

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 775-3270
Access: Web: CSIS.ORG
Contact the Author: Acordesman@aol.com

Iraqi Force Development:

Coalition Reporting as of the Fall of 2005

Anthony H. Cordesman
with the Assistance of William D. Sullivan

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KEY DEVELOPMENTS	3
SECURITY FORCES TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE	4
Total Trained & Equipped ISF as of September 19, 2005	6
Source: adapted from “Measuring Stability in Iraq,” October 2005, pp. 4 & 27.	6
Rate of Growth in Trained & Equipped ISF in Fall of 2005	7
Source: adapted from “Measuring Stability in Iraq,” October 2005, pp. 4 & 27 and MNSTC-I.....	7
READINESS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES	8
Iraqi Battalions and Other Units Actively Supporting Counterinsurgency Operations as of September 19, 2005	10
Note: Transition readiness has not yet been assessed for conventional police forces.	10
Source: adapted from “Measuring Stability in Iraq,” October 2005, p. 29	10
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM	11
PROGRESS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES	11
IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES	13
Growth of Active Iraqi MOD Battalions	14
Source: adapted from “Measuring Stability in Iraq,” October 2005, pp. 30 & 31.	14
MOD Combat Forces Capability: Iraqi Units in the Lead or Fully Independent –Growth of All Level Two Formations.....	15
Ministry of Defense Force Manpower Levels: 7/27/05 to 11/16/05	16
Equipment Issued Since June 2004.....	17
ARMY	17
IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES	19
INCREASING ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY	20
Iraqi National Force Deployment: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005	20
<i>Equipment</i>	20
<i>Operational Readiness</i>	21
<i>Creating an Officer Corps</i>	21
Number of ISF Personnel Who Received CS/CSS Training as of November 2005.....	23
<i>The State of Iraqi Intelligence Capabilities</i>	24
<i>Progress in the Force Evaluation Matrix</i>	24
Transition Readiness Assessment Categories	25
STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE BATTALIONS.....	25
NAVY	26
AIR FORCE.....	27
Iraqi Air Force Equipment: Historical Figures 1990 to 2005.....	29
NATO TRAINING MISSION.....	30
IRAQI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES	30
Ministry of Interior Force Manpower Levels: 7/27/05 to 11/16/05	31
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	32
<i>Training</i>	32
<i>Recruitment and Vetting</i>	32
<i>Equipment</i>	33
<i>Effectiveness</i>	33
SPECIAL POLICE FORCES	33
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDOS	33
Iraqi Special Police Deployments: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005	35
MECHANIZED POLICE	35
PUBLIC ORDER POLICE	35
<i>Effectiveness</i>	36
Special Police Courses/Personnel Attended as of November 2005.....	37

EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT.....	37
BORDER FORCES	38
Iraqi Border Fort Development.....	39
IRAQI HIGHWAY PATROL	39
<i>Equipment</i>	39
<i>Effectiveness</i>	40
CENTER OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	40
MNSTC-I Training Definitions for MOI Forces as of November 2005.....	41
SOURCE: MNSTC-I, NOVEMBER 2005.....	41
CRITERIA FOR WITHDRAWING FORCES	42

There seems to be a great deal of ignorance about the details of Iraqi force development, and the level of progress that is being attained. The US and MNSTC-I have provided substantial additional data on Iraqi force development in recent weeks. Key sources include the Bush Administration’s October 13, 2005, “Report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” They also include detailed insights into Iraqi force development that General David Petraeus provided in his November 7, 2005 briefing at the CSIS.

This report provides a summary of those statements and other official statements by US and Coalition officers and personnel. The reader should be aware that this document is intended only to make the reader familiar with official US reporting, not an analysis of the validity of such reporting or critique of Iraqi force development.

A full-scale analysis is in process that will address the strengths *and weaknesses* of Iraqi force development. It is clear, however, that very real progress is being made in many areas, and that no assessment of the insurgency campaign or Iraq’s future can be made without an understanding of what is happening and underway.

Key Developments

The October report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq provides the following summary of current developments in Iraq forces:

- **Iraqi Security Forces.** Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces continue to progress in their ability to take ownership of Iraqi security. This progress has come in a relatively short period of time, in the face of a brutal insurgency. Key measures of progress include:
 - o **A continued increase in the number of Iraqi units able to take the lead in combat operations against the insurgency.** There are now 88 Iraqi Army and special operations battalions conducting combat operations against the enemy –an increase of nine since the July report. Of the 88 operational units, 36 are assessed as being “in the lead” or fully independent – a 50% increase over units at these levels of readiness in the July report. There are 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations – an increase of 13 since the last report.
 - o **Progress of Iraqi units in assuming responsibility for the battle space.** Since the last report, Iraqi forces have taken responsibility for security in several areas of Iraq and now have the lead in one Iraqi province, roughly 87 square miles of Baghdad and over 450 square miles in other provinces.
 - o **A continued increase in the number of units and individuals trained, equipped,**

and formed into operational status. More than 87,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen have now been trained and equipped – an increase of 10,000 since the last report. A total of 68,800 police have been trained and equipped – an increase of 5,500 since the last reporting period. These work alongside 35,500 other Ministry of Interior forces. Overall, this represents a 12% increase in Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations since July 2005.

The ultimate goals of the transitional security process remain to defeat terrorists, neutralize the insurgency and transition the Iraqis to security self-reliance. To achieve these goals, the United States, its Coalition partners, and the Iraqi government are focused on objectives that include:

- increasing the capacity of the Iraqi government and its security structures and forces to provide national security and public order;
- neutralizing insurgents' effectiveness, influence, and ability to intimidate; and
- helping Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities – law enforcement, justice, and the corrections system.

The Iraqi Security Forces continue to grow in strength and capability with progress documented through indicators that include:

- progress on the program of equipping and training units and individuals of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces;
- readiness assessments of operational units; and
- progress in assuming responsibility for security of areas within Iraq.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to assume more battle space and are preparing to assume command and control responsibilities at the division level. At present, the Iraqi Army is in the lead for planning and executing counterinsurgency operations in one Iraqi province that is roughly the size of New Jersey. The ISF also have the lead for 87 square miles in Baghdad and over 450 square miles of battle space in the other Iraqi provinces. Coalition Forces continue to support and assist the ISF in these areas as they move towards the capability for independent operations. The ISF patrol alongside Coalition Forces elsewhere in Iraq with growing competence.

Security Forces Training and Performance

The United States, its Coalition partners, and the Iraqi government are working together to train, equip, and prepare Iraqi Security Forces to conduct self-sufficient security operations – counterinsurgency, border protection, and law and order. Iraq's military and police organizations are making solid progress. Their progress is measured through indicators that include:


- progress on the program of training and equipping units and individuals of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior and forming them into operational units;
- readiness assessments of operational units' capabilities; and
- progress in assuming responsibility for security of areas within Iraq.

As of September 19, 2005, 116 ground combat battalions of Iraqi military and Special Police Forces are conducting operations against the insurgency, an increase of 22 over the past three months. Over 192,000 Iraqis have been trained and equipped as members of the police and military forces. This is an increase of approximately 21,000 personnel over

the number reported in the previous report and represents a key indicator of the progress made in development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The criteria for withdrawing Coalition Forces from Iraq remain conditions-based, but one key condition – fielding of capable ISF – is continuing apace. Another necessary development is the growth of required capabilities within the security ministries, including procurement, life support contracting, and personnel management. The U.S. Embassy-Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq recently agreed to assign the mission of developing security ministry capabilities to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTCI) effective October 1, 2005. The military expertise, unity of effort, and added resources inherent in this change will help in producing capable security ministries.

Total Trained & Equipped ISF as of September 19, 2005




Note: Numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces. Police total does not include 67,500 trained and equipped individual police service personnel throughout Iraq.

***Ministry of Defense Forces:** Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel are not included in these numbers. Unauthorized absences are no longer impacting operations. The Army component includes the operational totals of the combat battalions, special operations forces, combat support/combat service support/training units, and the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions.

****Ministry of Interior Forces:** Exact Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel numbers are unknown. However, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) and the Police Partnership Program (P3s) are gaining better fidelity on MOI present for duty status. As a result, all known police AWOL and casualties have been dropped from the rolls and are not included in these numbers.

Source: adapted from "Measuring Stability in Iraq," October 2005, pp. 4 & 27.

Rate of Growth in Trained & Equipped ISF in Fall of 2005



Note: Numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces. Police total does not include 67,500 trained and equipped individual police service personnel throughout Iraq.

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Source: adapted from "Measuring Stability in Iraq," October 2005, pp. 4 & 27 and MNSTC-I.

The Iraqi government continually assesses its force requirements based on current threat. Iraqi forces have already grown from 96,000 in September 2004 to over 210,000 in November 2005. They will reach a total of 270,000 by July 2006. The Iraqi government currently projects an end-state combined total force structure for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior of 325,000 – an increase of about 28,000 since the previous report, mainly because of an increase in authorized army and combat service support personnel at MOD. It plans to reach this level, and complete its total force generation effort, by August 2007.

As the operational environment changes and the Iraqi Transitional Government transitions into the constitutional Government of Iraq, so will the plan for security forces evolve. The force generation program maintains the flexibility to adapt to changing requirements. Both the military and police forces will need to evolve as the insurgency is defeated. The force structure provides for eventual conversion to a more conventional structure in which the military focuses on external security and police forces provide internal security.

Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces

A key measure of progress is the growth in the number of operational units and in the percentage of these units capable of taking the lead in combat operations. Iraqi units are assessed at different levels of readiness. Units at level four are forming – that is, training – and are not considered operational.

Units in the top three levels are all operational – that is, capable of (and frequently engaged in) combat operations against the enemy. Units at level three are fighting alongside Coalition units. Level two units are “in the lead” – this level is the critical achievement that marks the point at which the unit can take over its own battle space. Units at level two can control their own areas of responsibility and, therefore, allow Coalition units to focus elsewhere.

The final level is the one at which the unit is fully independent – not just capable of leading operations but requiring no Coalition assistance in any form. Considering the need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures and command and control, it will take some time before a substantial number of units are assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance.


Levels of readiness for Iraqi units are evaluated by embedded Coalition teams using the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) process. The TRA began less than a year ago and assesses objective as well as subjective measurements of key variables in unit readiness including leadership, command and control, personnel, equipment, training, and sustainment. These variables may change over time – just as is the case for U.S. units – as key personnel rotate, equipment is added or replaced, unit operations tempo changes, and so forth.

As changes occur, especially those that occur in a hostile environment, the assessed level of readiness will change as well.

The following charts depict the capability of MOD units and MOI “military-type” units assessed using the TRA. The number of MOI Special Police Forces units operating “in the lead with Coalition support or fully independent” reflects a re-baselining of MOI Special Police Forces that took place in June 2005. At that time, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) joined these MOI units and began assessing their effectiveness in accordance with the TRA. All of the 28 MOI authorized Special Police Force battalions are trained, equipped and in the fight.

More importantly, the MOI table does not include 67,500 trained and equipped individual Iraqi Police Service (IPS) personnel throughout Iraq.

Iraqi Battalions and Other Units Actively Supporting Counterinsurgency Operations as of September 19, 2005



Note: Transition readiness has not yet been assessed for conventional police forces.

Source: adapted from "Measuring Stability in Iraq," October 2005, p. 29

Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Constitutional Referendum

It should be noted here that the Minister of the Interior (MOI) has responsibility for the security planning for the October 15, 2005, constitutional referendum. As in the January 2005 elections,

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have the principal responsibility for providing security for the referendum. Iraqi police station commanders at the provincial level are responsible for polling center security, while forces of both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior special police will be providing security outside the polling centers.

The total number of ISF today exceeds the number that was available for the successful January 2005 elections by some 60,000. There are 6,235 polling centers, up from 5,677 polling centers in the January elections. Coalition Forces will assist with broad area security.

Progress of Iraqi Security Forces

Much has been made about the observation that only one Iraqi MOD battalion is at level one – fully independent, not just capable of leading operations. Coalition Forces are helping Iraqis not just build combat elements but establish all the supporting infrastructure needed to sustain them – materiel, logistics, doctrine, command and control, and other functions.

Development of Iraqi units takes place in the midst of an insurgency, with the enemy actively attempting to disrupt the re-establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), destroy their infrastructure and equipment, and intimidate recruits. In this context, the progress of the ISF is truly remarkable; even some U.S. allies would not be able to meet level one standards because they do not have the enablers they need to operate fully independently.

Progress also needs to be seen through a wider aperture. The more accurate measure of progress is Iraqi units in the lead – planning and successfully executing counterinsurgency operations, with minimal direct support or assistance of Coalition Forces. It is at level two that Iraqi units can take their own battle space, and it is at that level – where there has been steady progress – that the Coalition is focusing current efforts.

This progress in Iraqi Security Forces development is apparent on the ground. Iraqi battalions of the 3d Iraqi Division, the Border Force, and the Police Commando Division were operating in northwestern Iraq during recent combat operations in and around Tal Afar. Iraqi battalions from several different divisions – police and army – are also fighting in Anbar province with Coalition

Additionally, an Iraqi Police Mechanized Battalion is assisting coalition forces in securing the airport road, and three Iraqi battalions now secure a major thoroughfare in Baghdad (Haifa Street). Iraqi security forces have responsibility for the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and other locations.

The following developments have been taking place in the forces under the command of the different ministries.

Ministry of Defense

- In September of 2005, the Ministry of Defense continued to take over more training functions from the Coalition, including three Regional Training Centers. By this time, the MOD was in charge of the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute (formerly the Combat Service and Support School), the Military Intelligence School, the Military Police School, and the Engineering School. These Iraqi-led schools and training centers were meant to better enable Iraqis to continue improvements in their ability to provide tactical logistical support and combat enablers to the combat battalions.

Ministry of Interior

- By the fall of 2005, that force had grown to nearly 10,000 commandos trained and equipped, with 2,000 coming online between July and September of 2005. This placed MNSTC-I ahead of its projection to train and equip 9,800 Commandos by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 11,800 Commandos, which MNSTC-I planned to train and equip by May 2006.ⁱ
- By September 2005, a total of 67,500 Iraqi Police Service IPS members had been trained and equipped, an increase of 5,500 since July 2005. This fell behind due course for 75,000 IPS trained and equipped by the time of the October 15, projected by MNSTC-I. However, MNSTC-I maintained that it would still reach its full-authorized complement of 135,000 IPS by February 2007.
- By September 2005 more than 44,400 police recruits had completed the eight-week basic police training at the Jordan International Police Training Center and the Baghdad Police College, as well as seven smaller regional academies. The police training curriculum was increased between July and September 2005, and new police academy graduates were receiving informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police. Some IPS station commanders still question the adequacy of initial training, but they are continuing training at the station level.ⁱⁱ
- As of September 2005, there were 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations, an increase of 13 since July 2005. Along with the Iraqi Army, the Special Police Commandos and the Public Order Police contributed to operations in Tal Afar, and the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade was assigned to provide route security to reduce the incident of insurgent attacks along the highway from the International Zone to Baghdad International Airport.ⁱⁱⁱ
- The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 28,300 Border Police, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. These forces are organized into 36 battalions that will man the 258 border forts around Iraq. As of September 20, 152 forts had been completed, with a total of 250 projected to be reconstructed or renovated by November 30, 2005; all border fort construction is scheduled to be complete by January 2006. To stem the flow of foreign fighters from Syria, priority was given to work on the Iraqi-Syrian border in the summer of 2005.^{iv}

Other

- NTM-I completed instructor training for 24 Iraqis in July 2005. The class included nine Iraqi colonels and 15 lieutenant colonels. Eighty-eight Iraqi students started pilot Joint Staff College courses on September 25.^v
- On September 27, 2005 Dr Ibrahim Jaafari, Prime Minister of Iraq, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, opened a new staff college for the Iraqi army, in Rustimiyah in southeast Baghdad. They were accompanied by the Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jaber, the head of the Iraqi armed forces, Gen Babiker Zebari and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, US Marine General James Jones. The College began courses that day for 90 trainees drawn from the rank of major and lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi army. The courses were being given by Iraqi trainers supported by NATO trainers.

Iraqi Ministry of Defense Forces

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces' mission is to defend Iraq against external threats and assist in providing defense against internal threats to national security. The MOD was created in early 2004, and the number of fielded Army combat battalions has increased from zero to 88 – which includes two special operations battalions – plus several support battalions in only 18 months.


Iraqi units are being fully integrated into all major Coalition operations and are playing a key role in fighting the insurgency. This role includes stabilizing and restoring government control to areas after combat operations, such as in Tal Afar. Thus, they are performing numerous missions that otherwise would be done by U.S. or other Coalition Forces. MOD forces also include a small Air Force and a small Navy, including a naval infantry element that will assume missions from Coalition Forces.

MOD continues to generate combat units, but it is increasingly focused on developing combat enablers and logistics support units that enable fully independent operations. Current projections foresee MOD force generation complete by late 2006. Projected end-strength is approximately 131,000. Equipping of these forces continued, using U.S.-funded procurements.

In the past quarter, MOD forces received over 10,000 AK-47 rifles, almost 1,800 pistols, over 2,700 light and medium machine guns, and over 750 light and medium vehicles. Although the July report stated the Iraqi Army had more than 100% of AK-47 requirements, the Army had an additional requirement due to an increase in authorized end-strength.

The Ministry of Defense continued to take over more training functions from the Coalition in recent months, including three Regional Training Centers, and is now in charge of the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute (formerly the Combat Service and Support School), the Military Intelligence School, the Military Police School, and the Engineering School. These Iraqi-led schools and training centers will provide the means for the Iraqis to continue improvements in their ability to provide tactical logistical support and combat enablers to the combat battalions.


Growth of Active Iraqi MOD Battalions



NOTE: Includes Special Operations Forces but does not include combat support and combat service support units


Source: adapted from "Measuring Stability in Iraq," October 2005, pp. 30 & 31.

MOD Combat Forces Capability: Iraqi Units in the Lead or Fully Independent – Growth of All Level Two Formations



NOTE: Includes Special Operations Forces but does not include combat support or combat service support units.
 Source: Adapted from "This Week in Iraq," October 2005, p. 6.

Ministry of Defense Force Manpower Levels: 7/27/05 to 11/16/05



	27-Jul	3-Aug	17-Aug	24-Aug	7-Sep	14-Sep	21-Sep	28-Sep	5-Oct	16-Nov
■ Air Force	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
□ Navy	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700
□ Army	78200	79400	79000	81000	84800	86400	86900	86900	90200	98,600
■ Total	79100	80300	79900	81900	85700	87300	87800	87800	91100	99500

Source: Data drawn from Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Iraq Weekly Status Reports, US Department of State

Equipment Issued Since June 2004

(Includes US & Ministry purchases, and NATO deliveries, through November 3, 2005)

Item	Ministry of Defense Forces	Ministry of Interior Forces	Total
Uniforms	436,337	335,880	772,217
Helmets	119,532	27,020	146,552
Body Armor	95,153	132,232	227,385
Radios	15,868	14,513	30,381
AK-47s	94,883	95,874	190,707
Pistols	17,028	149,292	166,320
Machine Guns	8,310	2,190	10,500
Ammunition	203,265,978	137,462,093	340,728,071
Vehicles	12,123	8,306	20,429

Army

The 86 Iraqi Army combat battalions now conducting counterinsurgency operations include almost 75,000 trained and equipped soldiers organized into nine infantry divisions and one mechanized division; an additional 12,000 troops provide support, training and special security functions.

An indicator of progress in the Iraqi Army is its recent involvement in the counterinsurgency operation “Restoring Rights” in Tal Afar. In this operation, eleven Iraqi combat battalions (a mixture of military and police forces) were employed as independent maneuver elements within their own assigned battle space.

This is an improvement from operation “al- Fajr” in Fallujah late last year, where five Iraqi combat battalions participated, following behind Coalition Forces to occupy ground secured by the Coalition. In Tal Afar, Iraqis led tribal engagement, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction and were partnered with Coalition Forces for public relations and establishing security. Although no exact comparison can be made between the two battles, the Iraqi populace was a key enabler of the reduction in friendly and civilian loss of life during the fighting.

Development of complementary combat support and combat service support continues at the tactical and operational levels. A multi-layered logistics system has been designed, was approved by the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in early 2005, and is being built. The system consists of national-level supply contracts, regional and local base support units, motor transport regiments in each division, and headquarters and services companies in each combat battalion. Because MOD does not yet have organic maintenance capability, MNSTC-I has implemented an interim national maintenance contract.

The Army is equipped primarily with Warsaw Pact weapons, either donated by NATO or other nations, or purchased by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

Some important equipment additions in the past three months include hundreds of Kraz and Gaz trucks (Russian manufacture, purchased by MOD) and hundreds of heavy machine guns. The costs of sustaining the Army's equipment may require the Iraqis to spend significantly more money than they anticipated on maintaining the force structure they want.

Training of individual military recruits follows one of two patterns. Recruits with former military experience can go into a Direct Recruit Replacement program. The Multi-National Force-Iraq Major Subordinate Commands train these recruits following a three-week program standardized by MNSTC-I. Recruits without military experience are sent to a program conducted under MNSTC-I auspices at the Iraqi Training Brigade in Kirkush.

All new recruits undergo the same five-week program of instruction and then receive an additional three-to-seven weeks of training, depending on their military occupational skill assignment. The specialized training develops skills in supply, communications, administration, armor, transportation, maintenance, and military police, among others.

Leadership of Iraqi Army units is assessed regularly as part of Transition Readiness Assessments. Some units excel because they have leaders who are extremely proficient combat veterans; the majority of units have leaders of varying degrees of proficiency.

Absenteeism in the Iraqi military is dependent upon where a unit falls in its training and employment life cycle. During individual and collective training, some recruits determine that the life of a soldier is not for them and leave, while others fail to meet training course standards and are dismissed. Approximately 15% attrition is the norm for initial training. When a unit is fully trained and employed in combat operations, some soldiers find that they do not like the particular location, or they find that the danger of the counter-insurgency is too much for them.

In either event, Iraqi Army policy is that soldiers who leave are dropped from the rolls within a week and are prohibited from ever rejoining the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). What remains is a unit that is confident in its ability to fight, in its leaders, and in its backup (which is increasingly another Iraqi unit). Although deployments to combat sometimes cause absentee spikes of 5% to 8%, soldiers in units in this final stage of development are unlikely to leave the service; absent without leave (AWOL) rates are typically about 1-4% for most divisions. As more and more ISF are generated, absenteeism has become less of a problem.

Recruiting for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continues to be done through national recruiting centers spread throughout the country. The Sunni community is a major focus of recruiting efforts. Sunni enlistments have increased since Sunni religious and political leaders have started expanding their participation in the political process.

The goal remains a diversified force that represents national ethnic and religious demographics and whose allegiance is to the Republic of Iraq rather than to a particular ethnic, religious, or tribal group. All recruits sign a contract agreeing to serve anywhere in Iraq based on mission requirements. The enlistment oath is being revised to include swearing loyalty to the Iraqi constitution.

Some insurgent infiltration of ISF undoubtedly occurs, both through the recruitment process and through bribery and intimidation. Although it is reasonable to believe that it

would be more prevalent in Sunni-majority provinces, the precise extent of such infiltration cannot be known.

The inability of suicide bombers to penetrate police and military facilities regularly is an encouraging indicator. Greater vetting of recruits makes infiltration more difficult. More detailed information in insurgent infiltration is contained in the classified annex.

Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) are embedded with every Iraqi battalion, brigade and division and assess units using the Transition Readiness Assessment; these assessments identify overall unit capabilities including the quality of leadership and unit weaknesses. In addition, the presence of the MiTTs helps the Ministry of Defense forces monitor the risk of insurgent infiltrations.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces

Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) include approximately 1,300 trained and equipped soldiers organized into a single brigade with two battalion-sized operational units: the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force and the Iraqi Commandos. A Special Operations Support Battalion and Special Operations training organization have also been activated. The latter two are currently at Initial Operating Capability, providing only limited capabilities, but will develop into integral enablers of ISOF missions.

The Commandos and the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force have conducted frequent reconnaissance and direct action missions throughout the most hostile and non-permissive areas in Iraq, to include numerous recent operations in al-Anbar province, participation in Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar, and several precision raids conducted in and around Baghdad. On every occasion, the ISOF has proved to be one of the most highly trained, reliable, and effective Iraqi units.

The ISOF operates primarily with U.S. equipment to enhance interoperability with U.S. Special Forces, sustainability, and the long-term bilateral working relationship. This equipment includes the M4 carbine, M240 machine gun, M2 .50 caliber heavy machine gun, and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). Fielding of individual equipment continued during the past quarter, as did fielding of eight M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs).

Although the ISOF is fully equipped for combat operations, they still lack the organic ground and air mobility assets necessary for rapid deployment throughout the country.

There were no major changes in the past three months in the training program for ISOF. All ISOF continue to undergo careful pre-training screening/vetting and extremely rigorous training.

The success of the ISOF in combat operations is directly attributed to their comprehensive training program. Completion of ranges and barracks at unit locations will facilitate more effective training and command and control.

Leadership of ISOF is assessed monthly with the Transition Readiness Assessment system. Senior leadership is assessed as generally strong, as is the junior leadership. Absent without leave (AWOL) rates in ISOF are insignificant.

Increasing Army Deployment and Activity

According General Casey, Iraqi Security Forces had conducted about 160 combined or independent operations at the company level and above in May 2005. By September, that number was up to 1,300. Casey further stated that some 60,000 to 70,000 more Iraqi forces would be available to provide security during the October 15 referendum than were available during the January 2005 elections. This number will have increased to 100,000 more Iraqi security force personnel by the time of the next parliamentary election on December 15, 2005. The growth was so significant, he said, that he's only had to ask for an additional 2,000 troops to help protect the 2005 referendum and election progress, compared to 12,000 in January for the first election.^{vi}

In October 3, 2005, the U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq officially handed over military control of parts of central Baghdad to the Iraqi Army's Sixth Division. The move transferred control of security responsibilities for the Karkh and Rasafa districts. The Coalition had also begun transferring control of bases to Iraqi command. On September 6, 2005, the US Army handed over its base in Najaf, giving Iraqis full control of the city. On September 28, 2005, the US handed over its base in Karbala, south of Baghdad, giving Iraqis full control of the city.

Iraqi National Force Deployment: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005

(in Numbers of Combat and Support Battalions)

Location	1 July 2004	19 October 2005
Baghdad (Greater Area)	0	4
Baquba (CE)	0	4
Fallujah (CS)	0	6
Hillah (CS)	0	2
Al Kasik (NW)	0	6
KMTB (CE)	3	3
Mosul (NC)	0	1
Numaniyah (CS)	0	3
Ramdi (CW)	0	11
Taji (SC)	3	5
Tal Afar (NW)	0	3

Equipment

Iraqi forces were finally beginning to get significant armor. Under a \$5 million contract with Iraq's Ministry of Defense, Washington-based Defense Solutions was refurbishing 77 T-72M1 tanks and four BT-55 recovery vehicles to be delivered to the Iraq Army. The tanks had originally been built in Poland and the Czech Republic, and were mothballed in Hungary, one of the few countries authorized by the US government to do business in Iraq. The refurbishing is part of the effort to stand up the Iraqi Army's first armored division by December.

Designated the 9th Motorized Rifle Division, the new Iraqi heavy division will be made up of two mechanized brigades comprising nine maneuver battalions, and will include two battalions of T-72 tanks, two of T-55 tanks, and five BMP-1 armored personnel carriers.^{vii}

Operational Readiness

In the summer and fall of 2005, Coalition forces began turning over key areas and cities to Iraqi control:

On June 1, the Multinational Force officially transferred full responsibility for security at a base in Dibbis to the Iraqi Army.

On August 21, the Multinational Force turned over Camp Zulu in As Suwayrah, Iraq, in the Central South sector, to the Iraqi Army.

On August 31, the Iraqi Base Support Unit assumed control of all perimeter force protection in a sector in Kirkuk.

On September 6, the MNF handed over security responsibility in Najaf.

Iraqi Army units continue to assume security responsibility in the western region. They currently are conducting independent security and offensive operations in Rawah and combined zone reconnaissance near the Syrian border.

September 6, 2005-- The U.S. Army handed over its base in Najaf, giving Iraqis full control of the city. Najaf, 100 miles south of Baghdad, is the holiest city in Iraq for Shiite Muslims and was the scene of heavy fighting last year between the U.S. Army and the militia of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

September 28, 2005—The US Army handed over its base in Karbala, south of Baghdad, giving Iraqis full control of the city.

September 29, 2005—British forces handed over their main base in the city of Basra to the Iraqi military to allow it to take over the main security duties there.

October 3, 2005-- The U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq officially handed over military control of parts of central Baghdad to the Iraqi Army's Sixth Division. The move transferred control of security responsibilities for the Karkh and Rasafa districts.

To put these details in perspective, the Iraqi Army did not control the battlespace in any area as of October 2004. In October 2005, 3 battalions controlled battlespace area in the northeast, two brigades with four battalions were controlling battlespace in the west, two brigades with 9 battalions were controlling battlespace in the greater Baghdad area, and 8 battalions were controlling battlespace in the southeast. A total of 24 battalions were now controlling their own battlespace.

As another example, in the fighting in Fallujah in November 2004, a total of 9 Coalition and 5 Iraqi Infantry battalions were involved. The Iraqi forces followed behind Coalition forces and protected their flanks. In September 2005, in the fighting at Tal Afar, the Iraqi forces deployed 11 Infantry Battalions and the Coalition deployed 5. Iraqi forces fought independently, Iraqi headquarters units executed command and control of Iraqi forces, and Iraqi units controlled their own battlespace.

Creating an Officer Corps

New efforts were also made to include Sunni and former Ba'athist officers and create truly national forces. At the end of major combat operations in 2003, some 400,000 to

500,000 Iraqi soldiers, who had served Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party, were relieved of their duties in the disbanding of the Iraqi Army. After more than two years of the insurgency that followed, the Iraqi Army invited former Ba'athists to return to the ranks. On November 2, the Iraqi Army invited junior Iraqi officers who had served under Saddam Hussein to serve in the ISF.

The move was meant not only to assist the filling out of the nascent officer corps, but to re-enfranchise the predominantly Sunni Arab cadre of soldiers who had lost their jobs when the erstwhile Iraqi Army was disbanded in 2003. Recruits to the Iraqi Army have been largely Shi'ite in nature, yet fighting primarily in Sunni areas. The potentially negative cultural impact of a force which could appear sectarian was another concern which the move to re-incorporate Sunni elements into the ISF seeks to allay.

Senior officers were not invited back, although some former senior officers under Saddam had already been selectively recruited back to senior positions in the new Army. A statement by the Ministry of Defence indicated that all returning ex-Ba'athist soldiers would undergo a screening process, including interviews designed to screen out potential insurgent elements.^{viii}

Progress also occurred in the broader officer training effort. As of November 2005, MNSTC-I reported the following progress in terms of ISF personnel matriculating through professional development and education programs:

Joint Staff College Instructors: 24

Joint Staff College Students (Junior/Senior Courses): 88 in training

Military Academy Graduates (IMAR and Zakho): 377

Military Academy Cadets (IMAR and Zakho): 657 in training

Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses: 441

Contracting Capacity Course: 170

Number of ISF Personnel Who Received CS/CSS Training as of November 2005

Combat Support Courses

Intelligence	795
Engineers	866
Signal	582
MPs	748

Combat Service Support Courses

Bomb Disposal	207
Transportation	1971
Maintenance	790
Supply	667
Logistics Officer	250
Medical	498
Administration	369
Instructor Training	615

The State of Iraqi Intelligence Capabilities

Iraqi intelligence was also improving. An example of a success that was partly based on Iraqi intelligence was seen in the joint Coalition-Iraqi strike on Tall Afar in mid-September 2005. In a video teleconference with reporters on September 13, Third Armored Cavalry Regiment Commander Col. H.R. McMasters told reporters that the involvement of Iraqi troops played a key role in the success of the operation. About 5,000 Iraqi security forces and around 3,500 U.S. troops participated in Tall Afar operations during the first two weeks of September, the colonel said.^{ix}

McMasters credited the integration of Iraqi troops into operations for having been able to collect good intelligence on the whereabouts and identities of insurgents operating in and around the city. To date, Coalition and Iraqi forces had killed 118 terrorists and captured 137, while suffering one US killed and 11 wounded and eight Iraqis killed and 19 wounded, according to McMasters.^x

At a September 29 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld pointed to a sharp increase in tips coming into Coalition or Iraqi authorities, which he said had increased from 480 tips in March 2005 to over 3,300 in August 2005.^{xi} Figure 32 depicts the number of tips recorded from the Iraqi population from March 2005 through August 2005, as recorded by MNC-I.

Progress in the Force Evaluation Matrix

During a September 30, 2005 press briefing, Gen. Casey explained that the three Level 1 units were actually one brigade and two battalions, and that they failed to meet these re-adjusted standards upon re-evaluation. Upon re-evaluation, it was found that only one battalion out of 110 met standards for the top tier of readiness. In terms of troops, this means that no more than 750 troops out of some 200,000 were rated at Level 1.^{xii}

Casey further explained that units rated Level 2 and 3 were functioning units, and that there was no fixed number of Level 1 units needed as a gauge for handing over the mission and withdrawing US troops. He cited the example of the September 2005 Tall Afar strike, which consisted of one US brigade, three Iraqi brigades, and an Iraqi infantry division.

None of the Iraqi units, according to Casey, were Level 1; they all rated either Level 2 or Level 3.^{xiii}

At the time of the Casey press briefing, slightly more than three dozen battalions rated as capable of taking the lead in counterinsurgency operations, provided that the US providing advisory support attacks helicopters, logistics and medical support, as well as combat troops.^{xiv} At the briefing, Donald Rumsfeld stressed that overall ISF growth was more important than trying to gauge success by shifting readiness assessments.

It should be stressed that “Level 1” is not a measure of unit combat capability per se, but rather the ability of a unit to operate without Coalition logistic support and supply, or support from Coalition armor, artillery, and airpower. The priority in Iraqi force development has been to create combat battalions. Until Iraqi divisions and brigades get all of the headquarters, combat and service support units, and logistic back they need, it is very difficult to reach “Level 1” status. Even then, Level 1 units will still be dependent

on Coalition mobility, artillery, armor, and firepower for major combat operations until the Army and Air Force are reequipped with heavy weapons.

The effectiveness of battalions rated Levels 2 and 3 is significant. At Level 2, battalions were capable of planning and successfully executing counterinsurgency operations, with minimal support of coalition forces. Since 2004, the number of Army combat battalions had risen from zero to 88. Figure 38 shows a total of fully 36 were now taking the lead in operations or are fully independent, while 52 more were engaged in side-by-side fighting with Coalition forces. Projected end-strength, according to an October 2005 Executive report to Congress, was 131,000, with force generation to be completed by 2006.

Casey said that MNSTC-I was now focusing on combat enablers and logistic support, so as to increase the independence of MOD forces from Coalition assistance. Development of complementary combat support and combat service support continued at the tactical and operational levels. A multi-layered logistics system had been designed, was approved by the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in early 2005, and was being built. The system consisted of national-level supply contracts, regional and local base support units, motor transport regiments in each division, and headquarters and services companies in each combat battalion. Because MOD does not yet have organic maintenance capability, MNSTC-I had implemented an interim national maintenance contract.^{xv}

Transition Readiness Assessment Categories

Level 1	Fully Independent	A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning and executing operations, and sustaining itself, without Coalition support.
Level 2	In the Lead	A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with some Coalition support.
Level 3	Fighting Alongside	A Level 3 unit is capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
Level 4	Forming	A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of capable of counterinsurgency operations.

Strategic Infrastructure Battalions

In early 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government directed the formation of four Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) to protect critical oil pipelines and eventually to protect parallel electrical transmission lines. Ministries that own critical infrastructure are currently responsible for providing security for their facilities. They use a mix of their own ministerial guard forces and contracts with local tribal forces. Coalition forces provide security in some instances as well.

Since the July report, the SIBs have been integrated into the Ministry of Defense (MOD) force generation plan and are built on the standard Table of Organization and Equipment for an Iraqi infantry battalion. Training of these battalions utilizes a “train the trainer”

model: Iraqi instructors are first trained; these instructors are then responsible for training of their individual companies. The first four SIBs are manned and will complete unit training in mid-October.

MNSTC-I is providing mission-essential equipment to the SIBs, such as AK-47s, vehicles, Individual Body Armor, helmets and uniforms. The Iraqi government has begun fielding up to seven more SIBs, bringing the total authorized to eleven with a possible end-state total of 17 or more SIBs, but they are minimally equipped and untrained. MNSTC-I has agreed to match

MOD-provided funding up to \$35 million to fund start-up costs for the first four SIBs. Training for all SIBs will follow the same model. The SIBs are being assessed using the Transition Readiness Assessment system.

Navy

The Iraqi Navy is executing operational missions that include border and waterway protection from smuggling and site protection of port and oil assets in the Gulf. The Navy currently has over 700 trained and equipped sailors and Marines organized into two squadrons.

It is anticipated that the Iraqi Navy will assume point defense responsibilities for the offshore oil terminals. Coalition military and civilian advisors will work closely with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to ensure it has the capacity to handle this transition. The Iraqi Navy's ability to conduct planned operations with Coalition partners has suffered as a consequence of a lack of MOD funding and contracting execution capability for fuel, and an ongoing inability to provide sufficient spare parts and maintenance, resulting in operational missions being cancelled. Iraqi

Marines are continuing their manning of oil platform defense stations under the guidance of U.S. Navy advisory training teams.

The Iraqi Navy operates five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Dual Outboard Engines), and ten Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats. The naval forces are further equipped with various small arms and Night Vision Devices. Current planning calls for the Iraqi Navy to be equipped with three al-Faw class patrol boats by December 2005 and with an additional three by September 2006.

Design deficiencies (e.g., seawater strainers below the waterline) and construction shortcomings (e.g., poor welding) of the one Al Faw boat already delivered are causing significant delays in fielding these patrol boats. Funding for two Off-Shore Support Vehicles has still not been provided, affecting the Navy's capability to support itself in maritime operations.

The Iraqi Navy Training Department continues to conduct all of its own training, assisted by the advisory support team. Training is focused on maintaining basic seamanship skills and on maritime patrol operations. Leadership of the Iraqi naval forces is assessed through the Transition Readiness Assessment system. Senior commanders are generally strong, although weak staffs inhibit their effectiveness. A strong group of junior officers provides a foundation for future naval leadership. The absent without leave (AWOL) rates in the Iraqi Navy are insignificant.

In a Defense Department Briefing on September 22, 2005, Vice Admiral David Nichols reported on the state of the Iraqi Navy. VADM Nichols was the Commander of US Naval Forces Central Command out of Bahrain:

The Iraqi navy, though small, is already integrated into our maritime security ops in the northern Gulf as well as Iraqi navy marines aboard the Iraqi oil platforms in the northern Gulf... the Iraqi navy, as I said, is fairly small -- about six patrol boats, a total of about 700 sailors, and there are around 400 marines or so. But they have pretty much continuous patrol boat presence in -- again, in our Northern Gulf Maritime Security Ops. Because the Iraqis know the lay of the land and understand what they're looking at out there a lot better than we do. They've been very helpful there. The Iraqi navy marines, as I mentioned, we have them aboard the oil platforms now. And in the not-too-distant future -- and I'm calling that about November -- most of the security effects aboard the oil platforms will be Iraqi navy marines.

So, on the one hand, there's good progress there by the Iraqi navy, as I think there is overall in Iraq in terms of building the security capability. On the other hand, there is plenty of work to be done there to continue to help the Iraqi navy build, particularly the sustainment, logistics support, other kind of capacity it's going to need to be operationally effective.

When asked about what platforms the Iraqi Navy would need in the future -- be that planes, ships, increased capabilities of whatever variety -- VADM Nichols replied as follows:^{xvi}

Well, you know, I think there's good news there. One of the tendencies when you're -- is to go for big ships and big airplanes, kind of blue-water navy sort of capability. But the Iraqis, again, with the help of this U.K.-led team that's part of MNSTC-I -- the Multinational Security Transition Command -- I think they've got their requirements in the right quadrant. They know that they need things like small patrol boats that give them the ability to enforce sovereignty inside their territorial waters, and in the waterways Shatt al-Arab and Khor Abdullah, which are the key to the re-establishment of legitimate commercial activity in southern Iraq.

I would say the biggest -- the most important thing is not in terms of their requirements in terms of platforms. But again, I'll go back to my last point. It's about building the ability to sustain, and again, MNSTC-I and others, including us, are working hard with them to help them on that. I mean, it's going to be a gradual and an iterative process, and I believe that we're going to be involved in maritime security ops in the northern Gulf for a while.

Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force has more than 200 trained and equipped personnel. A squadron of three C-130E aircraft operates regularly from Ali Air Base. The squadron supported the recent counterinsurgency operation in Tal Afar by transporting Iraqi Army soldiers and commandos to Tal Afar in late August and early September.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) still has not concluded a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to sustain the C-130E fleet, resulting in MNSTC-I continuing to fund operations and maintenance costs. Resolution of the FMS case remains an issue that MNSTC-I regularly addresses with the MOD.

The Iraqi Air Force also operates a fleet of small reconnaissance aircraft: two Seekers, six CompAir aircraft, and six CH-2000s. The Seeker and the CompAir aircraft are flying reconnaissance missions daily. The six CH-2000 aircraft are currently grounded for engineering deficiencies. A lack of Ministry of Defense funding limits fuel and spares for the reconnaissance aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force also operates five Bell Jet Ranger helicopters.

These aircraft are used for training purposes only. The helicopter fleet also includes four donated UH-1 helicopters in Iraq. Another twelve are being held by Jordan awaiting final decision by the Iraqi Air Force on conversion to Huey Two, a version more capable of operating in the Iraqi environment. None of the UH-1 aircraft in the Iraqi Air Force are currently operating, because of maintenance problems.

Training for the Iraqi Air Force consists of pilot sustainment and conversion training. Maintenance training is also being accomplished. All training is provided by the Coalition Air Advisory Support Team. Iraqi pilots generally have many hours of flight time, but tend to be senior officers. A system of recruiting and developing junior pilots needs to be developed.

Leadership of the Iraqi Air Force is still being developed and is formally assessed using the Transition Readiness Assessment system.

Iraqi Air Force Equipment: Historical Figures 1990 to 2005

Type	Week Ending				
	1990	1995	2000	2002	2005
Bomber	16	~6	~6	~6	-
Tu-22	8	4	4	4	-
Tu-16	4	-	-	-	-
H-6D (PRC)	4	2	2	2	-
Fighter/Attack	390	216	116	96	-
J-6 (PRC MiG-19)	30	30	-	-	-
MiG-23	90	70	40	20	-
Mirage F-1 EQ/BQ	94	55	45	45	-
Su-7	30	20	-	-	-
Su-20/Su22	70	45	15	15	-
Su-25	60	25	15	15	-
Su-24	25	1	1	1	-
Fighter	245	140	90	85	-
J-7 (PRC MiG-21)	40	35	35	35	-
MiG-21	150	75	40	40	-
MiG-25	25	15	5	5	-
MiG-29	30	15	10	5	-
RECON	~12	~5	~5	~5	16
CH2000	-	-	-	-	8
SB7L-260	-	-	-	-	2
Comp Air SL7	-	-	-	-	6
MiG-21	5	-	-	-	-
MiG-25	7	5	5	5	-
AEW					
II-76 Adnan	2	-	-	-	-
TANKER					
II-76	1	2	2	2	-
TRANSPORT					
C-130E	-	-	-	-	3
An-2	10	5	5	20	-
An-12	10	5	5	3	-
An-24	6	6	6	6	-
An-26	2	2	6	6	-
II-76	19	4	4	4	-
TRAINING					
AS-202	35	20	20	20	-
EMB-312	80	70	60	50	-
L-29	50	20	-	-	-
L-39	50	50	50	50	-
MB-233	16	8	-	-	-
PC-7	50	25	25	25	-
PC-9	30	30	15	12	-
Yak-11	10	-	-	-	-

*The figures for 1990 and 1995 reflect estimated total aircraft inventory, and during this timeframe most of these aircraft could be assumed to be operable. From 2000 on, the figures reflect operational aircraft only. Thus, the change from 1995 to 2000 reflects a reduction in the estimated number of operable aircraft, rather than the total number of extant airframes, which is probably largely unchanged. Data taken from GlobalSecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/air-force-equipment.htm>

NATO Training Mission

The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is helping to build the Iraqi Security Forces with training and advisory support to middle- and senior-level leaders at locations such as the National Joint Operations Center, Ministry of Defense Headquarters Joint Operations Center, and the Iraqi Staff College. A key role of the NTM-I is to assist in the development of the new Staff College.

As noted earlier in this report, NTM-I completed instructor training for 24 Iraqis in July 2005. The class included nine Iraqi colonels and 15 lieutenant colonels. A Senior Joint Staff College course, similar to a command and general staff curriculum, has a planned duration of approximately nine months. A seven-month junior course has been developed for officers who have attained the rank of captain or major. Eighty-eight Iraqi students started pilot Joint Staff College courses on September 25.


Iraqi Ministry of Interior Forces

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces consist of the Iraq Police Service (IPS), Special Police (Police Commandos, Public Order Police, and the Mechanized Police), Civil Intervention Force, the Emergency Response Unit, Border Forces, the Highway Patrol, and Dignitary Protection. Current projections foresee MOI force generation complete by August 2007.

Projected end strength is approximately 195,000. In the past quarter, MOI forces received more than 21,000 AK-47 rifles, almost 15,000 pistols, and more than 1,700 light and medium machine guns. They were also issued more than 1,900 light and medium vehicles. Individual MOI personnel received almost 19,000 sets of individual body armor and more than 10,000 Kevlar helmets.

Insurgent infiltration is likely a more significant problem in Ministry of Interior forces than in Ministry of Defense forces. Because the police are often recruited by local police chiefs with little Coalition oversight, infiltration tends to be somewhat higher in the police than in the military and paramilitary forces. Although infiltration harms the ability of the police to combat the insurgency, it does not render the forces incapable. The exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown at this time; the topic is addressed further in the classified annex.

Ministry of Interior Force Manpower Levels: 7/27/05 to 11/16/05



	27-Jul	3-Aug	17-Aug	24-Aug	7-Sep	14-Sep	21-Sep	28-Sep	5-Oct
■ Police & Highway Patrol	64100	64100	67000	67000	68800	68800	68800	68800	69900
■ Other MOI Forces	30700	31300	32900	34000	35000	35500	35500	35500	35600
■ Total	94800	95400	99900	101000	103800	104300	104300	104300	105500

Source: Data drawn from Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Iraq Weekly Status Reports, US Department of State. Note: Unauthorized absences personnel are included in these numbers

Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the primary organization for local civilian policing in Iraq, analogous to “beat cops” in the United States. Their mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The police are organized into patrol, station, and traffic sections in all major cities and provinces in Iraq. Iraqi citizens are becoming more comfortable making direct contact with the IPS to report local crime, although a local “tips” hotline remains popular because of the anonymity it provides. The IPS continues to improve in performance and professionalism, increasingly using appropriate methods and developing consistency in law enforcement.

Training

A total of 67,500 IPS have been trained and equipped, an increase of 5,500 in the three months since the last report. MNSTC-I is currently behind in its projection to train and equip 75,000 IPS by the October 15 referendum; however, MNSTC-I estimates that it will reach its full-authorized complement of 135,000 IPS by February 2007. Training of Iraqi police continues at the Jordan International Police Training Center and the Baghdad Police College, complemented by seven smaller regional academies.

The police training curriculum was recently increased significantly, effectively adding two full weeks of training to the previous eight-week course. To date, more than 44,400 police recruits have completed the eight-week basic police training. As mentioned in the last report, new police academy graduates receive informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police. Some IPS station commanders still question the adequacy of initial training, but they are continuing training at the station level.

IPS personnel with previous police or military experience attend the three-week Transition Integration Program (TIP). To date, more than 35,800 veteran police have received the three week TIP training. Almost all eligible veteran police still on the force have now completed the program. In the past quarter, more than 17,000 police personnel have received additional specialized training on subjects as diverse as interrogation procedures, counter-terrorism investigations, and election security. Annual refresher training for serving police has also been implemented, with more than 6,600 serving police officers already completing the three-day course.

Recruitment and Vetting

The work of the Ministry of Interior Qualifying Committee (MOIQC) to weed out “ghost employees” (who are being paid but not working) and other police who do not meet minimum standards continues. The MOIQC continued its biometric data collection efforts that will assist in proper vetting of the MOI employees and support the separation of unqualified Iraqi Police Officers.

To date, the MOIQC has collected approximately 150,000 personnel profiles and is expected to complete collection in 15 of the 18 provinces during the fourth quarter. Profiles collected by the MOIQC will eventually be linked to human resources and pay; the Ministry of Interior has not yet initiated the process of dismissing those employees who are being paid but not working.

Equipment

The IPS uses a variety of equipment: small pick-up trucks, mid-size sport utility vehicles, medium pick-ups, AK-47s, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, high frequency radios, and body armor. Logistics capabilities continue to be an area of concern for the IPS, particularly regarding vehicle maintenance and distribution of supplies and equipment. Construction of IPS stations has slowed due to insurgent intimidation and assassinations of construction personnel.

Effectiveness

Absent without leave (AWOL) rates are a significant problem in areas where there is considerable strife, such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Samarra. This situation is largely attributed to intimidation by the insurgents. Absenteeism in the Iraqi Police Service is difficult to quantify because the patrol, station and traffic police are operating without significant transition team oversight. IPS absentee data will be more precisely known when International Police Liaison Officers are more readily able to work at local police stations on a regular basis.

To further the development of the Iraqi institutional capability at the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has established a multi-disciplinary coalition team to work with critical MOI personnel. Its task is to help build policy and procedures to enable the MOI to function more effectively as a national ministry. The team is based at MOI headquarters and comprises personnel from both CPATT and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. Development of administrative procedures for the dispersed IPS is a key task for this team.

Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility.

Special Police Forces

The Special Police Forces are a high-end, elite paramilitary police force tasked with providing a national, rapid-response police capability to counter armed insurgency, large scale civil disobedience, and riots. There are 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations – an increase of 13 since the last report. The Special Police include three separate organizations: the Special Police Commandos (providing light infantry for counter-insurgency operations), the Mechanized Police (providing light armor for counter-insurgency operations), and the Public Order Police (specializing in re-establishing order in high-risk environments).

Along with the Iraqi Army, the Special Police Commandos and the Public Order Police contributed prominently in operations in Tal Afar. The assignment of the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade to provide route security was key in reducing the incident of insurgent attacks along the highway from the International Zone to Baghdad International Airport.

Special Police Commandos

Almost 10,000 Commandos have been trained and equipped, an increase of almost 2,000 since the last report. MNSTC-I is therefore currently ahead of its projection to train and

equip 9,800 Commandos by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq has authorized a total force of more than 11,800 Commandos, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. New recruits to the Special Police Commandos, who typically are seasoned military veterans, undergo six weeks of intense training at the Special Police Commando academy in northern Baghdad.

Each training cycle is designed to accommodate 300 to 500 students. The syllabus spans weapons qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, vehicle check points, and improvised explosive device characteristics and recognition. The effectiveness of the Special Police Commandos has been established in numerous operations. They have repeatedly demonstrated willingness to engage the enemy in locations such as Samara and Baghdad (including Haifa Street).

As stated in the last report, the Special Police Commandos' equipment is non-U.S. in origin with the exception of the primary tactical vehicles. Small arms and crew-served weapons are principally Glock pistols, Eastern-bloc AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and RPK and PKM light machine guns. Most organizational clothing and individual equipment is manufactured in Iraq.

Iraqi Special Police Deployments: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005

(in Numbers of Combat and Support Battalions)

Location	1 July 2004	19 October 2005
Baghdad (Greater Area)	0	20
Fallujah	0	2
Habbaniyah (CS)	0	0
Hillah (CS)	0	1
Kaski (N)	0	0
Mosul	0	2
Numaniyah (CE)	0	0
Quaim	0	2
Ramadi	0	1
Rutbah area	0	2
Samarra	0	2
Tajir (CN)	0	0
Talil (SE)	0	0
Umm Qasr (SE)	0	0
Zahko (N)	0	0
Zubayr (SE)	0	0

Mechanized Police

Almost 1,200 Mechanized Police have been trained and equipped, an increase of 300 since the last report. MNSTC-I has now reached the target force structure authorized by the Government of Iraq, so further basic training is necessary only for force sustainment. In conjunction with their operational mission, the brigade is undergoing Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) transitional training at Camp Taji, just north of Baghdad. The two-week transition course focuses on vehicle operations, communications, and vehicle maintenance.

One battalion of Mechanized Police is equipped with Russian BTR-60s armored wheeled vehicles fitted with 23mm cannons. Although some of these vehicles were recovered from the former regime, others were donated by Jordan. Two battalions of ASVs will eventually round out the brigade. These ASVs are armed with .50 caliber machine guns.

Public Order Police

The Public Order Police complete the Special Police triad. Almost 7,000 Public Order Police have been trained and equipped, an increase of 1,200 since the last report. MNSTC-I is therefore currently on track to train and equip its target of 7,400 Public Order Police by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq has authorized a total force of approximately 10,600 Public Order Police, whom MNSTC-I plans to train

and equip by May 2006. Public Order Police receive six weeks of training at Camp Numaniyah, with a syllabus similar to that of the Special Police Commandos.

The Public Order Police use a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid-size sport utility vehicles, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, high frequency radios, and body armor. As noted in the last report, each battalion and member is currently equipped with all mission-essential equipment.

Effectiveness

Leadership in the Special Police Forces is evaluated monthly using the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) system. Special Police Transition Teams are collocated with special police in the field, where they provide daily mentoring on proper police procedures as well as preventing human rights violations.

The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team support personnel and International Police Liaison Officers make unannounced visits to special police force sites to assess progress, particularly regarding detainee handling. Allegations of detainee abuse and extra-judicial police actions by the Special Police Commandos are cause for concern. The MNF-I, MNSTC-I and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq are taking immediate steps to ensure Iraqi investigation of abuse allegations and to promote public reporting on the investigations, aiming thereby to build public confidence in Iraqi Special Police Forces.

Although the allegations of misconduct are troubling, the Special Police Forces provide a significant capability to the Ministry of Interior, and the growing pride and dedication of its personnel are demonstrated by their operational successes and a minimal rate of absent without leave (AWOL). Strong leadership, key to the continued development and professionalism of these three organizations, is routinely demonstrated by the junior officers and young noncommissioned officers.

Special Police Courses/Personnel Attended as of November 2005

Special Police Courses	
Basic Criminal Investigation	2,678
Internal Controls	667
Violent Crimes and Kidnapping	1,114
Junior, Mid-Level, and Senior Management and Leadership	1,427
Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement, and Criminal Intelligence	859
Interviews and Interrogations	755
Explosive Hazard Awareness and Post-Blast Investigation	262
Counter-Terrorism Investigations	220
Critical Incident Management and Incident Command System	836
SWAT (28 Provincial Teams)	769
Dignitary Protection, Motorcade Escorts, and Site Security	1,578
Election Security	828

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005

Emergency Response Unit

The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) is a small, elite, national unit trained for high-risk search, arrest, hostage rescue, crisis response, and explosive ordnance disposal missions. During the past quarter, the ERU operated nearly nightly in both Mosul and Baghdad. After depleting the target insurgent population in Mosul, the contingent there re-deployed to Baghdad for continuing operations in support of security for the upcoming constitutional referendum and national elections.

Approximately 300 ERU members have been trained and equipped, an increase of 100 since the last report. MNSTC-I is therefore currently on track to train and equip its projection of 300 ERU members by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq has authorized a total force of almost 750 ERU members, whom MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by November of this year.

The ERU training consists of a four-week basic training course and a four-week advanced course. Courses include instruction on basic handling of detainees, human rights training, target reconnaissance, physical fitness, and basic mission planning. For selected personnel, this training is followed by an eight-week Explosive Ordnance Disposal course or a six-week Intelligence/Surveillance course. While an average of 15% of personnel are dropped from each basic course, the ERU currently experiences minimal rates of absent without leave (AWOL).

The ERU receives strong mentorship, through contract support, from former U.S. special operations personnel, who develop leadership and mission planning and execution capabilities. The ERU consistently demonstrates strong officer and non-commissioned officer leadership. Senior leadership is still learning how to use a competent non-commissioned officer level of leadership.

Border Forces

Approximately 17,000 Border Police have been trained and equipped, an increase of 1,500 since the last report, but lagging the projection of 21,000 border forces by the October 15 referendum.

The Government of Iraq has authorized a total force of more than 28,300 Border Police, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. These forces are organized into 36 battalions that will man the 258 border forts around Iraq. As of September 20, 152 forts have been completed, with a total of 250 projected to be reconstructed or renovated by November 30, 2005; all border fort construction is scheduled to be complete by January 2006.

To stem the flow of foreign fighters from Syria, priority of work in recent months has been on the Iraqi-Syrian border. The Ninewah and al-Anbar Brigades are each working their way to the Euphrates River, restoring border control as they progress. Border units in the region are supported by ten-person Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The BTTs' members are trained in various specialties, including logistics and communications, and provide critical assistance to the border force commanders in the areas of personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting, and equipment accountability/maintenance.

Equipping requirements for border forts and unit headquarters were determined earlier this year. Delivery has been tied to development of an accountability system. Typical organizational equipment includes small and medium pick-up trucks, mid-size sport utility vehicles, generators, and base radio stations. Personal equipment (e.g., AK-47 rifles, individual body armor, and medium machine guns) completes the outfitting of the border forces.

Three academies with a capacity of 800 each are utilized for training border patrol students. Border training focuses on an introduction to law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons qualification, combat life-saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling. The curriculum undergoes regular modification in response to the evolving threat environment.

The decentralized and dispersed nature of this force has fostered an environment in which corruption, "ghost" employees, and absent without leave (AWOL) rates remain a

significant concern. As mentioned in the last report, some areas of the border appear to have a high level of insurgent infiltration.

Coalition advisors are assisting Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) leadership in rectifying these problems. A Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) is being developed for the border forces. Until the TRA is fielded, evaluation of the border forces is conducted informally. The border force TRA reports will commence in October 2005.

Iraqi Border Fort Development

(as of October 18, 2005)

	MND-NC Turkey & N. Iran	MND-CS Iran Cent	MND –SE Kuwait & S. Iran	MND-W Saudi	MND NW Syria & Jordan	Total
Complete	45	14	50	29	25	163
Under Construction	45	6	13	14	17	95
Total	90	20	63	43	42	258

Iraqi Highway Patrol

The Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP) is a national force tasked with securing the main highways. The IHP includes performing armed escort and law enforcement duties along Iraq’s highway system.

Command and control of the IHP remains a contentious issue. The force was designed to be a national one, but has been subordinated to the provincial police departments. This turmoil has disrupted the IHP, causing a slight decrease since the last report to approximately 1,300 patrolmen, and below the projection to train and equip 1,600 IHP by the October 15 referendum.

The Government of Iraq has authorized a total force of 6,300 patrolmen, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by August 2007. Discussions with ministry leadership are ongoing to address the command and control issues.

As discussed in the last report, IHP officers must first qualify as police officers before attending a follow-on four week training program at Taji Highway Patrol Academy. The follow-on training covers basic policing, driving skills, convoy escort, and weapons qualification with pistol, rifle, and machine gun. The course was extended from three to four weeks in July 2005 to provide a more robust syllabus.

Equipment

The IHP is equipped with small pick-ups, mid-size sport utility vehicles, medium pick-ups, AK- 47 rifles, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, high frequency radios, and body armor. Distribution of supplies and equipment, as well as additional logistical and pay issues, continue to challenge the effectiveness of the IHP.

Effectiveness

A Transition Readiness Assessment will be conducted on the IHP National Headquarters and eight operating IHP stations by November 2005. Informal assessments currently being provided indicate that leadership in the IHP remains an issue. Some of the senior officers are extremely competent, while others still need considerable improvement to be effective independent of Coalition support. The absent without leave (AWOL) rates have not yet been assessed.

Center of Dignitary Protection

Approximately 600 personnel have been trained and equipped for the Center of Dignitary Protection (CDP). Training for personnel consists of four sub-courses: Tier I Personal Security Detachment (PSD) (five weeks), Tier I Motorcade Escort (four weeks), Tier I Site Security (two weeks), and Tier II PSD (four weeks). Courses emphasize defensive and lifesaving driving skills, site security, control point access, bomb threat actions, improvised explosive device counter-measures, facility and route reconnaissance, security functions, and basic life saving.

Although no official Transition Readiness Assessment exists for the CDP, contract mentors and advisors attached to each team provide detailed assessments. The procedures utilized by the CDP Tier I PSDs are continually evaluated and modified to increase effectiveness. Each PSD is provided basic equipment kits. During the month of September, thirty armored vehicles were issued to the Tier II PSDs.

MNSTC-I Training Definitions for MOI Forces as of November 2005

COMPONENT	TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	New Recruits: 10-Week Training Serving, Academy Graduates: 3-Week Transition Integration Program; Specialized Training; Refresher Training
Public Order & Mechanized Police	6-Week and 5-Week Specialized Training
Special Police Commandos	6-Week Specialized Training
Emergency Response Unit	4-Week Basic; 4-Week Advanced Specialized Training
Dept. of Border Enforcement	4-Week Academy and Specialized Training
Highway Patrol	3-Week Academy Training
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3-Week Initial Training, 2-3-Week Advanced Training; Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy SEALs

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005.

Criteria for Withdrawing Forces

U.S. forces will withdraw from Iraq as their mission is successfully accomplished. As noted in the July report, criteria for withdrawing Coalition Forces from Iraq are conditions-based, not calendar-based. There is not a timeline or milestones that directly tie the drawdown of Coalition forces to increased numbers of capable Iraqi battalions. Drawdown will occur in a phased, gradual manner as Iraqi forces become capable of taking the lead within areas of Iraq and in concert with Iraqi progress in political and economic capabilities.

To assist in determining when conditions permit handing over security responsibility from Coalition Forces to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the United States, the Iraqi government, and our Coalition partners have established the Coalition-Iraqi Joint Commission to Transfer Security Responsibility from Coalition Forces to ISF. Transfers will be effected on an area-by-area basis and will occur only with the approval of the Iraqi Prime Minister, the U.S. Ambassador, and the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq. Transfer of responsibility will depend on achieving conditions for each area in such categories as:

- levels of present and projected insurgent activity;
- readiness and capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces;
- readiness and capabilities of relevant government institutions; and
- ability of Coalition Forces to reinforce the ISF should this become necessary.

The ability to meet these criteria will continue to be affected by progress in political, economic, and other areas.

As reported previously, other conditions that will support and hasten success include the continued reconciliation of the various ethnic communities in Iraq. Recent polling data indicate that the various groups within the Iraqi body politic have made impressive progress towards coexistence within a political process. Additionally, the increase in registered voters, combined with polling data that indicate that Sunni Arabs believe that it was a mistake to boycott the January election, indicate that the Iraqi people are becoming active stakeholders in their own future. This will have an important impact on the security situation.

The expanded engagement of the international community is vital for the security situation within Iraq and in the region. Continuing United Nations and NATO commitments are similarly critical to Iraqi and regional stability and security. The March 2005 Arab League summit ended with a promise for increased diplomatic representation between its member states and Baghdad, along with a call to restructure Iraq's debt within the Arab League. The engagement of Iraq's neighbors will be critical to encouraging the Iraqi people to move peacefully down the path of political progress, as well as closing down the continuing stream of foreign terrorists entering Iraq.

ⁱ Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, October 2005.

ⁱⁱ Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, October 2005.

ⁱⁱⁱ Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, October 2005.

^{iv} Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, October 2005.

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^{vi} Donna Miles, “Casey Cites Continued Progress in Iraq Despite Challenges,” American Forces Press Service, October 1, 2005, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil>.

^{vii} Greg Grant, “‘T-72s To Bolster Iraqi Military,” Defense News, October 24, 2005, p. 34.

^{viii} “Iraq invites former Ba’athist to join army,” The Barre Montpelier Times Argus, November 3, 2005, available at: <http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051103/NEWS/511030371/1002/NEWS01>

^{ix} Gilmore, Gerry J. “Tall Afar Terrorists 'On the Run,' U.S. Officer Says,” American Forces Press Service, September 13, 2005, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050913_2729.html

^x Defense Department Report: Iraq Operational Update (U.S., Iraqi forces make major effort to eliminate enemy forces in Tall Afar). Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: <http://usinfo.state.gov>

^{xi} Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq and the Central Command Area, September 29, 2005, transcript printed by the Federal News Service.

^{xii} Dana Priest, “Generals Are Upbeat On Iraq,” Washington Post, October 3, 2005, p. 10.

^{xiii} October 1, 2005 Press Briefing with Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. George Casey, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050930-sedef4002.html>

^{xiv} Greg Jaffe and Yochi J. Dreazen, “As Bush Pledges To Stay In Iraq, Military Talks Up Smaller Force,” October 5, 2005, p. 1.

^{xv} Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, October 2005.

^{xvi} Briefing to the Department of Defense by VADM David Nichols, September 22, 2005, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050922-3963.html>