Islamic Debates over the War in Iraq and Attacks on the West
Muslims and Martyrdom
Bernard Haykel

The ideologues of global jihad argue that the war in Iraq is part of a larger American war on Islam and encourage Muslims to fight the US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. For them, armed resistance is the individual duty of all able-bodied Muslims, as this is a war against a non-Muslim invader of Islamic land. Until recently, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq was seen by jihadis as a divine blessing because it confirms the truth of their teachings, boosts recruitment and is an opportunity to defeat the last superpower in a replay of the 1980s war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The war in Iraq, however, has not been going well for jihadis.

Serious criticism has emerged within jihadi ranks and internal reassessments of the situation are underway. The nub of the dispute centres on the killing of civilians, particularly Muslims, in suicide bombings. It underscores that the jihadi's Achilles heel lies in their contentious and unrigorous justifications for the permissibility of suicide attacks.

Errors by Hotheads

The analogy that jihadis made between Iraq and Afghanistan in the 1980s quickly collapsed after the US-led invasion when they realised that the enemy they are facing is qualitatively different from the Soviet army. Jihadis are distressed at their inability to kill large numbers of Americans and, under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership, quickly turned to attacking Shiites in suicide operations. This, however, has had serious repercussions on their image among Muslims.

Ever sensitive to their Muslim public, some ideologues, such as Abu Musab al-Suri - also known as Mustafa Sitt Mariam - have been arguing that jihadis ought to diminish their efforts in Iraq and revert to 'spectacular' attacks in the west, like those of September 11 2001 and the Madrid train bombings. These he argues are singularly popular among Muslims and are the only effective means of doing long-term damage to the west. Zarqawi's mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi - also known as Asim al- Barqawi - expressed his unease about the jihadi strategy in Iraq on Al Jazeera on June 7: 'We see on television tens of Iraqi civilians, women and children, killed and barely one or two occupying Americans are killed. This is a matter about which to be concerned and which requires rethinking.'

Al-Maqdisi has written a treatise of 'support and advice' to Zarqawi, making the argument that the killing of ordinary Shi'a is not permitted in Islam, as they are not to be considered infidels, and that suicide bombing is a tactic to be used only in extreme and exceptional circumstances. He has also said that individual jihadis have resorted to this weapon in a systematic and uncontrolled fashion because of a misguided understanding of the rules of warfare. Al-Maqdisi sees his role as the jihadi movement's principal guide, correcting the errors of hotheads.

There are strong indications from jihadi websites, their online journals, and from contacts during research among fundamentalist Salafis, that the suicide attacks are turning many Muslims, including Salafis, against the jihadis.

Salafism represents a particular set of theological beliefs and a specific interpretation of texts of revelation. The Salafis are not a homogenous religious community, but are split on issues of politics and militant action. Not all Salafis advocate Al-Qaeda's militant jihad, and a majority is politically silent.

An example of the opposition, published in Al-Asr, an online pro-jihadi journal, www.alasr.ws, is a letter from a reader, criticising the religious legitimacy that al-Maqdisi and others have given to suicide attacks and their present ambiguous stand on this matter:

'Which jihadi operation, whether in Iraq, Saudi, Spain, London, America, even in Israel doesn't involve the killing of women, children and the cutting of trees! Is the shedding of innocent Muslim blood simply a mistake committed by an individual [as you've mentioned]? The massacres and the large numbers of those killed in Iraq and elsewhere are simply to be considered individual mistakes! You inflame the sentiments of the young men with general talk about jihad, whose many conditions [sanctioning it] have not been satisfied…as has been shown by such great scholars as Shaykh al- Albani. And after the shedding of all the blood and the large number of victims, you slither like a snake and say that these are errors committed by individuals!'

Sanctioning Killing

Jihadis base their claim that islamic law sanctions suicide operations in which Muslim civilians are killed on two arguments. The first relates to prophetic traditions allowing the historic use of siege engines, like the giant catapult, against an enemy who holds Muslims as human shields. This is referred to in Arabic as the tatarrus argument, from turs or shield. The second argument also draws on a tradition in which the prophet Muhammad tells his wife, Umm Salama, that the innocent people killed with an evil army that is entirely destroyed will be resurrected on judgment day and judged according to their good intentions. In other words, they will be saved and go to paradise. This is known in jihadi sources as the resurrected according to their intentions argument.

Quoting and elaborating on these, jihadis make comparisons and analogies with the situation in Iraq to justify their attacks. For example, they claim the Iraqi civilians are being held as human shields by the occupying US-led forces, and that the pious among them who die in the attacks will be resurrected and sent to heaven. In short, the jihadi position consists of saying there is religious sanction for the killing of Muslim civilians and neither the innocent victims nor the bombers are doomed to suffer in hell. It is important to note that an obsession with questions of salvation underpins all these discussions. Views and tactics have to be made to coincide with an understanding of God's will.

The first major test of these tactics for the jihadis came not in Iraq but in Saudi Arabia in 2003. First in May, and then in November, suicide bomb attacks killed a number of Muslims, including Saudis and other Arabs, at housing compounds in Riyadh. Those who died in November were fasting for Ramadan. This led to a furore against Al-Qaeda's branch in Saudi Arabia among ordinary Saudis and the organisation has not repeated such acts since, confining itself to attacking western and Saudi government targets.

The jihadis banked on the fact that in Iraq the attacks would primarily kill Shi'a, and that because they are considered heretics, fellow Sunni Muslims would either approve or turn a blind eye. Indications emerging from the Arab world point to a widespread view that such attacks have backfired and alienated ordinary Muslims from the jihadis. This explains the revised positions of ideologues like al-Maqdisi. The only exception to this is in Najd, in central Saudi Arabia, where a number of Salafis continue to support the Iraq tactics and see nothing wrong with the killing of Shi'a.

Reversing Views

Another major jihadi ideologue has in fact reversed his position on suicide bombings after the July London transport attacks. This is the British-based Abu Baseer al-Tartusi - also known as Abd al-Munim Halima, www.abubaseer.bizland.com. Despite his fatwa being well-argued on islamic legal grounds, Abu Baseer's motivations for the reversal are suspect. He is Syrian and may fear he will be extradicted to his homeland where he would face certain imprisonment and torture. Some jihadis have severely attacked him on Internet message boards for putting self-preservation above religious conviction. The important points to note, however, are that real chinks have appeared in the jihadi ideological armour, either because the real consequences of suicide attacks, or religious justifications underpinning them, are untenable.

Arguments can be built on Abu Baseer's position that suicide attacks inevitably involve killing innocent civilians, including Muslims living in the west, and that these are difficult to justify in islamic law. Rather than expelling him from his asylum in Britain, someone like Abu Baseer could be cultivated to further undermine jihadi ideology.

More Attacks Likely

It is likely, however, that an even more determined hardcore of zealots will emerge from these splits. This group will heed the advice of Abu Musab al-Suri by attacking western targets and withdrawing gradually from the Iraqi war because they will accept that the analogy with 1980s Afghanistan does not hold and that their campaign has alienated too many Muslims.

Al-Qaeda's most recent statements, as expressed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, appear to be trying to find common ground between the various factions by stressing the importance of the war in Iraq and attacks on the west.

The wars in Iraq and on terror are intertwined in complicated ways and, for the jihadis, this has to do with ideology, the Muslim public's perception of their activities and the achievement of long-term strategic goals. Far from being nihilists or fascists, the jihadis are a dynamic group which is constantly debating and calibrating its views in the hope of achieving an internal consensus that will translate into support from a worldwide Muslim public.