modern
feel to their programming in an effort to reach and build a larger
and younger audience. One example of this strategy at work is the
two-year-old venture known as Radio Sawa. Radio Sawa is a 24-hour
radio channel broadcast into Arab countries with western-friendly
governments, including Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait. Based on audience
research, the BBG developed a format that includes trendy western
and Arab pop music. They include 5-10 minute news reports between
music to inform the audience of US foreign policy and world
politics. The BBG recently cited the success of the network by
announcing the results of an ACNielsen survey of Radio Sawa's
audience in several Arab countries. The survey found that "11
percent of Egyptians aged 15 and older listened to Sawa in the
previous week, as well as 40 percent of Kuwaitis." (BBG Annual
Report 2002)
In February
2004, the BBG launched a satellite television network called
Alhurra. Alhurra has been called America's answer to the popular
Qatar-based Arabic satellite channel, Al Jazeera. With barely a few
months under its belt, it is hard to say whether or not it will be
successful. Tomlinson, a member of the BBG, discussed his ideas
about the need for US-sponsored satellite television in his
testimony before Congress in February 2003. He stated that
television is quickly becoming the preferred medium for news in the
"Arab World." He believes that by launching this network the US will
"make a major contribution toward helping the people of the region
move away from extremism and violence and toward democracy and
freedom." (Senate Hearing Testimony pg. 7)
Critical Perspectives on Current International
Broadcasting Strategies
Two
contrasting perspectives on the role and future of US sponsored
international broadcasting come from Ambassador Edward Djerejian and
Dr. Andrew Elliott-experienced individuals in public diplomacy and
international broadcasting, respectively. They are also vocal
critics of the BBG's plans.
Ambassador
Edward Djerejian is the director of the James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy at Rice University and a lifetime career Foreign
Service officer. He served as US Ambassador to both Israel and
Syria. He also leads the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the
Arab and Muslim World. He prepared a report to the Committee on
Appropriations in the US House of Representatives in October 2003.
This report was titled Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New
Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim
World. In the report he describes the potential challenges of
broadcasting into an Arab world that is highly cynical and
suspicious of US motives. Because of this challenge, he also
discusses the need for research.
To exemplify his
point on the weakness of international broadcasting in achieving
public diplomatic goals, Djerejian discusses a recent General
Accounting Office survey of State Department public affairs
officers. In this survey the officers were asked their opinions on
the effectiveness of government-sponsored international broadcasting
in achieving US public diplomacy objectives in their host countries.
The survey found that the majority believe it is either ineffective
or neutral: "neither effective nor ineffective." (GAO, "US public
diplomacy," pg. 61).
Djerejian (2003)
believes the BBG should be required to demonstrate its worth and
effectiveness before gaining additional government support. He adds
that Radio Sawa needs to establish more tangible public diplomacy
objectives, in addition to its goal of building a large audience.
Furthermore, their research should prove that Radio Sawa can
change negative attitudes into positive attitudes and "move the
needle" toward what the State Department, in its mission statement
on public diplomacy and public affairs, calls "influence" (p.
30).
Another critic
of the BBG believes there should be a separation between
international broadcasting and the State Department. This vocal
advocate is Dr. Kim Andrew Elliott, a 20-year veteran audience
researcher at Voice of America. In a personal interview he discussed
the many challenges international broadcasting is faced with in the
21st century. He explained his view that the Arab world is more
difficult to influence now because of its access to satellite
television and the internet. He believes the Al Jazeera and Al
Arabiya networks are popular because they appeal to mass sentiment.
He went on to add that the US could best counteract Al Jazeera with
a stodgy, balanced news service, similar to PBS's NewsHour with Jim
Lehrer. He also believes that the US should be targeting the elites
in these countries and not mass audiences, as the new board is
hoping to do. Finally he shared his hope that the BBC or CNN would
begin broadcasting into the Arab and Muslim world, as he believes
their credibility and autonomy would allow for quicker success than
the BBG could hope to achieve (K. Elliott, personal communication,
April 14, 2004).
Dr. Elliott
penned a letter to Ambassador Djerejian in response to his report.
He discussed the BBG's strategy of targeting "elites" as opposed
to mass audiences. He believes that mass audiences will be difficult
to reach because they will not be attracted to the type of
information that will be provided, nor will they go to the trouble
of finding the broadcasts. He notes that there is a reason why
international broadcasting audiences are elite, which is that "mass
audiences are less likely to own a shortwave radio, tune to a
distant medium wave signal, visit a website, or endure the
information laden, entertainment-sparse content of traditional
international broadcasting (Djerejian letter pg. 8).
Dr. Elliot also
makes an important point with respect to Alhurra's credibility. He
asserts his belief that international broadcasters with strong ties
to governments will not gain mass appeal because of their inability
to be objective. He questions whether Alhurra will be able to
interview and cover the stories of interest to their Arab audience.
He cites a particular event from September 2001 when "the State
Department applied pressure on VOA not to broadcast excerpts of an
interview with Taliban leader Mullah Omar." He also describes a
Congressional conference committee that reported, "The conferees
expect that the VOA will not air interviews with any official from
nations that sponsor terrorism or any representative or member of
terrorist organizations, or otherwise afford such individual
opportunities to air inaccurate, propagandistic, or inflammatory
messages. (Djerejian letter pg. 12) With these limitations Alhurra
will quickly establish itself as a propaganda station. Elliott
believes Alhurra's challenge is "to transmit to a skeptical target
audience while taking its income from a possible meddlesome US
government."
Elliott believes
the BBC has greater success than the US in international
broadcasting because of two important distinctions-consolidation and
autonomy. Elliott is not the first to criticize the US international
broadcasting system as a "jerry built monstrosity." However, he
illustrates the problem by discussing the tendency of its various
components to compete among themselves. For example, Elliot points
out that Radio Sawa, Radio Free Iraq, and the remnant of the VOA
Arabic Service all maintain Arabic-language websites and that none
of these services have links to the others. The BBG has responded by
saying it will address the overlap that takes place in US
international broadcasting.
Elliott also
raises the critical issue of autonomy. He reports that while the VOA
is required by law to broadcast editorials, the BBC World Service is
prohibited by law from broadcasting editorials. He goes on to argue
that this "contrast between the two stations in not lost on
listeners" (Djerejian letter pg. 3).
Analysis
Arabs and
Americans are like ships passing in the night, sounding their
horns, firing their guns, making known their views, but having no
impact on the other. The epitome of this is the widening gap
between Arabs' perceptions of the US and many Americans' flawed
interpretations of those Arab perceptions.
Rami G. Khouri,
The Daily Star, Beirut, Lebanon
From a public
communications standpoint, US international broadcasting will have a
difficult time achieving its goal of reaching mass audiences in the
Arab and Muslim world in order to further US public diplomacy
because (1) the research is lacking, (2) the audience is highly
resistant to the messages, and (3) the strategies and messages lack
cultural appropriateness.
Research
The
BBG has written research into their planning process; however the
type of research they are conducting is unclear, the data is not
shared with other key partners, and its reliability is unknown. For
example, research that the BBG has done has not been made available
to the public or even other State Department employees. Dr. Elliot
noted that "the BBG has never held a public meeting and is very
proprietary over all of their activities" (K. Elliott, personal
interview, April 14, 2004). Additionally a GAO survey of Foreign
Service officers in 2003 showed that the BBG was not making research
available to individuals working in embassies abroad. When embassy
employees were asked, "How often does your office receive the BBG
audience research data?" 29.6 percent reported "sporadically or
rarely," 53percent reported "never," and 15.7 percent reported "no
basis to judge," indicating that 98.3 percent of US embassy staff
have insufficient access to BBG research data.
With respect to
reliability, the Djerejian report (2003) reviewed a survey of Radio
Sawa listeners and pointed out that the Radio Sawa survey consisted
of poorly constructed questions that provided little insight into
how influential Radio Sawa is. It asked, "How favorably or
unfavorably inclined are you personally toward the USA? It found
Radio Sawa listeners had more positive views than non-Sawa
listeners. This result was to be expected, however, since any
listener to a US-sponsored station is likely to be favorably
disposed to the United Sates. A better question would be whether
Radio Sawa had changed a listener's attitude toward America. Better
still would be the establishment of an attitude baseline to measure
whether attitudes have improved and to compare the impact of other
media, while controlling for demographic factors" (pg.
31).
It is not clear
what the BBG is attempting to understand with their research. Are
they trying to deconstruct the target public in order to understand
them, or trying to prove that their commercial broadcasting
strategies will result in larger audiences and increased market
share? Should they not be attempting to asses what the challenges
are in communicating with their target audience and how they can be
overcome? Why are they not conducting research that attempts to
understand what the political, historical, and psychological
environment is in the countries that they seek to reach? One would
assume that broadcasting to Europe after WWII is dramatically
different than broadcasting to the Arab world amidst the current
Iraq Crisis. Yet, without reliable research, the differences and
cultural nuances will continue to elude the US
broadcasters.
Jihad
Fakhereddine (2002), a Middle East media analyst, notes the problem
with US and Arab communication today: "Neither the US nor the Arabs
have taken any serious systematic approaches to learn why there is
this gap of misunderstanding and mutual mistrust." He adds that both
sides have been more focused on setting up media channels for
disseminating their messages, than on the actual 'content of the
exchanged messages'" (p. 2).
If the BBG wants
their public communications efforts to succeed, they can look to
Mendehlson (1973) an advocate of in-depth research, and Hyman &
Sheatsley (1947), who also discuss research to understand the
psychological factors that will affect the success of a campaign.
They find that "those responsible for information campaigns cannot
rely simply on 'increasing the flow' to spread their information
effectively" (1947 p. 421). They posit that there are psychological
barriers that must be understood and overcome in order to
communicate successfully.
Those who have
conducted failed campaigns understand the necessity for extensive
and reliable audience research. Most 21st century corporations would
easily spend one million dollars on research to safeguard the other
millions they spend on their public outreach campaigns. Why would
the BBG not invest a significant amount of money into reliable
research in order to ensure that the millions they are spending are
not being wasted?
The BBG's
research should attempt, first and foremost, to understand the media
environment in Arab and Muslim countries. For example, how are
broadcasters like Al Jazeera impacting their audience and what does
this mean for American broadcasters? This information would
significantly influence their approach. If this type of research was
being conducted they might uncover the fact that Arab publics are
very different from American publics in their attitudes towards
media because most Arab nations control their domestic media. This
control results in low credibility among its audience. Mohammed
el-Nawawy, an assistant professor of Communication at Stonehill
College stated, "I think the Arab audience are very critical; they
have always been critical of their own media because they know they
don't get the complete picture from their own government-owned
media." He also believes that Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV have done
a good job of covering all sides of issues, which has increased
their popularity and credibility significantly.
If the BBG had
done a better job of understanding the target audience's feelings
and attitudes towards existing Arab language broadcasters like Al
Jazeera before launching their own network, they might have devised
an intelligent strategy of communication and engagement. Instead,
many US government officials have discounted these networks and
taken a hostile stance towards them. Al Jazeera has become, in its
short life, a trusted source of news and information in the
Arabic-speaking region. However, instead of playing on their field,
the US has decided to build its own. The US launch of
Arabic-language satellite broadcasting may "reinforce a competitive
stand vis-à-vis the United States and the Arab and Islamic world,
rather than a cooperative, relationship-building stance" (Zaharna,
congressional testimony, 2003).
The US administration's
hostile attitude towards existing Arabic-language media may also be
a serious public relations mistake. With over 35 million viewers
worldwide, why would the US want to alienate Al Jazeera? Dr. Elliot
discusses Al Jazeera's frustration with US officials who have not
been available for their interview programs and his frustration with
what he believes is a "missed opportunity to convey desired messages
to a ready-made audience" (pg. 12). Jihad Fakhreddine also notes "it
is intriguing how the Bush administration has failed to realize the
opportunities presented by the pan-Arab satellite stations for
disseminating the official political perspective of the United
States" (The Daily Star).
Kenton Keith, former Ambassador
to Qatar also counseled that "You have to be a supporter of Al
Jazeera, even if you have to hold your nose sometimes" ("Reality
Television," The Guardian).
Audience Resistance
Even
if the BBG is successful in attracting mass audiences through the
proliferation of catchy programming, it is unlikely that this
consumption alone will get far in altering attitudes and beliefs
about America. One must understand the psychological barriers that
exist, including the audiences' need for consistency and the
high-level of suspicion attached to government-sponsored
international broadcasting. Without a clear understanding of the
barriers and a strategy to address them, the messages will be
lost.
A prime example
of this is found in a study conducted by Smith (1973) where he
analyzed more than one hundred individuals as they listened to daily
broadcasts of international broadcasting originating from the former
Soviet Union. He found that the audience will reject messages that
are contrary to their existing predispositions. Therefore, with
anti-American sentiment running high in these target countries, it
is likely that the US's best efforts will be discarded as
propaganda. Smith also states that "low credibility" coupled with
"audience resistance to perceived manipulation attempts" makes
international broadcasting, in general, a difficult sell (p.
116).
Larson's (2003)
consistency theory alludes to the difficulties one encounters in
attempting to change another's mind. If individuals seek "balance,
consistence, congruity or consonance" (1994 p. 182) in their
communications, US broadcasting that carries a mandate to
disseminate US public diplomacy messages will likely not fit with
that need. This will result in audience rejection of the messages.
If at a minimum,
the BBG hopes to attract listeners and change attitudes by
highlighting the positive things about American life like popular
culture and technological and medical advances, it will probably not
be enough to "move the needle" and change anti-American sentiment in
the region. Pew public polls reveal that "very large majorities of
the publics in most of the world admire US technology. This is the
case even among people with a low regard for the US generally" (Pew
Center, 2003). Although anecdotal evidence demonstrates that some
people in the Arab world are watching and listening-either out of
curiosity, or because the mediums provide music and films that they
cannot get elsewhere-there is no evidence of what this will
accomplish. Anecdotal evidence also shows that the target audiences
have been angered by Alhurra's poor coverage of recent important
issues related to Iraq and Palestine, thus further downgrading its
reputation.
If the US
continues to ignore the values, perceptions, and underlying
psychological factors affecting this target public, it will continue
to implement poor broadcasting strategies that may not only be
missing the mark, but creating unintended, negative
consequences.
Rami G. Khouri,
executive editor of The Daily Star in Beirut, Lebanon
explains US misperception of the "Arab" world and the dangers
associated with it in an op-ed:
The American
president's intellectual gangsterism ("they hate our freedom") is
simplistic, wrong and dangerous…. By arguing that our region is
troubled and violent because Arabs and Muslims hate American
values, and then attempting to correct this by launching
television, radio and magazine efforts in Arabic, the US
government perpetuates a fatal combination of political blindness
and cultural misperception that is only going to exacerbate the
gap between Americans and Arabs, rather than close it
(p.1).
Bush's
sentiments are also echoed by the BBG's Tomlinson who said he
believed launching Alhurra would "make a major contribution toward
helping the people of the region move away from extremism and
violence and toward democracy and freedom" (Senate hearing testimony
2003). These dogmatic, ideological statements reflect a cultural
imperialism that is poorly received in the Arab World.
Dr. Elliott
penned an Op-Ed for the New York Times explaining what international
broadcasters should be doing if they want to attract mass audiences.
He believes that foreign broadcasters attract audiences when they
provide a trustworthy alternative to their state-run domestic media.
He believes that touting America's greatness is not what will
attract large audiences, and he "is not aware of any person huddled
by their radios to hear about the achievements and values of the
United States or any other country" (p. 1).
Cultural Appropriateness
Perhaps the US's whole approach to communicating with this
new target audience has to be reexamined. As Zaharna suggests, "the
model of one-way communication and image building isn't working." It
also seems that typical American communication styles do not
resonate in this part of the world. For example the constant
positioning of the US, as an altruistic country, kindly trying to
instill democratic values and principles of freedom abroad, is
missing the mark. This positioning must have inspired the naming of
the network Alhurra (The Free One). The name Alhurra is reportedly
being perceived as condescending and hypocritical by the target
audience. These errors could have been avoided by employing simple
message testing techniques. These are a few among several faux
pas that have taken place recently in US public communications
in the Arab world.
Cultural Misfires
Even
when the US does not intend to offend, it may be doing more damage
than good. Cross-cultural training could help to avoid some of the
semantic and stylistic errors the current administration is
notorious for. Zaharna discusses some of these issues and explains
how our "cultural style" may be considered offensive to an Arab
audience. She writes, "President Bush's penchant for 'speaking
straight' may resonate positively with an American public that
values directness. But the Arab public prefers more indirect
messages, especially in public. Thus, irrespective of the message's
content, differences in delivery style can cause a message to
resonate negatively" (Zaharna pg. 4).
Khouri (2004)
explains what some unintended consequences of US international
broadcasting may be. He believes Alhurra will put American values on
display, which will highlight the contradiction between those
values-human rights, liberty, and freedom of speech-and our foreign
policy. He believes that US broadcasting is insulting to the Arabs
and doomed to failure. He states, "Alhurra, like the US government's
Radio Sawa and Hi magazine before it, will be an entertaining,
expensive, and irrelevant hoax. Where do they get this stuff from?
Why do they keep insulting us like this?" (p. 1).
There is
significant information available in the US about cultural
differences and diversity. There are research firms across the globe
and professional organizations who conduct training in cultural
appropriateness. With these resources readily available to the US
government, these mistakes become inexcusable and
dangerous.
A New Approach
If
the US is unable to design and execute culturally appropriate public
communication campaigns to this region, either because of its lack
of understanding or because of the target audience's refusal to hear
the messages, then another approach should be considered.
Ross (2002)
writes about the new challenges and approaches that must be taken in
twenty-first-century, post-September 11th public diplomacy. He
believes the US is more likely to achieve success if it "structures
activities in ways that encourage dialogue." Zaharna underscores his
point by stating "nothing in the Arab or Islamic world suggests that
this public subscribes to a one-way, transmission model of
communication. The culture and society are built around
relationships" (Zaharna pg. 6). Most parties agree that in order for
the US to successfully influence public opinion in this part of the
world, it must change the paradigm of the past and "establish a
two-way approach that builds credible dialogue" and
relationships.
Zaharna believes
there are two ways of approaching US public diplomacy in the Arab
World-"relationship-building strategies or messages and
image-building strategies." Zaharna argues that current American
public diplomacy "appears very much focused on its message and its
image." She believes that a more effective approach would entail
"relationship-building strategies [that] focus on developing
mutually beneficial and reciprocal connections between people and
nations" (Zaharna pg. 5).
Relationship
building is not a new concept for the US State Department. Some
great examples of relationship-building programs in the past have
included student, professional, and cultural exchanges. The
Fulbright Fellowship program has been a tried and true component of
our foreign outreach. They might also consider an increase in
educational, social, and grass-roots community programs on the
ground in foreign countries. Other helpful steps would include
careful restraint and cultural sensitivity towards the Arabs and
Muslims who live in the United States with ties to family abroad.
There is no shortage of ideas if there is, similarly, no shortage of
support for them.
Conclusion
America's image abroad and most specifically in the Arab and
Muslim world is at an all-time low. The US administration has said,
time and again, they must win the "hearts and minds" of the Arab
public. However, all they have created in terms of a solution to
this public relations crisis is a poorly funded and thought-out plan
of public diplomacy, which includes a healthy dose of
government-sponsored international broadcasting.
This case study
has sought to apply the dominant theories in public communication to
analyzing the Broadcasting Board of Governor's plan and launch of
international broadcasting into the Arab world with Radio Sawa and
Alhurra television. This study finds the BBG's public communication
efforts fall short in three important areas: research, effective
message development, and cultural appropriateness.
The BBG's
research is lacking, not widely shared, and unreliable. Their
messages are not only failing to influence their audience, but are
actually proving offensive to them. They also display a lack of
cultural awareness and appropriateness which is widening, rather
than bridging, the gap between Arabs and Americans.
Because there is
no lack of experts, studies, or information that could help the BBG
design an effective public communications plan in the Arab world,
questions hover. Why are they not doing a better job? As Henry Hyde
of the House International Relations Committee said, "How is it that
the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed
such a destructive and parodied image of itself to become the
intellectual coin of the realm overseas?" (Senate Hearing
Testimony).
Areas for further research
As
senator Richard Lugar has argued, "We must resist the temptation to
believe that public relations wizardry alone can fix the American
image overseas." Furthermore, public diplomacy is pointless while
the US administration continues to implement public policy that is
perceived negatively by their target audience. Djerejian argues
along similar lines that "your public diplomacy can only be as good
as your values and policies." In order to address these issues,
further research must be conducted to understand the relationship
between a country's or organization's reputation and its policies.
In a case like this, where US policies are vastly despised and
resented among the target audience is there really a role for public
diplomacy?
Other important
questions must be posed, for example: should US international
broadcasting serve as a public diplomacy tool under the US State
Department? Or, should it be allowed to form into an independent
media organization similar to the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC)? Most people would agree that autonomy is important for the
overall credibility of any media organization. Throughout the past
few years in America and Europe, there has been a great amount of
discussion and debate regarding issues of independence and
consolidation of media. This discussion has been prompted by
changing media ownership regulations in the US and Prime Minister
Berlusconi's loosening of media ownership laws in Italy. Government
or corporate controlled media will always live under a cloud of
suspicion. Therefore, how well can it serve the goals of public
diplomacy anywhere?
Some have also
suggested that social capital and civil society would be enhanced if
we spent the millions of dollars earmarked for Alhurra and Radio
Sawa to instead develop a free press in the countries themselves.
Others have suggested that broadcasting C-Span or PBS programming
would be a better strategy than distributing carefully formulated
and scripted news programming with a public diplomacy mandate. These
are all important points that warrant further research.
Another
important area for consideration and investigation is the
difficulties in reaching important regions like Palestine and Saudi
Arabia. Radio jamming of frequencies, refusal of cable distributors
to carry US programming, and blocks on websites, all prevent the US
public diplomacy efforts from reaching the residents of these
countries. Since there will always be limits on access to these
publics, is this the best communications strategy? The US has no way
of guaranteeing that publications will print their ads or position
papers, and no assurances that satellite networks will carry their
networks or make radio frequencies available to them. They can
develop communication products, but they will never be guaranteed
the media to deliver them.
This leads the
US, once again, back to the question of whether or not their current
efforts will succeed. Perhaps, as Ross and Zaharna suggest, a new
approach is needed. As Senator Lugar argues, "Successful public
diplomacy is not about manipulating people into liking us against
their interests. Rather, it is about clearly and honestly explaining
the views of the United states, underscoring the issues of
commonality, and expanding opportunities for interaction between
Americans and foreign peoples" or, put more simply, public diplomacy
is, or should be, about "relationship building" (pg.
3).
Wendy Feliz Sefsaf works at the National Public
Radio (NPR) affiliate in Washington D.C., WAMU 88.5 FM. She recently
received her master's degree in Public Communication from the School
of Communication at American University. She may be contacted at wfelizali@aol.com.
References
Broadcasting Board of Governors (2002). Marrying the
Mission to the Market Strategic Plan 2002-2006. Retrieved April
1, 2004 from http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_plan.cfm.
Davison, P.W.
(1983). "The Third Person Effect in Communication" in Public
Opinion Quarterly 47, 1-15.
Djerejian,
Edward P. (2003). Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic
Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim
World. Report of
the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for
the Arab and Muslim World.
Elliott, Dr. Kim
Andrew, personal communication, April 14, 2004.
Elliott, Kim
Andrew Dr. (2002). "Is There an Audience for Public Diplomacy?" in
The New York Times. Retrieved April 15, 2003 from
http://www.trsc.com/cw/ellicottoped.pdf.
Fakhreddine,
Jihad (2002). "The US-Arab Cross-Communication Exchange: A
Dialogue
Amongst Mutes" in Transnational Broadcasting
Journal, Spring 2002 (TBS 8).
Fakhreddine,
Jihad (2004). "The US Should Use Arab Satellites More Effectively"
in The Daily Star. Retrieved April 4, 2004 from
http://www.dailystar.com.
Fitzpatrick, D.
(1946-1947). "Telling the World About America" in Public Opinion
Quarterly 10, 582-592.
General
Accounting Office (2003). US Public Diplomacy: Report to the
Committee on
International Relations, House of
Representatives. Publication No. GAO-03-
951T, Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office.
General
Accounting Office (2003). Broadcasting Board of Governors: Report
to the
Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives. Publication No. GAO-
04-627T, Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office.
Hopkins, M.
(1999). "A Babel of Broadcasts" in Columbia Journalism
Review, July/August 1999, 1-7.
Hyman, H. and
Sheatsley, P. (1947). "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail"
in Public Opinion Quarterly 11, 412-423.
Johnsen, Gregory
D. (2004). "Arabs Glued to TV News - But Not to US-sponsored
Alhurra" in The Christian Science Monitor, April 30,
2004.
Khouri, Rami G.
(2004). "The US Public Diplomacy Hoax: Why Do They Keep Insulting
Us?" in The Daily Star. Retrieved April 20, 2004 from
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=10&article_ID=4274&categ_id=5
Kohut,
Andrew (2003). US Senate Committee Hearing on American Public
Diplomacy and Islam, February 27, 2003. Retrieved April 1, 2003 from
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrg030227a.html
Larson, C.
(2003). "Consistency: The Third Process Premise" in Persuasion:
Reception and Responsibility 10th Ed, 174-182.
Mendehlson, H.
(1973). "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Can Succeed" in
Public Opinion Quarterly 37, 50-61.
Neslen, Arthur
(2004). "Reality Television" in The Guardian. Retrieved April 25,
2004 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1197288,00.html.
Ross, C. (2003).
"Public Diplomacy Comes of Age" in The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2002, 75-83.
Tomlinson,
Kenneth Y. (2003). US Senate Committee Hearing on American Public
Diplomacy and Islam, February 27, 2003. Retrieved April 1, 2003 from
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrg030227a.html
Zaharna, R.S.
(2003). US Senate Committee Hearing on American Public Diplomacy and
Islam, February 27, 2003. Retrieved April 1, 2003 from
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrg030227a.html
Zogby
International (2002). The Ten Nation Impressions of American Poll,
March 2002
The Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press (2003). Views of Changing World,
Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 3, 2003. Retrieved from
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185
| 