uring the first two weeks of October, conflict in the stateless country of Somalia entered a new phase as opponents to the Islamic Courts Council's (I.C.C.) bid to establish an Islamic state in Somalia mobilized for armed resistance throughout the country, raising the probability of civil and regional war.

The event that triggered the increased militarization of the conflict was the I.C.C.'s peaceful takeover on September 24 of the key seaport of Kismayo in Somalia's deep south and its inroads into the southern regions of Middle and Lower Jubba. These takeovers gave the Courts movement preponderant control of all Somalia south of the border of the breakaway sub-state of Puntland, with the exception of the southwestern Gedo region bordering Kenya and Ethiopia, and the area in the south-central Bay region surrounding the town of Baidoa -- the seat of Somalia's feeble but internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) that is protected by Ethiopian troops.

The I.C.C.'s successful entry into Somalia's deep south signaled to the other domestic and external actors involved in Somalia's conflict that the Courts movement was on the brink of achieving indisputable power, leading to the judgment that there was only a small window of opportunity either to repulse the Courts through force of arms or to exert sufficient pressure to bring the I.C.C. and T.F.G. into a power-sharing deal through diplomacy.

As the sense of "now or never" seized all the players, points of tension began to resemble military fronts and tests of arms broke out. Western and local analysts and regional and domestic political leaders raised the specter of war, often projecting doomsday scenarios and floating conspiracy theories. Whenever the possibility of war draws near, propaganda becomes more extreme and disinformation abounds, rendering predictive intelligence more difficult to achieve. Cutting through the war fever in Somalia, it is still too early to forecast armed civil and regional conflict. No actor has an unambiguous interest in a war, yet all actors believe that they must be prepared for one. Whether any player will make a decisive move remains to be seen.

With resistance to its revolutionary momentum mounting, the I.C.C. has endeavored to centralize and consolidate its authority in the areas under its control. On September 29, the I.C.C. announced that it was creating a unified Islamic military force that would transcend clan affiliations and bring disparate Court militias under a single command. On October 5, the I.C.C. made good on its pledge to set up a centralized Islamic administration, inaugurating an Upper Islamic Council to unify local authorities. The head of the Courts' Shura (consultative and policymaking) Council, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, announced that "the courts will become officially unified into one court, which will lead the country by determining what is right and what is wrong."

Although centralization of I.C.C. authority is far from being realized, the I.C.C. began the process by instituting a single court for the Banadir region, which includes Somalia's official capital Mogadishu. The I.C.C. announced that similar administrations would soon be set up in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. On September 30, the I.C.C. had taken over official control of Lower Shabelle from its Courts-affiliated former warlord Yusuf Indha Ade, who was co-opted into the I.C.C. as its director of security. On October 14, the I.C.C. peacefully gained authority over the town of Barawe in Lower Shabelle -- the last area that had resisted the Courts in the region.

Moves by the I.C.C. to create a unified armed force and a centralized administration amount to the institution of a governing apparatus that competes directly with the clan-based T.F.G. Aweys and the head of the I.C.C.'s Executive Council, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, have made it plain that the Courts movement will not share power within the T.F.G.'s clan-based constitution and will only accept an Islamic state that brings together all Somalis under a formula of religious nationalism. Indeed, Aweys invited the T.F.G. to leave Baidoa and come to Mogadishu where, he promised, it would be given power over the country if it agreed to establish an Islamic state. A piece of artful propaganda, Aweys's offer was not taken up by the T.F.G.

As the I.C.C. moved to institutionalize its revolution, it faced resistance at every turn from its opponents, forcing it to go on war footing on fronts throughout Somalia.

The Emergence of Military Fronts

The highest probability for armed conflict between the I.C.C. and its opponents is in Somalia's deep south -- the Middle and Lower Jubba regions -- where the Courts movement faces a counter-attack to retake Kismayo by militias led by the city's former chief warlord, Col. Barre "Hirale" Adan Shire, who is also the T.F.G.'s defense minister.

In moving on Kismayo, the I.C.C. had violated its policy of only entering an area after it had negotiated an agreement with local clerics and warlords and was assured that it would be well received. The Courts movement broke with its successful pattern in order to head off a possible African peacekeeping mission that would enter Somalia across its border with Kenya and would be supplied through Kismayo. The city was controlled by a loose coalition of warlords -- the Jubba Valley Alliance (J.V.A.) -- that was divided by factions and constituencies favoring a deal with the I.C.C. and opponents of an agreement led by Hirale. Although Hirale and his forces fled Kismayo when the I.C.C. moved in, the city remained divided and Hirale did not acquiesce in defeat.

Although the I.C.C. acted quickly to establish an administration in Kismayo, it was immediately faced with a series of violent street demonstrations against its rule that resulted in one death and scores of arrests. The most serious protest was a rare night demonstration on October 7 in which hundreds of people burned tires, hurled stones and vandalized shops, impelling I.C.C. forces to fire on the crowd. Whereas previous demonstrations had reportedly been organized by traders in khat -- a mild stimulant drug that the I.C.C. had banned during Ramadan -- the October 7 protest was mounted by disaffected clans that complained that the new I.C.C. administration had been formed without consultation, included officials from outside the city and was unrepresentative.

As the I.C.C. attempted to cope with popular unrest in Kismayo, Hirale retreated to his stronghold in the Gedo region where he mobilized his forces for an advance east into the Jubba regions. The I.C.C. responded by taking over the town of Buale -- the capital of Middle Jubba -- and the Afmadow district in Lower Jubba in order to block an advance by Hirale. I.C.C. forces also moved to the Kenyan border in an attempt to seal it from peacekeepers, prompting Nairobi to place its border police on alert. On October 6, after consulting with clan elders, the I.C.C. formed an administration for Lower Jubba that would also function temporarily for Middle Jubba.

Throughout the first half of October, a flurry of reports placed Hirale's forces in various parts of the Jubba regions and even near Kismayo, with I.C.C. militias taking positions to confront them. Swearing to retake Kismayo, Hirale petitioned the T.F.G. for military support, but was rebuffed by its president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who favored a more comprehensive and coordinated response to the I.C.C.'s takeover of the city. Hirale nonetheless claimed that he had reached an agreement with the T.F.G.

On October 5, the leader of the I.C.C.'s Jubba campaign, Sheikh Hassan Turki, said that the I.C.C. had opened peace talks with Hirale and that they were progressing well. On October 8, the I.C.C. claimed that Ethiopian troops had crossed into the Middle Jubba and Gedo regions to support Hirale.

On October 15, Hirale's forces finally moved on Kismayo and were engaged in a firefight by I.C.C. militias, which forced the attackers to retreat. Another armed clash occurred in Buale with similar results. These first incidents were, according to Hirale, only the beginning of a serious campaign to displace the I.C.C. from Kismayo.

Although the entire situation in the deep south is clouded by conflicting reports and possible disinformation, it is clear that Hirale has not given up and that the I.C.C. is determined to hold the Jubba regions. At a pro-I.C.C. demonstration in Kismayo on October 5, reportedly attended by 5,000 people -- mostly women and religious students -- I.C.C. cleric Sheikh Adam Elmi predicted: "This will be the first place where the soldiers of Allah and his enemies will face each other."

A second area in which armed conflict is a growing possibility is Somalia's western Hiraan region around its capital Beledweyne where several thousand Ethiopian troops are massed on the border and in some cases have crossed it in order to protect Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region -- where Addis Ababa faces an insurgency -- from I.C.C. incursions and to cut off support for the rebels from the Courts movement.

Facing the possibility of a major move into Hiraan by Ethiopian forces, which might be a prelude to a campaign to take central Somalia from the Courts, the I.C.C. captured the village of Jawil, which controls the only road between Ethiopia and central Somalia, on September 30. As was the case in Kismayo, the I.C.C. failed to reach an agreement with local authorities before its takeover of Jawil, which was accomplished by force. After a firefight, the local pro-T.F.G. militia fled across the Ethiopian border. In early October, the I.C.C. reinforced its position in Jawil and the neighboring village of Kalaber with ten battle wagons and 100 troops.

On October 5, the I.C.C. accused Ethiopian forces of shelling its bases around Beledweyne, a charge denied by Addis Ababa, which has persisted in claiming that it has no forces in Somalia despite an abundance of credible reports to the contrary. Tensions ratcheted up on October 7, when the I.C.C. closed border crossings in the Hiraan region and charged that Ethiopian forces were planting mines, firing artillery and conducting maneuvers in the border areas. On October 9, there were reports that Ethiopian troops were massing near Beledweyne as the I.C.C. gained full control of the town's airstrip from the allied local militia.

On October 14, the I.C.C. held a mass rally in Beledweyne to mobilize resistance against a possible Ethiopian invasion. The I.C.C. also opened up recruiting centers in the town to forge a popular armed resistance. Officials from the Beledweyne court were reportedly traveling to Mogadishu to develop a strategy for defending the Hiraan region.

Although the I.C.C. and Ethiopian forces have been testing each other in the west for the past several months, the recent moves by both sides bring them closer to an armed clash than ever before. It is not possible at present to determine whether Addis Ababa plans a major move into central Somalia through Hiraan, but it is highly probable that if it makes one, the I.C.C. will resist it militarily.

A military offensive by Addis Ababa became more likely when a new front opened up in the central Mudug region, where militias loyal to the warlord Abdi Qeybdid, who is allied to Ethiopia and had been driven from Mogadishu by the I.C.C., were reportedly positioning around the towns of Gelinsoor and Bandiradley close to the region's capital Galkayo on the Puntland border. The I.C.C. responded by moving forces close to Qeybdid's position, creating another tension point that could become the focus of armed confrontation.

As tensions rose in the deep south, west and center of Somalia, the northern regions of the country controlled by the sub-states of Puntland and Somaliland came under pressure from the I.C.C. and responded by tightening security measures. Both sub-states have functioning administrations and military forces, and both are allied to Addis Ababa, but there are also sectors of their societies that are favorable to the I.C.C. and would like to see Islamic courts installed in the north.

With the goal of unifying Somalia in an Islamic state, the I.C.C. has attempted to stir up pro-Courts sentiment in the sub-states and has reportedly been training forces from the northern regions in Mogadishu that would infiltrate into the those regions to support popular bids to set up Islamic courts in them.

Most directly threatened by I.C.C. penetration, Puntland's President Mohamud "Adde" Muse issued an unprecedented decree on September 27 banning all aliens from entering Puntland from the south and threatening deportation of at least some of the several hundred thousand southern Somalis who already reside in the sub-state and form an important part of its economy. Muse also warned I.C.C. sympathizers from Puntland not to collaborate with the Courts movement in an attempted takeover of the sub-state.

On September 30, Muse took the further step of banning all commercial flights into Puntland from southern Somalia, charging that the airlines flying from Mogadishu had brought in members of the I.C.C. who were planning to organize courts.

Amid reports that he was facing rising domestic opposition, Muse flew to Dubai on October 7 for talks that he had reportedly requested with the I.C.C.'s Ahmed, with Puntland Islamist Sheikh Mohamed Yasin mediating. On October 9, fresh infusions of Ethiopian troops were reported to have entered the northern part of Galkayo, which is under Puntland's control and would be a flashpoint for a military conflict between the I.C.C. and the sub-state's forces.

Although immediate armed confrontation is less likely on the emerging northern front than it is in the deep south and west, it would become a near certainty if Addis Ababa mounted a major offensive into central Somalia from the west. It is apparent that Puntland's administration is cooperating with Addis Ababa in an attempt to encircle the I.C.C. as the latter pushes outward, partly to defend itself against Ethiopia and partly to achieve its goal of unifying Somalia under Islamist rule.

More insulated from the I.C.C., Somaliland, which is in the far north and does not share a border with Courts-controlled territories, came under unaccustomed pressure from the Courts movement during the first half of October.

On September 29, Somaliland's deputy justice minister, Yusuf Ise Duale Tallaabo, warned the I.C.C. against trying to realize the "dream of capturing Hargeisa [Somaliland's capital]" and told Somalilanders to reject "a new prophet" from Mogadishu. Tallaabo's statement was prompted by the presence of Somaliland's prominent Islamist cleric Sheikh Ali Warsame in Mogadishu, where he was thought to be strategizing with the I.C.C. on plans to set up Islamic courts in the sub-state. Warsame was a founder of the radical Islamist organization al-Ittihad al-Islami (A.I.A.I.) that pre-dated the I.C.C., has been linked by Washington to al-Qaeda and included among its leaders the I.C.C.'s major power figure, Sheikh Aweys.

Somaliland's administration encountered domestic opposition after the release of a videotape allegedly showing the torture by Somaliland authorities of Islamist cleric Sheikh Mohamed Ismail who had been arrested on charges of terrorism. On October 1, there was a demonstration in Hargeisa protesting Ismail's alleged mistreatment, in which 56 protestors were arrested. Somaliland authorities claimed that the videotape was a fabrication produced by the Puntland administration, with which Hargeisa has territorial disputes. Somaliland's president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, who is constrained to keep Puntland and the I.C.C. at bay, reiterated his position that Somaliland would not rejoin Somalia, but would discuss cooperation when a stable government was formed in the south. Distancing himself from Puntland and Ethiopia, Riyale stated that he was not opposed to the I.C.C. as long as it stayed out of Somaliland and called for non-interference of external powers in Somalia's conflicts.

Riyale's moderate tone did not prevent a strong response to the Ismail affair from the I.C.C. Military commander Turki pledged that the I.C.C. would free all religious prisoners in Puntland and Somaliland, and said: "We will forcefully free Sheikh Mohamed from Somaliland if it does not release him immediately."

More reverberations from Ismail's jailing came on October 10, when 13 Muslim scholars in Hargeisa called for an independent investigation of prison torture, the release from jail of demonstrators arrested in protests triggered by the torture video, and the institution of Shari'a law in Somaliland. The scholars group hailed the I.C.C. for the restoration of security in southern Somalia and for implementing Shari'a law, but urged the Courts movement not to "create discord" in Somaliland.

A military confrontation between the Somaliland administration and the I.C.C. is distant, but the events of early October show that the sub-state is being drawn into the wider conflict and faces an internal opposition sympathetic to the Courts movement. Long considered stable and insulated from the rest of Somalia, Somaliland has now been brought into play and would likely be drawn into any major military conflict in the north in order to defend itself from Puntland and from the I.C.C.

The last emerging military front opened up in the south central Bay region, where the T.F.G. prepared to defend Baidoa from a possible I.C.C. attack. On October 3, Ethiopian troops, on whom the T.F.G. depends for protection, were for the first time deployed in a regular military base, and T.F.G. militias were reportedly receiving large supplies of weapons from Addis Ababa.

Underscoring the threat perceived by the T.F.G., the I.C.C. on October 5 occupied the town of Moode Moode, which is 20 kilometers (12 miles) from Baidoa and the closest that the I.C.C. has yet advanced toward the provincial capital. I.C.C. militia commander Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal said that his forces had entered Moode Moode in order to help its residents repel bandits and to lift blockades on the Baidoa-Mogadishu road. The T.F.G. branded the occupation as a "provocation."

The T.F.G. and its Ethiopian protectors moved on October 9 to mount their first military operation against the I.C.C., briefly taking the strategic town of Bur Haqaba on the Baidoa-Mogadishu road from Bilal's militia, which retreated in the face of the advance. Rumors abounded that the T.F.G.-Ethiopian forces were on their way to Mogadishu or to the Balidogle airport in Lower Shabelle, but they returned to Baidoa after Bilal's fighters engaged them. The commander of the T.F.G. militia, Said Mohamed Hirsi, denied that Ethiopian troops had been involved in the operation, which he claimed was a "normal visit" to an area under the T.F.G.'s authority, promising that there would be more such visits in the future.

Although the level of tension around Baidoa has increased, the probability of imminent armed confrontation between the I.C.C. and T.F.G. remains low there because an I.C.C. attack on Baidoa would cause the Courts movement to lose the qualified international and regional support that it has gained by committing to peace and reconciliation talks with the T.F.G. in Khartoum brokered by Sudan and the Arab League (A.L.). The I.C.C.'s leadership believes that it has gained a preponderant advantage over the T.F.G. on the ground and that it can use that advantage to achieve its political goals through the negotiations.

It is the T.F.G. that is wary of the Khartoum process, pinning its hopes on the introduction of a peacekeeping mission into Somalia sponsored by the African Union (A.U.) that would protect it from the I.C.C. and take pressure off Addis Ababa. Even with the support of Ethiopian troops, the T.F.G. is not in the position to mount an effective offensive against the I.C.C. If fighting breaks out in and around Baidoa, it will probably be an offshoot of a major Ethiopian incursion into central Somalia from the west supported by allied warlord militias and possibly forces from Puntland.

The key factor in the current military situation in Somalia is the presence of Ethiopia on all the emerging fronts. As PINR has argued, the basic conflict in Somalia is between the I.C.C. and Addis Ababa, neither of which seems to be eager to wage war, despite suggestions by analysts that Addis Ababa would gain Washington's approval and a resumption of economic aid if it defeated the I.C.C., and that the Courts would gain an infusion of domestic support from a wave of anti-Ethiopian nationalist sentiment if armed conflict broke out.

The difficulties that would be faced by Addis Ababa if it mounted a major military operation in Somalia were indicated by reports that senior Ethiopian military officers had been arrested for opposing a campaign against the I.C.C. Local media also reported that the Ethiopian government was making large cash payments to officers in return for pledges to attack the I.C.C.

The probability of civil and regional war is higher than it was before the I.C.C. took Kismayo, but, at present, armed conflicts, if they occur, are likely to be localized. There is, however, a sense among the players in Somalia's conflicts that war is now a genuine possibility and that judgment should not be discounted.

Flurries of Diplomacy

As the possibility of war in Somalia loomed larger, the external players with interests in the country's conflicts, save Ethiopia and its adversary Eritrea, were constrained to make more strenuous efforts to bring the I.C.C. and the T.F.G. to the bargaining table.

Throughout the period of the I.C.C.'s ascent since early June, regional states and organizations, Western powers, and international organizations have officially shared the position that the T.F.G. is the legitimate government of Somalia, but that it should negotiate with the I.C.C. on a power-sharing agreement. Behind that facade of consensus, however, have been serious differences on the interpretation of the position, with some actors supporting a peacekeeping mission and others opposing it, some actors insisting that any settlement be reached within the terms of the T.F.G.'s clan-based constitution and others holding themselves open to an Islamist revision of the constitution, and some actors concerned to curb the I.C.C. and prevent the institution of an Islamic state in Somalia, and others acquiescent in that eventuality.

Before the I.C.C.'s takeover of Kismayo, the divisions among the external actors had polarized into a north-south split, with the A.L. behind the Khartoum process and an open dialogue, and the A.U. backing the peacekeeping mission along with reconciliation talks. Regional states tended to follow in line, with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and the Arab states tilting toward the I.C.C., and Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda tending to support the T.F.G. in varying degrees. Western powers and international organizations remained indecisive, vacillating from one emphasis to the other.

The polarized configuration collapsed after the I.C.C. took Kismayo, causing two frontline states -- Kenya and Djibouti -- and the A.L. and Dubai to try to play the role of honest brokers, leaving only Ethiopia and Uganda clearly supporting the T.F.G. and the peacekeeping mission, and Eritrea as the only unequivocal backer of the I.C.C.

The dizzying number of diplomatic missions, purported meetings between the I.C.C. and T.F.G. brokered by various parties, proposals for international conferences in advance of the next round of the Khartoum talks scheduled for October 30, bilateral discussions between regional states and between those states and delegations from the I.C.C. and the T.F.G. reflected a sense of desperation on the parts of all the actors, including the I.C.C. and Addis Ababa, none of them appearing keen on a war into which they might be drawn.

As the flurry of diplomatic activity began to take on a pattern through the first half of October, primary responsibility for mediation fell to Kenya and Djibouti, which had brokered settlements in Somalia prior to the rise of the I.C.C. The details of the initiatives, which were hardly ever disclosed publicly, are less important than the fact that none of them has thus far borne fruit, primarily because the T.F.G. and Addis Ababa -- possibly with Washington's backing -- insist that any settlement fall within the terms of the T.F.G.'s constitution, which is a deal breaker for the I.C.C.

The T.F.G. is also at best lukewarm to the Khartoum process and has accused the A.L. of a bias in favor of the I.C.C., which the A.L. has firmly denied. On October 15, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, the speaker of the T.F.G.'s parliament who has supported peace talks, resigned as head of the T.F.G.'s delegation to Khartoum after T.F.G. Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, who has criticized the Khartoum process, sent a letter to international organizations denying Adan's authority to negotiate. In addition, it is not clear that Addis Ababa wants the peace talks to proceed, fearing the possibility of an Islamic state on its borders that might result from a settlement.

Washington's policy remains uncertain, with some analysts convinced that it is secretly supporting an Ethiopian military offensive and others convinced that it backs Djibouti's and Kenya's efforts to be honest brokers. Before the I.C.C.'s takeover of Kismayo, Washington had appeared to be leaning toward bargaining with the Courts movement, but it appeared to veer back toward a confrontational stance when U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan met with Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, on October 10 to discuss counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa with an emphasis on Somalia. Whelan's visit to Addis Ababa was followed on October 15 by talks there between T.F.G. President Yusuf and Ethiopian defense officials on arms transfers to T.F.G. forces.

The key development diplomatically in the aftermath of Kismayo is the apparent coordination of the A.L., Djibouti and Kenya to exert pressure for negotiations between the I.C.C. and T.F.G. under whatever auspices needed so that they might take place. This newfound cooperation stems from the Arab states' calculation that negotiations favor the I.C.C., Djibouti's judgment that it would gain stature by mediating a settlement, and Kenya's calculation that stability is better served by accommodating to the I.C.C. than by following Ethiopia's hard line against it.

Regional resistance to Addis Ababa emerged in an October 15 meeting in Asmara between officials from Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan in which the three states are seeking to coordinate their positions on Somalia based on the principle of non-interference.

Whether coordinated efforts to renew peace talks will be successful cannot at present be determined. Much will depend on Addis Ababa's intentions, which in turn will be partially determined by Washington's stance. All the actors are speaking with each other, but it is far from clear that they will harmonize in a single voice.

Conclusion

As points of tension develop into possible military fronts throughout Somalia and diplomatic efforts to avert armed conflict step up, the clouds of war gather over the country. At present, the intentions of the major players -- the I.C.C. and Ethiopia -- remain unclear and are probably not fixed, as each side tests the other's resolve and attempts to strengthen alliances.

It is most likely that none of the actors is certain of its next moves, which both makes them cautious and increases the probability that one of them will miscalculate and precipitate a spiraling armed conflict. Revolutions spawn counter-revolutionary initiatives, and the I.C.C.'s attempt to effect an Islamic revolution is no exception.

Somalia has moved closer to the brink of war, but major armed conflict is not yet inevitable.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of enquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.