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InsideBy Joe F.
Khalil
Nearly everybody agrees that reality television in the Arab
world has changed the way we, as viewers, relate to television. This
programming genre has been the center of much debate ever since the
first group of reality participants was locked up in a villa. These
views can be divided in four categories:
° Judging by the
popularity of reality TV in the Arab world, many Western journalists
welcomed and praised its “democratic” values and modern,
taboo-shattering appeal.(1)
° Both religious
groups and intellectual/creative elites were critical of the genre.
The prior view reality TV as threatening Islamic values and
traditions while the latter see in it a decadent, low-brow form of
art. At best, these views were rejectionist and condemnatory.(2)
° Professionals
in television and advertising celebrated the increase of audiences
in prime-time television as this translates into financial rewards.
There was a renewed faith in a production that could be truly
Pan-Arab, both in terms of participants and audiences.
° In a true
academic tradition, very few scholars addressed this emerging
popular culture phenomenon. Yet it now is generating a debate within
academic circles.
Much of this
article started as a journal describing my meetings with “reality”
colleagues and students when I was (un)lucky enough to consult or be
consulted on various shows and formats. These scattered notes
provided a starting point for an articulation and exploration of the
phenomenon of reality television in the Arab world. What has
resulted is an attempt to look at the process of continuity and
change within a vibrant industry.
Understandably, it is
difficult to establish a perfect vantage point in order to assert
the definite direction of the genre. Will reality television remain
established and popular? And what exactly are the implications of
this new genre? Indeed, the the term “Arab reality television”
itself seems to be cause much confusion. This study is a
contribution to the emerging assessment of this programming genre.
I will start by
tracing the history and development of reality television in the
region. What you will be reading is an account—not the history—of
reality television from the inside. What does reality television in
the Arab World mean to those involved in the selection, production
and selling of those programs? What factors contributed to the
flourishing of the genre? What roles did the successes of some shows
and the failures of others have on future productions? Central to
these questions is the belief that the popularity of these shows is
multifaceted, contested and still unfolding.
In other words,
reality television is a representation of reality. Inaccessible in
its raw form, reality or its tele-visual representation becomes
available once selected and processed by the producers of reality
television. The unfolding of reality, as we see it on the screen, is
a process involving a number of people. This paper is concerned with
this group of programmers, producers, technicians and advertising
salespersons. As a matter of fact, understanding this genre starts
by looking at the processes by which it came to be planned, produced
and broadcast.
History
and Development
In previous research(3) , I have
examined program adaptations of Western franchises that were
produced on Arab television channels. That study evaluated the
nature, continuity and change in program transfer after the
introduction of television technology in the region. As a summary of
those findings, I observed the growth of a “live on air” television
drama in the 60s. A decade later, programmers started producing
classical dramatic works of Arab and world literature,(4)but they
also were beginning to look at Western shows for either inspiration
or plagiarism. By the '80s, a practice Albert Moran refers to as
”copycat TV”(5) had become common, in which major successes were
“Arabized” versions of predominantly European and American shows. In
the '90s, it became common for the concept of a Western show, its
rights and production bible, to be bought and locally reproduced for
regional consumption. For a price, the format came with a plethora
of consultants (creative and technical) and various computer
software and machinery. Overall, the study also discussed the
wholesale cloning and licensing of programs in the case of
variety/game shows, but it did not approach reality television as it
had only recently been introduced to the Arabic television milieu at
the time.
I would like to
approach this study of reality television by establishing some
essential premises. First, producing reality shows involves a
variety of managerial, creative and technical aspects. Second,
reality shows are mostly licensed formats that programmers buy for a
particular region or territory, in this case the Arab world. These
reality shows by nature have a multitude of influences, including an
important economic component. The practice of “paying for” a format
as opposed to “freely” imitating or cloning a show makes economic
considerations central. At this stage, the following questions seem
de rigueur: How new is reality television in the Arab world? And is
the buying of a licensed format the starting point for this
discussion?
The Lebanese
station Murr Television (MTV) was a pioneer in buying
internationally successful reality TV formats as early as the fall
of 1996. Known for its adventurous programming tactics, this channel
viewed some of the game-show formats as a means of capturing
audiences in preparation for its Pan-Arab broadcast. For five years,
MTV was producing Arabic versions of French and Dutch formatted game
shows such as Family Feud and Everybody’s Equal.
During the same period, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC)
and the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) respectively produced
the Arabic versions of the French Fort Boyard and the
British Who Wants to be a Millionaire. This experience
paved the way for the possibility of buying an international format,
training the technical team and producing and promoting it as a
“local” show. In addition, management and advertising executives
became convinced of the financial reward of buying a format given
both audiences and clients interest. This industry trend should not
be isolated from other factors such as an increase in monitoring
intellectual property violation and a boom in satellite broadcasting
capabilities. In fact, it is during that same period that the United
States was leading a movement towards adopting stricter anti-piracy
and copyright laws, while both NileSat and ArabSat were providing
incentives to terrestrial channels to broadcast on
satellite.
In 2002, MTV,
LBC, Future Television (FTV) and MBC were all in negotiations to buy
reality television formats.(6) These negotiations were focused
primarily on the financial viability of these shows. The growing
interest in formatted shows in general had caused licensing fees to
increase tremendously. As an illustration, the licensing fee per
episode rose 1,500 percent between the first game show format Family
Feud, in 1996, and the latest reality license for The
Apprentice, which was to go to production in 2005.(7) Program
buyers for all these stations were keeping a close eye on the
international markets and their competitors. It was just a matter of
time before one station ventured into the production of reality
television.
Any in-depth
discussion of reality television should not reduce it to a recent
phenomenon linked to the rise of the genre in the Western world. The
cause-effect relationship results in a very narrow view. Instead, I
would argue that the rise of reality TV in the Arab world was a
two-phase development. First came a “foundation era” in which
producers and marketers at Arab channels became used to or convinced
of the strategy of buying Western formatted programs and game shows.
Secondly, a “developmental era” witnessed a major buzz as public
awareness of the genre grew and even controversies that erupted over
the first reality TV programs added to the hype. Format adaptation
acts, then, as a turning point between the two eras. On one hand,
the industry became watchful of the international markets, as well
as open to the discussion of format-buying as a source for
programming. At the same time, the audience’s reception of formatted
shows offered a de facto proof of popularity.
The “foundation
era” can be traced to the early Arab television of the 1950s and the
1960s, when the need for a large number of programs, coupled with
the lack of video recording technologies, gave rise to a unique
genre of “real drama.” The shows were mostly broadcast live, so one
actor could not always predict what the other would say or do.
Consequently, those actors, mostly amateurs and poorly trained,
developed a certain level of improvisation and wit to enable them to
deal with the real, unexpected dramatic situation. Playwrights would
sketch out a situation, flesh out the characters and sit behind the
camera operators. As the improvisation unfolded live before their
eyes, they injected characters and scenes or even suggested lines.
In Lebanon for example, this practice was common with the works of
Shushu, Abu Salim and Abu Melham. Personal conversations with actors
and various anecdotal incidences confirm this practice.(8) This
experience of early television suggests a sketchy resemblance to
today’s reality television.
While the '70s
saw the rise of grand masterpiece drama, the '80s offered what many
consider as the first reality TV show: Candid Camera.(9)
(See the article on Egypt’s version of Candid Camera in
this issue) That show was produced in almost every Arabic country at
some point during the 1980s and the 1990s. Following the same
American pattern, this show put real people in ridiculous situations
and recorded their reactions. In Lebanon, LBC was pioneer in
offering several seasons of this show during the '80s, as did
Tele-Liban, MTV and FTV in the '90s. Because of privacy concerns,
other more conservative parts of the Arab world, like Kuwait,
concentrated on situations featuring celebrities. Candid
Camera was produced with basic technology relying on people's
simplicity and lack of television literacy.
One of the stars
of LBC's Candid Camera, Tony Khoury, went on to present two
distinctly different shows that set the stage for a wider acceptance
of reality television. The first was called Wakkef Ta
Kellak (Stop So I Tell You). The premise is simple: the
presenter roams the streets with a special truck, stops a person
randomly and asks him/her to execute a request in order to win the
contents of the truck. The tasks ranged from collecting certain
products to organizing a rally, but all were captured, edited and
presented in this one-hour show. The second show was originally
designed as a special one-off New Year's Eve program, but soon
became a fixed yearly event. On the eve of the new millennium,
audiences were hooked by a human interest story—the dream of a
family come true. The show followed the same presenter of Wakkef
Ta Kellak as he tried to help a family reunite, find a loved
one, or achieve a level of happiness. More like a docudrama, the
show could not sustain its success. Interestingly, the last special
aired on the eve of 2003 to be replaced the following year by the
launch of Star Academy in its first season.(10)
The transition
to the “development era” did not happen overnight. From 2002 to
2003, Arab, and particularly Lebanese, channels were experimented
with reality as an emerging genre. In fact, there was a period of
adjustment, featuring a process of trial and error. To illustrate,
one of the under-researched television channels is Zen TV. Launched
in December 2001, the channel offered a fresh mix of programs
produced, presented and managed by a young team of recent graduates
who were ready to experiment with new ideas and technology. Various
Music Television (MTV)-style shows were created, including a
variation on MTV’s Road Rules. Zen TV was essentially
experimental. It provided a platform for young talent to learn on
the job and an interactive forum for this staff to interact with
Arab audiences. It also tested various docu-drama approaches.
Introduced in
January 2003, Super Star quickly became the most
significant show of that era. Broadcast on FTV and licensed by
FermantleMedia’s British version of Pop Idol,(11) Super
Star attempted a transparent Pan-Arab search for the next star
singer, using casting calls, judges, live performances and, most
importantly, the audience’s right to vote.(12) Arguably, the show is
a cross between a reality and a variety show. While the search for
the possible super star definitely captured real moments, feelings
and events, the weekly performance show is in the pure tradition of
variety shows. Undeniably, the contribution of Super Star
is multifold:
1. It
re-emphasized the commercial viability and value of the
format
2. it proved
again that an all-Arab show can be successfully produced
3. It was the
first Idol franchise to feature contestants from different
countries
4. It allowed
for an unprecedented interactivity between the audience and
television(13)
5. It showed an
audience united in watching the show but divided along nationalist
lines when voting for the ‘superstar’(14)
6. Its success
sped up the competitive exploration of reality television.
In February
2003, LBC launched its first reality show in preparation for the
selection of Miss Lebanon. Following a national casting call, the
finalists lived together in “The House” (a luxurious villa and spa).
For six of the eight weeks, the public, including Pan-Arab
audiences, voted for the removal of two candidates each week.
Meanwhile, the girls were being monitored by cameras that
transmitted their lives live on a 24-hour channel.(15) The
experimental nature of this Miss Lebanon special was present on four
levels:
1. It was a
training field for the team in charge of preparing for another
upcoming reality show, Star Academy
2. It introduced
a new kind of interactivity in the form of short text messaging from
mobile phones
3. It provided
an opportunity to test the set of rules of conduct in respecting
“Arab values” as cameras filmed participants around the
clock
4. It took the
pulse of advertising and marketing interest for such programs. While
this experiment was repeated the following year between June and
August, it was only treated as summer filler with not much hype or
success.
By November
2003, LBC and MBC were racing towards a target launch date for two
Endemol(16) reality productions respectively: Star Academy
and Big Brother. Additionally, an unexpected competitor
joined the race—Arab Radio and Television (ART) dedicated one of its
Al Awael channels to a 24-hour reality show Al Hawa Sawa
(On Air Together). Beginning December 2003, this reality matchmaking
show featured girls courting a marriage proposal on air for three
months, 24-hours a day. This exposure was important in launching the
reality wave because:
1. It tested the
conservative audience reception
2. Participants
with no special talents had the potential to become
celebrities
3. It was a
format completely re-adapted to consider “Arab values.”(17)
But the primary importance of this show was its adoption by
ART, owned by the Saudi company Dallah El Baraka and known for a
conservative approach to broadcasting.
The last day of
December 2003 witnessed the birth of the most successful Arab
reality show: Star Academy. Following Endemol’s format for
the French version,(18) Star Academy’s team identified a
group of talented Arabs and invited them to join the Academy, where
they lived and trained to become star singers. A “graduation
process” allowed the instructors at the academy to nominate two
candidates and the public would vote for one of them to stay in the
Academy. Star Academy stretched the limits of reality
television because of its unprecedented popularity and because it
represented the full realization of a marketing and sales potential
that included various ancillary activities discussed in detail
below. Perhaps the show’s main impact, however, remains its
consistent audience loyalty to both the “prime”(19) episodes as well
as the 24-hour dedicated channel.
At the same
time, another show also was in preparation, this time in Bahrain.
Broadcast for just over a week between February and March 2004, Al
Ra’is (Big Brother) was a shocking “reality check” to many in the
industry. Another Endemol format, the show was a popularity contest
between a group of girls and guys living together in a purpose-built
villa. While effort was made to re-adapt the show to accommodate
cultural and religious sensitivities, Al Ra’is nevertheless
caused a wave of uproar in the Arab media which resulted in its
cancellation. Three main realizations came out of the Big Brother
experience:
1. !t was the
first and last attempt to produce a 24-hour reality show outside of
Lebanon
2. It revealed a
divisive nature of reality television along conservative religious
versus liberal lines
3. It revealed
the unpredictability of the genre. These realizations will factor in
further discussion below.
In an attempt to
renew its commitment to reality television after the scandal of
Al Ra’is, MBC made a comeback with an Arabic version of
Fear Factor renamed Thadda El Khouf (Defy Fear).
Produced in Argentina during the spring of 2004, the show lasted for
only one season. Consequently, its impact was limited to allowing
MBC to remain in competition by offering a new reality TV show.
Interestingly, MBC appeared to have learned a lesson from the
failure of Al Ra’is. Starting with Fear Factor,
MBC’s reality shows were all based on a controlled environment, with
a flexibility to edit before broadcasting. Also during June of the
same year, MBC produced the long-standing international format of
Star Search, renaming it Najem el Noujom. This
singing talent show included some reality sequences but primarily
was a variety show.
By the first
weeks of January 2004, LBC was preparing for a fall replacement for
Star Academy—an Arab version of Survivor. The
show, produced in Kenya, used a crew composed of French, Lebanese
and Kenyans. The French team already had worked on the French
version of the show, while some of the Lebanese crew had worked on
Fort Boyard. The Kenyans were local scouts who provided
general assistance. As noted, this was not LBC's first experience
outsourcing a production to a third party. It had done that with a
French team for Fort Boyard and it gathered members of that
same team for Survivor. The show aired between September
and December 2004, earning only limited success. Several elements
contributed to this disappointment, including the absence of a live
component with games and audience participation. Furthermore, the
location was completely alien to the viewers. These very same
elements now are being taken into consideration prior to starting
work on an improbable second season.
The rest of 2004
witnessed a proliferation of reality shows as the phenomenon came
into full swing. In addition to a second season of Super
Star, Future TV (FTV) ventured into various new reality
formats, some of which gained relative success. In Wedding
Express, for example, a couple was offered a fixed amount of
money to negotiate their wedding ceremony and the camera followed
them as they negotiated with suppliers. FTV also introduced a
special Ramadan program starring actor Adel Karam, who would hit the
streets and ask people to answer questions or perform stunts in
return for cash. In so doing, FTV managed to (1) introduce a
cost-effective reality production; (2) interact with the viewers on
the street; and (3) combine reality with an element of the game show
genre.(20) In spite of the setback caused by the death of its owner
Lebanon’s prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, Future Television also
re-launched the third season of Super Star in September
2005.
Interestingly,
the Future Television experience was imitated in 2005 on a newly
revamped Dubai Television. Lead by the previous manager of Future
Television and executed by a number of his assistants and producers,
Dubai television offered several reality shows.(21) The much talked
about Al Daw al Akhdar (The Green Light) monitored the
progress of a group of contestants as they collaborated on a
“goodwill” activity. The show had no winners or losers, but depicted
a socially responsible activity such as raising money for
Palestinian refugees and offered an “ethical” alternative to racier
reality TV like Big Brother and Super Star.
In 2005, LBC
produced a relatively less successful third season of Star
Academy, and halted the production of an Arabic version of the
The Apprentice a few weeks before the start of filming. LBC
also postponed the decision to produce the second season of
Survivor and did not produce Miss Lebanon because of
Lebanese security concerns. However, LBC produced two celebrity
reality shows: Al Wadi (The Farm); and Dayf al-Beit
(The House Guest). Both shows constitute a major turning point
in the course of reality television: Celebrities are the
participants in these shows. In Al Wadi, a group of Arab
celebrities come to assist the singer Hayfa Wehbeh in maintaining
her farm, while in the second show, a celebrity spends a day taking
care of a family, particularly the kids.(22)
MBC started 2005
with a production of Worlds Apart which it renamed El
Beyt Mish Beytack (This House is Not Yours). Essentially, the
show transplanted an Arab family into an alien community such as
Kenya, Ghana or Mongolia. The audience got to monitor the family’s
survival instincts, their adaptation skills, frustrations and the
new friendships. The show was consistent with MBC’s approach to
reality television, echoing its slogan “The World Through Arab
Eyes.” Moreover, it coincided with the channel’s move towards
becoming the “Arab family channel.” Almost simultaneously, MBC
introduced Starting Over with a literal Arabic translation
as Min Jedid.(23) The show followed a group of women trying
to overcome their problems and make a positive change in their
lives. Assisted by various professionals, these women lived together
and engaged the audience through a weekly special episode, where
host Rania Barghout updates the women’s progress and debates the
audience and the professionals on the main themes of the week. The
show introduced a new “reality” approach close to the soap opera
with women's stories narrated as a series with dramatic cliffhangers
at the end of every episode.(24)
In short, from
2003 to 2005, reality television became an established programming
genre in the Arab world. Competition between LBC and MBC meant that
each channel produced at least three shows a year. Interestingly,
ART never produced another reality show again after Al Hawa
Sawa. Following an experimental stage, each channel developed
its own niche; LBC maintained a consistent delivery of shows
involving a “Prime” show and a 24-hour dedicated channel. After the
devastating Big Brother experience, MBC limited itself to
daily or weekly episodes showcasing the participants “activities”
while maintaining close control on production, editing and
broadcasting. Aside from Super Star, Future Television did
not produce any significant reality television shows. Finally, the
following conclusions may be drawn:
• Lebanon was a breeding
ground for the production of reality television. The very few shows
produced outside Lebanon had Lebanese managerial, creative and
technical crews.
• Reality television is an overarching term
which includes various genres. In the Arab world, it primarily
started as talent searches and then reality game shows. Gradually,
other formats were introduced, including lifestyle programs and
celebrity “docu-soaps.”
• One company Endemol almost
dominated the licensing of reality shows. At one time, it had two
shows under production: MBC with Big Brother, and LBC with
Star Academy.
• Apart from Candid Camera,
which was a Ramadan staple, reality shows are not produced or
broadcast during the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan, despite the fact
that it is a prime period for TV viewing and advertising.
The
Definition of Reality Television in the Arab
World
There is an inherent hybrid nature in the
conception, execution and promotion of reality television shows and
in this the Arab world is no exception. Consequently, the term
“reality TV” itself is too general and has taken on different
meanings to those who use it. Essentially, reality television has
become the two words that advertising sales, programmers, producers
and technicians use to create a buzz around their programs. In the
following, I am offering a definition of reality television from the
creative, technical and advertising perspectives. It is beyond the
scope of this study to offer a comparative definition of reality
television that merges an Arabian and the more common European or
American definitions, but I will explore what the genre means for
the developers of reality television in the Arab world.
Primarily, the
role of television programmers often is elided in the examination of
the end product, but their role should not be marginalized.
Particularly in the case of format licensing, it is the programmers
who spot, decide, negotiate and sometimes force the production of
these reality shows. They have witnessed the success of the format
in other countries, monitored the episodes; made an appropriate
financial offer and want “Arab audiences to experience the
international successes of reality television.”(25) In other words,
the buying of a previously tried and tested Western format is
generally a reliable way of ensuring programs can compete and win
ratings. Once they sign the format deal, programmers look for two
talents: a producer who can carry the weight of the show and a
presenter who can incarnate the spirit of the show.(26)
Reality
television is a producer’s genre. As a team, the producers set the
stage for an activity that they direct, frame and edit.(27) To the
producers, the definition of reality television often hides behind a
jargon that refers to the origination, combination or presence of
reality elements within any show. For instance, they refer to shows
depending on their shooting location “on the road” or in a
“purpose-built” studio environment. They talk about presence or
absence of a host, celebrity or “voice of God” (announcer or
narrator) and almost always their production is promoted as a “never
seen before” novelty. Although by definition reality TV is
“unscripted,” in fact many elements are tightly controlled. In this
sense, reality television producers are storytellers—by planning
tasks, selecting sequences, editing and combining elements, they
define “reality.”
For the
technicians, every show is a challenge to their wit, expertise and
ability to challenge the "foreigners." The presence of foreign
consultants is always an occasion for the technicians to learn and
to prove that they can outdo their competitors. Audio engineers,
cameramen and technicians try to adapt their equipment and
experience to the requirements of the show and for these
technicians, reality has come to mean an exciting and competitive
challenge.
Before the show
is even produced, an army of advertising sales people try to get the
word out. Primarily, they look for the following ingredients: first,
that the show is a proven international success; second, that it has
Pan-Arab audience appeal; and the program is entertaining. In fact,
the word “reality” has become synonymous with a sure success.
Usually, it is by simply adding to the word ‘reality’ that sales
pitch is complete. For instance, advertising people will talk about
a “reality” sequence within a talk show, a “reality” approach to an
interview, or a “reality” style for the camera work. As a
programming genre, “reality” has become such an infatuation that the
mere mentioning of the word triggers smiles throughout corporate
advertising meeting rooms.
To summarize,
then, reality television is a format that is bought from
one of several Western companies. Ideally, the show should have been
produced in at least one other country to allow for comparison,
evaluation and possible training. The format has to have the
potential of being Pan-Arab. For instance, its contestants
should be selected from a number of representative Arab countries.
The most common pool of participants come from countries either
considered liberal (such as Egypt, Lebanon or Jordan) or from those
with solid advertising bases (such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).
Moreover, the show should have a familiar or exotic setting.
However, it should not oppose Arabic values. To explain
this situation, both programmers and advertising sales agree that
the show should be confined to what is permissible by “Islamic
standards.” This rather complex Islamic/Pan Arab nature of formats
will be discussed in detail in a later section of this
paper.
The Creators
The introduction of
reality television to the Arab region has changed the way
programmers and advertising sales persons addressed production. Up
until the reality era, television directors used to make all the
creative and organizational decisions related to the production. It
was a tradition inherited from filmmaking, in which the director was
the source of all decisions and the role of producers was restricted
to an accountancy or management job. With the early reality formats,
an emerging role for the producer began to take shape under the
primary influence of contractual bindings. Licensing agreements
follow a particular production bible that calls for the position of
a producer to handle the organization as well as the editorial
control of a particular show. But it was not until the “development”
era of reality television that we witnessed the establishment of a
significant role for the producer. As pointed out earlier, this
change was taking place primarily in Lebanon where most of these
productions and their staff are located.
The most
important change in the organizational control of the production
process in Arab television is that the variety of production
positions have become professionalized since it became important to
coordinate the various creative and production activities to succeed
in producing reality television in the Arab world. Consequently, a
relative margin of freedom has been given to executive producers in
casting, hiring and packaging their shows. At the same time, these
“liberties” were attached to a series of innovative advertising
practices. When combined, these practices produced the most
expensive television genre to be executed in the region.(28)
Just where did
these producers come from? What lay behind this loosening of
financial and creative control? And how did advertising influence
this creative process? As argued, programmers paid for a “reliable”
idea -- a secure road to success. This reliance on Western format
purchasing undoubtedly is due to a combination of the Arab world’s
fascination with Western media and the sound business reasoning that
a proven format guarantees a return on investment, allowing
programmers to release anywhere between $5,000 to $70,000 as
licensing fee per episode. Such prices were inflated by
competitive bidding by various channels. This battle for rights to
produce formats requires further study, but suffice it to say that
the evaluation of financial risk or promise partially explains the
environment in which producers flourished and helps explain the way
in which these producers were recruited, trained and managed.
Reality
television came at a time when the pool of underemployed or
unemployed creative labor in the Arab media was getting larger
because of a number of interrelated factors. By September 2002, the
Lebanese government had shut down one the country's most vibrant
television channels, MTV, leaving more than 400 employees without
jobs. In addition, Zen TV’s productions scaled down dramatically
after the main partner on the project pulled out. Meanwhile, more
and more universities were graduating students majoring in
journalism, mass communication and the audio-visual arts. While
there are no official numbers of graduates, a safe estimate will put
those above one hundred per year in Lebanon alone. On the Pan-Arab
market, the Gulf-based channels seemed stagnant except for the
transition of MBC and the establishment of Al Arabyia, while the
long-awaited re-launch of Dubai Television and Al Jazeera’s promised
documentary channel was causing frustrations amongst graduates
interested in more serious work.
In addition to
this glut of journalism graduates and media talent, three main
elements contributed to the growing number of reality television
producers. First, the nature of reality television does not require
extensive experience in any particular form of mass media. In fact,
producers came from various backgrounds, including fresh graduates,
but also journalists, entertainment producers, news reporters etc.
The main criterion was the ability to work under pressure and long
hours -- something many were willing to do in order to get a foot in
the door. Secondly, given the hybrid nature of reality television,
each producer attempted to use it as a platform for his or her own
creative pursuits, or at least to demonstrate skill. Thirdly, the
training and exposure to new technology was an added value to
working in this field. For instance, LBC trained its core reality
staff on Miss Lebanon before moving them to Star
Academy. As expected, some of those producers remained with the
show while others sought opportunities with other channels given
their new-found “expertise” in the genre.
Having noted this
growing presence and status of producers in the reality TV genre,
the following discussion will address the increasing interest of
programmers and advertising sales in reality television—an interest
which translated into lucrative investments. Undoubtedly, the
Western success of reality television triggered the original
interest of programmers in the genre. It was impossible to escape
the euphoria created around reality shows at television market
exhibition such as Le Marché International des Programmes de
Télévision (MIPTV- the International Market for Television
Programmes) in France. These shows were bought because they provided
various opportunities with a low-risk and high-return investment.
Programmers know they are minimizing their risk when they adapt a
show that has appealed to various target audiences around the globe.
In addition, they are assured high production values, given both the
available technology and the presence of foreign consultants since
being a licensee entails having access to technical support,
training and supervision. Therefore, both licenser and licensee have
a vested interest to maintain a higher production value.
At the same
time, programmers are tempted by reality television's potential for
high ratings, which in turn can be translated into financial
rewards. Given the archaic status of audience research methods,
programmers rely on a combination of gut feeling and tested formats
to make their buying decisions. Reality television draws its
participants from the Arab world, particularly ones that are
considered advertising targets. The financial success of these shows
is more often then not linked to the success—or at least perceived
success—of the nationals of those countries, particularly in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Furthermore, the ancillary programming
that accompanies or is inspired by the reality shows is another
valued asset of reality television. Programmers increasingly are
interested in filling their airtime with rehashed or re-packaged
material. Some of these practices include the development of a daily
show, wraps and/or the launch of 24-hour channel created for the
show. Probably, this trend can be witnessed in the
institutionalization of Star Academy with concerts, CD's,
music videos, and other paraphernalia, all revolving around the
show's themes and stars.
Added to this
income is the revenue from advertising. A 30-second commercial costs
between $10,000 to $12,000, compared to an average of $5,000 for
other prime-time shows. Advertisers also are encouraged to sign onto
exclusive or co-sponsored agreements. Reality’s Pan-Arab appeal
attracted major advertisers willing to spend anywhere between
$250,000 to a couple of million for a sponsorship package. A system
of branding and product placement also was developed to cater for
both the sponsors as well as other advertisers' needs. As a result,
it is not unusual to listen to a conversation between two
participants about a particular brand and even less unusual to see
the participants parading various sponsored products on air. Another
growing area of advertising revenue is related to interactivity.
Increasingly, text messaging is used for voting participants in or
out of a show and for sending messages that will be displayed on a
scroller in the lower third of the screen. A typical deal would
involve three or four parties: two mobile telecoms in the calling
and receiving country, the television channel and possibly a fourth
party that handles the voting/display/censorship system. The
channels receive a cents-per-call figure usually ranging between 10
to 40 cents.
All the above illustrates a positive contribution to the
state of television production in the region, including increasing
job opportunities, entrepreneurial programming spirit and
advertising revenue. Nevertheless, one should not forget three
essential observations relating to the working conditions and the
evolution of the television business. There are over a hundred
positions directly related to reality television in the region.
Should the audience become less attracted by the genre, what would
happen to those employees?
Similarly, Arab
channels’ reliance on formatted shows, particularly in terms of
reality television, has resulted in a peculiar situation. One on
hand, most of those producers are working out of an already existing
production bible, potentially affecting their ability or willingness
to develop their own ideas. On the other hand, programmers may be
less reluctant to pursue a locally developed format which they would
ordinarily consider a risky adventure. This often works against the
development of local talent.
The
Continuing Debate
I started this
paper by examining a wide spectrum of views concerning reality
television in the Arab World, ranging from condemnation to
celebration. In addition, I have suggested the need for further
serious study. In the previous sections, I traced the development of
the genre with an emphasis on factors relating to the nature of
television in the region. Particularly, I was concerned with
managerial, creative and technical forces that presented this genre
to the Arab audience. In the following, I hope to address that
debate and offer an idea worth exploring.
As I have noted,
reality television is produced almost entirely by Lebanese for an
Arab audience. The historical development suggests that culturally
and economically Lebanon was a ripe ground for the ferment of
reality television. On one hand, the Lebanese social context is open
to exploring Western ideas and on the other hand, a pool of talent
is readily available and affordable. At the same time, I have
stressed the structural needs for respecting Islamic, particularly
Saudi, values because of the powerful influence of sensitive and
conservative Gulf-based advertisers and viewers. Creative and
advertising personnel working on reality TV programs in the Arab
world cautiously interpret and continuously rewrite the rules of
what can and cannot be broadcast. The dilemmas of how and whether
creative producers should or should not faithfully adhere to
original formats, which I am exploring in a different study,
suggests that socio-cultural elements, specifically Lebanese and
Islamic, are at the centre of format adaptation for the Arab
World—its Arabization.
The Arabization
of an international format involves as much adherence to a
Lebanonization as does Islamization. My use of Arabization refers to
the repackaging of Western formats to Arabic-speaking audiences. The
process of Lebanonization involves the staffing, the aesthetic and
editorial treatment of the format, while Islamization refers to the
various codes that producers apply in evaluating their stories. In
other words, Lebanonization is not a reductionist notion; rather it
helps explain the introduction of words like the French
'nomine' for nominee in Star Academy, and the
Western looks and language on Al Wadi. At the same time,
Islamization justifies the prayer rooms in Big Brother, and
the taboo subject of religion in Star Academy.
In the
Arabization of an international format, both programmers and
advertising salespersons have a vested interest in balancing
Lebanonization and Islamization. In doing so, they achieve a
Pan-Arab audience appeal while maintaining an Islamic “safe margin”
that guarantees continuous advertising support. One can argue that
Big Brother's failure is partly due to a lack of
Arabization—the show failed to strike a balance. Through
Lebanonization, it achieved its first few days of success when the
audience was getting hooked on the characters. This was followed by
an Islamization stage where participants were afraid to touch, play
or even talk to each other. The inability to strike a balance was
instrumental in the cancellation of the show.
The success of
the Arabization of these shows needs further study. For instance,
what would explain the success of these reality shows at a time when
a more real, harsh and bitter truth was offered on Al Jazeera and Al
Arabyia? It was during and after the latest Iraqi war that reality
television flourished. It is true that programmers were eager to
maintain an audience that was shifting from general entertainment
channels to news channels. But while this explanation might satisfy
the business, programming and production angles; but it does not
answer questions about those in the audience who watched and voted.
Just like game
shows, reality television is a format—a patented product with a
reproduction permit that is sold in return for money and copyright
recognition. Issues of flows, meanings, globalization and
"hybridity” are central to a better understanding of this format. In
other words, the boom in reality television in the Arab world is
closely related to issues of structure and reception. Ignoring one
or the other robs the phenomenon of its full significance.
In attempting to
avoid the danger of overemphasizing the “democratic freedom” of the
reality TV audience, it is important to note that primarily private
media is supporting reality television government media is still
cautiously exercising creative control. Central to this point is the
role of advertising in encouraging, promoting and indirectly
bankrolling reality television. The potential risks of reality
television are twofold: financial loss and a public relations
crisis. The Big Brother case embodies the problems
encountered when a reality TV show stumbles into both pitfalls, but
significantly, it did not hinder MBC from producing more than five
other reality shows.
As I argued
earlier, reality television purports to represent reality, but in
fact it represents many complex and competing “realities.” The task
therefore, is first and foremost to develop the perspectives and
knowledge for us to explore fully the possibilities offered by this
new genre. On the knowledge front, this study offered an account of
the development of the medium. This account was not exhaustive, but
rather selective. A more detailed history needs to be written. On
the perspective front, this study was concerned with the developers
of reality television. The framework of “Arabization” will need more
theorizing as structural issues pertaining to the political economy
of the media in the region. I hope this contribution will encourage
further studies and contribute to this ongoing debate.
Joe F. Khalil is a PhD student at
Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. He has more than 12
years of professional television experience as director, executive
producer and consultant with CNBC Arabiya, MBC, MTV and Orbit. As
media professional, he has travelled on assignments in Italy, USA,
UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. For seven years, he
was an instructor at the Lebanese American University where his
teaching and research focused on transnational broadcasting,
programming and production.
NOTES
1. This is primarily in
reference to numerous articles that appeared in the Western press,
particularly the views of Melik Kaylan, James S. Robbins, Carla
Power and others. In their view, reality television is a means of
spreading democracy, fighting religious fundamentalism and
introducing the West to Islam.
2. Religious clerics in
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait released religious fatwa condemning
some of the rituals associated with reality television. On the other
hand, Arab journalists, actors and directors were very vocal
concerning their dismay and disdain of the cultural quality of
reality television.
3. For a more detailed
analysis of the transfer of program ideas please refer to another
article by the author which appeared under the title “Blending in:
Arab Television and the Search for Programming Ideas,” TBS Vol. 13,
Fall/Winter 2004.
http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall04/fall04.html
4.
During the '70s, Beirut and Cairo were producing classic works of
French and English authors translated into Arabic but also series on
the lifes of classic Arab figures from the arts and sciences. This
came at time when Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf, gained
their independence and were eager to feature Arab works on their
newly founded television channels.
5. Albert Moran,
Copycat Television: Globalization, Program Formats, and Cultural
Identity. University of Luton Press, 1998.
6. All
channels pursued their negotiations except for MTV, which was shut
down in September by a court order.
7. This difference is
between Family Feud and The Apprentice. The latter
was going to be produced during the spring of 2005. The project is
pending a replacement for Mohammad el Abbar who was going to act as
the show’s host.
8. One writer in particular Salah Tizani,
known as Abu Salim, always told stories about how difficult it was
for him to recruit new actors because everybody was acting
improvised plots.
A newcomer always found him/herself unable to
move in front of the camera, resulting in awkward silences.
9. Each channel came up with their own different name for
the show, but the basic structure and logistics are very similar to
those in the US version. To avoid confusion, all shows following the
same format are discussed by reference to the channel, not to the
show.
10. The show was cancelled because of the last special
which involved the search for a missing person. When the show’s team
was unable to locate the person or even provide a conclusive answer,
LBC was left with negative publicity and decided that the show would
not be produced again.
11. While the main show’s format is
the same as American Idol, licensing companies offer their
license from a particular ‘territory’ to another. In this case, the
license of the Pan-Arab Super Star is in reference to the British
Pop Idol.
12. Talent search shows in the region
date as far the early '70s, but unlike Super Star, a
judging committee was in charge of selecting the winners.
13. Future television sources reveal that the number of
votes received for the first season’s finale amounted to 4
million.
14. In 2003, the 4.8 million voters for Super
Star voted along nationalist lines with Jordan leading the
votes for its Diana Karazon, the show’s winner. A massive
spontaneous voting campaign involved the Jordanian king, the mobile
companies, private businesses and individuals. Unlike the European
song contest Eurovision, the candidates were not selected as country
representatives but still, Arab voters were somehow more concerned
with the nationality of the winner than with their performance.
15. For all its 24-hour reality shows, LBC converts its pay
channel Nagham into a dedicated channel for the duration of the
reality show. It has done that for Miss Liban , Star
Academy and The Farm.
16. Along with
FermantleMedia, Endemol is the second main format show provider and
both are located in Europe. FermantleMedia is based in London and is
part of RTL group while Endemol is based in the
Netherlands.
17. ART’s owner Sheikh Saleh Kamel is a Saudi
businessman known for sponsoring religious channels like
Iqraa.
18. Cf note 9. In this case the license of the
Pan-Arab Star Academy was in reference to the French
version Star Academy.
19. Prime episodes are two
hours episodes associated with a 24-hour type of a reality show.
Characterized by its spectacle nature, the Prime is typically the
occasion to vote someone out or in the show. Editorially, it also
involves the best stories of the week, while commercially, it is
considered the most-viewed and consequently, most expensive
advertising window.
20. To many people, this show was not too
new, as it resembled LBC’s Wakef Ta Kellak.
21. It
is important to consider the fact that Ali Jaber as well as many of
his close associates, the producers, and directors had been previous
employees of Future Television or Zen TV.
22. At the time of
writing this study, it was deemed too early to assess the impact of
both shows.
23. Originally the show, was going to be the
Swan. I did meet with the team working on the initial
proposal. While casting started off along the lines of a possible
Swan, halfway through, an more acceptable format was
bought, which was Starting Over. This is a currently
produced program in the US and has nothing to do with the
Swan. Starting Over is a daytime syndicated
reality show in its US third season.
24. Ibid.
25.
This is how the first season of Star Academy was promoted
using for visual support clips from the various productions of
Star Academy around the world but with particular focus on
clips from the French Star Academy. Interestingly, the
French version was occasionally broadcast in Lebanon on MTV during
the first and the second season (2000 and 2001) as part of a deal
with the French channel TF1.
26. I am not offering a
discussion on the role of the presenter since many of these shows do
not have a one, or when they do, his or her role is very much
restricted.
27. The term producer here refers to the various
titles including executive producers and their assistances, creative
producers and story producers. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to outline the differences between each; however, this will be part
of future research looking at the work of the creative personnel and
reality television.
28. Unlike the US, where a half hour
sitcom could cost a couple of million dollars, the Arab world acting
and drama production does not cost as much. On the other hand,
reality show’s one hour has the same drama cost in addition to more
staff, travel, special equipment and license fee. While a drama
episode might cost anywhere between $10-100,000, a reality show
license alone could consume half of the $100,000.
29. The
largest bidders are MBC and LBC. Companies like Endemol are
constantly approaching both channels knowing that both will be
willing to pay for a sure product. In my minor interaction with
Endemol consultant in Bahrain (2004), it was obvious that the Middle
East was becoming a excellent prospect with great
potential.
30. Dubai Media City withdrew from its partnership
with FTV. Currently ZenTV is understaffed music channel with no
specific programs.
31. A major television market exhibition
held in Cannes, France. This is primarily where most Arab
programmers seek to buy shows including formats and
series.
32. This is an important area for future studies,
particularly the packages for exclusive sponsors and the issues of
exclusivity, product placement, etc.
33. It is interesting to
note that some of the current jobs involved in reality television
are not handled by Arabs. For instance, the director, choreographer
and some of the dancers of Star Academy’s Prime are not
Arabs.
34. This framework articulated here is part of a
forthcoming paper dealing with issues of creative identity and
creative control in the Arab media in general.
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