 |
| Volume X,
Summer 2003, Number 2 |
| |
| Killing in
the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for
September 11 |
| |
| Quintan
Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner |
| |
Dr. Wiktorowicz is an
assistant professor of international studies and Dr.
Kaltner is an associate professor of religious studies,
both at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. The
al-Qaeda document that serves as the basis for this
article is available in Arabic and English here.
For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.
By means of this document we send a
message to America and those behind it. We are coming,
by the will of God almighty, no matter what America
does. It will never be safe from the fury of Muslims.
America is the one who began the war, and it will lose
the battle by the permission of God almighty.
--
Al-Qaeda statement, April 24,
2002
In the wake of the September 11
attacks, President Bush moved quickly to dismiss
al-Qaeda operatives as part of the lunatic fringe,
religious usurpers bent on misrepresenting and
"hijacking" Islam to serve terrorism.1 This
characterization was echoed in the Muslim world, where
an assortment of government officials, religious
scholars and opposition figures fervidly denounced the
killing of civilians as un-Islamic.2
Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Ashaykh, the mufti of Saudi
Arabia, argued that "hijacking planes, terrorizing
innocent people and shedding blood constitute a form of
injustice that cannot be tolerated by Islam, which views
them as gross crimes and sinful acts."3
Muhammed Sayyid al-Tantawi, the rector of al-Azhar
University in Cairo, issued a similar condemnation:
"Attacking innocent people is not courageous, it is
stupid and will be punished on the day of judgment. . .
. It's not courageous to attack innocent children, women
and civilians. It is courageous to protect freedom, it
is courageous to defend oneself and not to
attack."4 Shaikh Yussuf al-Qaradawi, a
prominent Islamic scholar and television personality
from Qatar, emphasized that "Islam, the religion of
tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem, and
considers the attack against innocent human beings a
grave sin."5
Even Islamic
fundamentalist groups issued sharp denunciations.
Forty-six leaders representing an assortment of Islamist
movements and groups signed a letter opposed to the
attacks:
The undersigned, leaders of Islamic
movements, are horrified by the events of Tuesday 11
September 2001 in the United States, which resulted in
massive killing, destruction and attack on innocent
lives. We express our deepest sympathies and sorrow.
We condemn, in the strongest terms, the incidents,
which are against all human and Islamic norms. This is
grounded in the Noble Laws of Islam, which forbid all
forms of attacks on innocents. God Almighty says in
the Holy Quran: "No bearer of burdens can bear the
burden of another" (Surah al-Isra 17:15).6
Signatories included the general
guide of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the amir of
the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and Ahmad Yassin, the
founder of Hamas.
To be sure, many of these
condemnations were blunted by concomitant criticism of
American foreign policy as the primary catalyst for
al-Qaeda's war. Leaders throughout the Middle East,
including traditional allies, cautioned the United
States to reflect on the consequences of its
"unbalanced" approach to the region (particularly
vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq),
and public opinion in the Arab world indicated mounting
resentment against perceived American hegemony and
arrogance. Yet in the wake of September 11, U.S. allies
and adversaries alike in the Muslim world joined
President Bush in rejecting the radicalism of al-Qaeda.
Given this broad rejection, how could al-Qaeda
defend killing thousands of innocent civilians in the
name of Islam? Although pre-September 11 fatwas,
interviews and statements by Bin Laden and al-Qaeda
representatives clearly outlined the movement's belief
that American civilians are legitimate targets, al-Qaeda
had yet to articulate its religious rationale for
attacks against civilian populations. In the first six
months after September 11, al-Qaeda failed to issue a
response to the maelstrom of criticism that denounced
the attacks as un-Islamic. Then finally on April 24,
2002, al-Qaeda released an extended statement
(approximately 3,700 words) outlining, for the first
time, its religious justification for killing civilians
in a total war against the United States, titled "A
Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of
the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New
York and Washington."7 Unlike previous
al-Qaeda statements, the justification was not published
by Arabic or Western newspapers and has largely been
ignored by experts. Yet it provides essential insights
into the movement's religious rationale for September 11
that could help American policy makers in the war on
terrorism.
The 2002 statement is best understood
as part of an ongoing debate about the use of violence
in Islam. Al-Qaeda is a component of a broader
"fundamentalist" community and as a result is actively
engaged in debates about religious authority, the
legitimacy of war and rules of engagement in combat. In
the 1990s, most disputes focused on whether it was
permissible to rebel against incumbent regimes in the
Muslim world. Toward the late 1990s, this focus shifted
to address the United States as an emerging enemy and
the legitimacy of particular tactics in warfare against
unbelievers. The 2002 document is part of this latest
debate and should therefore be understood as an argument
that seeks not only to outline al-Qaeda's justification,
but also address alternative, competing religious
interpretations about acceptable violence in Islam.
DEBATING VIOLENCE
Al-Qaeda is a
radical tendency within a broader Islamic movement known
as the Salafi movement. The term Salafi is derived from
the Arabic salaf, which means "to precede" and
refers to the companions of the Prophet Muhammed.
Because the salaf learned about Islam directly from the
messenger of God, their example is an important
illustration of piety and unadulterated religious
practice. Salafis argue that centuries of syncretic
cultural and popular religious rituals and
interpretations distorted the purity of the message of
God and that only by returning to the example of the
prophet and his companions can Muslims achieve
salvation. The label "Salafi" is thus used to connote
"proper" religious adherence and moral legitimacy,
implying that alternative understandings are corrupt
deviations from the straight path of Islam.8
While Salafis all agree about the importance of
the prophetic model and the paradigm of the companions,
there are important interpretive differences that have
engendered schisms within the movement, particularly
over the proper method to create an Islamic society and
protect the umma (Muslim community). Differences
in interpretation tend to emphasize one of the following
four basic methods for promoting Islam:
1)
Propagation (dawa). Salafis who focus on this method
emphasize personal piety, cleansing the corpus of
hadiths (reported sayings and traditions of the
Prophet Muhammed), and spreading proper Islam. For this
group, the priority is for individuals to practice a
pure understanding of Islam. This entails not only
propagation and individual piety, but a program to
eliminate any weak or false hadiths so that Muslims
ensure they are truly following the prophetic
model.
2) Advice. A large number of
influential Salafis and their followers believe that it
is the responsibility of the ulama (religious
scholars) to advise leaders about Islamic legislation
and regulations. In general, however, they believe this
advice should be given in private.
3)
Non-violent action. Some Salafis believe that it is
the duty of Muslims (particularly the ulama) to openly
speak out against un-Islamic actions, decisions and
public policy. This can include the use of the
khutba (Friday sermon), open letters, public
speeches, demonstrations and rallies.
4)
Violent action. A small, radical fringe in the
Salafi community argues that it is an Islamic duty to
use violence to remove leaders who do not properly
follow or enforce Islam. Known as jihadis, these Salafis
do not reject the other methods, but they do emphasize
the necessity of violence. Al-Qaeda is part of this
group.
These differences have produced debates
about the proper methodology for promoting Islam,
leading to often vitriolic conflicts. Because Salafis
believe that there is only one accurate understanding of
Islam -- the model of the prophet and his companions --
this creates a tendency to dismiss any differences of
interpretation as deviations. It is quite common, for
example, for one Salafi group to call scholars and
followers from other clusters to "return to the straight
path." This has even generated disagreements over who
can be considered a Salafi. In particular, non-violent
Salafis, who make up the vast majority of the movement,
often vehemently reject use of the Salafi label to
describe the violent or jihadi elements.9 The
latter, however, identify themselves as Salafis and
dismiss the other groups as misguided, ignorant
(unknowledgeable about Islam) or corrupt.
The
debate within the Salafi community over the use of
violence has divided the movement more than any other
issue. During the 1990s, as al-Qaeda developed, the
initial debate between violent and non-violent Salafis
was over takfir -- declaring a Muslim an
apostate. Declaring a Muslim an unbeliever is a serious
endeavor, since it could mean a death sentence. The
central axis of divergence was over whether one could
judge a ruler in the Muslim world an apostate according
to his actions. Non-violent groups argued that one can
never know with certainty what is in an individ-ual's
heart and that so long as a ruler has a "mustard seed of
iman (belief)," he is considered a Muslim,
especially if he allows Muslims to pray and generally
practice their religion. The jihadi Salafis, on the
other hand, argued that the oneness of God
(tawhid) demands that Muslims follow Islam in
both belief and action. In other words, an un-Islamic
belief is just as revealing as an un-Islamic action. As
a result, the jihadis charged the Saudis and other
regimes in the Muslim world with un-Islamic behavior and
thus apostasy, and called for a jihad to remove them.
In the late 1990s, although this debate
continued, it became less relevant to Islamist struggles
on the ground as jihadis faced defeat and
marginalization throughout the Middle East. This was
particularly the case in the largest Islamist
insurgencies in Egypt and Algeria.10 In
Egypt, leaders from both the Islamic Group and Islamic
Jihad declared cease-fires, and the violence came to a
dramatic end. Elements from within the Islamic Group
went so far as to issue a public apology for the
violence and published a four-volume justification for
the decision. In a move that epitomized the recasting of
the jihadis, a number of Islamists from both groups
attempted to establish political parties (the Sharia and
Islah parties), though the regime rejected the requests
for permits. Violent jihadi dissidents found themselves
marginalized; many left for Pakistan and Afghanistan to
work directly with al-Qaeda.
In Algeria, a
similar process occurred. The regime's decision to
cancel elections in 1992, as Islamists were poised to
control parliament, sparked an insurgency that has
claimed more than 150,000 lives. Early in the conflict,
the jihadi Salafis united under the banner of the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) and attacked government officials
and soldiers. In 1996, however, the GIA launched a
series of civilian massacres that undermined the unity
of the Islamist opposition; and groups such as the
Islamic Salvation Army issued a unilateral cease-fire.
The regime responded by using an amnesty program to
reintegrate former Islamist fighters into society.
Although a number of radical groups continue to operate,
the violence has dropped substantially since the late
1990s. As a result, many Algerian jihadi Salafis placed
their networks, resources and personnel at the service
of al-Qaeda.11
For non-violent
Salafis, these defeats made it clear that the jihadi
vision to unseat incumbent Arab regimes was at an end
(at least in the short term), and so the issue of takfir
became less prominent in debates over violence. Instead,
the focus shifted to al-Qaeda's war against the United
States and its allies. In general, most Salafis agree
that the United States is waging a war of aggression
against Muslims through its actions in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Differences emerge,
however, over the proper response and course of action.
Jihadis once again call for violence, while the
non-violent Salafis promote other means, including
public announcements of opposition to a U.S. presence in
the Middle East, prayer, and advice to Arab and Muslim
leaders.
This is the context in which one should
understand al-Qaeda's 2002 justification for September
11 and the purposeful targeting of civilians. The
document is part of a discursive contest over the proper
methodology for fulfilling religious obligations. As a
result, it reflects a carefully constructed case to
undermine the legitimacy of non-violent solutions. In
this respect, it makes three important arguments. First,
proponents of a non-violent response to the United
States are corrupt, ignorant and/or hypocritical, and
therefore are not credible religious mediators. This is
contrasted with the scientific, independent and
religiously authentic interpretation of the jihadi
Salafis. Second, the United States is waging a war
against Islam. Therefore, violence is a defensive
jihad that is incumbent upon all Muslims. And third,
there is no unconditional prohibition against killing
civilians in Islam. In fact, civilians can be purposely
targeted under certain conditions, and these conditions
are met in the current climate.
PERSUASION
AND CREDIBILITY
For Muslims, scholars of Islam
play a critical role as intermediaries between the
sacred texts and everyday religious rituals and
practices. They are seen as the inheritors of the
prophetic message, intellectually equipped to interpret
the immutable sources of Islam in light of the changing
conditions of the temporal world. For Islamists, the
scholars are central nodes in networks of religious
meaning, responsible for providing guidance and
mentoring students so that they might follow the
straight path of Islam to Paradise in the hereafter.
They provide religious interpretations and offer
lessons, books and lectures for those seeking
enlightenment. For Salafis, in particular, scholars are
essential, since they are purveyors of knowledge capable
of illuminating an unadulterated understanding of Islam
based upon the example of the prophet and his
companions.
Not all scholars are equal, however.
There are differences in training, intellectual
capacity, communicative skills and charisma, all of
which affect the reputation and influence of individual
scholars. Those with strong reputations develop
extensive followings and can use fatwas and other
vehicles to exert substantial influence. The term
"scholar" (alim) itself does not reflect
objective criteria of learning; it is subjectively
derived recognition dependent upon the reputation of the
individual. Whether an individual is recognized as a
scholar in good standing determines the likelihood that
his interpretation will be accepted.
The debate
over the conditions for permissible violence is
therefore more than merely a conflict over ideas; it is
a struggle over sacred authority -- the right to
interpret Islam on behalf of the Muslim
community.12 As studies of persuasion and
framing have noted, the impact of an argument is
determined not only by its resonance with the
experiences and worldview of the target audience, but by
the credibility of the articulator as well.13
Influence is contingent upon the trustworthiness and
integrity of the scholar. A lack of credibility can
undermine the effect of a religious interpretation or
argument by leading an audience to question the
intentions of the source and thus whether the message
represents an honest assessment of Islam and the will of
God.
The jihadi scholars who nurture al-Qaeda and
provide religious cover for acts of violence suffer from
a "reputation deficit." Many are self-taught, new
Islamist intellectuals with little formal religious
training. Others have spent their lives studying Islam,
but a dearth of resources, sponsors and fora for
communication limits their capacity to develop a
reputation. There are a few classically trained jihadi
scholars with global notoriety, such as Omar Abdul
Rahman (the Azharite shaikh and former mufti of several
radical Egyptian groups, now in jail in New York), but
these are the exceptions. This is in contrast to the
training of the non-violent Salafi scholars, many who
hold PhDs from established Islamic universities in Saudi
Arabia and are considered part of the ulama in the
kingdom. Non-violent Salafis thus find ample opportunity
to dismiss the jihadis as unknowledgeable or ignorant, a
pejorative insult among Salafis, who pride themselves as
students of learning.
The case of Umar Abu
Qatada, one of the key religious scholars of the
al-Qaeda network, highlights this reputation deficit.
Abu Qatada began his religious training with Mohammed
Nasir al-Din al-Bani (d. 1999), a renowned Salafi
reformist who came to Jordan after fleeing Syria in the
late 1970s. Abu Qatada was part of a small group of
teenage students that included eventual luminaries of
the non-violent Salafi community, such as Salim
al-Hilali and Ali Hasan al-Halabi. He left al-Bani's
study circle over the issue of violence and continued
his studies elsewhere, eventually fleeing security
services in Jordan and relocating to London. Abu Qatada
developed an impressive reputation among small jihadi
circles and became an important reference point for the
radical jihadis in Algeria (both the GIA and the Salafi
Group for Call and Combat, or GSPC). His centrality as a
jihadi scholar is exemplified by his participation on
the fatwa committee of al-Qaeda.14 After the
9/11 attacks, Abu Qattada, who became known as
al-Qaeda's European paymaster, went underground; but he
was caught in the UK and imprisoned in late 2002.
Despite this considerable history, reformists
quickly dismiss Abu Qatada as unknowledgeable. For
example, when asked about Abu Qatada in an interview,
Salim al-Hilali quickly denounced him as ignorant and
claimed, "He is not a scholar."15 Such
assaults on the credibility of the jihadi scholars are
common among the non-violent Salafis.
As a
result, much of the 2002 document can be seen as an
attempt to establish the credentials of the jihadis
while demeaning the credibility of the non-violent
reformists. Since formal pedigree favors the reformists,
jihadis stress the issue of scholarly independence and
integrity. The thrust of this line of argument is that
the reformist scholars are "the rulers' shaikhs" --
mouthpieces for Arab regimes, which, in turn, are
puppets of the United States. This connotes an
inextricable connection between reformist legal rulings
about violence and the desire of authorities to protect
American interests, thus implying that non-violent
Islamic interpretations are corrupted by politics and
therefore unreliable and deceitful. This is clearly the
argument at the onset of the document:
We pass on this initial report, without
details or exposition, regarding the evidence of the
legality of this kind of operation. Let it be a quick
message to those who dress their political opinions in
the garb of a legal ruling. Let it also be a call to
those who oppose and condemn the operations to obey
Allah, repent and return to the legal evidence.
Cowardice in defending the warriors (mujahidin)
is no better than being silent. Allah is our guide and
the guide of all Muslims.
Elsewhere, the connection between
opposition to the violence of al-Qaeda and the
dubiousness of reformist legal rulings is again
emphasized:
These great events which changed the face
of history on such a grand scale occurred in the
umma, and it will be a great regret to anyone
who blames those who brought about the operation of
September. Those ignorant ones do not speak with legal
evidence or reasonable logic. Rather, they speak in
their masters' languages [i.e., Saudi Arabia] and in
the concepts of the enemy of the umma [i.e.,
the USA].
The jihadis go even
further and charge the reformists with apostasy because
of their support for the American war on terrorism, an
extreme condemnation that, if true, would eliminate the
reformists' right to issue legal rulings.
Despite the clarity of the matter and the
obvious nature of the evidence, however, it is
regrettable that many of the motives were destroyed in
the comforting of America, the expressions of sorrow
for her, and the legal rulings to assist her and to
donate blood for her innocent (!!) victims. Legally
incriminating the one who carried out the operations
and expelling him from Islam is also regrettable, as
is giving the Crusaders the green light to exact
revenge on Muslims. This teaches all those who issue
opinions that America may pursue the Afghans and
Shaikh Usama Bin Laden, may Allah protect him. We warn
them about apostasy because of their assistance to the
Crusaders by word or by their legal rulings to Arab
governments that cooperation against terrorism [by
this they mean cooperation against the mujahidin] is
lawful. This is defiant
apostasy!
The document argues that
the corruption of these religious scholars is clearly
demonstrated by the hypocrisy of their rulings: the
reformists condone the use of martyrdom (suicide)
operations in Palestine against Israelis (including
civilians) yet denounce similar operations against
Americans, such as the September 11
attacks.16 The jihadis categorize both the
Israelis and Americans as "people of war": Israel
occupies and oppresses Muslims in Palestine; the United
States oppresses and attacks Muslims in Afghanistan,
Iraq and elsewhere. More important, Israel is portrayed
as an extension of an American policy to attack the
Muslim world, thus representing the conflict in
Palestine as only one of many strategic components
designed to support U.S. aggression. As a result, they
argue, one can use the same tactics and strategies
against both. Those who think otherwise are influenced
by a political agenda that ignores the sources of Islam
and the evidence legitimating September 11:
[Y]ou will truly be surprised by those who
rule that the martyrdom operations in Palestine in
which civilians fall victim are among the highest
forms of jihad, and then rule that the martyrdom
operations in America are wrong because of civilian
deaths. This inconsistency is very strange! How can
one permit the killing of the branch and not permit
the killing of the supporting trunk? All who permit
martyrdom operations against the Jews in Palestine
must allow them in America. If not, the inconsistency
leads to nothing but a type of game playing with the
legal ruling.
The hypocrisy and
treachery of the non-violent Salafi scholars is
contrasted with the independence and purity of the
jihadis' intentions. Whereas the reformists are seen as
inspired by political ambition and the interests of the
United States and its Arab allies, the jihadis are
characterized as influenced only by a desire to
implement divine will:
[T]he only motive these young men had was
to defend the religion of Allah, their dignity, and
their honor. It was not done as a service to humanity
or as an attempt to side with Eastern ideologies
opposed to the West. Rather, it was a service to Islam
in defense of its people, a pure act of their will,
done submissively, not grudgingly.17
The 2002 document notes the purity
of the mission with pride. And, in an interesting shift
from earlier denials, al-Qaeda not only accepts its
responsibility for September 11, but claims "that hiding
all trace of the agents of the operation was not
something we considered. Rather, some of the heroes were
intent on leaving Islamic fingerprints on the
operation."
The purity of the jihadis is
contrasted with the corruption of their detractors in an
effort to impugn the reputation, credibility and
persuasive effect of alternative religious
interpretations. As part of the debate over the use of
violence in Islam, the document reflects the Salafi
emphasis on the centrality of reputable scholars capable
of interpreting Islam and providing guidance for others.
Character assassination and charges of deception and
ignorance are devices intended to weaken opposing
arguments.
JUST WAR AND JIHAD
In Islam,
there are two types of external jihad: offensive and
defensive.18 In Islamic jurisprudence, the
offensive jihad functions to promote the spread of
Islam, enlightenment and civility to the dar
al-harb (domain of war). In most contemporary
interpretations, the offensive jihad can only be waged
under the leadership of the caliph (successor to the
prophet). It is tempered by truces and various
reciprocal agreements between the Islamic state and
non-Muslim governments, such as guaranteed freedom of
worship for Muslim minorities. Today, very few Islamists
focus on this form of jihad.
The defensive jihad
(jihad al-dafaa), however, is a widely accepted
concept that is analogous to international norms of
self-defense and Judeo-Christian just-war
theory.19 According to most Islamic scholars,
when an outside force invades Muslim territory, it is
incumbent upon all Muslims to wage jihad to protect the
faith and the faithful. Mutual protection is seen as a
religious obligation intended to ensure the survival of
the global Muslim community. At the root of defensive
jihad is a theological emphasis on justness, as embodied
in chapter 6, verse 151 of the Quran: "Do not slay the
soul sanctified by God except for just cause." Defending
the faith-based community against external aggression is
considered a just cause par excellence.
In the contemporary period, this widely accepted
notion of the defensive jihad was first put to the test
in Afghanistan in the 1980s. After the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a failing communist
government, Islamic scholars throughout the Muslim world
called for jihad. Thousands of Muslim fighters flocked
to Afghanistan to fulfill their religious duty,
supported by Islamic charities, wealthy individuals and
governments in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Pakistan. State leaders and radical Islamists
alike concurred that the jihad was an Islamic duty that
could include fighting, financial support, humanitarian
work or verbal assistance, depending on an individual's
capacities and resources. This broad agreement was
extended to justify support for jihad in other conflicts
as well, including Bosnia and Chechnya.
In a
disturbing confluence of opinion regarding jihad, the
focus on the just nature of defensive war united both
mainstream Islamic scholars and al-Qaeda in opposition
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In a tape
aired by al-Jazeera television on February 11, 2003, as
the U.S.-led coalition built its forces on the borders
of Iraq, Bin Laden continued his call for jihad against
the U.S. "crusaders" and their pending
invasion.20 Only a month later, before the
invasion took place, Islamic scholars at al-Azhar
University (Cairo), the oldest Islamic university in the
world, echoed Bin Laden's sentiments and emphasized the
need for a defensive jihad: "According to Islamic law,
if the enemy steps on Muslims' land, jihad becomes a
duty on every male and female Muslim."21
Although the al-Azhar scholars may have used the term
"jihad" to mean non-violent struggle, the justification
shared al-Qaeda's theological understanding about the
defensive nature of any such jihad.
Consistent
with this understanding, the 2002 document frames
September 11 and other al-Qaeda operations as defensive
measures to protect the Muslim community from outside
aggression. The argument repeats the framing in earlier
al-Qaeda documents and includes a litany of U.S.
aggressions and crimes against Islam: support for Israel
against the Palestinians; support for Serbian genocide
against Bosnian Muslims; support for India against the
Kashmiris; the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; actions in
East Timor; support for the Philippine aggression
against Muslims in the south. The document frames these
examples as indicative of a nefarious "Zionist-Crusader"
plot to annihilate Muslims. Under this assault, al-Qaeda
argues that violence is the only solution: "The only way
to liberation from this humiliation is the sword, which
is the only language the enemy understands that will
deter it." September 11 is thus portrayed as a defensive
response necessary to thwart U.S. aggression against the
Muslim world.
The document also addresses a very
particular criticism of al-Qaeda's war against the
United States. A number of Salafis and Islamists have
argued that, since Muslim governments made treaties and
agreements with the United States and its Western
allies, it is illegal in Islam to wage jihad against
them. This is based, in part, upon a story narrated by
Abdullah bin Amr in which the prophet said, "Whoever
kills a muahid [a treaty partner] shall not smell
the fragrance of Paradise though its fragrance can be
smelt at a distance of forty years (of
traveling)."22 However, in many
interpretations of Islamic law, treaties are revisited
every ten years, and so revisions can be made depending
upon changing conditions, needs or strategies. If the
non-Muslim partner violates the treaty conditions first,
the agreement is voided.
Responding to this line
of argument, al-Qaeda dismisses the premise that the
Muslims ever had viable treaties with the United States.
To some extent, this is based upon the jihadi belief
that governments in Muslim countries are controlled by
apostate regimes and therefore cannot legitimately make
treaties on behalf of Muslims. Such contracts are
therefore null and void.
In addition to this
outright rejection, al-Qaeda evaluates the argument on
its own basis and poses a counterargument. Suppose a
treaty really did exist? Is it still valid? The document
argues that the innumerable acts of U.S. aggression
constitute massive breaches of any hypothetical
agreement. These violations render the "treaty"
meaningless:
Truly, America is not, nor has it ever
been, a land of treaty or alliance. If we were to line
up with the other side and say that it is a land of
peace, we would say that it has turned into a land of
war. That occurred with its violation of the treaty
and its help to the Jews for more than fifty years in
occupying Palestine, banishing its people and killing
them. It is a land of war that violated its treaty
when it attacked and blockaded Iraq, attacked and
blockaded Sudan, attacked and blockaded Afghanistan.
It has oppressed Muslims in every place for decades
and has openly supported their enemies against
them.
For al-Qaeda, there is no
treaty, and the U.S. "atrocities" against Muslims
provide the rationale for a just and defensive jihad.
The argument is rooted in widely accepted Islamic
principles about justice and the legitimacy of a
defensive struggle and therefore appeals to mainstream
understandings about warfare.
RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT AND CIVILIAN TARGETING
Fighting and
killing in the name of Islam are conditional, and there
are important rules of engagement that dictate and limit
targets and tactics. The Prophet Muhammed expended great
energies elaborating what was and was not permissible
during wartime, demonstrating the importance of
restraint and caution on the battlefield. The
prohibitions against killing innocent civilians, in
particular, are numerous, and non-violent Salafis and
others quote a number of hadiths to support their
opposition to the September 11 attacks,
including,
Set out for jihad in the name of Allah and
for the sake of Allah. Do not lay hands on the old
verging on death, on women, children and babes. Do not
steal anything from the booty and collect together all
that falls to your lot in the battlefield and do good,
for Allah loves the virtuous and the
pious.
Many scholars also quote Abu
Bakr, the first caliph or successor to the Prophet
Muhammed. He gave the following instructions to a Muslim
army setting out to battle against the Byzantine Empire
in Syria:
Stop, O people, that I may give you ten
rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not
commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You
must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child,
nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the
trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which
are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save
for your food. You are likely to pass by people who
have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave
them alone.
In his response to the
September 11 attacks, the mufti of Saudi Arabia focused
on the need to be fair and just, quoting an assortment
of Quranic verses prohibiting oppression, such as "O My
servants, indeed I have forbidden oppression upon Myself
and I have also made it forbidden amongst yourselves,
hence to not oppress each other," and "O you who
believe. Be of those who stand up to Allah, as witnesses
of justice. And let not the hatred of a people make you
swerve away from justice toward them. Verily, be just,
and that is closer to piety."23 Qaradawi
builds on such verses as well, highlighting Quran 5, 32:
"Whosoever kills a human being for other than
manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as
if he has killed all mankind, and whosoever saves the
life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of
all mankind."24
Al-Qaeda, however,
disputes the broad prohibition against killing civilians
on two grounds. First, it takes issue with the notion
that those killed in the September 11 attacks were
"innocents" covered by the prophet's prohibitions.
Second, al-Qaeda argues that the prohibition is not an
absolute one and that there are conditions under which
killing civilians becomes permissible. The movement thus
takes on both the theological argument proffered against
the September 11 attacks and reformist framings of the
victims as innocent. The result is a broad set of
conditions that provide religious justification for
killing civilians in almost every possible circumstance.
Only one condition need be met to legitimize an
attack against civilians.
Condition One: The
Norm of Reciprocity
The sources of Islam provide
clear prohibitions against killing civilians, but
al-Qaeda argues for reciprocal attacks. This is
justified with reference to Quran 2, 194: "And one who
attacks you, attack him in like manner as he attacked
you." Thus, if the enemy uses tactics that are
prohibited in Islam, these tactics become legal for the
Muslims. Since the document makes the case that America
has purposely targeted Muslim civilians, it presses
readers to accept the logical conclusion that civilian
targeting, as in September 11, is now legal. This point
is emphasized with particular reference to the
Palestinian struggle:
There currently exists an extermination
effort against the Islamic peoples that has America's
blessing, not just by virtue of its effective
cooperation, but by America's activity. The best
witness to this is what is happening with the full
knowledge of the world in the Palestinian cities of
Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and elsewhere. Every day, all
can follow the atrocious slaughter going on there with
American support that is aimed at children, women and
the elderly. Are Muslims not permitted to respond in
the same way and kill those among the Americans who
are like the Muslims they are killing? Certainly! By
Allah, it is truly a right for Muslims.
For al-Qaeda, the evidence points
to a clear conclusion:
It is allowed for Muslims to kill
protected ones among unbelievers as an act of
reciprocity. If the unbelievers have targeted Muslim
women, children and elderly, it is permissible for
Muslims to respond in kind and kill those similar to
those whom the unbelievers
killed.
Condition Two: Inability
to Distinguish Civilians from Combatants
When
attacking an enemy "stronghold" it may be difficult to
distinguish combatants from non-combatants, particularly
if enemy fighters hide among the general population. The
Arabic term the document uses for "stronghold"
(hisn) has an interesting semantic range in light
of the targets of September 11. It refers to a place
that is immune to attack either because it is well
fortified or because great height makes it
impregnable.25 The connection with the
targets is obvious -- what American sites have been more
clearly associated with fortification and height than
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center? Al-Qaeda argues
that so long as the stronghold is a legitimate target
and enemy fighters are present, Muslims can attack, even
if this means civilian casualties: "It is allowed for
Muslims to kill protected ones among the unbelievers in
the event of an attack against them in which it is not
possible to differentiate the protected ones from the
combatants or from the strongholds." So even if one
grants the argument that there were innocent civilians
in the buildings, which al-Qaeda does not accept, the
buildings can still be attacked.
The document
cites as evidence a story in which Muslims asked about
the offspring and women of unbelievers who stayed behind
with the enemy fighters and were killed. The prophet was
said to reply, "They are from among them." In this
story, the women and children of the enemy preferred to
remain with their men rather than flee to safety. Once
they made that decision, they ceased to be innocents
because they had aligned themselves with the combatants
and were now legitimate targets for the Muslim forces.
The al-Qaeda document suggests that those in the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon should be viewed in the
same way. The distinction between combatants and
civilians is thereby erased since some of the latter
chose to remain in "enemy
territory."
Condition Three: Assistance of
Civilians in "Deed, Word or Mind"
In Islamic law,
the legitimacy of a target in the context of a war is
typically determined by the capacity of that target or
individual to fight against the Muslims. This includes
enemy soldiers and leaders, as well as advisers to the
military and the enemy leadership, including civilian
advisers. The vast majority of civilians, however, are
excluded from target lists because they are not actively
engaged in battle, especially women, children and the
elderly, whose capacity to fight is considered minimal
in most cases.26
Al-Qaeda, however,
broadens the definition of active participation to
include roles that indirectly assist the enemy:
It is allowed for Muslims to kill
protected ones among unbelievers on the condition that
the protected ones have assisted in combat, whether in
deed, word, mind or any other form of assistance,
according to the prophetic command.
This is based upon a story about
Duraid Ibn al-Simma, a well-known Arab poet who strongly
opposed Muhammad and the message of Islam. According to
tradition, he was brought to the battlefield to advise
the Hawazin troops about battle procedures in a conflict
against the Muslims. As a very old man, he posed no
physical threat to the Muslim forces, but the
intelligence he provided to the enemy made him a target
and led to his death in battle.
But al-Qaeda's
use of this story creates an expanded understanding of
combat assistance that includes not only direct support
through physical participation or advice to war
planners, but less direct support as well. From this
perspective, the press and journalists are legitimate
targets because they are American propaganda tools in
the war against al-Qaeda. Academics and intellectuals
working on Islam and/or terrorism can be killed because
their studies and publications help inform government
officials and provide knowledge that can be used against
the Muslims. Employees working in businesses that supply
the government and/or military can be targeted because
they provide equipment and services that support the war
or the leaders waging the campaign.
The breadth
of this category is underscored by al-Qaeda's
understanding of American democracy. It reasons that
since a democratically elected government reflects the
will of the people, a war against Islam of this
magnitude must have popular support. Using the term
"public opinion" (al-ray al-amm) to represent the
will of the people in a democracy, al-Qaeda argues
that,
It is stupidity for a Muslim to think that
the Crusader-Zionist public opinion which backs its
government was waiting for some action from Muslims in
order to support the Crusader war against Islam and
thereby enkindle a spirit of hostility against Islam
and Muslims. The Crusader-Zionist public opinion has
expended all it has in order to stand behind the
nations of the cross, executing their war against
Islam and Muslims from the beginning of the
colonization of Islamic countries until the present
day. If the successive Crusader-Zionist governments
had not received support from their people, their war
against Islam and Muslims would not have taken such an
obvious and conspicuous form. It is something that
would not attain legitimacy except by the voices of
the people.
This reflects the logic
of an earlier fatwa issued by Hammoud al-Uqla al-Shuaybi
just after September 11, which was adopted by the jihadi
Salafis. In the fatwa, al-Shuaybi argues,
[W]e should know that whatever decision
the non-Muslim state, America, takes -- especially
critical decisions which involve war -- it is taken
based on opinion polls and/or voting within the House
of Representatives and Senate, which represent
directly, the exact opinion of the people they
represent -- the people of America -- through their
representatives in the Parliament [Congress]. Based on
this, any American who voted for war is like a
fighter, or at least a supporter.27
Given this perspective, al-Qaeda
scoffs at the notion that those killed in the September
11 attacks, including those in the World Trade Centers
were "innocent civilians." These individuals could be
targeted because they assisted the government in its war
against Muslims by "deed, word or mind." The economic
significance of the towers as sources of revenue for the
government (through taxes or business, for example)
further damned its occupants. This condition is so
expansive as to include virtually any individual in the
United States (or allied countries).
Condition
Four: The Necessity of War
The document argues
that it is permissible to "kill protected ones among the
unbelievers in the event of a need to burn the
strongholds or fields of the enemy so as to weaken its
strength in order to conquer the stronghold or topple
the state." Throughout, al-Qaeda defines the World Trade
Centers as enemy "strongholds," in effect directly
linking the centers to the government and thus to the
"war" against Muslims. In such an interpretation, the
use of flying suicide bombs is equivalent to "burning"
the stronghold.
Condition Five: Heavy
Weaponry
Al-Qaeda uses a story about the prophet
in which he was asked whether the Muslim fighters could
use the catapult against the village of Taif, even
though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian
population. The Arabic term for catapult
(manjaniq) refers to any stone throwing siege
engine. In the early Islamic period and later, such
devices proved quite effective against targets that were
well fortified and difficult to overcome, but they were
inaccurate and imprecise. Taif, located southeast of
Mecca, was taken by Muslim forces in 630 ce. They
resorted to the use of catapults in their assault
because the city was surrounded by a high brick wall.
Al-Qaeda likens the catapult as a heavy weapon to the
planes used in the September 11 attacks. This is also
the religious evidence used by jihadis to rationalize
the acquisition and possible use of weapons of mass
destruction.
Condition Six: Human
Shields
Al-Qaeda argues that it is permissible to
kill women, children and other protected groups if the
enemy uses them as human shields (turs). Although
the religious evidence for this is not outlined in the
document, it seems to derive from a fatwa by the
medieval Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyya that is widely
cited by jihadis:
The Islamic scholars have unanimously
agreed that when the Kafir [unbeliever] takes Muslims
as human shields, and the Muslims fear defeat if they
do not attack, then it becomes permissible to fire,
but we aim at the Kafir. Some scholars have said that
it is permissible to fire even if ceasing fire will
not form any kind of danger to Muslims.28
This understanding is thus rooted
in the consensus of the scholars rather than explicit
textual evidence.
Condition Seven: Violation
of a Treaty
The final condition is when the enemy
violates its treaty with the Muslims. "It is allowed for
Muslims to kill protected ones among unbelievers if the
people of a treaty violate their treaty and the leader
must kill them in order to teach them a lesson. This is
just as the Prophet did among the Bani Qurayza."
According to Islamic tradition, Muhammad made a treaty
with the Qurayza tribe soon after the hijra, or
migration to Medina in 622 CE. It is reported that he
was later persuaded to break that alliance and tear up
the treaty. The Qurayza did not engage in hostile
activity against Muslims but probably negotiated with
the enemy while Medina was under attack. Upon learning
of their betrayal, Muhammad besieged them for 25 days.
When they unconditionally surrendered, their men were
killed and their women and children were sold into
slavery.
The sheer breadth of these conditions
leaves ample theological justification for killing
civilians in almost any imaginable situation. The notion
that civilians become legitimate targets because of
"deed, word, mind or any other form of assistance"
(condition three) is so broad that it encompasses
virtually every American. This is particularly the case
since the document emphasizes the connection between
supportive public opinion in a democracy and the ability
of the government to wage an extended war against
Muslims. And since only one condition need be met to
provide a religious rationale for attack, al-Qaeda
justifies terrorism under an almost inexhaustible array
of possible scenarios and
conditions.
CONCLUSION: ECHOES OF ALGERIA
These justifications echo the rationale used by
jihadi Salafis during the civil war in Algeria, which
could foreshadow the future direction of al-Qaeda
operations. During the conflict between the government
and Islamist rebels, jihadi groups massacred civilians,
assassinated public personalities (including Berber
singers, feminist leaders and academics), and targeted
members of the press. Between 1996 and 1998, civilians
were killed en masse in a directed and purposeful
strategy of total war that eventually claimed more than
150,000 lives (mostly civilians). The rationale used to
justify these killings represents a chilling precursor
to the 2002 al-Qaeda document.
As in the
al-Qaeda justification, the jihadis in Algeria broadened
the understanding of combat to include any individual or
group seen as complicit in the regime's
counterinsurgency efforts against the Islamists. In an
interview with al-Djamaa, which claimed to
represent the "official voice of the GIA in the West,"
GIA chief Abu al-Moudhir argued that civilians who
fought against the jihad by "force, talk or with the
pen" were legitimate targets,29 reflecting a
doctrine of total war. As a GIA communiqué put it,
"There is no neutrality in the war we are waging. With
the exception of those who are with us, all others are
apostates and deserve to die."30
This
Manichaean worldview condemned broad swathes of the
civilian population to death. Reporters and the press
were attacked as extensions of the regime used to "cover
its crimes and rationalize its aggression."31
The jihadis supported killing those "who do not pray,
who drink alcohol and take drugs, homosexuals, and
immodest or debauched women."32 Seven
Trappist monks were beheaded for "mixing with [the
Algerian people], living with them, and blocking the way
of Allah by calling people to Christianity, and these
are the worst ways of fighting the religion of Allah and
Muslims."33 Even children attending
government-controlled schools were not immune to
violence.34 The scope of the violence was
startling, and no quarter of society was immune from
attack.
Given the stark parallels between the
justifications for killing civilians in Algeria and the
2002 al-Qaeda document, the Algerian conflict may
portend the future direction of al-Qaeda operations.
Algerian jihadis attacked civilians with machetes,
burned people alive, and slit throats in a brutal
violence rationalized through broad categorization of
legitimate civilian targets. The murder of reporter
Daniel Pearl, whose throat was slit by al-Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan, mirrors the brutality of the
Algerian campaign. Al-Qaeda has thus far relied mostly
on bombs and planes, but it is clear from the 2002
document that the echoes of Algeria could become louder
as the jihadis continue to expand their war against U.S.
civilians.
1 Address to a Joint
Session of Congress and the American People, September
20, 2001. Available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
2 See www.unc.edu/~kurzman/terror.htm for
a listing with sources. In the following quotes, the
original sources are cited.
3
http://saudiembassy.net/press_release/01-spa/09-15-Islam.htm.
4
Agence France Presse, September 14,
2001.
5
http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2001-09/13/article25.shtml.
6
MSANews, September 14, 2001,
http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/200109/20010917.15.html;
Arabic original in al-Quds al-Arabi (London),
September 14, 2001, p. 2,
http://www.alquds.co.uk/Alquds/2001/09Sep/14%20Sep%20Fri/Quds02.pdf.
7
Although al-Qaeda's main website was shut down after
September 11, it was subsequently hosted at various
alternative sites, including one run by The Center for
Islamic Studies and Research (markaz al-dirasat
wal-buhuth al-islamiyyah), which posted the al-Qaeda
statement. We would like to thank Paul Eedle for
bringing the document to our attention.
8
See Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat:
Transnational Salafis and Jihad," Middle East
Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 18-38, and
The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the
Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan
(Albany: State University of New York Press,
2001).
9 Wiktorowicz's interviews with
Salafis in Jordan from 1996-1997 and a phone
conversation with the president of the Quran and Sunna
Society of North America (a U.S.-based Salafi
organization), February 18, 2002. After Michael Doran
published "Somebody Else's Civil War" in Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1, January/February 2002, pp.
22-42, he received an onslaught of complaints from
non-violent Salafis for his characterization of al-Qaeda
as part of the Salafi movement (Wiktorowicz's
conversation with Doran, December 2002).
10 See, for example, Fawaz Gerges, "The
Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt,"
Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp.
113-125.
11 See Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The
GIA and GSPC in Algeria," In the Service of al-Qaeda:
Radical Islamic Movements, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New
York: Hurst Publishers and New York University Press,
forthcoming).
12 Dale F. Eickelman and
James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996).
13 See,
for example, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow,
"Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment," Annual Reviews in Sociology, No. 26,
2000, pp. 611-639.
14 United States
District Court vs. Usama Bin Laden et al.,
2001.
15 Wiktorowicz's interview with
Salim al-Hilali, Amman, Jordan, April 2,
1997.
16 Many leading Islamic figures who
condemned the attacks in New York and Washington have
lent their support to Hamas attacks in the Palestinian
territories, including well-known scholars such as
Qaradawi.
17 This characterization was
repeated by Bin Laden in a tape aired on al-Jazeera
television prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Perhaps addressing charges that al-Qaeda is linked to
Saddam Hussein, he emphasizes that the mujahidin must
fight "for the sake of the one God" and that "fighting
in support of the non-Islamic banners [ethnicity,
nation, etc.] is forbidden. Muslims' doctrine and banner
should be clear in fighting for the sake of God. He who
fights to raise the word of God will fight for God's
sake." An English translation of the tape is available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2middle_east/2751019.stm.
18 In addition to the external jihad,
there is the inner jihad or struggle against the ego
(jihad al-nafs). The prophet referred to the
latter as the "greater jihad."
19 See, for
example, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds.,
Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic
Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and
James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western
and Islamic Traditions (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997).
20
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2middle_east/2751019.stm.
21
The Washington Post, March 10,
2003.
22 Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 9,
Book 83, No. 49.
23 Official statement by
Abdul Aziz al-Alshaykh, mufti of Saudi Arabia, posted at
www.fatwa-online.com/news/0010917.htm.
24
See
www.islamonline.net/English/News/2001-09/13/article25.shtml.
25
See Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English
Lexicon (8 vols; London: Williams & Norgate,
1863-1893; repr., Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1980), pp.
2, 586.
26 There are, of course,
exceptions to this. Radical Islamists often argue that
Israeli women, for example, are legitimate targets
because they serve in the military.
27 An
English translation of the fatwa was posted at
www.azzam.com after September 11. The fatwa was
dismissed by reformist Salafis in Saudi Arabia. The
Council of Ulama argued that the statement was "not
worth adhering to." The council also contested Shuaybi's
authority to issue fatwas. See
www.fatwa-online.com/news/0011017_1.htm.
28
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmua al Fatawa,
28/537.
29 AFP, August 7,
1997.
30 AFP, January 21, 1997, in
FBIS-NES-97-013.
31 Armed Islamic Group
communiqué, issued January 16, 1995.
32
Al-Majallah, March 14-20, 1999, pp. 21-22, in
FBIS-NES-1999-0323.
33 Armed Islamic Group
communiqué, issued April 18, 1996.
34 See,
for example, AFP, September 21, 1994, in
FBIS-NES-94-184. |
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