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NASSAR AND HIS ENEMIES: FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION MAKING IN EGYPT ON THE EVE OF THE SIX
DAY WAR
By Laura
James
This article argues that Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]
neither blundered into the Six-day War, nor did he make deliberate
plans to provoke conflict. Instead, in early 1967, he took actions
aimed at reaping political gains, which he knew carried a high risk
of precipitating military hostilities. It is suggested that Nasser's
willingness to take such risks was based on his fundamental
underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent and effective
military action. This was largely founded on his image of
America as
an all-powerful adversary, although intelligence failures caused by
domestic factors, including Nasser's lack of control over the
Egyptian military, also played a role.
In early 1967, Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser took actions aimed at reaping political gains,
which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating military
hostilities. Nasser's willingness to take such risks was based on
his fundamental underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent
and effective military action. In turn, this conception was largely
founded on his image of America as an all-powerful adversary,
although intelligence failures caused by domestic factors, including
Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian military, also played a
role.
To explain these conclusions, this
article begins by discussing the composition of Egypt's
decision-making elite in order to identify those individuals whose
images of the enemy are likely to have been most important. Elite
images of the United States, Israel, and other perceived enemies, as
evidenced in public rhetoric and private speech, are then analyzed.
The crucial decisions in the crisis preceding the 1967 war are
analyzed in this context, in each case examining both events and
Egyptian perceptions to assess the significance of the role played
by images of the enemy in the decision-making process. The principal
sources used here include memoirs,[2]
interviews,[3]
public speeches and radio broadcasts,[4]
diplomatic documents,[5]
and a broad array of secondary literature.
THE
DESICION MAKING ELITE
The principal decision-maker in Egypt
in 1967 was President Nasser. The cabinet met only once after May 14
for a collective discussion of the 1967 crisis, and appears to have
played no major decision-making role.[6]
The Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU),
which consisted of Nasser, Prime Minister Sidqi Suleiman, and
several veteran members of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC)--Abdel Hakim Amer, Zakaria Mohieddin, Anwar Sadat, Hussein
Shafei and Ali Sabri[7]--
was more important.[8]
Nasser valued the opinions and advice of Foreign Minister Mahmoud
Riad, but the Foreign Ministry was repeatedly bypassed during the
crisis.[9]
The editor of Al-Ahram, Muhammad Hassanein
Heikal, Nasser's close friend and adviser, was also very
influential.[10]
The defense establishment played an
important independent foreign policy role. In particular, Field
Marshal Amer was able to question and even reverse Nasser's foreign
policy decisions. Nasser was unwilling to move against
Amer or contradict him in public. Since 1962, the armed
forces had been substantially independent of Nasser's direct
interference.[11]
Amer promoted officers loyal to himself, so that, for example, the
Chief of Staff, General Muhammad
Fawzi, known to be a supporter of Nasser, was largely
bypassed in favor of General Abdel
Mohsen Murtagi, the head of Ground Forces Command.[12]
Other key figures included Air Force chief Sidqi Mahmoud, the naval
commander Admiral Suleiman Izzat, and most importantly Defense
Minister General Shams Badran, who was Amer's close friend and
"leading hatchet man."[13]
Foreign policy decision-making in the area of defense was divided
between Nasser and Amer, necessitating careful consideration of
individual decisions to identify who was actually responsible for
them.
Images
of the Enemy14]
From Nasser's point of view in late 1966 and early 1967,
there were three main enemies: Imperialism, represented by the
United States and Britain, was linked to Zionist Israel,
the "imperialist base in the heart of the Arab homeland,"[15]
and to the "Arab reactionaries." This conception is repeatedly
expressed in Nasser's own speeches, and was also commonplace in the
wider political discourse.[16]
All three groups were represented as being closely
connected:
"We can
see that imperialism coordinates operations with both
sides--reaction on one side and Israel on the other. And since
imperialism is the origin and the source of planning, the two
sides receiving its support and arms cannot by any means be two
conflicting sides but must be two cooperating sides."[17]
Imperialism, especially that practiced
by the United States, was seen as by far the most powerful enemy up
to and during the early stages of the 1967 crisis, while the other
hostile states were said to be "only satellites spinning in the U.S.
orbit and following its steps."[18]
In Nasser's crisis speeches of 1967, "the West" is portrayed as
consisting primarily of the United States and Britain. It is
deceitful and knowingly hypocritical, despising and ignoring the
Arabs, and disregarding their legitimate aspirations and rights. In
addition, it is the staunch political ally of its creation, Israel,
supporting its propaganda, taking its side and providing it with
military equipment.
The
United States
Nasser saw the United States as his
real opponent, out to destroy him and the Egyptian revolution: "The
battle we are fighting is not an easy one; it is a battle in which
we are fighting America, the greatest power in the world."[19]
He perceived it as having strongly hostile intentions towards the
Arabs, especially in terms of its constant support for Israel. Indeed, he went so far as to
announce their identity: "Israel today is the United
States."[20]
Although Nasser had also become suspicious of Kennedy's true
intentions,[21]
he was on especially bad terms with his successor, Lyndon Johnson,
who Nasser saw as being strongly pro-Israeli.[22]
During the latter's presidency, relations deteriorated, largely due
to the United States' perceived attempt to gain political profit
from Egypt's economic problems and to its arms sales to Israel and
the conservative Arab states.[23]
Thus Nasser came to believe in a
"wider conspiracy" between imperialism, Zionism, and reaction--"only different
names for the same thing"--which explained "the coordinated, hostile
movements against our nation."[24]
He identified a worldwide imperialist onslaught against progressive
regimes behind the replacement of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno
in Indonesia by right wing, pro-Western figures, and the
interventions in the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Vietnam. He
suggested that the United States had created Israel and fostered the
Islamic Alliance[25]
in order to control the Arab world, and that the CIA was planning
his own assassination for the same purpose. Although Nasser was
intensely disliked in certain U.S. government circles by the
mid-1960s, it seems most improbable that there was an actual plot
against him. However, the idea became so fixed in his mind that
American denials were of no avail.[26]
The state-controlled media echoed
Nasser's insistence that the United States was the primary enemy and
conspirator. By February 24, 1967, Heikal, in his series of eleven
al-Ahram editorials on
the conflict between Egypt and America, was writing that the United
States had developed a "sinister dangerous complex" consisting of
"economic and psychological warfare, the hatching of plots and
assassinations, and a basic and fundamental reliance on secret
activities."[27]
Even at the height of the pre-war crisis with Israel, the Voice of
the Arabs' radio station retained its priorities:
"We
challenge you, Israel. No, in fact, we do not address the
challenge to you, Israel, because you are unworthy of our
challenge. But we challenge you, America."[28]
However, despite this belief in its
hostile intentions, it does not appear that Nasser expected the
United States to launch a conventional military attack on Egypt. The
situation in Vietnam was taking up so much of the United States'
resources and attention that it seemed unlikely to embroil itself in
yet another regional conflict.
With regard to the issue of relative
capability, it was obvious to most members of the Egyptian regime
that the military strength of the United States was vastly greater
than that of all of the Arab states combined. Nasser stated during
an international press conference on May 28 that he had not even
taken U.S. forces into account, because:
"If I
started considering how strong America is and how strong I am,
even before I started my calculations I should come to the
conclusion that America has air, land, and sea superiority over
us."[29]
He went on to say that
Egypt would certainly defend itself
with great determination if the United States intervened, even suggesting that
he would destroy the Suez Canal. Defense Minister Badran, on the
other hand, apparently replied to a colleague's query about the
possibility of intervention by the U.S. Sixth Fleet that "we have a
weapon that can deal it a lethal blow."[30]
His hearers concluded he had received Soviet arms or assurances of
support on his recent visit to Moscow, although it is possible, given
the incongruity of the boast, that he did not mean it
seriously. There is at least no evidence that other members of the
military establishment shared his confidence.
Israel
In Nasser's public speeches and
private conversations of 1967, Israel's intentions are consistently
portrayed as hostile, threatening, deceitful, and aggressive. In his
Unity Day broadcast, for example, he referred to Israel as "the
original enemy which is a manifestation of perpetual aggression."[31]
As such, its nature was seen as fundamentally expansionist.[32]
Israel was also usually portrayed as subordinate to external forces:
in particular, the international Zionist movement, Western
imperialism, and the United States. Heikal questioned the extent of
this subordination in al-Ahram on January 14,
1963, writing that "Israel is an instrument but not an instrument
without a will of its own."[33]
However, such an opinion was uncommon.
The operational image of Israel's
relative military capability held by the Egyptian ruling elite is
more ambiguous. The defense establishment thought that they could
defeat Israel in May 1967, and said so in private and in public. At
his trial for conspiracy after losing the war, on February 24, 1968,
Badran testified:
"We were
confident that our army was ready and that Israel could not attack
because intelligence estimates pointed to the fact that we were
superior in armored weapons, artillery and air power. It was
calculated that Israel would not walk into an open grave."[34]
When the decision was being taken to
close the Strait,
Amer, asked by Nasser if the armed forces were ready for war,
apparently pointed to his neck and said, "On my own head be it,
boss! Everything's in tiptop shape."[35]
Furthermore, in early June, he told the foreign minister, "If Israel
actually carried out any military action against us I could, with
only one-third of our forces, reach Beersheba."[36]
Amer's subordinates seem to have shared his opinion. British Field Marshal
Montgomery visiting the Egyptian armed forces on May 12 gave a blunt
warning that they would lose a war with Israel, to which General
Murtagi replied that they had the latest Russian equipment.[37]
Murtagi expressed a similar opinion to a domestic audience,
reporting from Sinai that "Our forces are fully prepared to take the
battle outside the UAR borders."[38]
Internal propaganda convinced most military officers that their
capabilities were superior to those of the Israelis.[39]
This appears to have been a major
misperception. Due to economic problems, Egypt had been rapidly falling behind
in the arms race since 1965.[40]
Israeli and foreign intelligence agencies thought that no
confrontation would be possible for Egypt before at least 1970,[41]
and Johnson was advised by U.S. intelligence officials that
Israel could quickly defeat
Egypt or any combination of Arab
states.[42]
However, it appears that the Egyptian intelligence service, focusing
on the quantity of
arms and troops rather than quality, training, leadership, and
morale, seriously underestimated relative Israeli strength. Arab
tacticians in general agreed that Israel would be unable to fight a long
war, and that there would be "a crushing military advantage once
Arab military operations against Israel are conducted according to a
single, co-ordinated plan."[43]
Consequently, public opinion inside Egypt was entirely convinced that
Israel was weak, divided, and afraid to
fight without outside support. This was the belief that had long
been promulgated by Heikal in al-Ahram:
"Imperialism has built up an image of Israel as a ferocious
power which no Arab could challenge. But this is a myth, because
the UAR can eliminate Israel single-handed. The problem is the
forces protecting Israel and their military presence."[44]
It was also a theme emphasized in
Nasser's crisis speeches, which portrayed Israel as militarily boastful,
deluded by false past successes, and ripe for destruction by the
Arab nation.
However, it is difficult to tell
whether Nasser really believed this to be the case. It is possible,
as Heikal suggests, that since Nasser had limited access to the
armed forces, Amer was able to deceive him with regard to Egypt's
relative strength. At their May 24 meeting, Nasser told U Thant that his military
chiefs had assured him that they were ready,[45]
and Mahmoud Riad reports Nasser as saying, after the war, that Amer
had told him he could hold off Israel with one-third of his
strength.[46]
Other members of the regime also seem to have been convinced. When
Sadat, then speaker of the National Assembly, heard of the
Israeli attack, his reaction was, "Well, they'll be taught a lesson
they won't forget."[47]
Likewise, Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign Ministry, hearing a
military friend predict disaster, was deeply shocked and did not
believe him.[48]
The alternative possibility is that
Nasser knew Israel to be stronger than Egypt, but was bluffing and
did not really expect to fight. Mohieddin, for example, said that
Nasser had ways of knowing what really was going on in the armed
forces and knew that they were inferior in quality.[49]
This should have
been reinforced by the March 1967 report of the Unified Arab
Command, which emphasized the poor defensive capability of Arab
states. Moreover, Nasser had often expressed his awareness that the
time was not yet ripe to fight Israel, and that "the way back to
Palestine is hard and long."[50]
Heikal reported him as telling King Faisal in August 1965, "I
believe that the conflict between us and Israel is a matter of a
hundred years."[51]
The key to this apparent contradiction between Nasser's
statements and behavior seems to be that Nasser's belief in
Israeli strength was predicated upon two assumptions: that the Arabs
were divided, and that Israel was supported by powerful external
forces. He told the Beirut publication al-Hawadis on March 26, 1967, "We
could annihilate Israel in twelve days were the Arabs to form a
united front." Israel, when isolated from the aid of global
imperialism, was consistently portrayed as weak. For example, it was
generally believed that Israel had only survived the Suez conflict
with the help of Britain and France. The United States had taken the
place of the European powers as Israel's protector. Thus Nasser's
operational image of Israeli capability should be described less in
terms of objective strength or weakness, and more in terms of
dependency. On Palestine Day in 1967, he explained, "Israel could
not live for one day without U.S. economic and military aid."[52]
This belief was expressed during the shocked early hours of June 5
in the widespread conviction that the United States was fighting on
the Israeli side.[53]
Key Descision
In order to use a decision-by-decision
approach to
explaining the importance of images of the enemy prior to the
Six-day War, it is first necessary to establish that the whole
course of events was not planned in advance by the Egyptian
regime.[54]
U.S. and other foreign representatives believed at the time that the
Egyptians had a plan, due to small indications of forethought and
organization such as the speed of the movement into Sinai, and the
atmosphere of overwhelming confidence in Cairo.[55]
However, subsequent Egyptian accounts emphasize that in fact there
was a high degree of confusion, and decision-making was frequently
improvisational. The evidence of Nasser's own speeches is mixed. On
May 22 he asserted, "We had no plan prior to May 13,"[56]
though four days later he implied the opposite:
"Recently we felt we are strong enough, that if we were to
enter a battle with Israel, with God's help, we could triumph. On
this basis, we decided to take actual steps."[57]
However, it seems likely that, in
front of an Arab audience, Nasser was merely trying to take credit
for the inevitable.[58]
Although the Egyptian military certainly had contingency plans for
this sort of situation, the specific occasion seems to have come as
a surprise.
THE MOBILIZATION IN THE SINAI
The first important decision made by
the Egyptian regime in the crisis preceding the 1967 War was the
mobilization of the Egyptian armed forces and concentration of
troops in the Sinai desert. At the same time, Chief of Staff General
Fawzi, was sent to investigate the apparent threat to
Syria and assure the Damascus regime of Egyptian support.[59]
The decision seems to have been made late on May 13 at Nasser's
house, by Nasser, Amer, and Sadat, who had just returned from
Moscow.[60]
The following morning, Amer also met with Badran, Fawzi, and the
heads of the various sections of the armed forces in order to decide
military questions. The aim appears to have been to deter Israel
from aggression, following the pattern of the mobilization of
1960,[61]
rather than to start a war.[62]
This is confirmed by the fact that Egyptian troops passed through
Cairo in ostentatious procession, rather than secretly, and were
deployed in the Sinai according to the defensive "Conqueror" plan-- although offensive operations
were not ruled out.[63]
Nasser himself later said he estimated the likelihood of war at only
20% at this time.[64]
It was
generally stated that the key trigger for this decision was the
receipt, on May 13, of a report that Israeli troops were massing in
force on the Syrian border. Such reports had been received before,
but this one was more convincing. First, circumstantial detail on
the nature and location of the thirteen brigades was provided.
Second, there were fewer troops than usual in the Israeli
Independence Day parade in Jerusalem on May 15, which was intended
as a gesture to reduce provocation, but interpreted, due to the
rigidity of the Arab image of an aggressive Israel, as evidence they
were busy elsewhere.[65]
Third, and most importantly, the information was received through
several channels, given particular emphasis by the USSR. The Soviet
ambassador provided a detailed report to the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry; Vladimir
Semenov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, gave similarly
specific information to Sadat at the Moscow airport, and the story
may also have been passed directly from the Soviet to the Egyptian
intelligence service.[66]
Nevertheless, this report alone seems
insufficient to explain the Egyptian decision, especially since it was
soon contradicted. Fawzi was sent to Syria to investigate on
May 14, but he found no evidence of abnormal troop concentrations,
and was told by the Syrian air force chief that the report was
merely based on threats and past raids. He reported fully to Amer on
his return to Cairo on May 15.[67]
In addition, the Israelis repeatedly denied--through the U.S, the
USSR, and a secret channel previously used by Mossad--that unusual
numbers of troops were present on the border.[68]
The United States
confirmed this. However, due to the fixed Egyptian belief in Israeli
and American hostility, neither was believed, as the foreign
minister later said to UN Secretary-General U Thant:
"[The] U.S. Charge told
us that there were no concentrations but would not give us any
guarantees. We were back in a similar situation as existed in 1956
when the U.S. ambassador gave us similar information, and yet we
were attacked."[69]
Naturally, such denials were not
received until the Egyptian troops had begun to move into Sinai,
when to withdraw them would have meant a loss of face. As Badran put
it, "Everything had got escalated and we can't just turn the key and
get all the troops back as if nothing happened."[70]
However, this does not explain the continuation of the military
build-up, which was perceived as increasingly threatening by Israel,
in late May.[71]
It is therefore suggested that the
real reason for the mobilization was less the presence or otherwise
of troop concentrations, and more the image of Israel as having
aggressive intentions, which caused contrary evidence to be
discounted or ignored. Burdett even suggests the Soviet report was
never taken literally, but seen to represent a political rather than
a military reality.[72]
It is certainly true that, since Israel could mobilize within hours,
the lack of troop concentrations was not in itself significant. The
perception that Israel intended to attack Syria may therefore have
been more closely related to threats uttered by Israeli
decision-makers. For example, General Yitzhak Rabin gave a press
briefing on May 11 that was apparently misquoted and misinterpreted
as a threat to occupy Damascus and overthrow the Syrian regime.[73]
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol also threatened the Arab rulers with
drastic measures:
"We do
not recognize the limitations they endeavor to impose on our acts
of response. If they try to sow unrest on our border--unrest will
come to theirs."[74]
When even international observers
thought that an Israeli attack might be forthcoming,[75]
Nasser and the Egyptian media naturally took such words as evidence
of aggressive intentions toward Syria.
However, even an Israeli threat to Syria was not necessarily a sufficient
reason for action. Syria was no longer part of the UAR,
as it had been when Nasser mobilized in 1960, and the
Egypt-Syria defense agreement did not mandate a response to normal
raids, just as none had been made the previous month when six Syrian
planes were shot down. The statements of Israeli leaders and
reported troop movements seemed more threatening because they were
perceived in the context of a U.S. conspiracy against Egypt, attacking Nasser's prestige by
showing that he was unable to protect Syria. Bassiouny claims that the
Foreign Ministry saw the reports as credible, because Israel had reached the level at which
it could find strategic alliance with the United States.[76]
Similarly, on May 12, Heikal had written the last article in his
series about the clash between Egypt and America, in which he depicted the
United
States as finally
prepared to deal the coup de grace to Egypt's
government. In this atmosphere of danger, the heavy emphasis
laid by the USSR on the warning of troop movements seemed like an
opportunity not to be missed. It implied an invitation for Egypt to
confront her enemies with Soviet support, without which the United
States was utterly unassailable.[77]
The explusion of the UNEF
The next decision made by the Egyptian
regime was to expel UNEF from the Sinai. On May 16, General Fawzi wrote
to the UNEF commander:
"For the
sake of complete security of all UN troops which install
Observation Posts along our borders, I request that you issue your
orders to withdraw all these troops immediately."[78]
The UN's commander had no authority to
agree, and referred the matter to the secretary-general, who made it
clear that UNEF could be expelled but would not stand aside to allow
the resumption of hostilities. Therefore, Foreign Minister Riad sent
him a formal request "to terminate the existence of UNEF on the soil
of the UAR and in the Gaza Strip."[79]
Again, although Nasser does not seem to have intended war, he
acknowledged that this action raised its probability--to anything
from 20 to 80 percent, depending on the source.[80] Fawzi himself apparently
failed to realize the significance at the time,[81]
but Riad claims to have become aware of the possibility of a
military confrontation immediately upon reading Fawzi's letter.[82]
The UN commander thought it would make war inevitable, and was
cheerfully told by his Egyptian liaison, Brigadier General Sharkawy,
"We have arrived at this decision after much deliberation and are
prepared for anything. If there is war, we shall next meet at Tel
Aviv."[83]
There is some ambiguity regarding
precisely who took these decisions and what they intended.
Nasser certainly ordered both letters to be written. He planned the
first on the morning of May 14 in consultation with his advisor for
foreign affairs, delegating the task to Amer, who gave instructions
to General Fawzi. However, when Nasser saw the English
version, he displayed concern about the wording, since he wanted to
make it quite clear that UNEF could remain in Gaza and Sharm
al-Shaykh. He apparently asked Amer to change "withdraw" to
"redeploy" and cross out "all" before "these troops." Amer reported
that this was not possible, as the letter was already being
delivered.[84]
Therefore it seems likely that, two days later, Nasser ordered
Riad to request the full withdrawal reluctantly, with no alternative
that would avoid a loss of face. In the long term, he had wanted to
get rid of UNEF, but at this juncture it led to confused changes of
plan and raised new political issues for which the regime was not
prepared.[85]
However, once the lines had been drawn, he rejoiced with the
Egyptian people at the expulsion, and he never had any intention of
seeking a graceful way to back down, advising U Thant not to send an
appeal that would certainly be refused.[86]
On the other hand, it seems possible
that Amer intended the complete termination of UNEF from the
beginning. He had suggested it twice previously,[87]
and the Egyptian army, which he controlled, preempted the
withdrawal, demanding access not only to the border posts but also
to Sharm al-Shaykh.[88]
The occupation or otherwise of Sharm al-Shaykh was the crucial
difference between the withdrawal and the redeployment of UNEF,
since the military seems never to have considered the option of
leaving it empty and vulnerable to Israeli attack. Amer apparently
decided to occupy Sharm al-Shaykh on the evening of May 16, having
changed his mind twice. Troops were to be sent as soon as possible,
arriving by May 18.[89]
Since Amer seems to have been aware that the occupation of Sharm
al-Shaykh would force the closure of the Tiran Straits,
provoking Israel,[90]
this suggests that he may already have planned war in
mid-May.
Nasser, by contrast, was looking
primarily to increase the political gains from his previous move.
While Amer and his military supporters perceived Israel as the
primary enemy, and its military inferiority as the key factor
determining action, Nasser's calculations were more complex, since
his emphasis on the hostility of the United States
caused him to pay greater attention to the global situation. Unlike
Amer, who apparently never seriously considered the option of
partial UNEF withdrawal, Nasser was probably not committed to
the occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh until at least May 17, when U
Thant refused merely to evacuate the border posts.[91]
However, after that date, he must have approved it. The main
negotiator with the UN military forces was General Fawzi, who was
avowedly Nasser's man. On May 17, Fawzi definitely confirmed that
UNEF had to withdraw from Sharm al-Shaykh, but gave them 48 hours.
When the UN commander, hoping to delay the removal until Thant
arrived in Cairo, then asked for three extra days, Fawzi refused,
but granted him until May 22 as an act of cooperation.[92]
This particular date was almost certainly chosen because it was the
day on which Nasser intended to announce the closure of the
Gulf of Aqaba, which depended on an Egyptian military presence in
Sharm al-Shaykh. It was therefore probably Nasser who gave the
order.[93]
He was aware of the implications, as he made clear in his speech of
May 26: "Taking over Sharm al-Shaykh meant confrontation with
Israel . It also meant that we were ready to enter a general
war with Israel."[94]
The closure of the Straits
of
Tiran
The decision to control passage
through the Tiran Straits, closing the Gulf of Aqaba to
Israel, was made on the morning of May 22 by a meeting of the
Supreme Executive Committee, consisting of Nasser, Amer, the prime
minister, and the remaining members of the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). A vote was taken, but only the prime minister voted
against closure, citing economic concerns.[95]
On the evening of May 22, therefore, Nasser made a speech
affirming:
"Our
rights and our sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, which
constitutes Egyptian territorial waters. Under no circumstances
will we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of
Aqaba."[96]
On the following day, Cairo Radio
added that the president had also banned "the passage of strategic
materials through the Gulf to Israel even on non-Israeli ships."
There is some controversy over whether Egyptian
decision-makers believed this constituted a decision in favor of
war. Israeli leaders had long reiterated that they would view the
closure of the Gulf of Aqaba
as a casus belli. Although
only five Israeli vessels had passed through over the previous ten
years,[97]
Cairo Radio's explanation of Nasser's announcement threatened
Israeli oil imports, access to Africa and Asia and, most
importantly, deterrent capacity. There was the obvious precedent of
1956, when the Aqaba blockade was a key cause of the Israeli
attack.[98]
Officers in the Egyptian armed forces learned during training that
Israel had
laid down certain "red lines," including closure of the Tiran
Straits.[99]
Crossing these lines would be a declaration of
war.
As late as May 19, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban had
told the Soviet Ambassador, "There will be no war if the Egyptians
do not attack and do not interfere with
Israel's right of navigation."[100]
Therefore, it seems certain that Nasser and Riad were being
disingenuous when they expressed to U Thant on May 24 the belief
that the Gulf of
Aqaba was not really
important to Israel.[101]
According to two of those present at the May 22 meeting, Sadat and
Shafei, Nasser said then that the blockade would
make war 100% certain, although in his speech of July 23,
Nasser claimed his
actual estimate at that time was 50% or 80%.[102]
It is, however, interesting that the pilots who were the original
audience for Nasser's May 22 speech were apparently disappointed,
because they thought he meant that considerations related to the
U.S. would prevent war, and Amer had
to reassure them, "don't worry children, we're going to fight."[103]
The main reason for the Tiran blockade seems to have been the
criticism directed at the Egyptian regime by the other Arab states,
especially the Jordanians. Amman Radio asked on May 19:
"Will Egypt restore its batteries and guns
to close its territorial waters in the Tiran Strait to the enemy? Logic, wisdom,
and nationalism make it incumbent on Egypt to do so."[104]
Extravagant domestic propaganda had
also gathered momentum and raised high expectations.[105]
The loss of the Suez war eleven years earlier had long
rankled, and there was a deep desire to wipe this defeat out. This
opinion was expressed in Riad's words to Thant, " Israel will
not profit from that aggression any more."[106]
Some observers believed that Nasser
never wanted to close the Gulf of Aqaba, but was forced to it by the
occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh, which was in turn necessitated by the
termination of UNEF.[107]
The regime's credibility was involved. At the meeting on May 22,
Amer apparently protested that his troops could not simply sit in
Sharm al-Shaykh and watch the Israeli flag go past.[108]
However, Safran denies that the closure followed inevitably from the
occupation.[109]
Even after UNEF had been asked to leave, the possibility of a
blockade was hardly mentioned in the Egyptian press until it became
reality. Rabin reported the testimony of Egyptian prisoners of war
that Amer told a group of officers in Sinai on May 20 that the
Straits would not be closed, which, even if he was lying, must have
seemed plausible to his audience. Moreover, to the extent that it
was a significant factor, the link between occupying Sharm al-Shaykh
and closing the Tiran Straits seems to have been acknowledged
earlier in the policy-making process, as outlined above--implying
that the decision was taken then, rather than arrived at by
accident. Nasser did not appear to feel trapped by the course of
events. Indeed, U
Thant, when he visited Cairo, was puzzled by Nasser's air of
blissful confidence. Badran has even claimed, "Closing the Gulf was
the main aim."[110]
It therefore appears that Nasser made
a deliberate decision to blockade the Tiran Straits and run a high
risk of war, and that decision must be explained. An important
factor was the weak and apparently irresolute Israeli response to
his previous provocations. In private, Eshkol had sent Nasser secret
messages urging de-escalation. In public, he continued to assert
Israel's peaceful
intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism
of Egypt. For example, in his May 22 statement to the Knesset,
he stopped short of condemning the Sinai build-up.[111]
This reinforced the existing image of Egyptian military
superiority--if Israel wanted to avoid war, it was presumably
because she thought she would lose, and if she relied on the
international community, she must be too weak to stand alone. Nasser
was therefore encouraged to believe Israel might not
fight, especially if the United States urged a peaceful
solution. At the same time, Amer was assuring him that his armed
forces were more than ready to confront Israel,[112]
and the other Arab states were seeking his leadership. If it did
come to war, his prospects were looking better all the
time.
The
question of escalation
Over the following fortnight, from May
23 until the outbreak of war on June 5, the Egyptian leadership had
three options. It could launch a first strike on Israel,
continue to escalate the situation (forcing Israel either to
attack first or to back down), or attempt to deescalate by making
concessions to Israel. In the end, the Egyptian leaders seem to have
chosen the second alternative. However, there are indications that
the first option was under consideration and was rejected. The
military command apparently urged a first strike, but later changed
its mind, according to both Badran at his trial and Nasser in
his meeting with U Thant.[113]
In the Sinai, there was deep confusion
since, as late as June 5, officers were still not sure whether their
purpose was offensive or defensive. While Nasser reiterated
that Egypt would not strike first, tanks and planes were
fully fuelled and not concealed, as if they were going to attack,
implying that "the political decision did not match with the
military one."[114]
There is some evidence that an order was given for an offensive on
May 27, which was then cancelled, due to the insistence of the
United States and USSR that neither side should strike the
first blow.[115]
Thereafter, according to Badran, The situation was turned from
attacking to defense," which was the cause of all the confusion.[116]
Oren has attempted to reconstruct
Amer's changing intentions, based on Egyptian military memoirs.[117]
Replacing the established, defensive 'Conqueror' plan, Amer
apparently introduced Operation 'Lion', which involved the
elimination of Eilat and the acquisition of a Negev landbridge
connecting Egypt to Jordan. After the closure of the Tiran
Straits, he seems to have broadened objectives to include the
entire Negev, with Operation 'Dawn,' the orders for which were
to be issued directly from Amer's own house. Despite doubts
expressed by Murtagi, Fawzi, and Sidqi Mahmoud, by May 25 everything
was ready for an
attack at daybreak on May 27. Fawzi implies that Amer made his plans
independently and Nasser quashed them when he found out about them,
which seems plausible given the evidence that Nasser and Amer were
not on good terms in late May.[118]
On the other hand, Oren claims that Nasser was fully aware from the beginning
but preferred to
overlook the operation, canceling it a few hours before it
was due only because he came to believe that Israel was forewarned.
However, although Nasser gave Amer much latitude, it seems unlikely
that he was prepared to allow him to start a war without taking at
least a passing interest, and other evidence suggests that he never
had any intention of striking first. Indeed, all of Nasser's plans depended
on the assumption that the Israelis would strike the first blow.
Heikal claims that Nasser rejected the first-strike option, because
he thought it would give the United States and Israel
the pretext they were looking for. International opinion would be
alienated, the Soviets might withdraw their support, and the
United States could enter the war on Israel's side. When
Nasser met with the military commanders on June 2, he told the
air force commander that Egypt had to wait for Israel to
attack:
"Sidqi
just said 'Sir,' he said it in English, 'it will be crippling to
me'. Abdel Hakim Amer looked at Sidqi and said, 'Sidqi, do
you accept the first attack or do you want to fight the United
States?'"[119]
It seems, therefore, that Amer had by
this time accepted the political parameters within which Nasser was
working, especially as regards his image of the United States.
Badran also says that he tried to persuade Amer to allow a small
first strike in order to provoke a war, but Amer unwillingly refused
because of Nasser's wishes. [120]
However, if the Egyptian regime had no
intention of attacking first, neither did it make any great effort
to defuse tensions with Israel. There were some minor
concessions. In addition to the reiterated promise not to fire the
first shot, Nasser
agreed with U Thant to accept a two-week moratorium on action in the
Strait if Israel did the same, and to refer the issue of passage to
the International Court of Justice-- neither of which was acceptable
to Israel. A British Foreign Office Telegram sent on June 2
optimistically noted "signs that the Egyptians were already tending
to modify the application of their blockade."[121]
More significantly, on June 3, the U.S. envoy Charles Yost and
Foreign Minister Riad set a date for the U.S. government to receive
a visit from Vice-President Mohieddin. This seems to have revived
the hope in Egypt that the superpowers might compel Israel to accept
the situation, and lead to a military relaxation. General Noufal
reports that on that day, "We were ordered to deescalate and to get
back to our offices."[122]
Nevertheless, Nasser's small concessions do not suggest that he was
making a concerted effort to avoid war. The appearance of
reasonableness kept the international community from turning against
him, while every delay was to his advantage, since it gave Egypt
time to complete its military preparations and coordinate with the
other Arabs. Israel, by contrast, could not afford to sustain total
mobilization for long.
In fact, certain actions taken by
Nasser seemed designed to escalate the situation still further. On
May 29, he gave King Hussein of Jordan permission to come to Cairo,
and the Jordanian-Egyptian Joint Defense Agreement signed the
following day certainly increased the risk of war. The Arabs had
crossed another of Israel's "red lines" by explicitly encircling the
Jewish state and giving Egypt control of its most vulnerable border.
Indeed, Shimon Peres said that the key factor in Israel's decision
to fight was:
"[Seeing the behavior of] Nasser and
Hussein at Cairo Airport. This was an historic and crucial kiss. We
were now surrounded by a sort of banana [shaped front] filled with
Russian weapons."[123]
In addition, Nasser used increasingly
belligerent rhetoric, which worsened the crisis by making the issue
one of the rights of Palestine and thus, implicitly, the
existence of Israel. On May 22 he suggested that peace could
not mean ignoring "the rights of the Palestinian people" and
announced to Israel, "You are welcome [to attack], we are ready for
war."[124]
On May 28 he declared, "The rights of the people of Palestine must
be restored. We accept no basis for coexistence with Israel."[125]
By June 4, his tone had become even more triumphant:
"We are, with God's help,
advancing along the road towards our rights and the rights of the
people of Palestine, and God willing, we shall be victorious."[126]
Although all of these threats were
explicitly conditional on Israeli aggression,[127]
this could have provided small comfort when Nasser was also stating
that "the mere existence of Israel is an aggression."[128]
This raises the controversial question
of whether Nasser actually expected war. He seems, throughout, to
have been in two minds on this issue, making contradictory
statements. The UN commander, meeting him on May 24, says Nasser
clearly understood "that a continued blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba
would eventually force Israel to take aggressive action," but he
also claims Nasser believed Israel would not fight without U.S.
help, which would not be forthcoming.[129]
Nasser's confidant Heikal proclaimed the inevitability of an armed
clash with Israel in al-Ahram on May 26,
recommending that Egypt should wait to receive the first blow.
However, he also said in July 1969 that this was not then Nasser's own
opinion.[130]
At his May 28 press conference, Nasser said that he expected an
Israeli attack "daily."[131]
Yet, two days later, King Hussein received the impression that
Nasser did not want war, did not believe it would happen and thought
there was a way out, perhaps through international intervention.[132]
There is general agreement that on
June 2, following the Israeli cabinet reshuffle, Nasser
concluded war was certain, telling a meeting of the Supreme Command
that he expected an attack on the air force on Monday, June 5.[133]
By the following day, however, new doubts seemed to have arisen,
since in two interviews Nasser gave to the British press on June 3,
he claimed in one interview that war was imminent, and in the other
that the crisis had already passed.[134]
It is difficult to draw a general conclusion from so many
contradictions, but the central point appears to be that Nasser was
not actually sure whether a war would occur. He changed his mind
frequently, but not his policies, because, in one sense, the
question was unimportant. He expected military victory if war did
break out, political victory if it did not.
Nasser's confidence was therefore founded not only on his
belief, acquired from Amer, that the Arabs were militarily capable
of defeating Israel, but also on his perceptions of the
international situation. In particular, his beliefs about the stance
the USSR would take are crucial to
explaining his image of the degree of threat from the
United States. However, his
actual views on this point are often misinterpreted. Badran returned
from his mission to Moscow in late May and is said to have
given Nasser the false impression that the
USSR would
provide Egypt with military support
if Israel attacked first.[135]
Nasser's speech of May 26 certainly might be interpreted as
expressing this opinion, which seems to have been prevalent in
Cairo. [136]
On the other hand, it is unlikely that
Nasser himself believed it for long. As he implied at his May 28
press conference, he knew that in such a case the
United States would also intervene, perhaps
resulting in world nuclear war. Therefore he suggested that "if war
breaks out between Israel alone and us alone, I think that
it will be restricted to this area."[137]
The truth appears to be that although Badran mistook an empty
compliment by the Soviet defense minister and
passed it on to Nasser in time to influence his May 26
speech, the Foreign Ministry gave Nasser the true picture that very
evening.[138]
Nasser was not, thereafter, relying on the USSR to do more than
deter American intervention, which it did--for example, by moving
additional naval units to the eastern Mediterranean as a
"trip-wire." Since Nasser knew that the two superpowers had
been in touch at the highest levels since May 22, to avoid
misunderstanding, this action may also have affected his
calculations insofar as it seemed indicative of a lowered Soviet
estimate of the probability of U.S. intervention.[139]
Nasser's judgment that the USSR would deter American intervention
made it seem less likely that Israel, viewed primarily as an
instrument of the United States, would act independently. This was
partly because it was not perceived to be strong enough; to a
certain extent due to the fact that Nasser assumed it would follow
U.S. orders. The
United States was
clearly emphasizing a diplomatic approach, attempting to organize an
international flotilla, dubbed the "Red Sea Regatta," to break the
blockade, and agreeing on June 3 that the Egyptian and American
vice-presidents should exchange visits.[140]
Indications of the American search for a peaceful solution, if they could be taken at face
value, must also be indications of the fact that
Israel would not strike first.[141]
However, Nasser had
an established image of the United States as deeply hostile towards him
personally. Therefore, he did not take these signs at face value,
and did not rule out the possibility of war, according to his July
23 speech. When he
received Johnson's letter of May 23, expressing friendliness and
condemning aggression, he expressed doubt as to its sincerity.[142]
This suspicion was reinforced by indications from the American side,
such as U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Richard Nolte's estimate that the
chances of Israeli attack were about fifty-fifty and the report that
Johnson had told his aides, " Israel will hit them."[143]
However, so deeply ingrained were the images of American hostility
and Israeli dependency that these were seen as indications
of U.S. duplicity rather than genuine
inability to dictate to the Jewish state. Other factors were also interpreted within the Egyptian
regime as further indications of Israeli weakness.
For example, Amer
sent two MiG-21s to make a reconnaissance flight over Beersheba,
"laughingly" announcing the panicked Israeli response to Nasser over
lunch on May 28.[144]
Similarly, on May 30, Sidqi Mahmoud told the Jordanian delegation
that Egyptian squadrons had been flying into Israeli air space,
unchallenged for the last few days, and that "this indicated that
Israel's fear of the Egyptian air force was sufficient to prevent them from challenging
it."[145]
King Hussein, with rather different preconceptions, interpreted such
forbearance as Israeli intelligence-gathering.[146]
At the same time, Israeli rhetoric condemning
the Tiran blockade and subsequent
developments was relatively mild. Eshkol, in his Knesset statements
and May 28 broadcast, expressed his readiness to participate in a
peace effort and repeatedly called for international support and
action. Although he also emphasized the strength of the IDF and, in
coded terms, Israel's willingness eventually to use force,
his poor delivery of the speech--the hesitant tone of voice
which many interpreted as showing weakness--confirmed the impression of
irresolution, among his own people as well as the Arabs.[147]
Even the fact that the United States counseled restraint was
interpreted as an attempt to protect Israel from Arab wrath--and therefore as
further evidence of her need for protection.[148]
The Egyptian attitude was fundamentally based on the Arab
belief in Israeli military inferiority. Nolte sent a U.S. Embassy
telegram on May 27, explaining that Nasser appears sincerely to believe Egyptians can beat Israelis if
we do not intervene and his estimate is shared by every official
Egyptian we have talked to.[149]
Most other foreign observers similarly noted the confidence
of the ruling elite.[150]
This exemplifies the ability of a group to preserve a deeply
ingrained image, especially one to which there is a strong emotional
commitment, by ignoring or reinterpreting all evidence to the
contrary. Only a sufficiently dramatic and discontinuous event, such
as the Six-Day War itself, is able to invalidate such a
perception.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the Egyptian elite viewed the United States as its primary enemy: strongly
hostile, much more powerful than Egypt, and the head of a conspiracy
involving Israel and the "reactionary" Arab
states. Israel was
also perceived as extremely hostile and aggressive. However, it was
seen as subordinate to the United States in terms of both military
capability and political capacity for independent action. This image
encouraged Nasser to believe that Egypt
could hold her own
against Israel if the international conditions
were suitable, i.e. with the Arab states united and the United
States held back
from fighting on Israel's side by the Soviet
counterweight.
During the crisis of 1967, events
were neither planned in advance nor developing outside the
control of the Egyptian leaders. Nasser chose at each stage not to draw
back, motivated by the prospect of high political gains, and
knowingly risking war, based on a persistent underestimation of an
Israel seen as isolated from effective
international support. The mobilization of Egyptian forces in Sinai
was less a result of the reports of Israeli troop
concentrations--which were soon contradicted--than of the fact that
Israel was seen as having aggressive intentions, causing Egypt to
focus on the rhetoric of Israeli leaders suggesting the possibility
of an attack on Damascus. This was enhanced by the fact that the
tensions in U.S.-Egyptian relations seemed to be coming to a head,
suggesting that the United States might dictate an Israeli strike
in order to embarrass Nasser.
The expulsion of UNEF was originally part of the same
decision: a partial withdrawal was requested so that the Egyptian
forces would present a credible deterrent. Marshal Amer may have
instigated the demand for full withdrawal, perhaps even out of
desire to provoke a war, but Nasser confirmed it, apparently
willingly. On balance, however, the closure of the Straits of Tiran
was not an inevitable consequence of the expulsion of UNEF, nor did
the Egyptian elite fail to realize that this move carried a high
risk of war. Prime Minister Eshkol's messages seeking to avert war,
and emphasizing the role of the international community, had been
interpreted as further evidence of Israeli military inferiority and
unwillingness to take independent action. At the same time,
Nasser saw his own
position as constantly improving, with more Arab states pledging
support.
Finally, the decision not to strike first, but nevertheless
to continue to escalate the crisis, is explicable in similar terms.
The military establishment seems originally to have supported a
first strike, but later bowed to the demands of the
president.
Nasser thought that the United
States would not
support Israel militarily in case of an Israeli
first strike, not least because he felt assured that the Soviets
would intervene if the United States became directly involved.
Fighting Israel by itself, allied
with Jordan and Syria under a united command, he
thought that he could win, or at least hold out for a satisfactory
UN-imposed solution. Finally, Nasser also assumed that
Israel would follow the orders of the
United States, which appeared to be seeking to avoid war.
Indications that Israel might not follow suit were
perceived as evidence of U.S. duplicity rather than inability
to dictate to Israel.
Throughout the crisis, incoming information was distorted to
fit the preconceived enemy images of the Egyptian elite. This was
related to well-attested cognitive mechanisms,[151]
as well as to the general emotional commitment to the belief
that
Israel was inferior to the Arab states,
and to the authoritarian structure of the regime. For example, it
seems likely that regime propaganda in Egypt influenced those whose duty it
was to collect military information on Israel, causing them to
underestimate its potential, and the elite to believe that error.
Regime dynamics also apparently limited Nasser's access to reliable
information on the relative strengths of his own armed forces and
those of the Israelis. However, the decision makers themselves also
over-emphasized confirmatory evidence and ignored or distorted
contrary information so as to support the pre-existing and
self-perpetuating belief in the hostility of both the United
States and Israel, and in the military
inferiority of Israel.
NOTES
[1]
In this paper, common Arabic proper nouns are spelled
according to the generally accepted Western media usage, without
reference to a specific system of transliteration. For nouns in less
common usage, the paper follows the existing scholarly
literature.
[2]
In particular, Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years
(Reading, England: Ithaca, 1994); Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents
(London: New English Library, 1972); Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the
Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959); Mahmoud
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981); Indar Jit
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Cass, 1980); Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New
York: Harper and Row, 1978).
[3]
Extensive use is made of the transcripts of the background
interviews of surviving participants performed in BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews, Private Papers Collection, The Middle East
Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1997. Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation
in the Middle East (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1993); Avi Shlaim, "His Royal Shyness: King
Hussein and Israel," The New
York Review of Books, July 15, 1999; and Hussein of Jordan, My "War" with Israel: As told to
and with additional material by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer
(London: Peter Owen, 1969), also reproduce relevant interviews, in
full or in part.
[4]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (Caversham Park,
England: British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service, 1967),
supplemented by Fuad A. Jabber, International Documents on
Palestine,
1967 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), is the
major source for political speeches and radio transcripts.
[5] Useful files in the UK Public Record
Office include FCO 17/290, FCO 17/489, FCO 17/490, FCO 39/250 and
PREM 13/1826. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation
in the Middle East
reproduces relevant US foreign policy documents in an
Appendix.
[6]
A.I. Dawisha, "The Middle East," in Christopher Clapham (ed.)
Foreign Policy Making in
Developing States: A Comparative Approach (Westmead: Saxon
House, 1977).
[7]
Farid, Nasser: The Final
Years.
[8]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity.
[9]
BBC, Fifty Years War:
Israel and the Arabs:
Interviews. Bassiouny interview.
[10]
A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements
of Foreign Policy (New York: Wiley, 1976). Although Heikal had
no independent power base (Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political
Biography (London: The Penguin Press, 1971)), Nasser relied on
him for the most current information, and according to the former US
Ambassador, Lucius Battle, Heikal wrote important foreign policy
speeches for Nasser in the early 1960s (Raymond Cohen, Culture and Conflict in
Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990)).
[11]
Stephens, Nasser: A Political
Biography; Sadat, In
Search of Identity.
[12]
BBC, Fifty Years War:
Israel and the Arabs:
Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[13]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[14]
This section draws on an intensive qualitative analysis of all
Nasser's speeches during the pre-war crisis, on May 22, May 26, May
28, May 29, and June 4, 1967 (BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.
Part 4: The Middle
East and Africa (1967)). Such
rhetorical images are not necessarily identical to operational
images, but there is sufficient accuracy to delineate the most
salient enemies, Israel and the United States, which are later
analyzed more specifically in terms of operational perceptions
within the Egyptian regime of their intentions and
capabilities.
[15]
"Unity Day" speech, February 22. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.
Part 4: The Middle
East and Africa
(1967).
[16]
Yehoshofat Harkabi, Arab
Attitudes to Israel
(Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972).
[17]
February 22. BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967).
[18]
Cairo Radio: Nasser's "Palestine Day" Message to Arabs in UK,
May 15. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[19]"Labour
Day" speech, May 2. Jabber, International Documents on
Palestine, 1967.
[20]
May 26. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[21]
Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents.
[22]
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional
and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994). Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle
East, recalls that within 24 hours Kennedy's assassination was
said in Cairo to have been the result of a Jewish plot.
[23]
Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo
Documents.
[24]
May 15. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[25]
The fact that a major arms deal with Saudi Arabia coincided with the
announcement of the Islamic Alliance lent credence to this suspicion
(Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab
World: The Elements of Foreign Policy).
[26]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East .
[27]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[28]
May 23. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[29]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[30]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity. Riad, The
Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, reports a similar
statement.
[31]
February 22. BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[32]
Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to
Israel.
[34]
Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report on What Lies
Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Atheneum,
1969).
[35]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity.
[36]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East.
[38]
May 18. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[39]
BBC, Fifty Years War:
Israel and the Arabs:
Interviews. Fakhr interview.
[40]
Nadav Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus,
1969).
[41]
Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report
on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli
Conflict.
[42]
Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel,
1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980).
[43]
Ahmad Samih Khalidi, "An
Appraisal of the Arab-Israel Military Balance," Middle East Forum, Vol. 42, No. 3
(1966).
[44]
November 4. BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (Caversham Park,
England: British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service,
1966).
[45]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[46]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[47]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity.
[48]
BBC, Fifty Years War:
Israel and the Arabs:
Interviews. Bassiouny interview.
[49]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[50]
November 24. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle
East and Africa (1966).
[51]
Quoted in Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).
[52]
May 15. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[53]
Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo
Documents; Sadat, In
Search of Identity; Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the
Middle East; Parker, The
Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[54]
L. Carl Brown, "Nasser and the June War: Plan or Improvisation?"
in S. Seikaly, R.
Baalbaki, and P. Dodd (eds.), Quest for Understanding: Arabic
and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr (Beirut:
American University of Beirut Press, 1991), makes a good case that
Nasser had no master plan.
[55]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[56]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[57]
May 26. BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[58]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[59]
BBC, Fifty Years War:
Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[60]
Ibid. See also Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation
in the Middle East. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of
the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of
June 1967, reports Nasser as telling Thant the decision was made
on May 13, but by the Cabinet, which was probably a constitutional
fiction.
[61]
In February 1960, following a sharp increase in border incidents
between Israel and Syria, at that time joined with Egypt as part of
the United Arab Republic (UAR), Nasser concentrated his forces in
the Sinai in order to put pressure on Israel. Despite a warning from
Soviet intelligence sources on February 15 that Israel was massing
troops on the Syrian border, Nasser neither objected to the presence
of UNEF nor attempted to close the Straits of Tiran. He moved the
Egyptian forces out again from March 1, announcing that his aim of
deterring Israel had been achieved. This precedent figured in the
minds of both sides during the crisis of 1967 (Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign
Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)).
[62]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity; BBC, Fifty
Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi and Badran
interviews.
[63]
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
[64]
"Revolution Anniversary" speech, July 23. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.
Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967).
[65]
Cohen, Culture and Conflict
in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the
Deaf.
[66]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[67]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[68]
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of
War.
[69]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East. Appendix, Document
5.
[70]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews.
[71]
Michael Howard and Robert
Hunter, "Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967." Adelphi Paper, No. 41
(1967).
[72]
Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report
on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli
Conflict.
[73]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[74]
May 13. Jabber,
International Documents on Palestine, 1967.
[75]
See The New York Times, May 13.
[76]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny interview.
[77]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[78]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[79]
Quoted in Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[80]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[81]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews.
[82]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East.
[83]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[84]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East; Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War; BBC,
Fifty Years War: Israel and
the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[85]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation; Michael B. Oren, Six Days of
War.
[86]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[87]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[88]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[89]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview. Murtagi, as quoted
in Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East, suggests that the decision
was made later. However, Noufal's story accords better with the
testimony of Rikhye, The
Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force
leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967, and Thant's June 26
Report on the Withdrawal of UNEF (Jabber, International Documents on
Palestine, 1967).
[90]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview.
[91]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[92]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[93]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview.
[94]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[95]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity.
[96]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[97]
Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970).
[98]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[99]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fakhr interview.
[100]
Quoted in Parker, The
Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[101]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967; Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation
in the Middle East. Appendix, Document 5.
[102]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity; Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East:
An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli
Conflict; BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.
Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967).
[103]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview.
[104]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[105]
Walter Laqueur, The Road to War: The Origin and
Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-8 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).
[106]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East. Appendix, Document
5.
[107]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967. BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview.
[108]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East.
[109]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[110]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews.
[111]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[112]
Sadat, In Search of
Identity.
[113]
Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report
on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation
in the Middle East.
[114]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi, Shazly and Fakhr
interviews.
[115]
Avraham Sela, The Decline of
the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for
Regional Order. However, Gamassy firmly denies that there was
ever an offensive plan. BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews.
[116]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview.
[117]
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of
War.
[118]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi and Bassiouny
interviews.
[119]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview.
[122]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview.
[123]
Quoted in Randolph S. Churchill and S. Winston, The Six Day War (London:
Heinemann, 1967).
[124]
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa
(1967).
[125] Jabber, International
Documents on Palestine, 1967.
[127]
Cohen, Culture and Conflict
in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the
Deaf.
[128]
May 28. Jabber,
International Documents on Palestine,
1967.
[129]
Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder:
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the
Six-Day War of June 1967.
[130]
Stephens, Nasser: A Political
Biography.
[131] Jabber, International
Documents on Palestine, 1967.
[132]
Hussein of Jordan, My "War"
with Israel; BBC, Fifty
Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Hussein
interview.
[133]
The military command did not take this warning seriously, or pass it
on to the lower ranks, largely because it seems to have been based
either on the precedent of the Suez crisis or on a conversation with
an American journalist. "Revolution Anniversary" speech, July 23,
BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967); Sadat, In Search of Identity.;
Farid, Nasser: The Final
Years; BBC, Fifty Years
War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi, Noufal and Badran
interviews.
[134]
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of
War.
[135]
Badran insists he only
reported to Nasser that Marshal Gretchko, the Soviet Defense
Minister, had promised support if the US interfered. BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi and Badran interviews.
[136]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East.
[137] Jabber, International
Documents on Palestine, 1967.
[138]
Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo
Documents; BBC, Fifty
Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny
interview.
[139]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[140]
The Egyptians later claimed that they had believed the United States
was also endorsing Thant's moratorium and putting pressure on Israel
to comply (Heikal, Nasser:
The Cairo Documents).
[141]
This basic belief was at the root of the many Arab conspiracy
theories prevalent after the war.
[142]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the
Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview.
[143]
Riad, The Struggle for Peace
in the Middle East.
[145]
Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in
the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987).
[146]
BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel
and the Arabs: Interviews. Hussein interview.
[147]
Brecher and Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and
1973.
[148]
Safran, From War to War: The
Arab-Israeli Confrontation.
[149]
Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East. Appendix, Document
12.
[150]
Ibid. Documents 1 and 9; Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable,
1972); PRO, FCO 39/250.
[151]
See Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy:
Dulles and Russia." In
David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, (eds.), Enemies in Politics
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on
Misperception," World
Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1968), pp. 454-479.
Laura James is a College Lecturer at St Edmund Hall,
Oxford
University.
She is currently completing her doctoral thesis in International
Relations, entitled, "Images of the Enemy: Conflict Decision Making
in Nasser's Egypt." She also worked as a consultant at the
International Fund for Agricultural Development.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the U.S.
Department of State's conference "The United States, the Middle
East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held on January 12 and 13,
2004.
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